Countering insurgency

The Baloch insurgency has once again ignited a fierce debate on counterinsurgency (COIN) strategies, with Pakistan’s security institutions advocating forceful suppression while intellectuals and political leaders stress political resolution. This divergence of opinion reflects historical precedents and contemporary research, including the frequently misinterpreted RAND Corporation report Paths to Victory. Contrary to the prevailing belief that brute force ensures success, the study, which analyzed 71 insurgencies from World War II to 2010, underscores the importance of a multidimensional approach. The key factors in successful COIN operations include cutting off material support to insurgents, maintaining unwavering commitment, and adapting to evolving strategies. However, Pakistan’s historical reliance on sheer military strength, as seen in the 1972-78 Baloch insurgency, has failed to deliver long-term stability, highlighting the necessity of governance reforms and public trust-building.

The article analyzes ineffective COIN strategies such as collective punishment, repression, and arbitrary governance, arguing that insurgencies often persist when ruling elites prolong conflicts for vested interests. The study’s observations into Pakistan’s 1971 loss in East Pakistan—denial of a political mandate and excessive force that acts as cautionary lessons. Despite the military suppression of the Baloch insurgency, the insurgents adapted by establishing bases across borders, sustaining prolonged unrest. Historical patterns suggest that counterinsurgency victories hinge not merely on military dominance but on governance, legitimacy, and democracy. In 36 out of 71 cases, COIN forces failed due to neglecting post-conflict governance, while 26 out of 30 campaigns without democratic transitions ended in failure. Pakistan’s approach in Balochistan must, therefore, transcend brute force, emphasizing reconciliation, development, and inclusive governance to achieve lasting peace.

Overview:

The article critically examines counterinsurgency strategies in Pakistan, particularly concerning the Baloch insurgency, while referencing global best practices. It challenges the “crush them” narrative by citing empirical research that underscores the necessity of governance, legitimacy, and adaptability in COIN operations. The failure of past approaches, such as in East Pakistan and Balochistan (1972-78), highlights the need for political solutions alongside security measures. The article also exposes how misinterpretation of research influences policymaking, stressing that sustainable peace can only be achieved through governance reforms and public trust-building.

NOTES:

This article provides intuitions into the interplay between military strategy, governance, and insurgency persistence. The RAND study’s findings demonstrate that force alone cannot resolve conflicts, reinforcing the importance of comprehensive counterinsurgency measures. The historical context of East Pakistan and Balochistan gives lessons on the consequences of ignoring political grievances. Candidates should focus on how successful COIN strategies integrate security efforts with socio-political reforms. Additionally, the discussion on external support for insurgencies highlights the regional security dynamics affecting Pakistan.

Relevant CSS Syllabus Topics:

• Pakistan Affairs – Insurgency in Balochistan, national security challenges, historical conflicts (East Pakistan 1971)
• International Relations – Regional security, cross-border insurgencies, external influences on domestic conflicts
• Political Science – Governance, legitimacy, and democracy in counterinsurgency strategies

Notes for Beginners:

Counterinsurgency refers to the efforts made by a government to suppress or manage an armed rebellion. The article explains that relying solely on military force often fails in the long run, as seen in Pakistan’s history with the Baloch and Bengali uprisings. Instead, successful COIN strategies include cutting off insurgents’ resources, maintaining public trust, and adapting strategies to changing situations. For instance, in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), excessive military force without addressing political demands led to Pakistan’s loss in 1971. Similarly, in Balochistan, military victories have not prevented long-term unrest. The key lesson is that sustainable peace requires not just military action but also governance, fairness, and development.

Facts and Figures:

• The RAND Corporation study analyzed 71 insurgencies from World War II to 2010, revealing that pure military suppression is rarely successful.
• The median duration of an insurgency is 118 months (9.8 years), while the average duration is 128 months (10.6 years).
• The shortest insurgency lasted 9 months (Bangladesh, 1971), whereas the longest persisted for 35 years (Guatemala, 1960-1996).
• In 36 out of 71 cases, COIN forces failed due to lack of legitimacy and governance reforms.
• 26 out of 30 COIN campaigns without a democratic transition ended in failure.

To sum up, The article works as a reminder that counterinsurgency is not just a military challenge but a political one. While Pakistan’s security institutions emphasize force, historical evidence and global research indicate that a sustainable solution lies in governance, legitimacy, and adaptability. The misinterpretation of research to justify force-based policies risks prolonging conflicts rather than resolving them. If Pakistan aims for lasting stability in Balochistan, it must move beyond military suppression and engage in meaningful political and socio-economic reforms. The lesson from history is clear: wars may end on the battlefield, but peace is won through governance and trust.

Difficult Words and Meanings:

• Insurgency – A rebellion or uprising against an established authority (Syn: rebellion, uprising; Ant: compliance, obedience)
• COIN (Counterinsurgency) – Military and political strategy to combat insurgencies (Syn: counter-rebellion, anti-insurgency; Ant: insurgent support)
• Empirical – Based on observation or experience rather than theory (Syn: observational, factual; Ant: theoretical, hypothetical)
• Legitimacy – The recognized right to govern (Syn: validity, authority; Ant: illegitimacy, unlawfulness)
• Repression – The act of subduing someone by force (Syn: suppression, oppression; Ant: liberation, freedom)