

THIRD EDITION



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HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF  
**PAKISTAN**

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SHAHID JAVED BURKI

# Historical Dictionary of Pakistan

*Third Edition*

Shahid Javed Burki



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For Emaad and Saira  
Sairah and Houtan

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## Editor's Foreword

Since its hasty and messy creation in 1947, Pakistan has repeatedly been in the world news. It has experienced more turbulent internal events and been involved in more dramatic external ventures than most countries. These include partition, wars, coups, the Afghan resistance, internal dissension, and terrorism, as well as a recent deadly earthquake. Nevertheless, it has remained manageable and even made progress, including with its economy, which has grown faster than most. Given its size and location, Pakistan still plays an important role in the region, and what happens there is significant for the world arena. Despite the intensive—if sporadic—media coverage, Pakistan is only superficially known outside its borders.

These facts enhance the value of this updated and substantially expanded third edition of *Historical Dictionary of Pakistan*. Covering the past as well as the present and looking at ordinary aspects as well as the sensational, it gives us much of the indispensable background that is missing in the day-to-day coverage. It reaches back into history to explain how and why Pakistan was founded; it sheds light on the political system and the economy; it provides insight into social, cultural, and religious factors; and it tells us about the often imposing figures who have led the country. This is done through concise but informative entries in the dictionary, which are placed in context by an extensive chronology and an overarching introduction. Those who want to know more can consult the bibliography.

Shahid Javed Burki, who wrote this third edition and also the two previous editions, is a rather special expert on Pakistani affairs. He is not an academic like most of our authors, but is an economist. He held a number of posts in the Pakistani administration, including chief economist for the government of West Pakistan and economic advisor to the Ministry of Commerce. He subsequently joined the World Bank where he was, among other positions, vice president for the Latin America and

Caribbean Region and from which he retired recently. There was a short but significant interruption in his career with the World Bank in 1997 and 1998 when Dr. Burki returned to Pakistan to serve as minister in charge of finance planning and economic affairs in the interim government. He is the author of other writings on Pakistan, with several fine books to his name.

Jon Woronoff  
Series Editor

## Acknowledgments

This is the third edition of the dictionary. In preparing this edition, I have added a number of entries on what I call the “Muslimization” and “Islamization” of Pakistani society. It is because of these developments that Pakistan has come to be closely associated in the Western mind with Islamic extremism and also with the exploits of al Qaeda and other extremist groups. These developments and perceptions are reflected in a number of entries.

This edition was prepared as I entered retirement, having left the World Bank a few years ago. Most of the work on it was done at home but with the help of my assistant Virginia Baker, who worked hard to understand not only Pakistani names but also the history of the country. I am greatly indebted to her for her help.

I am also indebted to Mehrukh Burki, my niece, who carefully read all the entries and removed ambiguities whenever they occurred. Without her assistance it would have been difficult to put this work together in a relatively short period of time. Ali Burki, my nephew, also researched some of the new entries.

Finally, I want to thank my wife, Jahanara Burki, for her willingness to have me disappear into my basement and spend long hours completing this work.



## Reader's Note

There is no standard way of spelling Pakistani names. I have tried to use the most common spelling, which is why Muhammad is spelled the way it is and not as Mohammad or Mohammed. Some of the entries appear under first names since that is the way these people are generally recognized in Pakistan as well as by the Pakistani scholars. Accordingly, Imran Khan is listed under Imran, not under Khan.

Cross references are indicated by the use of bold type at the first mention of a name or term in an entry.

## Acronyms and Abbreviations


ADB	Asian Development Bank
ADBP	Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan
ADF	Asian Development Fund
AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
AIML	All-India Muslim League
AJP	Awami Jamoohri Party
AL	Awami League
AML	Awami Muslim League
ANP	Awami National Party
APEC	Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
APHC	All Parties Hurriyat Conference
APMSO	All-Pakistan Muhajir Students Organization
APPNA	Association of Pakistani Physicians in North America
APSENA	Association of Pakistani Scientists and Engineers in North America
APWA	All-Pakistan Women's Association
BCCI	Bank of Credit and Commerce International
BCCP	Board of Cricket Control of Pakistan
BDs	Basic Democracies
BJP	Bharatiya Janata Party
BLLF	Bonded Labor Liberation Front
BSFF	Baluchistan-Sindh-Frontier Front
CCI	Council for Common Interests
CDA	Capital Development Authority
CDNS	Council for Defense and National Security
CENTO	Central Treaty Organization
CMLA	Chief Martial Law Administrator
COAS	Chief of Army Staff
COP	Combined Opposition Party

CRBC	Chasma Right Bank Canal
CSP	Civil Service of Pakistan
CTBT	Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
DAC	Democratic Action Committee
DCMLA	Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrator
DOD	Debt Outstanding and Disbursed
DSR	Debt Service Ratio
ECC	Economic Committee of the Cabinet
ECO	Economic Cooperation Organization
EME	Electrical and Mechanical Corps
ERRA	Earthquake Relief and Rehabilitation Authority
FMS	Foreign Military Sales
FPA	Family Planning Association
FSF	Federal Security Force
GAVI	Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GHQ	General Headquarters of the Army
GNP	Gross National Product
GST	General Sales Tax
HDI	Human Development Index
HJ	Hilal-e-Jurat
IAEC	International Atomic Energy Commission
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICP	Investment Corporation of Pakistan
ICS	Indian Civil Service
IDA	International Development Association
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
IDBP	Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan
IDG	Independent Democratic Group
IFC	International Finance Corporation
IFFI	International Finance Facility for Immunizations
IJI	Islami Jamhuri Itihad
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMFESAF	International Monetary Fund's Extended Structural Adjustment Facility
INLF	Islamic National Labor Force

ISI	Interservices Intelligence
JI	Jamaat-e-Islami
JML	Jinnah Muslim League
JUH	Jamiatul-Ulemai-Hind
JUI	Jamiatul-Ulemai-Islam
JUP	Jamiatul-Uleami-Pakistan
KDA	Karachi Development Authority
KK	Khudai Khidmatgars
KMC	Karachi Municipal Corporation
KSE-100	Karachi Stock Exchange Index
LFO	Legal Framework Order
LIT	Lahore Improvement Trust
LUMS	Lahore University of Management Sciences
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MIGA	Multilateral Investment Guarantee Association
MMA	Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal
MQM	Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz
MRD	Movement for the Restoration of Democracy
MSM	Muttahida Shariat Mahaz
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NAP	National Awami Party
NCA	National Commission on Agriculture
NDC	National Defense College
NDFC	National Development Finance Corporation
NDP	National Democratic Party
NGOs	Non-governmental Organizations
NICFC	National Industrial Cooperative Finance Corporation
NIT	National Investment Trust
NLC	National Logistics Cell
NPP	National People's Party
NPT	Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
NSC	National Security Council
NU	Nasawat at Ulema
NVM	National Volunteer Movement
NWFP	Northwest Frontier Province
OGDC	Oil and Gas Development Corporation
OIC	Organization of the Islamic Conference
OML	Official Muslim League

OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
OPI	Overseas Pakistanis Institute
PAEC	Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission
PAI	Pakistani Awami Itihad
PBC	Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation
PDA	Pakistan Democratic Alliance
PDF	Pakistan Development Forum
PDM	Pakistan Democratic Movement
PDP	Pakistan Democratic Party
PIA	Pakistan International Airlines
PICIC	Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation
PIDC	Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation
PMA	Pakistan Military Academy
PMEB	Pakistan Madrassa Education Board
PMKP	Pakistan Mazdoor Kissan Party
PML	Pakistan Muslim League
PNA	Pakistan National Alliance
PNP	Pakistan National Party
PPL	Progressive Papers Limited
PPP	Pakistan People's Party
PPPP	Pakistan People's Party Parliamentarians
PSM	Pakistan Steel Mills
PTC	Pakistan Television Corporation
PTCL	Pakistan Telecommunications Corporation Limited
PUQJ	Pushtoon Ulasi Qaumi Jirga
QMA	Qaumi Mahaz-i-Azadi
QML	Quayyum Muslim League
QU	Quaid-e-Azam University
RCD	Regional Cooperation for Development
RCO	Revival of the Constitution 1973 Order
RTC	Resolution Trust Corporation
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SAFTA	South Asia Free Trade Area
SAP	Social Action Program
SAPTA	South Asian Preferential Trading Area
SCARP	Salinity Control and Reclamation Project
SCCP	State Cement Corporation of Pakistan

SEATO	South-East Asia Treaty Organization
SNG	Sui Northern Gas
SNSF	Sind National Students Federation
SPAWA	Sindh Punjab Abadgar Welfare Association
SSI	Small-Scale Industry
T & T	Telephone and Telegraph Department
TCWR	Technical Committee on Water Resources
TFR	Total Fertility Rate
TI	Tehrik-e-Istiqlal
TNSM	Tanzim Nifaz Shariat-I-Muhammadi
UBL	United Bank Limited
UF	United Front
UFLA	United Front of Leftist Alliance
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNEP	United Nations Environment Program
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WAF	Women's Action Forum
WAPDA	Water and Power Development Authority
WFTU	World Federation of Trade Unions
WTO	World Trade Organization
YMCA	Young Men's Christian Association



## Chronology

**712** Muhammad Ibn Qasim, an Arab general, conquered the province of Sindh and incorporated it into the Umayyad caliphate.

**977** Ibn Shayban, another general from the Arab world, was sent to add more territory to the province of Sindh. He conquered the city of Multan in the province of Punjab.

**1001** Mahmud of Ghazni, an Afghan general, began to mount expeditions into northwestern India.

**1026** Mahmud of Ghazni raided the temple of Somnath in Kathiawar, west India.

**1175** Shahabuddin Muhammad of Ghauri, an Afghan warlord, attacked and conquered Multan.

**1192** Ghauri conquered Delhi and established Muslim rule over north India.

**1206** Qutubuddin Aibak established the Slave dynasty.

**1290** Jalaluddin Khilji established the Khilji dynasty.

**1320** The Tughluqs came to India and established their dynasty.

**1414** The Tughluq dynasty was defeated by the Sayyids, who founded their dynasty.

**1450** The Sayyids were defeated by the Lodis, who founded their dynasty.

**1526** Babar, a Mughul general, defeated Ibrahim Lodi, the sultan of Delhi at Panipat, a battlefield north of Delhi.

**1530** Babar, the first Mughul emperor of India, died and was succeeded by his son, Humayun.



**1540** Humayun was defeated by Sher Khan, a Pathan general, in the battle of Kanauj. Humayun took refuge in Afghanistan.

**1555** Humayun regained his throne with the help of the Afghans by defeating Sikander Surs, the governor of Punjab, and recapturing Delhi.

**1556** Humayun died in Delhi and was succeeded by Akbar, who became the third Mughul emperor of India.

**1581** Akbar proclaimed a new religion, the Din Ilhai, aimed at incorporating India's two major religions, Hinduism and Islam.

**1605** Akbar died and was succeeded by his son Jehangir.

**1627** Jehangir died and was succeeded by his son Shah Jehan as the fifth Mughul emperor of India.

**1659** Shah Jehan's reign was cut short by his son, Aurangzeb, who after incarcerating his father, ascended the throne as the sixth Mughul emperor of India.

**1668** Shah Jehan died in captivity.

**1707** Aurangzeb, the last of the great Mughul emperors of India, died.

**1757** Nawab Sirajuddaula of Bengal was defeated by the British (East India Company) at the battle of Plassey.

**1774** Warren Hastings was appointed governor-general of British India.

**1784** The British Parliament passed William Pitt's India Act regulating the powers of the governor-general.

**1785** Lord Charles Cornwallis was appointed governor-general of India.

**1793** Permanent Settlement was introduced by Lord Cornwallis, granting proprietary rights to *Zamindars* (landlords).

**1798** Lord Richard Colley Wellesley was appointed governor-general of India.

**1799** Tippu Sultan, the Muslim raja of Mysore, was killed before the walls of Seringapatan in an encounter with Lord Wellesley's British Indian Army.

- 1807** Lord Earl Minto was appointed governor-general of India.
- 1809** The British government in India signed the Treaty of Amritsar with Raja Ranjit Singh of Punjab, establishing the Sutlej River as the boundary between the Sikh state in the Punjab and the British Indian territories.
- 1848** Lord John Dalhousie was appointed governor-general of India.
- 1849** The province of Punjab was annexed by the British.
- 1857** **10 May:** The Sepoy Mutiny broke out in Meerut. **8 July:** Delhi, the seat of the Mughul empire in India, was captured by the British from the mutineers and Emperor Bahadur Shah II was arrested and deported. **14 September:** Lord Charles Canning, the governor-general of India, proclaimed the end of the mutiny and restoration of peace. The East India Company was liquidated and the monarch of Great Britain assumed sovereignty over all territories controlled by the company.
- 1878** The Treaty of Gandinak was signed between British India and Afghanistan.
- 1893** A line indicating the boundary between Afghanistan and British India was drawn. The boundary became known as the Durand Line.
- 1899** George Nathaniel, Lord Curzon, was appointed viceroy of India.
- 1901** The Punjab Alienation Act was passed by the viceroy, Lord Curzon.
- 1902** The Indian Army was reorganized by Lord Kitchener.
- 1905** The province of Bengal was partitioned on religious grounds with East Bengal becoming a predominantly Muslim province of British India. Lord Minto was appointed viceroy of India to succeed Lord Curzon.
- 1906** **30 December:** The Muslim League was founded by Nawab Viqar ul-Mulk of Dacca.
- 1909** The Muslim community was granted separate representation in provincial legislatures under the Minto-Morley reforms.
- 1913** Muhammad Ali Jinnah joined the All-India Muslim League.

**1916 31 December:** An agreement was reached between the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League to work together for achieving self-government for India on the basis of separate electorates for Muslims and non-Muslims. The agreement came to be known as the Lucknow Pact.

**1917 20 August:** Edwin Montagu, the secretary of state for India, declared that “the policy of His Majesty’s Government was that of the increasing association of Indians in every branch of administration and the gradual development of self-government institutions with a view to the progressive realization of responsible government in India as an equal part of the British Empire.”

**1919** The Government of India Act, 1919, was passed by the British Parliament to allow greater association of Indians in the administration of India. **13 April:** Police opened fire at a public meeting in Amritsar, killing and wounding hundreds of people.

**1921** The Treaty of Friendship was signed between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, the first formal agreement between the Soviets and a foreign country.

**1935** The British Parliament passed a new Government of India Act, which effected important changes in the political and administrative system in the country.

**1936** Lord Linlithgow was appointed viceroy of India.

**1939** Elections were held in the provinces of British India under the Government of India Act, 1935.

**1940 23 March:** The All-India Muslim League passed the “Pakistan Resolution” demanding the creation of an independent country for the Muslims of British India. The resolution was passed in a meeting held in Lahore with Muhammad Ali Jinnah in the chair.

**1941** The Jamaat-e-Islami was founded by Maulana Maududi.

**1945** The Jamiatul-Ulemai-Islam (JUI) was founded by a group of Deobandi Ulema.

**1946 19 February:** The British government announced the decision to send a cabinet mission to India to arrange for the transfer of power to

the Indians. **24 March:** The cabinet mission arrived in New Delhi. **16 May:** The cabinet mission announced their plan to transfer power to Indians. **4 June:** Indians serving in the British Indian Navy mutinied in Bombay. **6 June:** The cabinet mission plan was accepted by the All-India Muslim League. **16 June:** The cabinet mission and the viceroy, Lord Wavell, announced their proposal to form an Interim Government. **16 August:** The Muslim League observed “Direct Action Day.” Widespread communal riots occurred in many parts of India. Hundreds of people were killed. Bengal was the most seriously affected province. **2 September:** Jawaharlal Nehru was sworn in as prime minister of the Interim Government. **26 October:** The All-India Muslim League joined the Interim Government, with Liaqat Ali Khan assuming the portfolio of finance.

**1947 20 February:** Lord Mountbatten was appointed viceroy of India. **2 March:** Sirdar Khizar Hayat Tiwana resigned as the chief minister of Punjab. **8 March:** The Indian National Congress passed a resolution demanding the partition of Punjab. **3 June:** The plan to transfer power to two independent states, India and Pakistan, was announced by the viceroy, Lord Mountbatten. **14 August:** The predominantly Muslim provinces of Punjab, the Northwest Frontier, Sindh in the west, and East Bengal in the east of British India were separated to form the independent state of Pakistan. Muhammad Ali Jinnah was sworn in as the first governor-general of Pakistan. Jinnah invited Liaqat Ali Khan to form a cabinet and become Pakistan’s first prime minister. **22 October:** Tribesmen from the northwest districts of Pakistan invaded the State of Kashmir. **26 October:** The state of Kashmir acceded to India.

**1948 11 September:** Governor-general Muhammad Ali Jinnah died in Karachi. **12 September:** Khawaja Nazimuddin was appointed the second governor-general of Pakistan.

**1949 18 September:** Pakistan decided not to devalue its currency with respect to the U.S. dollar, thus changing the rate of exchange with India. **19 October:** Khan of Mamdot was dismissed from the chief ministership of Punjab.

**1950 7 September:** The Basic Principles Committee of the Constituent Assembly presented its report on the constitution.

**1951 5 January:** General Muhammad Ayub Khan was appointed commander-in-chief of the Pakistan army. **14 February:** Elections were held in the province of Punjab for the first time after independence. **23 February:** A conspiracy, spearheaded by Major General Akbar Khan to oust General Ayub Khan as the army chief and overthrow the civilian government, was revealed. **16 October:** Liaquat Ali Khan, Pakistan's first prime minister, was assassinated while addressing a public meeting in Company Bagh, a public park in Rawalpindi.

**1952 21 February:** Thirty-six students were killed in a riot protesting the rejection of Bengali as one of Pakistan's national languages.

**1953 6 March:** Following widespread rioting against the Ahmadiya community, the province of Punjab was placed under military rule. General Azam Khan was appointed martial-law administrator. **23 March:** Chief Minister of Punjab Mumtaz Daultana resigned. He was succeeded by Feroze Khan Noon. **17 April:** Khawaja Nazimuddin, Pakistan's second prime minister, was dismissed from office by Governor-General Ghulam Muhammad. **17 October:** Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra was elected president of the Pakistan Muslim League by 300 votes against 14 for his opponent, Qazi Muhammad Isa, former ambassador to Brazil and leader of the Muslim League in Balochistan. **2 November:** The Constituent Assembly resolved that Pakistan should be made an "Islamic republic."

**1954 25 February:** U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower approved a military arms agreement with Pakistan. **5 March:** Pakistan joined the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). **19 March:** East Pakistan election results were announced. The Muslim League suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of the United Front. **26 March:** Abdul Kasem Fazlul Haq, one of the leaders of the United Front coalition of East Pakistan, formed a new government in Dacca. **2 April:** Pakistan concluded a five-year mutual defense agreement with Turkey. **19 May:** Pakistan and the United States signed the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement. Under this agreement, the United States would give material and technical military assistance to Pakistan. **30 May:** Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra dismissed East Bengal's chief minister Fazlul Haq for "treasonable activities." Iskander Mirza, federal defense secretary, was appointed to administer the province as governor. **7 June:** Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra inaugurated the first flight of the govern-

ment-owned Pakistan International Airlines. **16 June:** The princely states of Kalat, Lasbela, Makran, and Kharam were merged with the province of Balochistan. **22 September:** The Constituent Assembly adopted four amendments to the Government of India Act of 1935 (under which Pakistan was governed pending adoption of a constitution), sharply curtailing the powers of the governor-general. **24 October:** In a nationwide broadcast, Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra announced that elections would be held as soon as possible, and that the new representatives of the people would have a fresh mandate to frame a constitution. Governor-General Ghulam Muhammad declared a state of emergency, dissolved the Constituent Assembly and asked Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra to reconstitute the cabinet. General Ayub Khan joined the “Cabinet of Talent” as defense minister. **28 October:** Dr. Khan Sahib, leader of the Khudai Khidmatgar (Servants of God) in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), was sworn in as the ninth member of the new cabinet, and was assigned the portfolio of Refugee Rehabilitation and Kashmir Affairs. **2 November:** The central government took over the administration of Bahawalpur State. The state cabinet was dismissed and the state Parliament dissolved on charges of “maladministration and inefficiency.” **8 November:** The Sindh Provincial Cabinet of Abdus Sattar Pirzada was dismissed on charges of maladministration. Pirzada said dismissal resulted from his opposition to the governor-general’s projected plan of merging the whole of West Pakistan into a single unit. **9 November:** Muhammad Ayub Khuhro was sworn in as chief minister of Sindh province. **20 November:** The Central Government completed plans to dissolve all provincial and state governments in West Pakistan and assumed direct control of the area through the appointment of chief commissioners responsible to it. **20 December:** Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardhy, leader of the Awami Muslim League, was sworn in as minister of law, and said that he would begin drafting a constitution.

**1955** **19 January:** The Cabinet unanimously approved Pakistan’s participation in the Southeast Asian Defense alliance. **25 March:** The Supreme Court, in *Tamizuddin Khan vs. the Government of Pakistan*, upheld the constitutionality of the governor-general’s action terminating the Constituent Assembly. **30 September:** West Pakistan’s four provinces were merged to form the single administrative unit of West Pakistan.

**1956 2 March:** Pakistan's first constitution came into effect. **8 September:** Chaudhri Muhammad Ali resigned as prime minister. **10 September:** Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardhy was sworn in as prime minister.

**1957 14 October:** Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardhy resigned as prime minister and was succeeded by Firoze Khan Noon, who formed a Republican Party ministry.

**1958 17 May:** The government gave formal endorsement to the First Five Year Plan (1955–60), two years after a draft of the plan had been released. **7 October:** President Iskander Mirza imposed martial law, dissolved all legislative assemblies, dismissed Prime Minister Firoze Khan Noon and appointed Commander-in-Chief Ayub Khan as chief martial-law administrator. **27 October:** President Iskander Mirza was removed from office and General Ayub Khan assumed the presidency.

**1959 24 January:** Land reforms were announced by President Ayub Khan, under which no person could own or possess more than 500 acres of irrigated land, or 1,000 acres of unirrigated land.

**1960 1 July** The Second Five Year Plan (1960–65) was launched. **19 September:** The Indus Waters Treaty was signed in Karachi by Jawaharlal Nehru, prime minister of India, and Muhammad Ayub Khan, president of Pakistan. **25 September:** Former Prime Minister Chundrigar died in London. **26 October:** The cabinet approved the master plan for Islamabad, the new capital of Pakistan.

**1961 2 March:** The Muslim Family Laws Ordinance was introduced. **13 July:** In Washington, President Ayub Khan of Pakistan and President John F. Kennedy of the United States signed a joint communiqué, ensuring close cooperation between the two countries.

**1962 23 March:** A new constitution was introduced, with extensive powers given to the president. Ayub Khan was sworn in as the president under the constitution. **25 September:** Leaders of the National Awami Party, Jamaat-e-Islami, Nizam-i-Islam, and a portion of the Muslim League decided to revive the defunct National Democratic Party under the leadership of former Prime Minister Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardhy. **18 October:** Former Foreign Minister Manzur Qadir was sworn in as the chief justice of West Pakistan High Court. **25 October:** Abdul Monem Khan was appointed governor of East Pakistan in place of Ghu-

lam Farouque. **14 December:** President Ayub Khan appointed Muhammad Shoaib as finance minister, Khurshid Ahmad as minister of law, and Rana Abdul Hamid as minister of health, labor, and social welfare. Muhammad Munir (law) and Abdul Qadir (finance) resigned from the Cabinet. **28 December:** Pakistan and China announced “complete agreement in principle” on the alignment of their Himalayan border.

**1963** **23 January:** Foreign Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra died of heart failure in Dacca. **16 February:** Minister of Industries Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was appointed minister of foreign affairs. **2 March:** A border agreement between Pakistan and China was signed in Peking between Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Marshal Chen Yi, vice premier and foreign minister of China. **12 April:** The Aid-to-Pakistan Consortium meeting in Paris endorsed an aid package of \$500 million for the fourth year of the Second Five Year Plan. **22 May:** President Ayub Khan joined the Muslim League as the party’s president. **19 August:** The speaker of the National Assembly, Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan, died. **27 September:** The National Shipping Corporation was established under government control to build or charter ships to supplement the Pakistani fleet. The corporation was to operate on local and international routes. **25 October:** The first group of government employees moved from Karachi to Islamabad, the new capital of Pakistan. **5 December:** Former Prime Minister Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy died of a heart attack in Beirut, Lebanon. **25 December:** The National Assembly approved the Fundamental Rights Bill, which amended the 1962 Constitution, making civil rights enforceable in the courts.

**1964** **6 January:** The government declared Jamaat-e-Islami an illegal organization and banned all its activities. Maulana Abul Ala Maududi (the party’s leader) and 16 other members of the executive committee were arrested. **8 February:** Prime Minister Zhou En-Lai of China arrived in Karachi for an eight-day visit to Pakistan. **29 April:** The Pakistan International Airlines started service to Canton and Shanghai via Dhaka. **26 June:** The National Assembly approved funds for the construction of two nuclear power stations—one in Karachi and the other in Pabna, East Pakistan. **19 August:** The Muslim League named Ayub Khan as its candidate for the presidential election, scheduled for January 1965. **29 August:** Pakistan’s first submarine, a gift from the United States, arrived in Karachi. **20 September:** The Combined Opposition



Party (COP) nominated Fatima Jinnah, sister of Pakistan's founder, as its candidate for the presidential election. **9 October:** West Pakistan's High Court ordered the release of 44 leaders of the Jamaat-e-Islami, including Maududi and Farid Ahmad. **22 October:** Former Governor-General and Prime Minister Khawaja Nazimuddin died in Dacca of a heart attack.

**1965 1 January:** The first presidential election was held under the 1962 Constitution, with Fatima Jinnah of the Combined Opposition Party (COP) opposing Field Marshal Ayub Khan of the Muslim League. Ayub Khan won a narrow victory. **4 January:** A victory parade in Karachi, sponsored by Ayub Khan's Muslim League and led by his son Gohar Ayub, was marked by violence, with a death toll of 23. The army took control of the city from the local police. **23 March:** President Ayub Khan was sworn in for his second term as president. **23 April:** Indian and Pakistani troops fought a major battle in the Rann of Kutch. **14 June:** The government reduced the development program by 5 percent to meet defense costs in the next fiscal year. **1 July:** The Third Five Year Plan was launched, with estimated expenditures of 52 billion rupees—34 billion rupees in the public and 18 billion in the private sector. **13 July:** U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson informed President Ayub Khan of a delay in aid commitments. Ayub criticized this aid delay and defended Pakistan's ties with China and other communist countries. **21 August:** Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri of India charged Pakistan with sending 3,000 to 4,000 infiltrators into Kashmir and warned of an attack if "aggression" were to continue. **6 September:** Pakistan declared war on India, and India attacked West Pakistan at several points, including the city of Lahore. **23 September:** Following a resolution passed by the UN Security Council, India and Pakistan ceased fighting.

**1966 10 January:** President Ayub Khan of Pakistan and Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri of India signed the Tashkent Declaration "affirming their obligation . . . not to have recourse to force and to settle their disputes through peaceful means." **25 February:** At a Lahore meeting of opposition parties, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman presented his "six point program" for gaining autonomy for Pakistan's federating provinces. Mujibur Rahman was arrested and charged with conspiring with Indian officials to destroy Pakistan. The event came to be known as the Agartala Conspiracy.

**1967 30 November:** The Pakistan People's Party (PPP) was formed in Lahore, with Zulfikar Ali Bhutto as its chairman. J. A. Rahim was appointed secretary-general.

**1969 25 March:** Field Marshal Muhammad Ayub Khan resigned as the president of Pakistan and was replaced by General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan. General Yahya Khan abrogated the Constitution of 1962, dissolved the National and Provincial Assemblies, and placed Pakistan under martial law.

**1970 20 March:** President Yahya Khan announced the Legal Framework Order, which prescribed the ground rules for transferring power back to civilian authorities. **19 April:** Field Marshal Muhammad Ayub Khan, President of Pakistan from 1958 to 1969, died of a heart attack at his home in Islamabad. **12 November:** East Pakistan's coastal districts were hit by a cyclone and tidal waves 30 feet high. More than a million people were killed. **7 December:** Elections were held for the National Assembly. One hundred sixty of the 300 seats in the assembly were captured by the Awami League, whereas 81 seats, all from West Pakistan, were won by the Pakistan People's Party.

**1971 21 March:** Mujibur Rahman was arrested by the army in Dacca. Military operations were started against the Awami League followers. **4 November:** Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi assured U.S. President Richard Nixon in a meeting in Washington that "India has never wished the destruction of Pakistan or its permanent crippling." **16 November:** Indian troops moved into East Pakistan and began to advance toward Dacca. **16 December:** The Pakistani Army surrendered to Lieutenant General Jagjit Singh Aurora of the Indian Army in a ceremony held in Dacca. **20 December:** Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was sworn in as the president of Pakistan.

**1972 3 January:** In a mammoth public meeting held in Karachi, Bhutto sought and received the people's approval to release Sheikh Mujibur Rahman from jail. **3 March:** Lieutenant General Gul Hassan, chief of staff of the army, and Air Marshal Rahim Khan, commander of the air force, were replaced by General Tikka Khan and Air Marshal Zafar Choudhery, respectively. **4 April:** The National Assembly was convened in Islamabad to frame a new constitution for Pakistan. **3 July:** A peace agreement was signed at Simla (India) by Indira Gandhi and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the prime minister and president of India and Pakistan,

respectively. **11 October:** The Federal Security Force (FSF) was established as a parliamentary organization to help the police in the task of maintaining law and order. **20 October:** A constitutional accord was signed in Islamabad by the leaders of various political parties.

**1973 12 April:** The constitution was authenticated by President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. **14 August:** Pakistan's third constitution came into effect. Bhutto stepped down to become prime minister.

**1974 22 February:** A conference for heads of government and state of 37 Muslim countries began in Lahore and was hosted by Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Pakistan recognized Bangladesh. **5 May:** India exploded a nuclear device, thereby joining the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, and China as a member of the nuclear club. **11 September:** The National Assembly declared the Ahmadiya sect to be a non-Muslim community. **13 December:** Dr. Mubashir Hasan replaced J. A. Rahim as secretary-general of the Pakistan People's Party.

**1975 10 January:** The Pakistan People's Party was reorganized and began work on an election manifesto. **8 February:** Hayat Muhammad Khan Sherpao, chief minister of the Northwest Frontier Province, was assassinated while addressing a public meeting in Peshawar. **12 February:** The United States lifted the arms embargo on Pakistan, which was imposed during the 1965 Pakistan war with India. **15 February:** The National Awami Party led by Abdul Wali Khan was declared illegal and banned.

**1976 11 March:** President Muhammad Daud of Afghanistan visited Islamabad to hold discussions with Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. **17 March:** Prime Minister Bhutto visited President Muhammad Daud of Afghanistan in Kabul. **22 May:** Muhammad Zia ul-Haq, the Pakistan Army's most junior lieutenant general, was chosen by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to be chief of the army staff. **25 December:** Pakistan celebrated the 100th anniversary of Muhammad Ali Jinnah's birth. He was the country's founder and its first governor-general.

**1977 7 January:** In a speech in the National Assembly, Prime Minister Bhutto announced March 7 as the date for the next general elections. **11 January:** The Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) was formed by nine political parties to face Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party, in

the national and provincial elections. **7 March:** General elections were held to elect 200 members of the National Assembly. **10 March:** Elections were held for the four provincial assemblies. **March–July:** Agitation against the government launched by the opposition to protest what it said was widespread rigging of the elections gained momentum. **5 July:** General Zia ul-Haq, the chief of the Army Staff, removed Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto from office, declared martial law, and appointed himself the chief martial-law administrator. **20 July:** Martial Law Order No. 12 was promulgated, giving General Zia ul-Haq, the chief martial-law administrator, sweeping powers to detain people suspected of acting against the interest of the state. **3 September:** Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was charged with conspiracy to murder. **4 September:** Martial Law Regulation No. 21 was issued, requiring all politicians to submit declarations of the assets they held in 1970 and 1977. **18 September:** Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was arrested in Larkana. His cousin Mumtaz Ali Bhutto was also imprisoned. **10 November:** The Supreme Court issued its judgment on *Begum Nusrat Bhutto vs. Chief of Army Staff and Federation of Pakistan*, validating the imposition of martial law. **30 November:** A presidential ordinance was issued, repealing the Federal Security Force Act of 1973 and disbanding the FSF.

**1978** **1 January:** The Hyderabad Special Tribunal, which had been trying the cases of a number of political leaders including Wali Khan, was disbanded. More than 11,000 persons, imprisoned for political reasons by the government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, were released. **14 March:** President Muhammad Daud of Afghanistan visited Islamabad. **18 March:** In a unanimous opinion of the Lahore High Court, the charges against Zulfikar Ali Bhutto were found to have been “proved to the hilt.” The deposed prime minister and co-defendants were sentenced to death. **30 April:** President Muhammad Daud of Afghanistan was assassinated, and his government was overthrown by elements of the Afghan Army. **25 July:** The martial law administration published a “white paper,” reporting the results of its inquiry into the conduct of the Bhutto government during the 1977 election. **12 September:** General Zia ul-Haq visited Noor Muhammad Tarraki, the Marxist leader of Afghanistan, in Kabul. **16 September:** General Zia ul-Haq, the chief martial-law administrator (CMLA), was sworn in as Pakistan’s sixth president, replacing Fazal Elahi Chaudhry. **5 December:** Afghanistan and the Soviet Union signed a 20-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. According to Article 4 of

the treaty, both countries “will hold consultations and, with the agreement of both parties, take appropriate measures with a view to ensuring the security and territorial integrity of the two countries.”

**1979 10 February:** *Shariat* benches, made up of three Muslim judges (*Qazis*), were established in the high courts. **12 March:** Pakistan announced its decision to withdraw from the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), the last of its remaining alliances with the Western world. **4 April:** Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was executed in Rawalpindi’s central prison and buried in the Bhutto family graveyard near Larkana. **23 August:** President Zia ul-Haq announced his government’s decision to hold elections for local bodies on a nonparty basis. **16 October:** A number of Islamization measures were announced by President Zia ul-Haq. President Zia ul-Haq announced the decision to indefinitely postpone general elections set for November 17. Anticipating adverse reactions from most political parties, the government toughened martial law regulation against political activity. **17 November:** Maulana Abul Ala Maududi, the former *amir* (president) of Jamaat-e-Islami, died in Lahore. **20 November:** Fanatical followers of a Sunni Moslem extremist group occupied the Grand Mosque in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. **21 November:** The United States Embassy in Islamabad was sacked and burned by a mob. Two U.S. marines died in the fire. **27 December:** The Soviet Army invaded Afghanistan. President Hafizullah Amin was executed and Babrak Kamal was installed as the new head of state.

**1980 17 March:** The Islamic University was founded in Islamabad. **20 June:** The Zakat and Ushr Ordinance (No. XVII of 1980) was promulgated.

**1981 27 April:** The Ministry of Finance issued a notification exempting Shias from the levy of *zakat*.

**1983 25 January:** The government established an ombudsman’s office, the *Wafaqi Mohtasib*.

**1984 10 January:** Benazir Bhutto left Karachi for London after having been allowed to leave Pakistan for medical treatment. **19 January:** The countries belonging to the Organization of the Islamic Conference met for their fourth summit at Casablanca. President Zia ul-Haq played a prominent role in getting Egypt readmitted to the organization.

**1985** **1 January:** Non-Islamic banking was abolished. **12 January:** The election schedule was announced by President Zia ul-Haq. **25 February:** General elections were held for the 200-member National Assembly. **23 March:** Muhammad Khan Junejo was invited by General Zia ul-Haq to form a civilian Cabinet. **1 July:** The economy was declared to be in conformity with Islam. **30 December:** Martial law was lifted.

**1986** **18 January:** Prime Minister Muhammad Khan Junejo was elected chairman of the Pakistan Muslim League. **10 April:** Benazir Bhutto returned to Pakistan and addressed a mammoth public meeting in Lahore. **23 July:** The National People's Party (NPP) was formed under the chairmanship of Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi. **8 August:** The seventh round of "proximity talks" between Afghanistan and Pakistan on the Afghanistan issue were suspended in Geneva. **14 August:** The Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) launched a campaign against the government, demanding new general elections. **16 August:** Benazir Bhutto was arrested in Karachi. **6 September:** Benazir Bhutto was released from prison. **20 November:** Army troops were called out to assist police in quelling riots in Karachi. **13 December:** The Pakistani government launched an operation to remove 20,000 Afghan refugees from Sohrab Goth in Karachi. **22 December:** A new federal Cabinet was sworn into office by President Zia ul-Haq, with Muhammad Khan Junejo as prime minister.

**1987** **25 February:** Eighth round of "proximity talks" between the governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan began in Geneva under the auspices of the United States with Diego Cordovez, undersecretary for political affairs, providing the link between the two delegations. **30 November:** Local body elections were held in the four provinces of Pakistan. **18 December:** Benazir Bhutto married Asif Ali Zardari in Karachi.

**1988** **10 April:** An explosion in the ammunition depot in Ojheri, an army camp near Rawalpindi and Islamabad, killed 100 people while injuring another 1,000. **15 May:** Prime Minister Muhammad Khan Junejo expanded the federal cabinet to 33 members by taking in five new ministers and three new ministers of state. **29 May:** President Zia ul-Haq dismissed the government of Prime Minister Junejo, dissolved the National Assembly, and ordered new elections to be held within 90 days.

**31 May:** President Zia ul-Haq dissolved all provincial assemblies. **17 August:** President Zia ul-Haq was killed in a plane crash near the city of Bahawalpur in south Punjab. Also lost in the crash were a number of senior officers of the Pakistan army, including the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Akhtar Abdur Rahman. Arnold Raphael, U.S. ambassador to Pakistan, also died. Ghulam Ishaq Khan, chairman of the Senate, was sworn in as acting president. General Mirza Aslam Beg was appointed chief of the Army Staff. **17 November:** Elections were held for the National Assembly; the Pakistan People's Party won 92 out of the 207 seats contested. **2 December:** Benazir Bhutto was sworn in as prime minister. **8 December:** The government submitted a revised budget to the National Assembly. **12 December:** Ghulam Ishaq Khan was elected president of Pakistan. **15 December:** Balochistan Governor Muhammad Musa dissolved the Provincial Assembly on the grounds that no party had won a majority and therefore none could form a stable government. **31 December:** During a meeting of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in Islamabad, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi held private talks and signed agreements on cultural relations, taxation, and safeguarding the two countries' nuclear installations.

**1989** **23 January:** The Balochistan High Court declared the December dissolution of the Provincial Assembly unconstitutional and ordered the body's reconstitution. **5 February:** Nawab Muhammad Akbar Khan Bugti of the Balochistan National Alliance was sworn in as chief minister of Balochistan. **15 February:** The Soviet Union completed the withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan. **10 March:** The Supreme Court ruled that the May 29, 1988 dissolution of the National Assembly was unconstitutional. **13 March:** In the Punjab assembly, Chief Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif won a vote of confidence in a session demanded by the PPP. **30 April:** Labor Minister Malik Mukhtar Ahmad Awan announced the lifting of a ban on trade-union activities. **22 May:** The government approved a 20-year plan for developing nuclear power generation. The program was to rely heavily on co-manufacturing with foreign firms. **3 June:** The budget for the 1989-90 fiscal year was presented to the National Assembly by Minister of State Ihsanul Haq Piracha. **4 June:** Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi was elected to lead a 94-member opposition coalition in the National Assembly. **20 July:** The Afghan mujahideen began their assault on Khowst, a town close to the Pakistan

border. **21 July:** Officials in New Delhi, India, said that Pakistan was violating the informal understanding reached between the two countries on the Siachen Glacier. **3 September:** The *New York Times* carried a story according to which the United States and Pakistan had changed their policy with respect to the provision of arms and supplies to the mujahideen. Under the new policy, assistance was to be provided directly to the fighters in Afghanistan and not through the seven political groups operating out of Pakistan, as had been done previously. **8 September:** The government denied a report published in the *Financial Times* that a number of army officers had been arrested following a failed coup attempt against Benazir Bhutto. **13 September:** General Aslam Beg, chief of the Army Staff, said that the purpose of the armed-forces exercise planned for later in the year was to test their readiness for effective defense. The exercise was named *Zarbe Momin*. **15 September:** The U.S. Senate approved a \$460 million aid package for Pakistan for 1989–90 while voicing concern over the direction of the country’s nuclear-development policy. Half of the amount fell in the category of foreign military sales (FMS). **20 September:** Prime Minister Bhutto reshuffled her Cabinet. **1 October:** Pakistan rejoined the Commonwealth. **31 October:** Prime Minister Bhutto survived a vote of no-confidence by a narrow margin of 12 votes. **11 November:** Prime Minister Bhutto included three members from IJI, the opposition party, in her Cabinet. **13 November:** Prime Minister Li Peng of China arrived in Pakistan for his first visit to the country. **26 December:** Hyderabad was put under 24-hour curfew following riots that claimed scores of lives in four days.

**1990** **29 January:** The Federal Cabinet, meeting under the chairmanship of Senior Minister Nusrat Bhutto, took stock of the situation created by continuing troubles in Kashmir. There were reports of massing of troops by Indian and Pakistan along their common border. **2 February:** Prime Minister V. P. Singh of India warned Pakistan to stay out of Kashmir and to stop assisting the forces of opposition in the Indian state. He promised Pakistan “a fitting reply” if it continued its activist policy in Kashmir. **18 February:** President François Mitterrand of France arrived in Pakistan on a first-ever visit to the country by the French head of state. **26 February:** Aftab Shahban Mirani was sworn in as chief minister of Sindh province. **28 February:** The Board of Investment, meeting under the chairmanship of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, approved 13 proj-



ects at a cost of 5.7 billion rupees. **24 April:** The U.S. State Department expressed the hope that talks between India and Pakistan would avert another war on the unresolved Kashmir dispute. **25 April:** Talks were held in New York between Foreign Ministers Yaqub Khan and Kumar Gujral of Pakistan and India, respectively, on the situation in Kashmir. **3 May:** Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu of Japan met with Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in Islamabad. After the talks, Bhutto offered to meet with V. P. Singh, her Indian counterpart, in order to avert a war between the two countries. **14 May:** A strike by businessmen shut down all commercial areas of Karachi. The strike was to protest the government's inability to stop crimes and kidnappings against the business community. **20 May:** Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto arrived in Cairo to explain Pakistan's position to Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. **30 May:** Ethnic violence in Karachi spread to a number of areas in the city, bringing the death toll to 103 in four days of fighting. **2 June:** Ethnic troubles continued in Karachi, bringing the number of dead to 200. **7 June:** Minister of State for Finance Ihsanul Haq Piracha presented the budget for the 1990–91 fiscal year. **10 July:** Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto arrived in Baghdad, Iraq at the start of her second mission to the Middle East to solicit support for Pakistan on the issue of Kashmir. **20 July:** Indian Foreign Secretary Muchkund Dubey said in Islamabad that his country did not want war with Pakistan on the issue of Kashmir. **6 August:** President Ghulam Ishaq Khan dismissed Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and her Cabinet, dissolved the National Assembly, and ordered national elections for October 24, 1990. Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, the leader of the opposition in the National Assembly, was sworn in as caretaker prime minister. Senators Sartaj Aziz and Sahibzada Yaqub Khan were appointed finance and foreign ministers, respectively. **20 August:** Pakistan announced its intention to contribute its forces to the coalition army being assembled in the Middle East under the leadership of the United States in response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. **22 August:** Twenty-seven people were killed, including two women and four children, in Karachi when gunmen raided various camps and offices of Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz. **31 August:** Caretaker Prime Minister Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi asked India to pull back its troops from the border with Pakistan. **4 September:** President Ghulam Ishaq Khan filed "references" against three former federal ministers for alleged misdeeds and corruption. The references were made to special tribunals set up to investigate the conduct in office of elected officials

during the administration of Benazir Bhutto. **12 September:** The special tribunal comprising Justice Munir A. Sheikh returned the “reference” to President Ghulam Ishaq Khan that had been filed by the president against former minister Jehangir Badr for want of sufficient evidence to warrant further proceedings. **20 September:** President Ghulam Ishaq Khan met with President Yang Shangkun of China in Beijing. **30 September:** Benazir Bhutto appeared in Karachi before Justice Wajihuddin Ahmad in response to a “reference” filed against her by President Ishaq Khan. **24 October:** Elections were held all over Pakistan. Bhutto’s PPP lost in all the provinces to IJI, an alliance of rightist parties. **10 November:** An 18-member federal government was sworn in by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan. Mian Nawaz Sharif became prime minister, while Sartaj Aziz and Sahibzada Yaqub Khan stayed on as finance and foreign ministers, respectively. **21 November:** The fifth summit of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation was held in Male, Maldives. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif met with Chandra Shekhar, his Indian counterpart. **9 December:** While on a visit to Sindh, Prime Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif announced a special Rs. 12 billion program for the development and reconstruction of the provincial economy. **15 December:** The Cabinet meeting under the chairmanship of Prime Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif decided to allow the establishment of passenger and cargo airlines in the private sector.

**1991 5 January:** The government announced plans to distribute 350,000 acres of land to the *haris* (landless peasants) in Sindh. **10 January:** The government coalition, IJI, won the majority of the seats in the national and provincial by-elections. **18 January:** Demonstrations were held all over Pakistan to protest the bombing of Iraq by the United States and other coalition forces. **25 January:** Prime Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif met in Amman with King Hussein of Jordan to find a solution to the crisis in the Gulf. **1 February:** A devastating earthquake hit the northern areas of Pakistan. The death toll was estimated at more than a thousand. **25 February:** Prime Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif went on a visit to China. **26 February:** Foreign Minister Sahibzada Yaqub Khan resigned from the Cabinet. **14 March:** Elections were held for the Senate. The government coalition, IJI, maintained its control of the upper house. **20 July:** Azad Kashmir President Abdul Qayyum Khan resigned. **9 September:** The Sindh High Court acquitted Asif Ali Zardari, Benazir Bhutto’s husband, of charges of fraud and corruption.

Unidentified gunmen assassinated Fazle Haq, former governor of the Northwest Frontier Province. **19 December:** Opposition members walked out of the National Assembly when President Ghulam Ishaq Khan rose to deliver his annual address.

**1992 1 January:** China revealed that it had agreed to build a nuclear power station in Pakistan at Chasma on the Indus River. **6 February:** In a meeting with the *Washington Post*, Foreign Secretary Shahrayar Khan admitted that Pakistan had acquired the technology to build nuclear weapons. **5 May:** Jamaat-e-Islami announced the decision to leave the ruling coalition formed by Islami Jamhuri Ittehad. **14 July:** Sunni gunmen killed several Shiite Muslims while they were observing the death anniversary of Imam Hussain. **18 August:** Indian and Pakistani officials met to hold talks on Kashmir. **10 October:** Asif Ali Zardari was acquitted of some more charges of corruption and fraud by the Sindh High Court.

**1993 5 February:** Pakistan observed a strike against India's presence in Kashmir. **27 March:** Pakistan Muslim League leaders nominated Mian Nawaz Sharif to succeed Muhammad Khan Junejo as the party's president. **17 April:** In a nationally televised speech, Prime Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif accused President Ishaq Khan of "unscrupulous and dirty politics." **18 April:** President Ghulam Ishaq Khan dismissed Prime Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif and dissolved the National Assembly. A caretaker administration was appointed under Prime Minister Balkh Sher Mazari. **20 May:** The Supreme Court held the prime minister's dismissal unconstitutional. Sharif was reinstated. **18 July:** President Ghulam Ishaq Khan dissolved the National Assembly for the second time in three months and then resigned. Prime Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif also resigned. Moeen Qureshi, a former senior official at the World Bank and who had lived outside Pakistan for nearly four decades, was appointed caretaker prime minister. **19 August:** The prime minister announced a program of structural reforms. **6 October:** The Pakistan People's Party won the most seats in the National Assembly but did not obtain a majority. **17 October:** Benazir Bhutto was sworn in as prime minister. She saw off caretaker Prime Minister Moeen Qureshi at the Islamabad airport. **4 December:** Farooq Ahmad Khan Leghari of the Pakistan People's Party was elected president.

**1994 26 January:** Bhutto brought new ministers—Anwar Saifullah Khan, Khalid Ahmad Kharal, Makhdum Fahim Amin, Mustafa Khar, and

Ahmad Mukhtar—into the Cabinet. **26 February:** Western governments announced pledges amounting to \$2.5 billion to support the development plan. **26 May:** President Farooq Leghari visited Washington and held talks with senior U.S. officials. **5 June:** Murtaza Bhutto, the brother of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, was released from jail. **6 June:** The Bhutto government announced the budget for the 1994-95 financial year. **26 June:** The Federation of Pakistan Chambers of Commerce and Industry went on strike to protest government budget proposals. **25 August:** The government announced plans to expel one million immigrants of Afghan, Burmese, Bangladeshi, Indian, and Iranian origin who had settled in Karachi. **1 September:** Bhutto decided against visiting Gaza without permission from Israel. **11 September:** Opposition launched “oust Bhutto” campaign with a train march from Karachi to Peshawar. **21 September:** A strike call by opposition leader Mian Nawaz Sharif resulted in widespread violence and disruption of economic activity. **30 September:** Sixty persons were reported killed in Karachi in MQM-related violence. **10 October:** Some 1,100 opponents of Benazir Bhutto were arrested by the government. **18 October:** The army was called out in Karachi after 13 persons were killed in sectarian violence involving the Sunni and Shia communities. **31 October:** Eighty-four persons were reported to have been killed during the month in MQM-associated violence. **12 November:** Suffering a major diplomatic defeat, Pakistan was forced to withdraw a resolution on Kashmir tabled at the UN General Assembly. **13 November:** Mian Muhammad Sharif, Nawaz Sharif’s father, was arrested. **30 November:** One-hundred-four persons were reported killed during the month in MQM-related violence. **4 December:** Muhammad Salahuddin, editor of the Urdu newspaper *Takbeer*, was shot dead outside his office in Karachi. **31 December:** One-hundred-sixty-eight persons were reported killed during the month in MQM-related violence.

**1995** **10–12 January:** U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry visited Pakistan. **12 January:** Khalid Latif, chairman of Allied Bank, Pakistan’s second largest private-sector bank, was arrested by the government. **16 January:** India rejected preconditions set by Pakistan for the resumption of bilateral talks on Kashmir. **31 January:** Ninety-two persons were reported to have been killed during the month in MQM-related violence. **12 February:** Ramzi Youssef, the main suspect in the terrorist bombing of the World Trade Center in New York, was arrested in Islamabad and immediately deported to the United States. **18 February:** Opposition leader

Ijaz ul-Haq—member of the National Assembly and the son of the late Zia ul-Haq—was arrested. **28 February:** One-hundred-seventy persons were reported to have been killed during the month in MQM-related violence. **29 October:** The government devalued the rupee by 7 percent and increased fuel prices and import duties. **13 November:** Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto ordered the arrest of Mian Muhammad Sharif, the father of Nawaz Sharif, on charges of tax evasion. **21 December:** President Leghari appointed General Jehangir Karamat chief of the Army Staff.

**1996** **1 January:** Pakistan and India exchanged a list of nuclear installations. **13 January:** General Jehangir Karamat assumed the position of chief of the Army Staff. **28 January:** A banking tribunal directed two Iteffaq Group concerns owned by Mian Nawaz Sharif and his family to deposit Rs. 1,770 million against bad debts claimed by two banks. **31 January:** One-hundred-fifty-five people were reported killed in Karachi violence during January. **5 February:** The United States accused China of supplying nuclear-weapons technology to Pakistan in 1995. **8 February:** The Privatization Commission approved the sale of 26 percent of the shares of United Bank Limited to a Saudi businessman. **29 February:** Fifty-six persons were reported killed in violence in Karachi during February. **6 March:** Pakistan completed construction on its first multipurpose nuclear reactor located at Chasma on the Indus River. **20 March:** The Supreme Court ruled that the government did not have the executive power to appoint judges to the superior courts. **31 March:** Twenty-four persons were reported killed in violence in Karachi during March. **14 April:** Seven people died in a bomb attack on the Shaukat Khanum Memorial Hospital, which was established by Imran Khan. **23 April:** The Aid to Pakistan Consortium approved Pakistan's request for \$2.3 billion in assistance for the 1996–97 fiscal year. **4 May:** The government announced that wheat output for the 1995–96 growing year was a record 18 million tons. **10 May:** The United States decided not to impose sanctions on China for the alleged transfer of nuclear technology to Pakistan. **27 May:** The Supreme Court declared that the president had the final authority to appoint the chief justice. **13 June:** A Rs. 500 billion budget for the 1996-97 fiscal year was presented to the National Assembly. Defense expenditure was raised 14 percent to Rs. 131 billion, debt servicing to Rs. 186 billion, and development expenditure to Rs. 104 billion. **20 June:** The business community organized a protest against the taxation proposals in the budget. **20**

**July:** Leaders of the Jamaat-e-Islami began a 1,000-km. whistle-stop tour of the country to oust the “corrupt and incompetent” government headed by Benazir Bhutto. **31 July:** Prime Minister Bhutto brought seven new ministers into her Cabinet including her husband, Asif Ali Zardari, who was assigned the portfolio of investment. **26 August:** The first consignment of U.S. arms released under the Brown amendment arrived in Karachi. **13 September:** Sectarian tensions mounted in Kurram Agency as the death toll rose to 200. **20 September:** Mir Murtaza Bhutto and six of his followers were killed in an ambush in Karachi. **24 September:** Gunmen killed 21 worshippers at a Sunni mosque in Multan, Punjab. **27 October:** The Jamaat-e-Islami organized strikes in Lahore, Rawalpindi, and Islamabad. More than 150 persons were arrested in Lahore. **28 October:** Naveed Qamar was appointed finance minister. **30 October:** Four army officers accused of a coup attempt were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment. **5 November:** President Farooq Leghari dismissed Prime Minister Bhutto, dissolved the National Assembly, and appointed a caretaker administration with Meraj Khalid as prime minister. Shahid Hamid and Umar Afridi were appointed ministers of defense and interior, respectively. The Punjab assembly was also dismissed and Tariq Rahim was appointed governor. Asif Ali Zardari was arrested. **7 November:** The Sindh assembly was dissolved and Mumtaz Bhutto was appointed chief minister. **8 November:** Shahid Javed Burki took leave of absence from the World Bank and joined the Cabinet. He was put in charge of finance, planning, and economic affairs. The Balochistan Assembly was dissolved. **12 November:** The NWFP Assembly was dissolved. **18 November:** President Leghari instituted the Ehetasab Ordinance to address the problem of corruption. **1 December:** Chinese President Jiang Zemin arrived in Pakistan. **15 December:** President Farooq Leghari filed a document with the Supreme Court to defend his action against the Bhutto government. **16 December:** The Supreme Court dismissed the petition to postpone elections. The chief election commissioner approved the election schedule. **23 December:** 9,540 persons filed nomination papers for elections.

**1997** **4 January:** Shahid Javed Burki traveled to Beijing to enlist Chinese support for resolving the balance-of-payment crisis. **6 January:** President Leghari established the Council for Defense and National Security, consisting of military leaders and members of the caretaker administration, to advise the government. **29 January:** The Supreme Court upheld the

dismissal of the administration of Benazir Bhutto by the president, accepting President Leghari's contention that the dismissed government had been corrupt and was also responsible for hundreds of "extrajudicial" killings in Karachi. **3 February:** Mian Nawaz Sharif's Muslim League scored a massive victory in the general elections, whereas Benazir Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party performed very poorly. **17 February:** Mian Nawaz Sharif was sworn in as prime minister; Sartaj Aziz was appointed minister of finance. Shahbaz Sharif became the chief minister of Punjab. **23 February:** Prime Minister Sharif appealed to the Pakistanis living abroad to donate generously to a fund set up to reduce the country's external debt. **1 March:** The United States placed Pakistan on the decertification list for drug-producing and transit countries. Pakistan was granted a waiver on attendant sanctions, however. **9 March:** Benazir Bhutto was elected chairperson for life of the Pakistan People's Party. **12 March:** The Pakistan Muslim League won 23 seats in the Senate out of the 34 contested. This gave the PML a two-thirds majority in both houses of Parliament, sufficient to amend the constitution. **21 March:** Waseem Sajjad was elected chairman of the Senate. **1 April:** Both houses of Parliament unanimously adopted the 13th amendment to the constitution, taking away the power of the president to dissolve the National Assembly and dismiss the prime minister. **9 April:** The Pakistani and Indian foreign ministers met in New Delhi, the highest level meeting between the two countries in seven years. **15 April:** Scarcity of wheat flour led to riots in Lahore. **2 December:** President Farooq Leghari resigned. **31 December:** Muhammad Rafiq Tarar, a close associate of Prime Minister Sharif, was elected president.

**1998** **1 February:** The U.S. State Department issued a harsh criticism concerning human-rights treatment in Pakistan. **7–17 March:** A population census was conducted with the help of the armed forces. Because of local opposition the count could not be carried out in Quetta, the capital of Balochistan. **1 April:** Corruption case against Asif Ali Zardari began to be heard by a magistrate in London. **2 April:** A magistrate in London rejected the plea by Benazir Bhutto and Asif Zardari to stop the government of Pakistan's investigation against them. **10 April:** Pakistan test fired the Ghauri, a medium-range missile. **12 April:** Pakistan refuted reports that foreign assistance was received by the country in the production of the Ghauri missile. **10 May:** A spokesman for Pakistan People's Party announced that a court had issued warrants for the arrest of Benazir Bhutto. **11 May:** India announced the successful testing of three nuclear

devices in a desert testing ground in the state of Rajasthan, near the border with Pakistan. The announcement of the test by the prime minister was followed soon after by condemnation from most of the important world capitals. The United States threatened to impose economic sanctions, while Pakistan suggested that it may also be forced to act. **13 May:** India carried out two more tests of nuclear devices. U.S. President Bill Clinton called the tests a “terrible mistake” and announced economic sanctions against India. **28 May:** Pakistan conducted five tests of nuclear devices at Chaghai, a site in Balochistan. **30 May:** Pakistan followed up with one more test of a nuclear device. The United States and Japan imposed sanctions on Pakistan. **2 June:** Israel denied Pakistan’s allegation that it was preparing an attack on its nuclear facilities. **3 June:** Prime Minister Sharif set up a National Self-Reliance Fund and appealed to all Pakistanis for donations to help the country face the situation created by the imposition of sanctions. **16 June:** Prime Minister Sharif ordered stern action against 25 top bank-loan defaulters, including seven persons belonging to the Pakistan Muslim League. **3 July:** The Supreme Court ordered the Lahore High Court to decide the government’s case against Hub Power Company, one of the dozen private companies that had invested in power generation during the time Benazir Bhutto was prime minister. **14 July:** The Karachi Stock Exchange Index (KSE-100) closed at 755, an all-time low. **7 August:** Terrorists bombed U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, killing more than 200 people, including 12 Americans. Pakistan arrested Muhammad Siddique Odeh, a Palestinian, at the Karachi airport who confessed to having worked with a group that bombed the embassies. **18 August:** Pakistan arrested two additional suspects in the embassy bombings. **19 August:** A judge in Switzerland indicted Benazir Bhutto on charges of money-laundering tied to contracts with two Geneva-based companies. **20 August:** The United States fired cruise missiles at Khowst, Afghanistan to attack the camps maintained by Osama bin Laden. The U.S. action came in response to the terrorists’ attacks on its embassies in East Africa. Some missiles landed in Pakistan, killing several people. **21 August:** Pakistanis protested against the U.S. missile attack. **23 August:** Pakistan lodged a formal complaint with the United Nations that the United States had violated its air space in the missile attacks on Afghanistan. **7 October:** General Jehangir Karamat, chief of the Army Staff, resigned after giving a speech at the Naval Staff College in Lahore. The speech was highly critical of the way Prime



Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif was handling the economy. General Pervez Musharraf was promoted and appointed chief of the army staff. **8 October:** The National Assembly passed the 15th Amendment to the Constitution by a vote of 151 in favor, 16 against, and 40 abstaining. The amendment adopted the *sharia*—the Islamic law—as the law of the land. It was sent to the Senate for ratification. **12 October:** The government initiated action against Hubco, a power-generation company owned in part by Britain’s National Power. The company was accused of having bribed senior officials in the government of Benazir Bhutto in order to receive favorable terms. **17 October:** Hakim Muhammad Said, former governor of Sindh and a prominent social worker, was shot dead by unknown assailants. **6 November:** Hafiz Pasha, Advisor to the Prime Minister for Finance, resigned. He was replaced by Ishaq Dar as finance minister. **7 November:** The army was brought in to manage the affairs of the Water and Power Development Authority. **2–4 December:** Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif visited Washington and held meetings with President Bill Clinton and other senior U.S. officials. **18 December:** Three army personnel were ambushed and killed in Karachi. **24 December:** Military courts were set up in Karachi to try people accused of terrorism.

**1999** **20 February:** Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee traveled by bus to Lahore to inaugurate a bus service between India and Pakistan. **21 February:** The Indian and Pakistani prime ministers issued a statement—the Lahore Declaration—promising to work towards an improvement in relations between the two countries. **10 April:** India test-fired the Agni II missile (with a range of 2,000 kilometers). **14 April:** Pakistan launched the Ghauri II missile (with range of 2,500 kilometers). **15 April:** Former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and her husband, Asif Zardari, were convicted of corruption and sentenced to five years in prison. The court also issued orders for the confiscation of their property. **21–22 April:** Prime Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif visited Moscow for discussions with President Boris Yeltsin. Russia and Pakistan issued a joint statement pledging the establishment of durable peace and security in the region. **May to June:** Pakistan and India fought a sharp war in the Kargil area of Kashmir. Pakistani troops occupied some of the Indian military positions in the area. India retaliated by heavy bombardment using its air force with artillery. **4 July:** Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif traveled to Washington and met with President Bill Clinton of the United States at the Blair House in Washington. The meeting led to the

declaration that Pakistan would pull out its troops from Kargil without imposing any conditions. **7-10 September:** Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif sent his brother Shabaz Sharif to Washington to warn the U.S. administration of the possibility of a military coup in Pakistan. The State Department issued a statement following discussions with the younger Sharif saying that the United States was in favor of democratic rule in Pakistan. **12 October:** Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif dismissed Chief of Army Staff General Pervez Musharraf while he was flying back from Colombo, Sri Lanka. He promoted Lieutenant Khwaja Ziauddin as the new chief of army staff. The senior generals of the army refused to accept the appointment, ousted the prime minister, and anointed General Musharraf as the country's chief executive. **14 October:** Chief Executive Musharraf addressed the nation and read out a seven point agenda for the economic and political reform of the country.

**2000 17 January:** General Musharraf arrived for a two day visit in Beijing, China and met Prime Minister Zhu Rongji and Li Peng, Chairman of China's National People's Congress. **18 January:** General Musharraf met with President Jiang Zemin of China. Both leaders vowed to strengthen their strategic partnership. **19 January:** Rehmat Hussain Jaffrey, the presiding judge of the anti-terrorism court framed charges against former prime minister Nawaz Sharif and his co-defendants in the "October 12 plane conspiracy case." **18 June:** Finance Minister Shaukat Aziz presented the military government's first budget in a televised address. GDP growth for the year ending June 30 was estimated at 4.5 percent, compared with only 3.1 percent in the previous year. **13 July:** Maulana Abbas Ansari, a Shia leader and head of the *It-tahadul Muslimeen*, was elected to lead Kashmir's APHC in a meeting of the organization's executive council. JI abstained from the meeting. Ansari was in favor of initiating talks with India without bringing Pakistan to the table at this preliminary stage. This position was not acceptable to the APHC members who had strong links with Pakistan. **1 August:** General Musharraf announced the arrangements for local elections. **6-8 September:** Heads of state and government representing the members of the United Nations adopted the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) which included halving the number of people living in absolute poverty in the world by the year 2015. General President Pervez Musharraf represented Pakistan at the meeting. **15 September:** The APHC General Council elected Syed Ali Shah Geelani its new

chairman. The groups based in Pakistan recognized Geelani's election. **12 October:** An explosive-laden dinghy exploded next to the American destroyer *Cole* in Yemen, killing 17 sailors. Abu Zubayda was identified as the chief commander of the attack. **30 December:** The Hamood ur Rahman Commission report on the conduct of the military's operations in East Pakistan in 1971 was declassified. The report cited professional incompetence; defective defense strategy; lack of coordination among the army, navy, and air force; and the moral degeneration of the military high command as the major reasons for the 1971 debacle. **31 October:** The first phase of elections to the local bodies was held in 18 districts. The turnout was estimated at between 35 and 50 percent. Chief Election Commissioner Abdul Qadeer Chaudhry said the elections were "held with fair, free and transparent manner and there were no complaints received from any polling station."

**2001 1 January:** Pakistan and India exchanged the lists of nuclear installations as required by an agreement between the two countries to prevent attacks against such installations in the two countries. The agreement provides for the exchange of this information on the first working day of each year. **2 January:** The Mutahida Jihad Council, an alliance of mujahideen groups fighting against the Indian occupation of Kashmir, reiterated its rejection of the "so-called cease fire" by India. **5 January:** Pakistan completed the withdrawal of its troops from the LOC while the chairman of APHC, Abdul Gani, met with Ashraf Jahangir Kaji, Pakistan's high commissioner in Delhi. The BJP, the party in power in India, indicated it was against any Kashmir peace formula that involved the partition of the state. **7 January:** Justice Muhammad Bashir Jehangir was sworn in as the 16th chief justice of Pakistan at a ceremony in Islamabad. **11 January:** The APHC named a five-member delegation made up of Maulvi Umar Farooq, Syed Ali Shah Gilani, Abdul Gani Lore, Sheikh Abdullaziz, and Maulvi Abbas Ansari to travel to Islamabad for talks scheduled for 15 January. It omitted Abdul Ghani Bhat and Yasin Malik from the delegation. The APHC urged the Indian authorities to issue passports to the members of the delegation. **15 January:** Vijay K. Nambrass, India's high commissioner in Pakistan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad. Pakistan's foreign office termed the meeting "very significant." **13 July:** President Pervez Musharraf arrived at India's Palam airport where he was received by Minister of State for Railways Digvijay Singh. This

was his first visit to India since his family had left the country in 1946 for what was to become Pakistan in 1947. **16 July:** Pakistan and India broke off their three day summit at Agra without issuing a communiqué. **17 July:** India and Pakistan reaffirmed their desire to continue their dialogue initiated in Agra. **18 July:** Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee won the crucial support of his cabinet to pay a return visit to Pakistan to resume the dialogue begun at Agra. **9 September:** Ahmed Shah Massoud, the leader of the mujahideen group assembled under the banner of the Northern Alliance, was assassinated by two suicide bombers who triggered an explosive device hidden in a camera. The bombers had gained admission to Massoud's office posing as journalists. **11 September:** Nineteen Muslim hijackers, led by Muhammad Atta, an Egyptian, commandeered four jet liners from Boston and Washington airports, crashing two into the World Trade Center at New York and the third at the Pentagon near Washington. The fourth plane crashed in Pennsylvania en route to Washington, D.C. More than 3,000 people were killed in the attacks. **12 September:** Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage summoned General Mahmoud Ahmad, head of the Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), to his office and told him that the U.S. would make a series of requests that would force "deep introspection" on the part of his country concerning its relations with Pakistan. "Pakistan faces a stark choice, either it is with us or it is not. This is a black or white choice with no gray." **13 September:** General Mahmoud returned to Armitage's office and was handed a list of seven demands the U.S. was making on Pakistan. "This is not negotiable," Armitage told the general. "You must accept all seven parts." The list was put together earlier in the day by Armitage working together with Secretary of State Colin L. Powell. **14 September:** President Pervez Musharraf accepted all U.S. demands and agreed to join the U.S. war on terrorism as a fully committed ally. **7 October:** The U.S. began military operations in Afghanistan with some of its planes and missiles flying over Pakistani territory. **14 November:** Ministers representing the members of the World Trade Organization met in Doha, the capital of Qatar, and agreed to launch another round of trade negotiations. **1–15 December:** After two weeks of U.S. air bombardment of al Qaeda forces in the Tora Bora Mountains, the Northern Alliance fails to fully engage al Qaeda; bin Laden, al-Zawahiri, and most of their fighters escape to Pakistan. **11 December:** The Indian Parliament

compound in Delhi was attacked by a group of Muslim fundamentalists. The Indian government suspected the hand of *Lashkar-e-Taiba*. **13 December:** Pakistan arrested Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, president of the *Lashkar-e-Taiba*. **31 December:** Train and air services between India and Pakistan were suspended. However, Pakistan's move against *Lashkar-e-Taiba* and India's favorable reaction to that move were interpreted by Western diplomats as a small thaw in the frosty relations between the two countries.

**2002** **1 January:** India downgraded its diplomatic relations with Pakistan by recalling its high commissioner (ambassador) from Islamabad. **14 January:** Pakistan reopened its embassy in Kabul, resuming diplomatic relations with Afghanistan at the counselor level. Meanwhile the U.S. remained concerned about escalating tensions between India and Pakistan. **23 January:** *Wall Street Journal* reporter Daniel Pearl was abducted in Karachi while going to interview Shaykh Sayyid Giliani, leader of *Jamaat al-Fuqra*, a group based in Pakistan and North America and tied to al Qaeda and Kashmiri guerrillas. Pearl was beheaded. His remains were found in May 2002. **27 February:** *Jamaat-i-Islam amir* (chief) Qazi Hussain Ahmad was released on bail in Lahore by a judge of the Anti-Terrorist Court. **14 March:** President Musharraf, while on a visit to Tokyo, Japan, met Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi who lauded the effort the Pakistani leader was making to bring peace to the region. **28 March:** Al Qaeda leader Abu Zubaydah was captured in Faisalabad, Pakistan. A 30-year-old Palestinian with Saudi citizenship, Zubaydah was a chief recruiter and ran an Afghan training camp. He was under a Jordanian death sentence for his part in al Qaeda's millennium plot to attack U.S. and Israeli targets. **2 April:** A car, packed with explosives, failed to detonate while a convoy of cars carrying General Musharraf and his entourage was traveling on a busy Karachi street. **15 April:** Interior Minister Moinuddin Haider told newsmen that the planned presidential referendum was allowed under Section 48(b) of the Constitution. **25 April:** A bomb ripped through a Shiite Muslim mosque in Punjab's Bhakkar district, killing 12 worshippers, all of them women. **8 May:** In Karachi, a car bomb was driven into a minibus carrying French naval technicians who were working for Pakistan's navy: 11 French workers were killed, 12 wounded; two Pakistanis were killed and 12 wounded. **17 June:** A car bomb exploded outside the U.S. consulate in Karachi, killing 11 and wounding more than 40. **10 Septem-**

**ber:** Ramzi bin al-Shibh was arrested in Karachi. He was to have been a pilot in the 11 September attacks but failed to get a U.S. visa. **13 July:** Grenades were thrown at an archaeological site near Manshera, Pakistan, wounding 12, including seven Germans, one Austrian, and one Slovak. **5 August:** Islamists raided a Christian school for the children of foreign aid workers northwest of Islamabad. Six staff members are killed. **10 August:** A Christian church in Taxila, Pakistan, is bombed. Five people were killed, including three nurses, and 25 were wounded.

**2003 2–3 January:** New governments took office in Karachi, Sindh, and Lahore, Punjab. **7 January:** Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain was elected unopposed as president of the Pakistan Muslim League (Q). **13 January:** General Musharraf told the Dubai-based Arabic television channel that he “guaranteed 400 percent that nothing has taken place between us and North Korea. No transfer of nuclear technology has taken place in the past and it will not happen in the future.” **30 January:** The George W. Bush administration designated the Pakistani Sunni Muslim Group *Lashkar-i-Jahangi* as a foreign terrorist organization. **4–6 February:** India expelled Jalil Jilani, Pakistan’s acting high commissioner, and four other Pakistani diplomats. **9 February:** Prime Minister Vajpayee accused Pakistan of failing to deliver on a promise made a year earlier to put an end to cross-border terrorism. **13 February:** Police in Quetta arrested Mohammed Abdel Rahman, son of jailed Gama’a al-Islamiyya’s spiritual leader Shaykh Omar Abdel Rahman. Bin Laden had cared for him after his father’s arrest in the United States. **28 February:** Islamists attacked Pakistani police guarding the U.S. consulate in Karachi, leaving two dead and five wounded. **1 March:** Pakistani police arrested al Qaeda operations chief Khalid Sheikh Mohammed in an upscale section of Rawalpindi. Mohammed had designed the 11 September attacks, was involved in the East Africa and *Cole* bombings, and participated in Ramzi Ahmed Yousef’s 1995 plot to destroy U.S. airliners flying Pacific routes. Pakistani police arrested al Qaeda financial officer Mustafa Ahmed al-Hisawai. Hisawai had funded the 11 September attackers via wire transfers. **18 April:** At a meeting in Srinagar, the first to be addressed by an Indian prime minister since 1986, Atal Bihari Vajpayee invited Pakistan to a dialogue with his government to resolve all outstanding issues. **19 April:** President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan and several members of his cabinet visited Islamabad and met with President Musharraf and Prime Minister Jamali. **29 April:** In Karachi,

Pakistani police arrested Tawfiq bin Attash and Amar al-Baluchi, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed's nephew. A Saudi citizen of Yemeni origin, bin Attash was a close friend of bin Laden, had fought with him in Afghanistan, and had run the attack on the U.S. destroyer *Cole*. Al-Baluchi was an al Qaeda financial officer and had sent nearly \$120,000 to Mohammed Atta, the leader of the 11 September attacks. **8–15 May:** A group of Pakistani parliamentarians began a visit to India after having twice postponed their trip at the request of the Indian hosts. **9 May:** India appointed Shiv Shankar Menon, its ambassador to China, to be the next high commissioner to Pakistan. **28 May:** Pakistan appointed Aziz Ahmad Khan as high commissioner to India. **7 June:** Finance Minister Shaukat Aziz presented the national budget for 2003-04 financial year. **24 June:** President Pervez Musharraf met with President Bush at the Camp David retreat. The U.S. announced that it would assist Pakistan with a \$3 billion aid package stretched over a period of five years. **28 July:** A two-day conference on Kashmir began in Washington at the initiative of U.S. Senator Thomas Hawkins and Representative Joseph Pitts. **7 August:** Karachi Stock Exchange broke two records by reaching a new high at the KSE-100 Index closing at 4205, and a record turnover of 959 million shares. **25 August:** Two taxis packed with the military explosive RDX were detonated 15 minutes apart in the Indian city of Mumbai, killing 53 and wounding more than 190. Indian police arrest four men they say belong to the Kashmiri Lashkar-e Tayyiba—an ally of al Qaeda—and are tied to India's Student Islamic Movement. The Indians said the groups also detonated bombs in Mumbai in December 2002, killing 17 and wounding 189, and speculated that both attacks were retaliation for anti-Muslim riots in Gujarat state in March 2002. **September–October:** Events undercut Pakistan President Musharraf's pro-U.S. policy. Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon made an official visit to India, supported India on Kashmir, and sold India three Phalcon radar systems. The Phalcons will allow India to see far into Pakistan. The visit coincided with U.S. criticism of Musharraf for letting Kashmiri fighters enter India and a joint U.S.-Indian Special Forces exercise in Indian Kashmir. **18 September:** Prime Minister Jamali announced that five factions of the Pakistani Muslim League had merged. **20 September:** Pakistani security arrests 15 Asian Islamic seminary students in Karachi and charges them with being linked to the Jemaah Islamiya, the Indonesian militant group allied with al Qaeda.

**21–25 September:** General Pervez Musharraf arrived in New York to attend the 56th Annual Meeting of the United Nations General Assembly. During his visit, President Musharraf met with President Bush. **30 September:** Prime Minister Zafarullah Khan Jamali arrived in New York on a 10-day visit to the United States. **11 October:** Pakistan continued to sign agreements with its donor nations to reschedule the debts it owed. An agreement was signed with South Korea to reschedule \$500 million of debt. **18 October:** Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Abdullah Bin Abdul Aziz visited Pakistan and announced an increase in assistance. **22 October:** Indian Foreign Minister Yashwant Singh announced a proposal to revive stalled efforts to normalize relations with Pakistan. **1–4 November:** President Pervez Musharraf visited China and concluded a number of agreements with the country on control of terrorism, increased trade, and greater economic cooperation between the two countries. **14 and 25 December:** Pakistan President Musharraf survived two attempted assassinations near Islamabad. On 14 December a mine was detonated along his travel route; on 25 December his convoy is hit by two suicide car bombs.

**2004 1 January:** The government formally approved the sale of Habib Bank, the country’s largest bank, to the Agha Khan Foundation for Economic Development. By a vote of 56.2 percent in favor, in a combined “sitting” of the national and four provincial assemblies, President Musharraf won a vote of confidence and elected to stay in office until 31 December 2007. **4–6 January:** The 12th SAARC summit was held in Islamabad, Pakistan. It approved the establishment of the South Asia Free Trade Area by 1 January 2006. On the sidelines President Musharraf met with Prime Minister Vajpayee of India and issued the Islamabad Declaration for resolving all outstanding disputes between the two countries through dialogue. **13 January:** The Indian Government invited Kashmiri separatist groups, including the All Parties Hurivat Conference, to meet with Deputy Prime Minister L.K. Advani. **17 January:** Musharraf addressed the parliament for the first time during his tenure as president. **2 February:** New information about the extent of scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan’s involvement in providing assistance to Iran, Libya, and North Korea continued to trickle out of Islamabad. **4 February:** In a televised address, A.Q. Khan admitted to providing nuclear weapons and expertise to Iran, Libya, and North Korea. **16–18 February:** Senior officials of the Ministries of External Affairs of Pakistan and India met in Islamabad to



draw up an agenda and timetable for future talks between the two countries. **2 March:** An attack by grenades and automatic weapons fire on a Shia procession in Quetta, Balochistan, killed 44 people and injured another 150. **12 March:** India began its first cricket tour of Pakistan in 17 years with a one day international played in Karachi. **15 March:** U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell on a visit to Islamabad said that his country will seek information from Islamabad about the nuclear proliferation network run by A.Q. Khan. **31 March–2 April:** Ten Islamist fighters were arrested in Canada and Britain after a long police investigation; all were Pakistanis and naturalized Canadians or Britons. British police also seized 1,100 pounds of fertilizer suitable for making a bomb. UK intelligence sources told the media that the eight men arrested in London were tied to al Qaeda members in Pakistan. **20 May:** The three-party National Alliance led by former President Farooq Leghari merged with Pakistan Muslim League (Q), the ruling party. **10 June:** Dr. Arbab Ghulam Rahim was sworn in as chief minister of Sindh. **19 June:** India and Pakistan began their first talks on easing the risk of nuclear war since 1998, when they tested nuclear bombs. According to the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies, India has 100 to 150 nuclear warheads while Pakistan has an arsenal of 25 to 50 bombs. **26 June:** Zafarullah Khan Jamali resigned as prime minister and nominated the ruling Pakistan Muslim League president, Shujaat Hussain, as acting prime minister. **27 June:** The PPP put forward Amin Fahim as its candidate in the forthcoming contest in the National Assembly for the prime ministership. **28 June:** The ruling PML decided to nominate Finance Minister Shaukat Aziz as its candidate for the prime minister's position. Since Aziz is not a member of the National Assembly, he will have to first seek election to a seat in the assembly. **29 June:** Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain was sworn in prime minister. **19 July:** Finance Minister Shaukat Aziz filed papers to contest the by-election for NA-59, a seat in the national assembly from Attock, in north Punjab. **25 July:** It was revealed later that a top al Qaeda operative, Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, who was wanted in connection with the August 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, was arrested after a shoot-out in the eastern city of Gujarat on 25 July 2004. **30 July:** Finance Minister Shaukat Aziz survived an attempt on his life by a suicide bomber after he addressed a public meeting at Fatchjang near Attock. His driver was killed. **18 August:** Shaukat Aziz won the by-election from two seats, one at Attock and the other at Tharparaikar, a con-

stituency in rural Sindh. **28 August:** Shaukat Aziz was elected prime minister by the National Assembly, receiving 191 votes in a house of 342 members. His only challenge came from Javed Hashmi, who was in jail charged with an attempt to provoke a rebellion in the army. **24 September:** President Pervez Musharraf and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh met in New York at the sidelines of the meeting of the UN General Assembly, and issued a joint statement. “They agreed that confidence building measures of all categories under discussion between the two governments should be implemented keeping in mind practical possibilities.” **14 October:** The National Assembly passed a bill allowing President Musharraf to remain in uniform beyond 31 December 2005. **22 November:** Asif Ali Zardari, jailed on 4 November 1996 on corruption charges, was released after the Supreme Court granted him bail. **25 November:** Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz held talks with Manmohan Singh, his Indian counterpart. **29 November:** Pakistan test-fired the indigenously developed short-range surface-to-surface ballistic missile Hatf III Ghaznavi. **30 November:** Acting President Mohammedmian Soomro signed into law the “President to hold another office bill” passed earlier by both the National Assembly and the Senate. President Musharraf was on a visit to Latin America having left Soomro, Chairman of the Senate, in charge. **5 December:** Presidents Musharraf and George W. Bush met in Washington and discussed a number of world issues including the Kashmir and Palestine problems. **15 December:** China and Pakistan signed a number of agreements in the areas of trade, communications, and energy during a visit to Beijing by Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz. **23 December:** The KSE-100 index on the Karachi Stock exchange reached the 6000 mark. **27 December:** Pakistan and India held a meeting at the secretary level in Islamabad at which Pakistan presented a list of 20 confidence-building measures. **30 December:** President Musharraf announced that he will retain the position of chief of army staff until December 2007, the end of his term as president. The move was opposed by all parties in the opposition. The Pakistan People’s Party, the largest opposition party in the national assembly, asked Musharraf not to discredit democracy in the country by continuing to stay in uniform.

**2005 8 January:** General John Amizaid, commander-in-chief of the United States Central Command, visited Islamabad and met with President Pervez Musharraf. **14 January:** Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, arrested on 25 July 2004, a top al Qaeda operative, was handed over to U.S. authorities.

**16 March:** U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice met with President Pervez Musharraf and also held meetings with Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz and Foreign Minister Khurshid Kasuri. The discussions covered Pakistan's participation in the on-going war against terrorism, the situation in Afghanistan, relations with India, the sale of F-16 aircraft, and restoration of full democracy in the country. **22 March:** President Hamid Karzai arrived in Islamabad for two days of consultations with President Pervez Musharraf and Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz. He agreed with Aziz to give a high priority to the construction of the 1,680 km, \$3.5 billion pipeline that would bring Turkmenistan gas to Pakistan via Afghanistan. **24 March:** The cabinet reinstated a requirement, first introduced in 1980, that passport holders state their religion. **2 May:** Pakistani authorities arrested Abu Farj al-Libbi, described as the third ranking official in al Qaeda. The arrested terrorist was implicated in two assassination attempts on President Pervez Musharraf in December 2003. **17 May:** Minister of Information Sheikh Rashid Ahmad announced that President Musharraf will run for reelection when his current term expires in 2007. **27 May:** A suicide bomber attacked the Bari Imam shrine and mosque near Islamabad and killed 20 people and wounded another 67. **29 May:** A suicide bomber and an accomplice died in an attack on a Shiite mosque in Karachi that killed two people, including a policeman and wounded at least 24 others. **1 June:** Nine separatists leaders from the Indian-held part of Kashmir walked across the recently constructed "peace bridge" connecting the two parts of the divided state to become the first separatist politicians to visit Pakistan in 58 years. On the same day, Lal Krishna Advani, President of Bhartiya Janata Party, began a visit to Pakistan at the head of a large delegation. **6 June:** Pakistan released the *Economic Survey, 2004–05* which showed a rate of GDP growth of 8.4 percent in 2004–2005. **27 June:** The Supreme Court began hearing the case of Mukhtaran Bibi in Islamabad. **3 July:** President Pervez Musharraf started a three-day visit to Saudi Arabia. He was accompanied by Shujaat Hussain, president of the Pakistan Muslim League (Q), and Rao Sikander Hayat Khan, leader of the Pakistan Peoples Party (Forward Block), suggesting that domestic politics were the reason for the trip. **4 July:** In a statement the U.S. military said that an air strike in the eastern province close to the Pakistan border had killed an unknown number of "enemy terrorists and non-combatants." **11 July:** It was revealed that of the four suicide bombers implicated in the bombings in London, three were young men belonging to families of Pakistani origin. **19**

**July:** Pakistan authorities launched a massive campaign to address the problem of Islamic extremism. More than 100 individuals were arrested in police raids. **1 September:** Foreign Minister Khurshid Kasuri met with his Israeli counterpart in Istanbul. This was the first high-level contact between senior officials of the two countries. **17 September:** President Musharraf was the guest of honor at a dinner hosted by the American Jewish community in New York. The Pakistani president pledged to improve relations between the Muslim and Jewish communities while not promising immediate recognition of the state of Israel. **8 October:** A 7.6 Richter scale earthquake shook most of northern Pakistan and Azad Kashmir. The tremor killed 87,000 people and injured another 150,000. Three million people were left homeless.

## Introduction

Pakistan is unlike most other countries. It is one of the two nations—the other being Israel—founded on the basis of religion. Although it was created to provide a homeland for the Muslim community of British India, in its original form it was able to accommodate only about half of the people of Islamic faith who lived in the subcontinent. Pakistan's birth in 1947 resulted in one of the largest movements of people in human history when some 14 million people left their homes, with 8 million Muslims leaving India for Pakistan and 6 million people moving in the opposite direction. This was the first large-scale incidence of ethnic cleansing the world was to witness. Within a matter of months, the proportion of Muslims in what is today's Pakistan increased from about 75 percent of the population to 95 percent.

There were other population movements that deeply influenced Pakistan's history. Among them was the migration of millions of people from the country's northern areas to build Karachi, the first capital of Pakistan. In 50 years, Karachi's size increased 40-fold, from a small port city of 250,000 in 1947 to a mega-city of more than 10 million people in 1997. By the end of 2005, the city's population was estimated at 13 million. This explosion brought a number of ethnic and linguistic groups that could not be accommodated socially, politically, and economically in the expanding city. Karachi's institutional development did not keep pace with its demographic expansion. Karachi consequently became one of the most violent cities in the world.

Demographic convulsion also brought four million Afghan refugees to Pakistan in the 1980s and later more than a million Kashmiris displaced by the earthquake in October 2005. There was also an outward movement of people from Pakistan to the Middle East, Great Britain, and North America that created three large Pakistani diasporas that began to interact in several different ways with the homeland. For the last

several years, members of the diaspora began to remit annually \$3 to \$4 billion to Pakistan, equivalent to 5 percent of the country's GDP. This helped to ease the country's resource constraints. However, not all the interactions were benign. For instance, three of the four suicide bombers who attacked London's transport system in July 2005 belonged to families of Pakistani origin. Many members of the diaspora sent their children for education to Pakistani *madrassas*, some of which give training in radical Islam and the pursuit of *jihad*. This became a matter of concern for the countries that had large Pakistani communities.

Pakistan is also unique among developing countries in having split into two almost equal halves as a result of ethnic tensions. Founded on the basis of religion, Islam did not provide a strong enough glue to hold together the two wings of the country on either side of India. While religion proved to be a weak nation-building device, it has had another kind of impact. The ethnic cleansing of 1947 "Muslimized" the country enough to make it a center of Islamic radicalism that shook the world on 11 September 2001 with lethal attacks on the United States. The war between Islamic extremists on the one side and the West led by the United States on the other became intense in the first few years of the 21st century.

Pakistan also lies on several fault lines in the Muslim world. It is in Pakistan that Arab Islam meets South Asian Islam, the first much more conservative than the second. It is also in Pakistan, with the second largest Shia community in the world, that the Sunni and Shia sects of Islam are attempting to coexist. And it is in the northern areas of Pakistan on the border with Afghanistan that Central Asian Islam is seeking to define its future—to accommodate itself in the non-Muslim worlds of South Asia and Europe or to move towards Islamic extremism.

Under General Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's fourth military president, the country is attempting to wean itself away from radical and political Islam and move towards what the country's president calls "enlightened modernization." Whether the country succeeds in achieving this goal will depend on both domestic policies, particularly in the sector of education, as well as the way the West deals with the Muslim world.

A series of demographic convulsions, the Muslimization of the country at the time of independence, the rise of radical Islam inside the coun-

try's borders as well as in the Muslim world around it have all brought volatility to Pakistan. If all this energy is channeled into productive endeavors, Pakistan could follow India—another populous South Asian country—and become a dynamic part of the global economic and political systems. If these forces are allowed to destabilize the country, Pakistan could become the epicenter of an earthquake that would rock the rest of the world.

## LAND AND PEOPLE

The modern nation of Pakistan came into being in December 1971, after the separation of Bangladesh following a bitterly fought civil war. From 1947 to 1971, Pakistan was made up of two “wings,” East and West Pakistan, separated by 1,600 kilometers of Indian territory. West Pakistan became today's Pakistan in 1971, following India's intervention in the conflict between the two wings of the country founded in 1947 as a homeland for the Muslims of British India.

Modern Pakistan has four neighbors, Afghanistan in the north, Iran in the northwest, India in the south, and China in the east. It has an area of 796,000 square kilometers, roughly the size of Texas. It has a land border of 6,159 kilometers of which the longest is with Afghanistan (2,430 km), followed by that with India (2,240 km), Iran (909 km), and China (580 km). The country has a coastline of 1,046 km.

Pakistan can be divided into four major geographical zones that run from east to west. In the east are the high mountains of the Himalayas, the Karakoram and Hindukush ranges, with several peaks reaching above 5,000 meters. A number of rivers, including the Indus, originate in this mountainous terrain and flow into the plains of the Punjab, the next geographical area. In these plains live more than 80 percent of the country's population. They are fertile, and have access to the waters of the Indus River System for year-round irrigation. There are several large cities in the plains including Lahore, Multan, and Faisalabad. While the winters are bitterly cold in the mountainous region, there can be scorching heat in the plains of Punjab during the summer months. The plains gradually turn into arid land and then into an extensive desert that makes up most of the provinces of Balochistan and Sindh. There is little agriculture in this geographic zone. They are also

sparsely populated. The fourth zone is a narrow sea belt with marshlands through which the Indus joins the Arabian Sea. Karachi, the country's largest city, is located at the southern part of the coastal belt.

The Indus is Pakistan's main river; it has six tributaries, each of them a major river in itself. From north to south the tributaries are the Kabul, which joins the river on its right bank, the Jhelum, the Chenab, the Ravi, the Beas, and the Sutlej, all flowing into the river from the left side. The five southern tributaries give the name of Punjab (*pun* means five in Sanskrit, *ab* means water in Persian) to the country's largest province.

Pakistan sits on the northern edge of the Indian tectonic plate that has been slowly moving north at the speed of five centimeters a year. This forward move is hitting against the Eurasian plate producing pressures that often result in severe earthquakes. One such tremor occurred on 8 October 2005 that resulted in the deaths of 85,000 people while another 150,000 were seriously injured. Some three to four million people were rendered homeless. The clash between the Indian and Eurasian plates also produced the mountain ranges of the Himalayas, the Karakoram, and the Hindukush.

In 2005 Pakistan had a population of 155 million people, which was increasing at an annual rate of 2 percent, one of the highest rates of growth in the world. If this rate of increase is maintained, Pakistan could become the world's fourth most populous country in 2050, after India, China, and the United States. The population is divided into six major ethnic groups. The Punjabis, with about 60 percent of the population, are the largest. They speak Punjabi or several of its many dialects, including Seraiki. The second largest group are the Pashtuns, who account for 17 percent of the population, and are concentrated in the provinces of Northwest Frontier Province, Balochistan, Karachi, and the western part of Punjab. They speak Pushto. About 13 percent of the population are Sindhis, living in the province of Sindh, and speaking Sindhi, an ancient language. The Balochis, living in the province of Balochistan, constitute about 6 percent of the population, and speak Balochi. The Muhajir constitute the fifth ethnic group, about 3 percent of the total. They are concentrated in the cities of Karachi and Hyderabad. The Muhajir (refugees), as the name implies, migrated from India to Pakistan in 1947. They speak Urdu, which is also the country's national language.

Some 95 percent of the population is Muslim, of this 75 percent are Sunnis and 25 percent are Shias. Minorities constitute 5 percent of the



population, made up of Christians and Hindus. Since 1977 the Ahmadiya community, a break-away sect of Sunni Islam, has been declared a minority.

Although Urdu is spoken by a small proportion of the population, it is the country's national language because of its association with the Muslim rule in British India. The language is the principal medium of instruction in schools. However, provincial languages are also taught in the schools located in the various provinces. English is widely used as a medium of instruction in colleges and the universities. The business of the government, as well as that in the modern sectors of the economy is conducted in English.

In 2005 almost two fifths of the population lived in urban areas. Karachi, with 13 million people, is the largest city in the country, while Greater Lahore, the capital of Punjab, with a population of 10 million people, is the country's most dynamic urban center. Karachi has the country's two main ports, most of its large industry, and is also the center of finance. That notwithstanding, the city has suffered because of violence among its many ethnic groups, which has stunted its growth. Lahore, which is the educational and cultural center of the country, has now begun to attract industry as well as finance and is catching up with Karachi as the center of urban activities. Another dozen cities have populations of more than a million people and are scattered throughout the country. Islamabad, the current capital, is a new city which began to be constructed in 1962 in the foothills of the Himalayas, 16 kilometers northeast of Rawalpindi, the headquarters of the army. In 2005 it had a population of more than a million people.

## THE ARRIVAL OF ISLAM IN INDIA

Pakistan's history really begins with the arrival of Islam in India in the eighth century. In 712, Muhammad Ibn Qasim conquered and incorporated Sindh province in the Umayyad caliphate, headquartered in Baghdad, Iraq. Under the Abbasids, the successors of the Umayyads, Sindh was culturally integrated in the *Dar al Islam*, the nation of Islam. The Arab control of Sindh was consolidated in the eighth and ninth centuries; in 977 Ibn Shayban was sent by the Fatimid caliphs, by now the rulers of Dar al Islam, to conquer the adjacent province of Punjab.

Multan, a city in the south of Punjab, was conquered and annexed to the Arab domain.

In the 11th century Islam began to encroach on India from another direction. Mahmud of Ghazni, a general operating from a southwestern province of Afghanistan, began to mount expeditions into northwest India. His purpose was to plunder rather than to conquer. His first incursion came in 1001 when he defeated Jaipai, a Hindu ruler, in a battle fought near Peshawar, a city in northern Pakistan. His most famous foray into India was in 1026, when he destroyed the famed temple of Somnath, in Kathiawar, and took the accumulated wealth he found in the temple back to Ghazni. His last Indian expedition was made in 1027 against Multan, which was by then a Muslim city, under the control of the Arab viceroys of Sindh.

This entrance of Islam into the Indus Valley from two different directions—from the Arabian Sea in the southwest by the Arabs and through the Khyber and other passes in the northwest by the Afghans—profoundly affected the social, cultural, and political life of the area that was to become Pakistan. The Arab Islam commingled with the native cultures and religions and laid the ground for the founding of several Sufi orders in Sindh. The saints of Sindh were the direct descendants of these orders and they were to have a significant influence on the economy and political structure of the lower Indus valley. The Islam that came to the northwestern parts of the Indus valley through Afghanistan was much more spartan in character; it was also much less accommodating of indigenous cultures and faiths. Its descendants settled in the Northwestern Frontier Province and in the northern districts of Punjab. These two Islamic traditions found it difficult to coexist, even when the Indus Valley gained independence in the shape of Pakistan.

Shabuddin Muhammad of Ghauri followed Mahmud of Ghazni into India, but his objective was to conquer not to plunder. It was also from Ghazni that Ghauri started on his Indian campaign, beginning with an attack on Multan in 1175, and culminating with his victory over Prithvi Raj of Delhi in 1192. This victory led to the establishment of Muslim rule over northern India. Delhi became the capital of the Muslim rulers. Ghauri's sway over northern India was cut short by his death in 1206. A succession of Muslim sultanates followed Ghauri and ruled India from 1206 to 1526. The Slave dynasty (1206–1290) was founded by Qutubuddin Aibak, who was originally an employee in the service of

Ghauri. In 1290, the Slave dynasty was overthrown by Jalaluddin Khilji, who established a dynasty that took his name (1290–1320), which was replaced in turn in 1320 by the Tughluqs. The Tughluq dynasty (1320–1388) was succeeded by the Sayyid dynasty (1414–1450), which was followed by the Lodi dynasty (1450–1526). Ibrahim Lodi was defeated by Babar in the battle of Panipat in 1526; Babar went on to Delhi, proclaimed himself the emperor of India and established the Mughul empire, which lasted until 1857.

Although the first five Mughul emperors of India, from Babar (1526–1530) to Shahjahan (1627–1658), were Muslims, they showed considerable tolerance toward other religions, in particular Hinduism, the dominant faith of the region. Most of them brought Hindu women into their harems and allowed Hindus to hold senior court and military appointments. One of them—Akbar the Great (1556–1605)—went so far as to proclaim his own religion, *Dine-Ilhai*, as a synthesis of the common faiths of India. Aurangzeb (1658–1707), the last of the great Mughul emperors, adopted a different stance, however. He was not prepared to accommodate other religions and was also not tolerant of the independent states on the borders of Mughul India. Attempting to bring all of South Asia under his control and to spread Islam among his subjects, Aurangzeb exhausted his own energies as well as those of the Mughul state.

It was the turmoil created by Aurangzeb's foray into South India that provided the British East India Company with the opportunity to establish its trading outposts in Bengal. As the Mughul power declined, that of the British trading company increased. The traders became generals able to use their immense profits to hire native soldiers and build an army. The East India Company army was better equipped and disciplined than the militias commanded by local warlords, who took over the periphery of the shrinking Mughul empire. The Mughul empire in India had all the attributes of a large continental state: strong at the center and weak around its periphery. It was the periphery that the British successfully penetrated.

The British advance toward the center took about a century; the only major challenge to it came in 1857 when the *sepoys* (soldiers), paid by the Company, rebelled against their employers. The Great Indian Mutiny of 1857 was the result; the leaderless *sepoys* inflicted a great deal of damage on the British, but they were finally defeated and

brought under the control of the Company's forces. The mutiny produced important political consequences for Muslim India: the East India Company was dissolved; Bahadur Shah, the last Mughul emperor, was deported from India; and India was made a part of the British empire. The capital was moved from Muslim-dominated Delhi to Calcutta, a new city the British had founded and in which the Hindu merchants flourished. After more than 1,000 years of uninterrupted rule in some part or another of India, the Muslims were now without a territory they could call their own.

It took the Muslims 90 years, from 1857 to 1947, to reestablish a state of their own in the Indian subcontinent. But the passage from subjugation to independence was not an easy one: It produced what the British administrators in India began to describe as the "Mussulman problem."

## TOWARD THE DEMAND FOR PAKISTAN

In the 1940s when the demand for Pakistan gained momentum, there were some 100 million Muslims in British India, slightly more than one-fourth of the total population. Religion was the only thing this community shared; there were vast differences of language, culture, social, and economic backgrounds between, for example, the Muslims of the Punjab and those of Bengal, or, again, between the Muslims of the Northwestern Frontier Province and the state of Hyderabad in British India's deep south. Within this one Muslim nation there existed at least three separate communities: one in the northwest (the provinces of Punjab, Sindh, and Northwest Frontier, the princely states of Bahawalpur, Kalat, and Khaipur); the second in the northeast (the provinces of Bengal and Assam); and the third in the north, central and western parts of British India (United and Central provinces, provinces of Bihar, Orissa, and Bombay, the capital city of Delhi, and numerous princely states scattered all over this part of the country). Most of the descendants of the Muslims who lived in the northwest are now the citizens of Pakistan; most of those of the northeast now live in Bangladesh; some of those in the third area either migrated to Pakistan or stayed behind in independent India.

The first two communities constituted clear majorities in their areas: of the total population of 60 million in the northwest, 60 percent pro-

fessed Islam to be their religion; of 90 million in the northeast, some 55 percent were Muslims. It was only in the north-central provinces that Muslims were a small minority, comprising no more than 20 percent of the total population. Muslims who belonged to this community were more educated, urbanized, and possessed a modern outlook compared to those in the other two. Although agriculture was the principal source of income for the Muslims in the northwest and northeast, those in the north-central provinces depended mostly on government, law, medicine, commerce, and industry for their livelihood.

In many ways the Muslims of the northwest had benefited from the British raj. There was some threat of economic competition from the non-Muslims once the British lifted the protection they had provided, but for them this threat constituted only a minor worry. The Muslim landed aristocracy was powerful in the countryside, the religious leaders had a great deal of support in villages as well as towns, and even the small urban community of Muslims had been reasonably well accommodated in the professions and in public services. The Muslims in the northeast constituted a totally different socioeconomic class. Unlike the northwestern Muslims, they owned little land, did not have much education, and had not found a comfortable place for themselves in the modern administrative and economic institutions the British had brought to India. Those in the northwest constituted the aristocracy of the Indian Muslim society; those in the northeast made up its peasantry and proletariat.

In between these two social and economic polar extremes were the Muslims of Delhi, the United and Central provinces, Bihar, Orissa, Bombay, and Gujarat. They were the descendants of the Mughul raj: sons, grandsons; great-grandsons of the families that had, for over two centuries, served the Mughul administration in various capacities. This was the elite the British conquest of India had hurt the most; they were deprived not only of their traditional jobs, but also of their social and cultural status. In 1857 this community made one disorganized but bloody attempt to regain the power it had lost to the British. The community called it the War of Independence; the British labeled it the Great Indian Mutiny. The British, with great force and much brutality, put down the mutiny. Once the situation had returned to normal, the Muslims found that their position had become even more precarious, in part because the languages they used were not those in which the matters of state would

be conducted. Up to 1857 the East India Company that governed the British territories had continued to use Persian and Urdu as quasi-official languages. After 1857 the responsibility of administering these territories passed to the officials appointed directly by the government in Great Britain. English became British India's lingua franca, and the Hindu community, freed from Muslim control and freed from the need to learn Muslim languages, eagerly became students of English.

English became the medium of official communication; because the Muslims had shown considerable disdain for all things English, including the language, they suddenly found themselves functionally illiterate and unemployed. The places they vacated were quickly occupied by the Hindus. "The pliant and adaptable Hindu was not agitated by the scruples which had tormented the Muslims," wrote W.W. Hunter, a contemporary British administrator. The Muslims stayed away—or, some believed, were deliberately kept away—from the British raj. "A hundred and seventy years ago," Hunter went on to say, "it was impossible for a well-born Mussulman to become poor; at present it is almost impossible for him to continue to be rich. . . . There is no Government office in which a Muslim could hope for any post above the rank of porter, messenger, filler of inkpots, and a mender of pens."

Bringing this community out of this state of self-imposed exile, therefore, became a major preoccupation with a number of Muslim reformers. The most successful of these was Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan who, having started his professional career as a minor government functionary, discovered that his people would not be able to make much headway without modern education. For Pakistan (its creation as well as its political and social development), Sir Sayyid's educational program had two important consequences. First, those who accepted his outlook and his philosophy were able to find their way back into the economic and social life of modern India. The university that he founded in the town of Aligarh soon began to produce graduates who could easily move into the upper ranks of the British Indian Army, and also into the upper echelons of the rapidly expanding administrative system of the British raj. They could enter as well the modern professions—law, medicine, banking, commerce, industry, teaching—that had helped the Hindus advance rapidly in British India. It was this Aligarh generation that not only provided the Pakistan Movement with its leadership, but was to provide Pakistan with its first ruling elite.

The second important consequence of Sir Sayyid's efforts was that they helped at least one segment of the Indian Muslim community to modernize by changing its identity. Aligarh made it possible for a large number of Muslims to finally leave behind the "Mughul" society of the early 19th century, in which Muslims identified primarily with family and lineage, and through these with the Mughul political system. At Aligarh University young Muslims discovered a new political identity. The Aligarh generation began to seek for themselves, and for the members of their community, a political future in which they could practice their religion in comfort and in which they could preserve their culture from being overrun by the more numerous Hindus. In many ways Aligarh prepared the ground in which Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Pakistan's founding father, and his like-minded associates could plant the seed of Pakistan—a separate homeland for the Muslims of British India. These seeds, in order to sprout and grow, needed the political waters of the other two communities of Muslim India.

The other Muslim communities, those in the northwest and northeast, by and large remained untouched by the reform movement that affected the Muslims in the central provinces and by the growing sentiment among the Muslims of British India that they must aggressively seek a separate identity for themselves. This was the case in particular for the upper echelons of the Muslim community of India's northwestern provinces—Punjab, Sindh, and the Frontier—where, as already noted, the Muslims were comfortable with their present situation as well as with their future prospects. If Aligarh touched this community, it was only at the margin. Some prominent families from the northwestern provinces sent their sons to Aligarh; but these sons, after graduation, seldom returned to their homes and to the areas of their parents' residence. Aided by modern education and in full command of English, they usually found their way into either government service—into the various branches of the civil administration or the army—or into one of the many modern professions. Many of the Aligarh graduates from the northwest were to play very significant political roles in Pakistan. In these roles they were torn between the teachings of Aligarh—the virtues of parliamentary democracy and *laissez-faire* economics—and the values of the society to which they belonged, which favored paternalism and statism.

Although the leadership of the Pakistan movement came essentially from among the Muslim minority provinces of British India—Muhammad

Ali Jinnah was from Bombay; Liaqat Ali Khan, his principal lieutenant, was from a small Punjab city on the border of the United Provinces; Chaudhry Khaliquzzman was from the United Provinces; the Nawab of Bhopal and the Raja of Mahmudabad were from two of the several princely states in and around the Central Provinces; I.I. Chundrigar was from Bombay—the Pakistan movement would not have developed the force it did without winning the support of the Muslim-dominated provinces in the northwestern and northeastern parts of the country. Initially, the idea of Pakistan was slow to take hold. Once it caught on in Bengal, parts of Assam, Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan, and the Northwest Frontier Provinces, the emergence of Pakistan became inevitable. But it was a different dynamic that brought about the conversion of these three Muslim communities to the idea of Pakistan. It was political frustration that persuaded the Muslims of the north-central provinces to opt for the idea of Pakistan; religion played an important role in winning over the northwestern Muslims; and social and economic deprivation were the main reasons for the support eventually given by the northeastern Muslims to the demand for Pakistan.

The state of Pakistan, therefore, was the product of a number of different aspirations expressed quite unambiguously by three rather different Muslim communities of British India. It was because of the extraordinary political genius of Muhammad Ali Jinnah that these aspirations could be accommodated within one movement; that Bengalis, Punjabis, and Muslims of the United Provinces could work together resolutely toward one political objective, the attainment of Pakistan. For seven years—from the passage of the Lahore Resolution in 1940 that demanded the creation of Pakistan to independence in 1947—all differences were brushed aside as Jinnah led his Muslim League to electoral victories in all the provinces that were important for the future state of Pakistan.

But what kind of country did the Muslims create for themselves in the territory of British India, where they constituted a majority? It was meant to achieve different things for different people: emancipation from the Hindu landlords for the peasantry of Bengal and Assam; the creation of new economic and political opportunities for the frustrated urban Muslim classes of Delhi, Bombay, and the United and Central Provinces; establishment of a Muslim—albeit not Islamic—state for the *pirs* and *sajjada nashins* of Sindh, Punjab, and the Northwest Frontier.



Certainly the task was not easy; to this day it remains unfinished. Bangladesh, the eastern wing of a two-winged country, left in 1971 after a bitter conflict and a civil war; and the western wing, the present-day Pakistan, once again began the arduous task of nation building that remains unfinished to this day.

## SIX PERIODS IN PAKISTAN'S HISTORY

The remaining part of this introduction and the period covered in the dictionary will deal only with the new Pakistan—the country that emerged after the secession of East Pakistan as Bangladesh in December 1971. Pakistan's evolution is best understood if its history of nearly 60 years is divided into six periods. The first period lasted for 11 years, from 1947, the year of Pakistan's birth, to 1958 when the Pakistani military first intervened in politics. The second period covers 13 years of the first long military rule, from October 1958 to December 1971, during which two generals, Muhammad Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan, governed as presidents. The third period, from December 1971 to July 1977, witnessed the emergence of the first strong political government led by a civilian politician, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. The fourth period lasted for 11 years from 1977 to 1988 when Pakistan was under the rule of the military once again. The fifth period saw the reappearance of democracy. This period lasted for 11 years, from 1988 to 1999, and ended with the re-entry of the military into politics for the fourth time in the country's history. Pakistan is still in the sixth period, once again under the domination of the military.

### **A Struggling Democracy, 1947–1958**

For two reasons Pakistan found it difficult to overcome the trauma of partition. It took the country more than 11 years to create the environment within which the lingering pangs of birth could be dealt with. To begin with, although the sister state of India could continue with the institutions established by the British, Pakistan had to start with a completely new state. A new government, with new ministries and departments, moved to a new capital, Karachi. A new diplomatic corps had to be organized and a new military force had to be created. A new currency had to be printed; for

several months, Pakistan used the Indian rupee with the word “Pakistan” stamped on it as its legal tender. A new central bank had to be established. A new court system had to be set up. All of these were daunting tasks.

All this was made even more difficult in light of the second problem partition brought to the new country. Within a few months of Pakistan’s creation, it received eight million Muslim refugees from India, while six million Hindus and Sikhs moved in the opposite direction. Nobody had expected a transfer of population of this magnitude. When the first population census was taken in February 1951, 30 months after the country’s birth, West Pakistan, the western wing of the country, had been thoroughly cleansed ethnically. The proportion of Muslims living in this area had increased by 25 percentage points, going from 70 percent to 95 percent of the total. The exchange of population had a profound social and political impact. It resulted in the “Muslimization” of the Pakistani population.

The refugees came in two streams. One stream originated in the north-central provinces of British India and went to Karachi and other cities of Sindh. The people in this stream quickly assumed control of most of the modern institutions created after independence. They staffed the civil administration; set up businesses; and went into such modern professions as banking, law, medicine, and teaching. Because their political base was narrow, they were not in a great hurry to establish modern political institutions that they, because of their small number, could not dominate. The other stream of refugees came from the eastern districts of Punjab, which were now part of India. The people from this stream settled mostly in Pakistan’s Punjab and took over the land and agricultural businesses vacated by the departing Hindus and Sikhs. The armed forces also offered employment opportunities to which a large number of the new settlers were attracted. The great migration from India, therefore, transformed the social scene of what was now West Pakistan. The refugees who went to Sindh took over the modern sectors of the economy and dominated most institutions of government. The refugees who settled in Punjab carved a niche for themselves in agriculture and entered the armed forces in large numbers.

The fact that most established leadership groups in Pakistan had not been warm to the idea of Pakistan created political space for the new arrivals at the top of the political structure. Operating from the top, the refugees sought to broaden their base but because this was a time-consuming task, Pakistan’s political development proceeded very slowly.

However, neither of these two streams of migrants had formed clear views on what kind of political structure should be adopted in the country they helped create. The host population, comfortable with the institutions the British had created—or adapted from the systems operated by the Sikh and Mughul rulers—would have preferred a strong executive capable of delivering the services they wanted. Enthusiasm for the Islamic revivalist sentiment that had grown during the campaign for the establishment of Pakistan had resulted in the expectation that the new country would Islamize some of the established systems. Some elements within the host population, therefore, wished to introduce some Islamic features into the mode of governance. The presence of East Bengal added the fourth variable to this complicated political equation. The result was a political impasse that lasted for nearly nine years, at the end of which Pakistan promulgated its first constitution.

The structure of Pakistani society as it evolved after the country was born also had a profound impact on the way its economy developed during this period. With the muhajir community in control of most institutions of government and with the National Assembly not powerful enough to influence economic decision-making, the policy-makers were able to deflect the government's resources away from the sectors dominated by the host population. Agriculture was starved of resources, while funds were lavished on the new sectors of manufacturing, large-scale commerce, and construction. India's decision to terminate all trade with Pakistan in 1949 further helped the pace of industrialization. The Indians took the decision to punish Pakistan for its refusal to follow Delhi which, along with other capitals in the British Commonwealth, had devalued its currency with respect to the U.S. dollar.

Largely as a result of this series of traumatic events, the first period in Pakistan's history witnessed only a modest increase in the rate of growth of the gross domestic product and stagnation of agricultural output. Although the provinces that were now part of Pakistan were once called the granary of India, by 1954 the country had become a net importer of food grains.

### **First Military Period, 1958–1971**

When General Muhammad Ayub Khan, the first Pakistani to command the army, began to plan the takeover of the government by the

military, he was convinced that his move would have popular support. There were many reasons for his confidence. The political chaos of the previous 11 years, economic dislocations caused by the trade war with India, and the resentment of the host population over loss of power to the refugee community were some of the factors that had created a deep crisis of governance in the country. Pakistan was ready for a dramatic change and it came in October 1958 in the form of military rule. Ayub Khan and his associates moved with caution. The first step was to persuade President Iskander Mirza to issue a proclamation putting the country under martial law. This was done on 8 October and Ayub Khan was appointed chief martial-law administrator. The second step was taken on 27 October when President Mirza was persuaded to resign and Ayub Khan took over as president.

It took Ayub Khan four years to decide on the political structure he needed to govern. He wished to accomplish two things: First, he wanted to bring the indigenous leaders, mostly landlords, back into the political fold. He chose an ingenious device for accomplishing this objective. A system of local government—the Basic Democracies—was put in place that gave significant powers to local communities and also brought them closer to the instruments of the state. In the constitution promulgated in 1962, 80,000 Basic Democrats, 40,000 from each wing of the country and directly elected by the people, became, in turn, the electoral college for choosing the president and the members of the National and Provincial Assemblies. Second, the new constitution provided a strong executive at the center, thus bringing back the figure of great political authority with which West Pakistan's indigenous population had become so familiar while the Mughuls, Sikhs, and British ruled these areas. The Constitution of 1962 was thus able to “indigenize” the politics of West Pakistan that had been so disturbed by the arrival of millions of refugees from India.

By relocating the capital from Karachi to Islamabad, a new city built near Rawalpindi, the headquarters of the Pakistani army, Ayub Khan helped to further erode the political power and the control of the refugee community on public institutions. The landed aristocracy, discredited earlier by its failure to enthusiastically support the Pakistan movement, walked into the political space the refugee community was forced to vacate. This was, of course, deeply resented by the refugees, who many years later proclaimed themselves a separate nationality—separate from

the Balochis, Pathans, Punjabis, and Sindhis—and organized themselves under the banner of a new political entity called the *Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz*. On the other hand, the landlords were pleased to be back on the center stage of politics. No man better personified this development than Nawab Amir Muhammad Khan Kalabagh, who as governor of West Pakistan wielded the kind of power and influence possessed by the governors of the days of the British raj. Pakistan's political culture returned to the values held in the first half of the 20th century.

Ayub Khan's social and political engineering brought stability and laid the ground for the remarkable economic progress made during the "decade of development." Agriculture led this recovery; in the late 1960s Pakistan witnessed what came to be called the "green revolution"—a sharp increase in agricultural productivity fueled by the adoption of high-yielding wheat and rice varieties. With small- and medium-sized farmers at the vanguard of this revolution, there was a palpable improvement in income distribution in the countryside. The effect of the revolution was also felt in the small towns that provided services and markets for the rapidly modernizing agricultural sector.

While the countryside was in the throes of the green revolution, large-scale industries continued to expand, moving into new product lines and into new areas of the country. Under Ayub Khan, Punjab and the Northwest Frontier also began to industrialize. Had the political sector been more accommodating, the economic progress achieved during the Ayub Khan period might have been sustained. The virtual exclusion of large segments of the population—in particular the muhajir community of Karachi and the urban professionals—created considerable resentment against the regime, the extent of which surprised the ruling elite. The active opposition Ayub Khan faced in the presidential elections of 1965 was the first manifestation of this growing sentiment. It was contained briefly by the September 1965 war with India, but resurfaced with even greater force following the end of the war and the signing of the Tashkent agreement with India in 1966. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Ayub Khan's foreign minister, left the government, accusing the president of surrendering at Tashkent what he believed had been achieved on the battlefield. In March 1969, Ayub Khan was forced out by the military, which now considered him a liability rather than an asset.

General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan, Pakistan's second military president, oversaw the country's breakup. His handling of the political

agitation that resulted in Ayub Khan's removal from office unleashed political forces he neither anticipated nor was able to contain. East Pakistan, unable to take advantage of the massive electoral victory in the general elections of 1970—the first to be held on the basis of adult franchise—rebelled against the domination of West Pakistan. After a brief but bitter civil war, East Pakistan emerged as the independent country of Bangladesh in December 1971. Yahya Khan, presiding over a demoralized country, surrendered the presidency to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, whose Pakistan People's Party (PPP) had won a majority in the 1970 elections at the expense of the Muslim League.

### **A Populist Interlude, 1971–1977**

The third period in Pakistan's history also began with a social revolution that was as profound as the one caused by the arrival of eight million refugees from India or the one produced by Muhammad Ayub Khan's politics of indigenization at the start of the second period. Social transformation at the beginning of the third period resulted from the practice of "naïve socialism." Bhutto's rhetoric and the policies followed by his administration once he took office bestowed a considerable amount of political and economic power on a number of groups that had been largely excluded from the political and economic system. The socioeconomic groups that benefited during Bhutto's short tenure included the urban poor, workers in large-scale organized industries, and urban professionals.

The policies adopted by the Bhutto government to reach this new constituency were spelt out in considerable detail in the "Foundation Papers" of the PPP issued soon after the formation of the organization in 1968. The approach to be adopted was a simple one. Because the founding fathers of the PPP believed that the private sector as it was organized in Pakistan would neither benefit the poor nor bring about an improvement in income distribution, the state had to intervene directly in managing industrial, commercial, and financial assets. This approach was implemented aggressively once the PPP was in power. In a series of acts of nationalization executed in 1972-74, the state assumed control over large segments of industry and commerce operated by private entrepreneurs. It also took over all commercial banks and insurance companies. It went so far as to nationalize educational institutions that were operating in the private sector.

Bhutto believed that in order to run an economic system dominated by the state, he had to concentrate political power in his hands and in the hands of his close associates. He began to subvert the constitution he had himself drafted the moment it was promulgated. The subversion was meant to take away all power from the instruments of government that he did not fully control. The powers of the National Assembly were curtailed and fundamental rights granted by the constitution were suspended. A paramilitary force—the Federal Security Force (FSF)—was created, ostensibly to help police maintain law and order. In fact, it was used to openly intimidate and harass the regime’s opponents. Even Bhutto’s close associates were not spared if they dared disagree with him. There were rumors that the FSF had been ordered to kill some of Bhutto’s more intransigent opponents. Later, it was one of these murders that resulted in Bhutto’s receiving the death sentence and his subsequent execution.

Bhutto’s social and economic policies and the way he conducted himself in office produced a number of predictable results. Of special concern for many people was the loss of political liberty. There was an expectation of a return to democracy following the end of the long military rule. Instead, Bhutto established a form of “civilian dictatorship” that was much more vicious than the military rule of Presidents Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan. Economic difficulties further aggravated the situation. There is now good understanding among economists on how this type of approach—called here *naïve socialism*—can do a great deal of damage to the economy. This happens for three reasons: First, countries with a highly intrusive state of the type developed by Bhutto tend to have a higher share of the informal economy in total GDP. This occurs as private entrepreneurs work to escape government’s controls and regulations and move “underground.” Second, a large underground economy usually feeds corruption as the owners of assets in this part of the economy have either to bribe officials to keep the assets hidden, or have to buy services, such as protection of property and enforcement of contracts. Third, as more and more people escape into the economy’s underground, the government is unable to collect taxes. With the tax base narrowing, the government can no longer provide fully the services expected of it. This in turn weakens the government and affects its legitimacy. All of this occurred during the Bhutto period and ultimately contributed to his downfall.

People's reactions to Bhutto came following the elections of 1977 in which the opposition had expected to do much better than indicated by official results. The results announced by the Election Commission indicated a massive victory for Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party. The opposition, convinced that the regime had rigged the elections, took to the streets and brought down the government. On 5 July 1977 the army, under the command of General Zia ul-Haq, intervened for the third time in Pakistan's political history. Bhutto's removal from office began the second long interval of army rule and the fourth period in Pakistan's history.

### **Second Military Rule, 1977–1988**

Unlike the first three periods in Pakistan's history, the fourth did not begin with a major social change. But like the three periods before it, this period also ultimately witnessed a significant transformation of the society. This change occurred gradually but left a deep and lasting impression. By the time Zia ul-Haq left the scene—he was killed in an airplane crash that also claimed the lives of several senior officers of the army and that of the U.S. ambassador to Islamabad—Pakistan had been set on the road towards Islamization. It had lost much of its Western orientation and was considerably closer to the Muslim countries of West Asia.

In all probability, Zia did not assume control of the country intending to keep it under martial law for a long time and to remain in power himself for an extended period. He became involved largely because of a fear that the failure to act on his part could bring about a serious rift within the ranks of the armed forces. The ferocity with which the opposition had fought Bhutto after the elections of 1977 not only surprised the prime minister, it was also not anticipated by the army intelligence. Called to the aid of civil authority, the army had to use great force against street agitators. With casualties mounting among the agitators, middle-ranking officers in the army began to question why they were being called upon to kill innocent people to protect an unpopular regime. Zia listened and decided to move against Bhutto in order to prevent the army from being politicized. Once Pakistan was placed under martial law, Zia took one step at a time. Unlike Ayub Khan, he did not have a clear strategy for the future.



Zia belonged to the social group—urban, middle-class professionals—that had high expectations from Bhutto when he took over the reins of government. Greatly disappointed with the way Bhutto had behaved in office, this class was at the forefront of the agitation that brought down the prime minister. Zia believed that Bhutto's term in office had created a serious divide between the rulers and the middle classes. Ordinary citizens of Pakistan expected some decency from the people in power. They had seen little of that from Bhutto and his close associates. One way of closing the gap was to tell the people that the rulers were not much different from them, that they shared the same set of values. Zia believed that this message could be communicated clearly if he explicitly followed what was expected from a Muslim leader. He would bring comfort to those who had been disillusioned by Bhutto by spearheading a movement to bring Islamic values to the country. After all, Pakistan had been created for the Muslims of British India. It was now necessary to turn this Muslim country into an Islamic state.

Zia's program of Islamization moved on three fronts—social, political, and economic. He was a practicing Muslim himself and set a personal example of piety and modesty that he expected his associates to follow. His beliefs were the beliefs of the lower and middle classes of Pakistan. He observed the basic tenets of Islam in a very public way. Official meetings were interrupted to allow time for prayers. Prayer times were announced on public radio and television. Government working hours were adjusted to make it easier for people to fast during the month of Ramadan. Zia encouraged government officials to go to *haj* and *umrah*; he performed the pilgrimage to Mecca himself a number of times. He expected that women would stay at home and not enter the workplace.

Zia sought to bring Islam into politics in several other ways. Although he had decided not to abrogate the Constitution of 1973 and thus had not followed the example set by Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan, he brought changes in the political structure that were supposed to make it Islamic. He nominated a *majlis-e-shura* (an assembly) to take the place of the National Assembly, which had been dissolved following the imposition of martial law. The people nominated to the assembly were supposed to be good Muslims. New clauses were inserted in the constitution to recognize in an explicit way that Pakistan was not

just a country with the majority of its citizens belonging to the Islamic religion but was an Islamic state. Among the changes incorporated was the creation of the Shariat Court as an adjunct to the Supreme Court, to ensure that all laws enacted by the legislature were Islamic. If the citizens were troubled by some legislation on the grounds that it went against the teachings of Islam, they were encouraged to seek remedy from the Shariat Court.

Efforts were also made to Islamize the economy. The most significant changes introduced by the Zia regime in its Islamization efforts related to the banking and fiscal systems. Commercial and investment banks were no longer permitted to charge interest on the loans made by them or to pay interest on the deposits kept with them. All depositors were treated as shareholders earning a return on their equity. By loaning money the banks became partners in the business for which funds were provided. The government introduced *zakat*, an Islamic tax on wealth, the proceeds from which were used to assist the “deserving.” Zakat funds were managed by zakat committees that were responsible for identifying the “*mustahiqeen*,” the deserving. Zakat funds were also allocated to *madrassas* (religious schools). The curriculum taught in these schools had to have the approval of boards of education set up for this purpose. Although Islam encourages private enterprise, the Zia administration made few efforts to reduce the size of the state inherited from Bhutto. A few small-scale enterprises that had been taken over by the Bhutto government were privatized but the role of the state remained large and intrusive. The tendencies detailed previously—the growth of the underground economy, increase in the levels of corruption, and the inability of the state to provide basic services to the people—continued during the Zia period.

Apart from Islamization, the Zia government left one more enduring legacy. When, in December 1979, the Soviet Union sent its troops into Afghanistan to protect the communist regime established a few years earlier, Zia enthusiastically recruited Pakistan to the cause of ridding its neighbor of communism. In this it had the support of the United States and Saudi Arabia. Pakistan became the conduit for arms that began to flow from the West to the Afghan *mujahideen* (freedom fighters); its intelligence services, in particular the Interservices Intelligence (ISI), provided active support to the Afghans, and the freedom fighters were allowed to operate bases in Pakistani territory. The *mujahideen* won; the

Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989 and two years later the weight of the military endeavor in Afghanistan contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union. These successes notwithstanding, Pakistan paid a heavy price for its involvement in this conflict. For years to come, it had to suffer the consequences of its support to the mujahideen, which included the flow of arms into the country and the development of a drug trade. Zia's emphasis on Islamization and his support for the war against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan brought an exceptionally militant Islam to Pakistan. "Sectarianism"—a violent confrontation between different sects of Islam—which arrived in Pakistan in the middle of the 1990s, was the direct consequence of the policies of President Zia ul-Haq. And as the world was to learn later, after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on the United States, some of the groups and many of the institutions Zia ul-Haq had promoted had aligned themselves closely with al Qaeda, an organization that was committed to removing all Western presence, in particular that of the United States, from the Muslim world.

### **Competitive Democracy, 1988–1999**

The fifth period in Pakistan's history began with an unforeseen development: President Zia ul-Haq's death in an air crash near the city of Bahawalpur on 17 August 1988. Had Zia not died, there were indications that he would have tried to perpetuate his rule by changing the constitution. The "Islamabad establishment"—the name given by Benazir Bhutto to the coalition of groups that wielded an enormous amount of political power in Pakistan's capital and included the senior army and civil officials and the representatives of large-scale industry and commerce—was not prepared to accept this move. The group briefly toyed with the idea of putting the country back under martial law, but decided in favor of accepting the constitutional provision that in case of the death of the president, he would be succeeded by the chairman of the Senate, the upper house of the national legislature. The fact that Ghulam Ishaq Khan, a veteran civil servant turned politician, occupied this position contributed to this decision. Khan was a prominent member of the Islamabad establishment.

The caretaker regime headed by the acting president decided to hold elections in October 1988 and when Benazir Bhutto's PPP won the most

seats in the National Assembly, the establishment then decided to offer her the prime ministership provided that she accepted some conditions. These included the formation of an informal governing council made up of the president, the prime minister, and the chief of the army staff. This arrangement came to be known as the “troika” and was responsible for making all important decisions. When Bhutto tried to free herself of this constraint, she was dismissed under Article 58.2(b) of the constitution, which had been inserted by President Zia ul-Haq. Another general election in October 1990 brought Mian Nawaz Sharif, a Zia protégé, to power. He too felt constrained by the “troika” arrangement and his efforts to gain independence met with the same fate—dismissal by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan under Article 58.2(b).

Sharif appealed his dismissal to the Supreme Court and won his case. He was reinstated as prime minister but the president refused to cooperate, creating a constitutional crisis. It was resolved by the army, which worked behind the scenes, forcing both the president and the prime minister out of office. Yet another election was held in October 1993 and resulted in Benazir Bhutto coming back to Islamabad as prime minister. The main lesson Bhutto learned from her previous occupation of this office was to get one of her loyal lieutenants to be elected president. Farooq Ahmad Khan Leghari became president in December 1993 and served under Bhutto’s shadow for nearly three years. Troubled by the amount of mismanagement and corruption that prevailed during her tenure, Leghari surprised her in November 1996 by using Article 58.2(b) to dismiss her. The people of Pakistan went back to the polls again in February 1997 and presented an overwhelming mandate to Nawaz Sharif, the leader of the opposition and the president of the Muslim League.

The elections of February 1997 brought new administrations to power not only in Islamabad, the federal capital, but also to Lahore, the capital of Punjab, the largest province. The federal and Punjab provincial governments were formed by the Muslim League, the party in opposition during Benazir Bhutto’s term in office. The League governments took office with very comfortable majorities in the National and Provincial Assemblies. The party received a clear mandate from the people to set the country back on track; in particular, to provide good governance and restore health to the battered economy.

The fact that Pakistan held four elections that placed four administrations in office, each of which was either dismissed by the president

or removed from office by the military, resulted in extreme political instability during this period. The reason for this was simple. The country had failed to bridge the great divide that separated the structure of the society from the structure of the political system. The society had evolved rapidly since independence. A number of new socioeconomic groups had emerged that wanted to carve out a place for themselves in the political structure. This was not provided, because the political system remained dominated by one socioeconomic group: the landed aristocracy. This group, although powerful, was insecure about the future. It realized that if the political system was allowed to evolve as envisaged in the constitution, it would lose a great deal of power to the new groups. The constitution of 1973 had provided for the reapportionment of seats in the National Assembly on the basis of population distribution. The distribution of population was to be determined by censuses held every 10 years. This was not done; the landed interests were able to prevent a census from being held for 17 years. With the political system thus atrophied, the groups not fully represented had no choice but to resort to extra constitutional means. This pressure contributed to the periodic dismissals of prime ministers.

### **Third Military Rule, 1999–?**

General Pervez Musharraf moved against the government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on 12 October 1999. He was persuaded to take this action because of the changes that were being introduced by the prime minister in the military's senior management. On 12 October the prime minister dismissed General Musharraf while he was flying back from Colombo to Karachi, and appointed one of the generals who were close to him as his successor. This move was not acceptable to the military, which took over the country's airports, television and radio stations, and other strategic assets while General Musharraf was still en route to Karachi. The general's plane landed safely at the Karachi airport and he flew on to Islamabad to proclaim himself the country's chief executive.

Once General Musharraf had taken over as the head of the new military government, he moved quickly to bring about economic stabilization. He appointed a number of professionals to manage the economy, and promised to bring growth back to the country. The first two years

of the Musharraf period, from 1999 to 2001, were spent in stabilizing the economic situation. This was done with the assistance of the International Monetary Fund, which persuaded Islamabad to adopt a very conservative fiscal strategy. The result of this was a slowdown in the rate of economic growth to only 3 percent a year. This was not enough to provide for the poorer segments of the population. The pool of poverty consequently increased.

The terrorist attack on the United States of 11 September 2001 brought a fundamental change in Pakistan's fortunes. With General Musharraf deciding to side with the United States, he gained recognition as Pakistan's legitimate leader, a status that was denied him following the overthrow of a democratically elected government, and large amounts of foreign capital also began to flow into the country. This helped to revive economic growth.

While the performance on the economic front was impressive General Musharraf did little to open the political system to larger participation by the people. In fact, he brought the army into a number of areas in which it had not encroached under the previous military administration. Serving and retired senior officials of the military were given positions of importance in the government and also became managers of various parts of the public sector. The result of this was growing resentment against the military's role in managing the country.

During Musharraf's period, the Islamic parties managed to create an important place for themselves in the political landscape. This poses a serious challenge for the president since he has vowed to modernize various aspects of the Pakistani society by implementing a program that he labels "enlightened modernization."

Pervez Musharraf has held the reins of power for more than six years. Barring an accident or some unfortunate event—there were two unsuccessful attempts on his life in December 2003—he could govern the country for several more years. He has already indicated his intention to contest the presidential elections scheduled to be held in 2007. By that time he would have governed for eight years; another five years as president would extend his tenure to 2012, a total of 13 years. This would be the longest period in office by one leader in Pakistan's history. It would also be the most significant since it will define what kind of country and state Pakistan will become. In October 1999, when General Musharraf assumed power, Pakistan had begun to be described as a rap-

idly failing state. He may have rescued the country from following that course but whether he will succeed in pulling Pakistan back from the abyss towards which it was headed will depend upon a combination of circumstances—the general's ability to address the five challenges he faces at the end of 2005 (discussed in the section below) and the way the still-building conflict between the forces of radical Islam and the West shape up.

## ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

At the time of the independence in 1947, Pakistan was primarily an agricultural economy, with the sector producing two thirds of the gross domestic product and providing employment to 80 percent of the population. However, within a short period of time the economy began to industrialize and urbanize. There were two reasons for this transformation. One, the large-scale movement of people that accompanied independence and brought 8 million Muslims, mostly from the urban areas of India, into Pakistan. Of the 6 million Hindus and Sikhs that left the country and went to India, about a third were from the countryside. The migration, therefore, produced a significant increase in the proportion of urban population. The second reason for the structural transformation was the trade war with India in 1949 that forced Pakistan to industrialize in order to compensate for the goods that were previously imported from India.

Under Ayub Khan, Pakistan's first military president, the state worked hard to promote industrial development as well as the development of such modern sectors of the economy as finance and insurance. During Ayub Khan's 11 years in power, from 1958 to 1969, Pakistan's rate of growth at 6.4 percent of GDP a year was among the highest in the developing world. At that time the country was regarded as a model for growth and structural transformation.

However, the economy suffered from a jolt as a result of two developments, one in 1965 and the other in 1972. In 1965 Pakistan fought a brief but destructive war with India. Although it lasted for only 17 days, the economic impact was significant. It suddenly brought to a halt the inflow of external resources on which Pakistan had relied heavily during the period of Ayub Khan. The second jolt came in 1972

when President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who replaced General Yahya Khan, Pakistan's second military president, undertook to nationalize all large-scale industries as well as institutions in the sectors of finance and commerce. This sudden expansion of the state in economic management slowed down the rate of growth of the economy and introduced inefficiency and corruption into the management of the economy. Bhutto's six year period was marked by economic stagnation, an increase in the incidence of poverty, and a deterioration in the system of public education.

Bhutto was replaced by General Zia ul Haq, who brought the military back to power and governed the country for 11 years. This period saw three significant developments. One, the reactivation of the private sector; two, increased flows of foreign capital into the country as a result of the support provided by the United States to Pakistan in the war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan; three, the first serious attempt to Islamize the economy. The economy once again expanded at more than 6 percent a year and the incidence of poverty declined considerably. By the end of this period less than one-fifth of the total population lived in absolute poverty, the lowest proportion ever in the country's history. However, Zia's Islamization efforts confused the economic and social picture. This was particularly the case in the sector of education in which the introduction of Islam weakened the curricula in public schools and developed a parallel system of religious education.

General Zia's death in 1988 brought the politicians back to the center stage of politics. However, the 11-year period, from 1988 to 1999, was marked by political instability, increased inefficiency of the government, and a significant increase in the level of corruption. Economic growth suffered, the incidence of poverty increased, and the public sector became largely dysfunctional. One unfortunate consequence of these developments was the neglect of education which suffered because of the failure by the public sector to cater to the needs of the growing population. Some of the gaps left by the public sector were filled by religious seminaries (*madrassas*) which had gained in strength during the period of Zia ul Haq.

In October 1999 the military, under the command of General Pervez Musharraf, returned to power. With professionals assigned to key positions as economic managers, the economy began to recover. Pakistan's decision to support the United States in the latter's war against interna-



tional terrorism brought the country significant amounts of foreign capital which helped to lift the rate of increase in GDP to 6.1 percent in 2003-04, and to 8.4 percent in 2004-05. With the bounce back in economic growth the pool of poverty also began to shrink. In 2005 Pakistan's economic growth was among the highest in the developing world.

Will Pakistan be able to sustain this rate of growth into the future? As discussed below, the prospects for doing this were not good at the end of 2005. The country suffered a devastating economic blow because of the earthquake on 8 October that killed more than 80,000 people, injured another 300,000 and displaced more than a million.

## PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES

The program of economic, political, and social reforms initiated by President Pervez Musharraf under the title of “enlightened modernization” is faced with a number of challenges. Its ability to overcome these hurdles will have a profound impact on Pakistan's economic, political, and social future. There are at least five challenges that the government must face. The most important of these is the strength of religious parties and Islamic fundamentalism. They gained strength after 1978—the start of the war against the Soviet Union's occupation of Afghanistan—and now have a significant presence in the political system. Not only does the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), a coalition of six religious parties, have a large presence in the national assembly, it also controls two of the four provincial governments. The provinces of Balochistan and Northwest Frontier, which have MMA-led or dominated governments, border Afghanistan and have been reluctant to pursue the drive against Islamic extremism that the government of President Musharraf launched in late 2001.

The second challenge is posed by the underdeveloped political system which still does not allow full participation to the people. The military under President Musharraf has been reluctant to loosen its grip on politics fearing that this would bring the discredited politicians back to power or increase the strength of the Islamic extremists. A new set of elections is scheduled for 2007 when new assemblies will be elected at the national and provincial level. President Musharraf

has already declared his intention to seek another term as president once the new assemblies are in position. Yet, there is growing opposition to the continuing involvement by the military in politics. If President Musharraf refuses to yield space to political forces, this political instability will return.

The third challenge Pakistan must address is the continuing underdevelopment of its human resource. There is still significant illiteracy in the country and there is a need to improve the levels of skill among the young. The government of President Musharraf has launched a massive drive to increase enrollments at all levels of the educational system. There is also an effort to have the private sector participate actively in promoting human resource development. If these efforts succeed, Pakistan may be able to turn its large population into an economic asset. If they fail, the country will face political, economic, and social instability.

In spite of the sharp increase in the rate of economic growth in the 2004-05 financial year, and despite the government's belief that it has set the economy on a trajectory of high growth rates for several years—if not for decades—it is by no means certain that Pakistan has joined the ranks of rapidly expanding Asian economies. The country continues to face a number of serious structural obstacles to achieving sustained growth. These include a low rate of domestic savings which increases the country's dependence on external capital flows. The availability of foreign capital on a sustained basis is not ensured, especially when much of it depends on Pakistan's ability to stem the rise of Islamic extremism. Also on the external side, the country has not been able to develop an export sector that can benefit from rapidly expanding international trade. Pakistan continues to rely heavily on textiles, an industry whose products face protection and sharp competition in the world's major markets. And, as already indicated, the woeful neglect of human development has turned the country's large but young population into a burden rather than an economic asset. This is the fourth set of challenges the country faces.

The fifth challenge is presented by the continuation of the conflict over Kashmir, a state that has been the main cause of prolonged hostility between India and Pakistan. Since 2003 India and Pakistan have taken small steps to ease the tension between them. There appears to be a genuine desire on the part of both Delhi and Islamabad to bring about greater cooperation between the two countries and greater contacts be-

tween the two people. Kashmir, however, continues to be the main stumbling block.

Thus Pakistan stands at a crossroads. It is possible that the country may be able to successfully deal with the many problems it faces and become an active participant in the global economic and political system. However, if that does not happen, then Pakistan could become the epicenter of instability in the entire Muslim world. The global community therefore has a great stake in the country's future.



## The Dictionary

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**ABDALI, AHMAD SHAH (1722–1773).** Ahmad Khan, also known as Ahmad Shah Abdali and Baba-i-Afghan (father of the Afghan nation), ruled Afghanistan and surrounding areas for 27 years, from 1746 to 1773. He led expeditions that swept across the mountains into India eight times. His expedition in 1752 led to the annexation of **Lahore** and **Multan**, thereby extending his sway over the whole of what is today **Punjab** province in Pakistan. His invasions of India had a number of major consequences for the subcontinent. They resulted in the sharp decline of the **Mughul Empire**, the rise of the Marathas in India's southwest, the rise of the Sikhs in Punjab, and the emergence of Britain's **East India Company** as a political power in India. According to some **Pathan** politicians, the use of the name **Pukhtunkhawa** to describe the Pathan areas is not new; it can be found in the poetry of Ahmad Shah Abdali.

**ABEDI, AGHA HASAN (1922–1985).** Agha Hasan Abedi was born in Lucknow, the capital city of the province the British called United Provinces, now called Uttar Pradesh (UP). His father was a tax collector for the estate of the Raja of Muhammadabad, one of the many Muslim princes who retained a measure of autonomy within British India. The partition of British India in 1947 brought Abedi and his parents to **Karachi** along with millions of other Muslims who left India to come to Pakistan.

In Pakistan, Abedi joined the Habib Bank as a teller but left in 1959 to found another bank, the **United Bank Limited (UBL)**, with startup capital provided by the Saigol family. Under Abedi's management, UBL grew quickly and established branches in all parts of

Pakistan. The members of the extended Saigol family also benefited from the close association with the bank, as they were able to draw on its assets to fund their rapidly expanding industrial empire. It was the close association of **industry** and finance of this type that contributed to the nationalization of both by the administration of **Zul-fikar Ali Bhutto** in January 1972. With UBL in government hands, Abedi was without a job. He was not unemployed for very long, however; he established the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) in September 1972 with capital injected by the ruler of Abu Dhabi. Within a year of its creation, BCCI had opened offices in London, Luxembourg, Beirut, and the Gulf States, and by 1975 it had grown into a financial institution with assets of \$2.2 billion and \$113 million in capital. BCCI continued to expand rapidly; it established operations in all parts of the world, including representative offices in the United States. There was not a single developing country of any significance in which the bank did not have an active presence. BCCI prospered in the financial “go-go” days of the late 1980s. This period was marked by the availability of large amounts of liquidity produced by the sharp increase in the price of oil by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The United Arab Emirates, an OPEC member, was a major supplier of capital for the new bank. BCCI adopted an aggressive posture aimed at increasing its market share in the industrial countries. This caused it to adopt unconventional ways of attracting new customers and eventually contributed to its demise in 1991.

Two of BCCI’s operations drew the attention of bank regulators in the industrial world: heavy losses sustained in commodity dealings in the late 1980s and the impression that its managers encouraged its officers to obtain deposits without regard to their origin. That the bank had accepted deposits of money linked with drug trafficking in North and South America was confirmed when it pleaded guilty to money-laundering charges filed against it in a court in Florida in the fall of 1988. In the meantime, the bank suffered another setback. Abedi became ill, suffered a series of heart attacks, and had to receive a heart transplant. On 5 July 1991, a concerted operation organized by the Bank of England resulted in the closure of BCCI in all industrial countries and most developing ones. At that time the bank’s assets were said to be approximately \$20 billion.

BCCI's closure left a number of bankers of Pakistani origin without jobs. Many of them were eventually hired by private banks in the Middle East. Some of these bankers found their way back into Pakistan in the 1990s when the government decided to privatize the banks that had been nationalized by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.

**ADVANI, LAL KRISHNA (1927– )**. Of the scores of **Indian** leaders who held power in New Delhi, four had a profound impact on the country's relations with Pakistan. This group included Lal Krishna Advani, along with Jawaharlal Nehru, the first prime minister of India; Sardar **Vallabhbhai** Patel, the first home minister; and Atal Bihari Vajpayee, India's prime minister from 1996 to 2004. In this group of leaders, Advani occupies a special position since he changed his position with respect to Pakistan in a spectacular way in the summer of 2005.

Lal Krishna Advani was born in **Karachi** 20 years before the departure of the British from India and the partition of their domain into the independent states of India and Pakistan. Partition of the subcontinent led to a mass migration of people across the newly established border. Eight million Muslims moved to Pakistan from India, and six million Hindus and Sikhs moved in the opposite direction. The Advani family moved from Karachi, the capital of the new state of Pakistan, to Delhi, the capital of independent India. Soon after arriving in India, Advani plunged into politics on the side of the Hindu nationalist parties. He aligned himself with Jan Sangh, the predecessor of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which he was to eventually lead. For several decades, the Hindu nationalists remained on the fringes of Indian politics; following a campaign led by Advani in 1992, which resulted in the demolition of the Babri mosque at **Ayodhya**, a small town in the state of Uttar Pradesh, the BJP gained national recognition and support. In 1998, Vajpayee and Advani led the BJP to electoral triumph over the Congress Party that had ruled in the country almost uninterrupted for a half century.

Advani advocated a hard line approach in India's dealings with Pakistan. In July 2001, when President **Pervez Musharraf** of Pakistan met with India's Prime Minister Vajpayee at Agra, it was Advani's unaccommodating attitude that led to the summit's failure. He vetoed the document that the Indian prime minister and the Pakistani president had agreed to issue as a joint statement. In 2001–2002,

when more than a million Indian and Pakistani troops faced each other across their long border, Advani threatened to obliterate Pakistan if it did not stop its support of the mujahideen who were fighting the Indian occupation of the state of **Kashmir**. At the height of the crisis with Pakistan, Advani was appointed deputy prime minister to provide support to the ailing prime minister.

The BJP suffered a surprise defeat in the election held in 2004 and went into opposition, while the Congress party formed a coalition government in New Delhi. Advani was elected president of the BJP following Vajpayee's resignation from the position and was chosen also to lead the opposition in the Lok Sabha, the lower house of the Indian parliament. In early 2005, Advani accepted the invitation of the **Pakistan Muslim League**, the governing party in Pakistan, to visit Pakistan. During this historic visit, Advani went to the Minar-e-Pakistan, a monument in Lahore that commemorates the passage of the "Pakistan Resolution" in 1943, at the annual meeting of the All-India Muslim League that demanded the partition of India and the creation of a separate state for the Muslim population of the country. This demand was bitterly opposed by the Hindu nationalists. By going to the Minar, Advani said that he was sending a clear message that he regarded Pakistan's creation as a fact of history and was prepared to work for peace between the two South Asian countries. He then visited Karachi, the city of his birth, and laid a wreath at the tomb of **Muhammad Ali Jinnah**, calling him a great secular leader who had served his people well.

These statements did not endear Advani to his base back in India. There were demands for his resignation, but when he resigned the more moderate elements in his party pressured him to stay on as president of BJP. He withdrew his resignation, and his gamble had paid off. His statements in Pakistan signaled a profound change in the thinking of the party that he now led, something that was required if it were to build a base that extended beyond the community of Hindu nationalists. Advani retired as BJP president on 31 December 2005 after celebrating the 25th anniversary of the founding of the party. He was succeeded by Rajnath Singh. *See also* HINDUVTA.

**AFAQ AHMED (1954– )**. Born in Karachi, Afaq Ahmed came under the spell of Altaf Hussain, a *muhajir* (refugee from India) student



leader, who went on to establish the **Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz** (MQM). For a number of years, Afaq Ahmed was a close associate of Altaf Hussain. In 1992, however, he split with the MQM and formed his own faction, the **MQM (Haqiqi)**. It was widely believed that Afaq Ahmed's move was motivated by the armed forces, which at that point were conducting a campaign against the MQM. Afaq Ahmed and his associates, of course, denied any such association with the officialdom. After battling both the mainstream MQM and the police for two years, Afaq Ahmed announced a new political program in April 1996. He demanded the establishment of another province in Pakistan, in which the *muhajir* community would be in a majority.

**AFGHANI, ABDUS SATTAR (1952– )**. Abdus Sattar Afghani, a Pathan settler in **Karachi** and prominent leader of the **Jamaat-e-Islami**, was the mayor of Karachi before the Karachi Municipal Corporation (KMC) was dissolved by the Sindh provincial government in 1987. The mayor's dismissal and the dissolution of the municipal corporation came after the ethnic riots in the winter of 1986–1987, in which hundreds of lives were lost. In January 1988, the KMC elected **Farooq Sattar** of the **Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz** as the city's mayor, signifying a dramatic shift in the center of gravity of ethnic policies in the city, from recent migrants such as the **Pathans** and the **Punjabis**, who had settled in the city in the 1950s and 1960s, to the *muhajirs* who had come in from India in 1947.

**AFGHANISTAN–PAKISTAN RELATIONS.** Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan reach far back in history to the time when the area that now comprises Pakistan began to be invaded and peopled by those from the country called Afghanistan. In the 11th century, Afghan kings installed themselves in Delhi and founded what came to be called the Delhi Sultanate. The Sultanate gave way to another invader who came into India through the Afghanistan passes. He was **Babar**, the first of the great Mughuls, whose **Mughul empire** lasted until the establishment of the British colony in India. When a segment of the Indian Muslim community challenged the British in 1857, in what the British called the **Great Indian Mutiny**, a large group of Muslims left India and settled in Afghanistan.

However, the collapse of the British empire in India created an expectation in Afghanistan that it could bring about an adjustment in its southern border. After all, the Afghans had never accepted the **Durand line** drawn by the British to demarcate the border between Afghanistan and India. When the British departed from India, the Afghans saw an opportunity and it was for this reason that they withheld recognition of Pakistan after the latter gained independence in 1947. Afghanistan was also the only country to vote against the admission of Pakistan to the United Nations.

After such an inauspicious beginning, it was not surprising that the relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan never became warm. Having failed to win an adjustment in the Durand line, Afghanistan chose to force a decision on Pakistan by giving its support to the “**Pukhtunistan movement**” in Pakistan’s **Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP)**. The Afghan leaders never defined the precise boundaries of Pukhtunistan, keeping vague as to the disposition of the Pukhtun areas in their own country. In 1947, Prime Minister Hashim Khan of Afghanistan said that “if an independent Pukhtunistan cannot be set up, the Frontier Province could join Afghanistan.” The Afghan-inspired Pukhtunistan movement reached its climax in 1950, when during the Jashan-i-Kabul (the Kabul festival), Pukhtunistan flags were hoisted in the city.

The Pukhtunistan campaign by the Afghan leaders soured the relations between the two countries for over a quarter century. On two occasions, it led to the rupture of diplomatic relations: in 1955, when Kabul objected to the merger of the NWFP into the “One Unit” of **West Pakistan**, and again in 1961 when Afghanistan actively supported tribal insurgency in the northern areas of Pakistan. During the administration of **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto** there was some improvement in the relations between the two countries, as the Afghan President, Muhammad Daud, attempted to pull his country out of the Soviet sphere of influence. This move by Daud may have led to his assassination and to the eventual invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union.

Soviet troops entered Kabul in December 1979 and brought about a dramatic change. This event not only affected Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan but also completely altered Pakistan’s geopolitical situation. As millions of Afghan refugees poured into Pakistan and

thousands of these refugees took up arms against the invading troops from the Soviet Union, Pakistan acquired the status of a “front-line state”; it formed the front line against the expansion of the Soviet power toward the non-Communist countries of the Middle East and South Asia. The United States rearmed Pakistan and supplied military training and material to the Afghan mujahideen who were pursuing war against the Soviets from camps and sanctuaries in Pakistan. Several other countries also joined the mujahideen war effort, including Saudi Arabia and China. The mujahideen succeeded beyond the expectation of their supporters. Not only did they stall the Soviet advance in Afghanistan, restricting its presence and therefore its influence on the country’s major cities, they also inflicted a heavy economic loss on the Soviet Union, which it was unable to sustain for long. This economic loss eventually led to the collapse of the Soviet empire. After lengthy negotiations conducted in a series of meetings held in Geneva under the auspices of the United Nations, Afghanistan, Pakistan, the United States, and the Soviet Union signed an accord, in the spring of 1988, that permitted the Soviets to withdraw their troops from Afghanistan.

The Soviet withdrawal was completed within the schedule agreed at Geneva—the last Soviet soldier was gone by December 1988—but this did not bring peace to Afghanistan. The two warring sides, President Najibullah’s government and the mujahideen, continued to receive arms and equipment from their supporters. The collapse of the Soviet Union created a new situation not only for Kabul, however, but also for a number of countries in the region, including the Muslim republics of the former Soviet Union. These republics became independent in late 1991 and began to exert pressure on Pakistan and the **Najibullah** government in Kabul to work toward durable peace. In January 1992, Pakistan announced a fundamental change in its position with respect to Afghanistan: it accepted the UN’s formula for ending the Afghan conflict. It agreed to the establishment of an interim government in Kabul, with participation allowed to President Najibullah’s political group, a position that was originally unacceptable to the Pakistan-based mujahideen groups but to which they eventually agreed under pressure from Pakistan and presumably the United States. But this arrangement did not last for very long. The mujahideen marched into Kabul and President Najibullah took refuge

in the UN compound where he was captured and executed. Following a number of peace initiatives brokered by the UN, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, a government of sorts emerged in Kabul, under the leadership of President Burhanuddin Rabbani.

But peace did not come to the country. In 1995, a new force emerged in the country, as a group of **Taliban** (students) marched into Afghanistan from Pakistan and quickly conquered one-third of the country. Although the Taliban were able to bring the **Pathan** areas of Afghanistan under their control, they had great difficulty in extending their influence over the areas peopled by other ethnic groups, such as the Uzbeks and Tajiks. This complication remained unresolved until a group of Islamic terrorists from Arab countries, but trained in Afghanistan, attacked the United States on 11 September 2001. On 8 October 2001, the United States attacked Afghanistan and in a short war supported by the forces of the Northern Alliance defeated the Taliban. In the spring of 2002, a new government headed by Hamid Karzai, a Pashtun leader, was installed in Kabul. In 2004, after a new constitution was adopted, Karzai was elected the country's president.

After a rocky start, relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan improved to the extent that a number of Pakistani firms were able to secure contracts for rebuilding Afghanistan.

**AGARTALA CONSPIRACY.** *See* MUJIBUR RAHMAN, SHEIKH; QADIR, SHEIKH MANZUR.

**AGRICULTURAL TAX.** In Pakistan, agricultural incomes have been, by and large, exempt from tax. Under the constitution of 1973, the national legislature does not have the authority to tax agricultural incomes; that power was bestowed by the constitution on the provincial assemblies, in which landed interests have had a greater presence than in the national assembly.

The first serious attempt to tax **agriculture** was made by the administration of caretaker Prime Minister **Moeen Qureshi** in the summer of 1993. Qureshi's government used the "producer index unit" (PIU) concept to estimate agricultural incomes. This concept had been developed to implement the **land reforms of 1959**, introduced by the government of President **Muhammad Ayub Khan**. A PIU is

calculated on the basis of national productivity of land; the value of the unit of rain-fed land, therefore, is much lower than that of canal-irrigated land. Qureshi fixed the value of one PIU at Rs 250 (\$7 at the rate of exchange prevailing in January 1993). Owners with farmland worth less than Rs 1 million (\$29,000) were exempt from the tax; a “wealth tax” ranging between 0.5 percent and 2.5 percent of the value of land, as calculated in terms of PIUs, was levied on larger farms.

Prime Minister Qureshi did not have to secure legislative approval to levy this tax, because all assemblies, national as well as provincial, stood dissolved while he was in office. The wealth tax was instituted through a presidential ordinance, and its levy was regarded as one of the major accomplishments of the caretaker administration.

Under the constitution, all presidential ordinances have to be subsequently approved by the National Assembly. Once the National Assembly was back in business and Prime Minister **Benazir Bhutto** had replaced Moeen Qureshi, the agricultural wealth tax ran into predictable political trouble. It was ultimately endorsed by the national legislature but in a considerably watered-down version. Accordingly, the amounts collected were embarrassingly low; for instance, in the 1994–1995 fiscal year, only Rs 2.5 million (\$71,000) was collected.

An awareness of the very low ratio of tax to gross domestic product in Pakistan, and an even lower rate of taxation on agricultural incomes, allowed Pakistan to be persuaded by the **International Monetary Fund (IMF)**, as part of the program the two sides negotiated in late 1995, to raise the value of the PIU by 60 percent, from Rs 250 to Rs 600, as a component of the budget of 1996–1997. In 1996, the **World Bank** added the imposition of an agriculture-tax as a condition for moving forward with its program to assist Pakistan in the modernization of the agriculture sector. It is unlikely that the pressure that was being exerted by the IMF and the World Bank would have resulted in bringing incomes from agriculture into the tax structure had Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto remained in power. Her dismissal, in November 1996, provided the caretaker government that held office for three months the opportunity to move in this area. Its program—although modest in scope—succeeded in extending the fiscal system to agriculture. The program was endorsed by the government of Prime Minister **Mian Nawaz Sharif**, which came into office in February 1997. Nonetheless, the amount collected from the

tax on agriculture and its proportion to total government revenues remains small.

**AGRICULTURE.** As a result of the very significant changes in Pakistan's economy since the country's birth in 1947, agriculture has lost its preeminent position. Its share in national output was much larger in 1947 but since then its contribution has declined as other sectors of the economy have grown. In 1947, agriculture accounted for 53 percent of the Gross Domestic Product; by 2004, its share had declined to less than 23 percent. This notwithstanding, as a result of the two "**green revolutions**"—one in the late 1960s and early 1970s and the other in the late 1980s and early 1990s—the agricultural sector has progressed from the state of subsistence to that of commercialization. This transformation has had a profound impact on reducing the incidence of rural poverty.

In the late 1940s—the years immediately following partition and the birth of Pakistan—less than one-fifth of Pakistan's total land area was cultivated. Sixty years later, in the early 2000s, this proportion has increased to more than one-fourth. During this period, more than six million hectares of additional land came under cultivation, almost entirely because of an increase in irrigation. In the late 1940s, 62 percent of the cultivated land was classified as irrigated; in the early 2000s, the proportion had increased to 76 percent.

The output of all major crops has increased significantly in the period since independence. The largest percentage of increase occurred for **cotton** and the least for **wheat**. These increases were the result both of additional land devoted to these crops and greater productivity. The sharp growth in the output of Pakistan's main crops helped to alleviate rural poverty, particularly in the 1960s, the period of President **Muhammad Ayub Khan**. In 1960–1970, for instance, food-grain output increased at the yearly rate of 5 percent, and per capita food availability increased at the rate of 2.3 percent a year. There was a dramatic change in the situation in the 1970s, however—the period dominated by the socialist government of **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto**. In 1970–1979, food-grain output increased by 3 percent a year, but per capita food availability grew by only 0.32 percent per annum. During the Ayub period, therefore, Pakistan nearly achieved food self-sufficiency. During the 1970s, on the

other hand, the country once again became dependent on large amounts of food imports.

In the late 1980s, Pakistan witnessed the “second green revolution,” which saw an enormous increase in both the productivity and output of cotton, the mainstay of the country’s economy. The agricultural sector came under stress in the 1990s, however. Pressure on the national budget reduced public-sector expenditure on the maintenance of the vast irrigation network, with the result that the availability of water per unit of irrigated land declined. The agricultural sector also had to deal with pest attacks, in particular on cotton. Consequently, in the 1990s, agricultural output failed to keep pace with growth in population and increase in domestic demand.

In 2004, the government of President **Pervez Musharraf** initiated an ambitious program aimed at rehabilitating the vast irrigation system. The aim was not only to make the country once again self-sufficient in food but also to become a major exporter of agricultural products.

**AHMAD, MIRZA GHULAM (1835–1908).** Mirza Ghulam Ahmad was born into a prominent landowning family of Qadian, a small town in the Gurdaspur district of **Punjab**. He is said to have received a series of divine revelations, the most prominent and controversial being the call to prophethood within the fold of Islam. Ghulam Ahmad also claimed that the prophecies revealed that he represented the second coming of Jesus Christ, who, in fact, had not been crucified, but had migrated to Kashmir and had been buried there. Ghulam Ahmad founded the Jamaat-e-Ahmadiyas in 1889. In 1901, he persuaded the British administration of India to list his disciples, **Ahmadiyas**, as a separate sect of Islam.

**THE AHMADIYAS.** The Ahmadiya community (Jamaat-e-Ahmadiyas) was founded in 1889, by **Mirza Ghulam Ahmad** at Qadian, a small town in the Gurdaspur district of **Punjab**. Ghulam Ahmad claimed that he was in direct communion with God and was receiving revelations. One of these revelations—Ghulam Ahmad’s claim to prophethood—met with intense opposition and some ridicule from Muslim theologians. This claim ran counter to the Muslim doctrine of *Khatam-e-Nubuwwat* (end of prophethood), which holds that Muhammad, the prophet of Islam, was the last prophet.

Ghulam Ahmad's disciples called themselves Ahmadiyas; his detractors called his followers Qadianis, after the place of his birth.

The proselytizing zeal of the community, its success in bringing in new converts, its ability to run a tight organization that emphasized pursuit of common objectives by the members of the community, and the success achieved by some of its members in business and in Pakistan's civil bureaucracy brought the Ahmadiyas into direct conflict with a number of religious parties and organizations in Pakistan. **Jamaat-e-Islami**, the most important religious party in Pakistan, pursued "anti-Ahmadiyaism" with great passion. The Jamaat-e-Islami's near obsession with the Ahmadiya community was to profoundly affect not only the Ahmadiyas but also the political development of Pakistan.

In 1953, the Jamaat-e-Islami, working in concert with a number of other religious organizations, launched a campaign against the Ahmadiyas. The campaign was organized under the banner raised by the Khatam-e-Nubuwwat movement which sought to draw the attention of the Muslim citizens of Pakistan to the fact that the Ahmadiyas had presented a serious challenge to one of the basic assumptions of Islam: that Muhammad was the last prophet. The campaign turned violent, especially after equivocation by an exceptionally weak government at the center. Prime Minister **Khawaja Nazimuddin**—a Bengali politician operating in a political world basically hostile to the Bengalis—hesitated to move against the agitators. Thus encouraged, the agitators became more confident and began to seek much more than their initial demands. Their original objective was to convince the government to declare the Ahmadiyas a non-Muslim community. Now they wanted the members of the community to be dismissed from government and the assets of those who had succeeded in business and industry to be confiscated by the government. Once it was clear that the movement was out of control of the civilian authorities of Punjab—2,000 people had already been killed in the strife associated with the campaign—the federal government in **Karachi** enlisted the help of the armed forces to bring peace and order in the troubled areas of the province. A limited martial law was declared, and the army, under the command of Lieutenant General **Azam Khan**, was able to restore order quickly. The army's success in **Lahore** and other trou-



bled cities of Punjab emboldened it and laid the ground for the coup d'état of 1958.

The anti-Ahmadiya movement resurfaced again in 1974 and began to impose pressure on the government of Prime Minister **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto** to move against the followers of Ghulam Ahmad. Bhutto, by this time confronting a united opposition that had also been gaining strength, decided to split the forces arrayed against him. He opted to oblige the *ulema* (clerics) of Islam, who were spearheading the growing movement against him. The National Assembly passed a bill declaring the Ahmadiyas to be non-Muslims; subsequently, the government prohibited the Ahmadiyas to call their places of worship mosques or to decorate them with verses from the Koran, to use the *azan* (call to prayer) to summon their members for prayers, and to issue translations of the Koran. These moves by the government further encouraged intolerance toward the members of the Ahmadiya community. In 1984, 10 years after the decision to declare the Ahmadiyas to be non-Muslims, the community's head moved to London and called the annual assembly of his followers to be held there. That was the first time in nearly a hundred years that the Ahmadiyas had met outside India and Pakistan.

Five million Ahmadiyas are estimated to be still living in Pakistan, whereas another million live outside the country. Those living outside are either converts from other religions or have migrated from Pakistan.

**AHSEN, VICE-ADMIRAL S. M. (1920–1990).** Vice-Admiral S. M.

Ahsen was the commander-in-chief of the Pakistan Navy—a position to which he was appointed in 1966—at the time Pakistan was placed under martial law for the second time in its history. It is not clear whether General **Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan**, commander in chief of the Army, consulted with Ahsen when he decided to move against President **Muhammad Ayub Khan** in March 1969. Having proclaimed martial law, however, Yahya Khan invited Vice-Admiral Ahsen and **Air Marshal Nur Khan**, commander in chief of the Air Force, to join him in governing Pakistan. Vice-Admiral Ahsen and Air Marshal Nur Khan were appointed deputy martial-law administrators and were also invited to join the five-member Administration Council that functioned for a few months as the supreme governing body in the country. In August 1969, Ahsen was appointed governor

of East Pakistan, whereas Nur Khan was appointed governor of West Pakistan.

Once in Dacca (renamed Dhaka), Ahsen came to the conclusion that the use of force was not a viable option for solving the problem of East Pakistan. He advocated political accommodation, but Yahya and his colleagues were determined to keep Bengal within the fold of Pakistan—by the use of military force, if need be. Whatever the reasons for his differences with Yahya, they resulted in Ahsen's resignation, in 1971. Vice-Admiral Ahsen returned to **Karachi**, and A. M. Malik, a veteran Bengali politician, was appointed to succeed him. Ahsen died in Karachi in 1990.

**AID TO PAKISTAN CONSORTIUM.** The Aid to Pakistan Consortium was formed in 1960 to lend coherence to the policies pursued and to programs and projects financed by the donor community. The group met in Paris every spring to discuss the country's economic plans for the following financial year. It also reviewed important development issues on the basis of the documentation prepared by the **World Bank** and the government of Pakistan. The outcome of the consortium meeting was issued in the form of a communiqué that expressed the collective impression of its members of the economic performance of Pakistan, the country's mid-term development objectives, and the amount of foreign flows the country required in order to close the "foreign exchange gap." The communiqué usually announced an amount that the consortium members were willing to pledge to Pakistan for the following year.

The Consortium meeting was chaired by the World Bank vice president in charge of the region that included Pakistan. The donor countries that normally attended the Paris meeting included all bilateral and multilateral donors active in the country. The number of delegations attending the meeting increased over time, but the volume of assistance provided peaked in the late 1980s. In the 1980s, the war in **Afghanistan** bestowed the status of a "front-line state" on Pakistan, and the Western donors were willing to provide generous amounts of financial assistance to the country to encourage it to resist the Soviet expansion into South Asia. The end of the war against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union reduced Pakistan's geopolitical importance and

with it the generosity of the donor community. Over the years, the bilateral donors attending the Paris meetings included: Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In addition to the World Bank, the Consortium also had a number of multilateral donors, including: the Asian Development Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Islamic Development Bank, the United Nations Development Program, the International Fund for Agricultural Development, the International Finance Corporation, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the Saudi Fund for Development, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and the World Food Program.

In the 1990s, the members of the Consortium began to put pressure on Pakistan to invest more in social development and to reduce its budget deficit. Some members of the group also began to take note of Pakistan's high defense expenditure, arguing that by committing large amounts of resources to the military, Pakistan was starving a number of sectors of vital investments.

In 2000, the World Bank, in agreement with Pakistan, replaced the Consortium with the **Pakistan Forum**, chaired by the finance minister and attended by the entire aid community interested in assisting the country.

**AKBAR, SAID (c1925–1951).** Said Akbar was an unemployed youth from the **Northwest Frontier Province** (NWFP) who assassinated Prime Minister **Liaquat Ali Khan** in **Rawalpindi** on 16 October 1951. The assassination took place in the Company Bagh—now called Liaquat Bagh—just as the prime minister had begun to address a large public meeting. Said Akbar had positioned himself close to the speaker's dais and was thus able to fire his weapon, a pistol, from close range. He was himself caught and shot dead by the police moments after he killed Liaquat Ali Khan. Said Akbar left no clues as to his motives for assassinating the prime minister. He had arrived in Rawalpindi a day before and had spent the night in a local hotel. A commission was set up to investigate the assassination but could not come to any definitive conclusion. There was a strong suspicion that the prime minister's assassination may have been ordered by a group of Punjabi politicians who wanted to capture power at the center.

**AKBAR KHAN, MAJOR GENERAL (1920–1994).** Major General

Akbar Khan was one of the many military officers who were to perform actively on Pakistan's political stage. He first gained public attention as the senior commander in the first **Indo-Pakistan war**, under the pseudonym of "General Tariq" (after the Muslim leader who crossed the Straits of Gibraltar into Spain at the beginning of the eighth century). Pakistan deployed Akbar Khan's troops in 1948 to assist the **Pathan** tribesmen in **Kashmir**. The invasion of Kashmir by the Pathan warriors was encouraged by Pakistan once it became clear that the state's maharaja (ruler) was not anxious to accede to Pakistan. But Pakistan was not as yet prepared to get directly involved by sending its troops into Kashmir. General A. T. Massarvey, Pakistan's commander in chief, a British officer who had stayed behind to serve the new country while Pakistan was in the process of grooming its own officers to take charge, was not willing to lead the country into open conflict with India. Accordingly, the Pakistan army gave the Pathans support in logistics but watched them operate from a safe distance. Akbar Khan was not happy with this passive approach.

Akbar Khan came to the attention of the public again in 1951, when he was accused of masterminding an attempt to overthrow the government of Prime Minister **Liaqat Ali Khan**. The conspiracy was hatched in **Rawalpindi**, the city that housed the army's general headquarters. The **Rawalpindi Conspiracy** was the first indication of the unhappiness within the ranks of the army with the way Pakistan was being run and managed by the politicians. The conspirators were arrested, tried by a military court, and sentenced to serve long prison terms. Akbar Khan reappeared briefly in the early 1970s, as minister of state for defense in **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's** government. He played a marginal role in the Bhutto Cabinet.

**AKHTAR ABDUR RAHMAN KHAN, GENERAL (1926–1988).**

Akhtar Abdur Rahman Khan was born in a village near Jullundhur in **Punjab** and joined the Pakistan army soon after Pakistan achieved independence. He rose rapidly, especially under President **Zia ul-Haq**, who appointed him to the critical position of Director General, **Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)**. Rahman's ISI functioned as the conduit of arms and funds that flowed to the

**Afghanistan mujahideen** from the United States and Saudi Arabia. This assistance was provided to support the mujahideen effort against the occupying forces of the Soviet Union. In March 1987, Rahman was promoted to the rank of full general and was appointed by the president to be chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Rahman was killed in the plane crash which also took the life of President **Zia ul-Haq** on 17 August 1988.

Rahman is survived by four sons, Akbar, Humayun, Haroon, and Ghazi, all of whom lived and worked in the United States while their father was in charge of ISI and was the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Upon his death, they returned to Pakistan, and two of his sons, Humayun and Haroon, went into politics.

**AKHTAR HUSSAIN (1914–1986)**. Akhtar Hussain was one of Pakistan's many civil servants who were to occupy important political positions. He was a member of the elitist **Indian Civil Service (ICS)** and chose to transfer to Pakistan after the country gained independence in 1947. In 1957, Akhtar Hussain succeeded Mushtaq Ahmad Gurmani as governor of West Pakistan and stayed in that position even after the country was placed under martial law in 1959 by General **Muhammad Ayub Khan**. In 1959, he was appointed to chair the Land Reform Commission set up by the military government, to bring about a more equitable distribution of land in the country. In 1960, Nawab Amir Muhammad Khan of Kalabagh was appointed to succeed Akhtar Hussain as governor of West Pakistan. *See also* LAND REFORMS OF 1959.

**AKHTAR KHAN, HUMAYUN (1954– )**. Humayun Akhtar Khan is the son of General **Akhtar Abdur Rahman Khan**, who was the head of Pakistan's **Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)** during the war against the Soviet Union's occupation of **Afghanistan** in the 1980s. He was elected to the National Assembly in the elections of 1990 and 1993 as a **Muslim League** candidate. The Muslim League did not give him a ticket for the elections of 1997, however. There were reports of major differences between the Rahman and Sharif families. Once these differences were resolved, Prime Minister **Nawaz Sharif** appointed Humayun Akhtar Khan to head the Board of Investment with the status of minister of state.

Humayun Khan left the **Pakistan Muslim League** group that remained loyal to Nawaz Sharif after the military takeover of October 1999. He joined hands with a number of other defectors to found the **Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid-e-Azam)** in 2000, and contested under the new party's banner for a seat from **Lahore** to the National Assembly in the **election of October 2002**. He won by a narrow margin. He was a serious candidate for the job of prime minister, but was not chosen by President **Pervez Musharraf**, because of intense opposition from **Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain**, the PML(Q)'s president and a fellow politician from **Punjab**. Instead, he was brought into the cabinet as commerce minister by Prime Minister **Sardar Zafarullah Khan Jamali**. Khan was back in contention for the prime minister's job after the resignation of Jamali in the summer of 2004, but was once again opposed by Hussain. He retains the portfolio of commerce in the cabinet headed by Prime Minister **Shaukat Aziz**. *See also* MADRASSAS; TALIBAN.

**AKHTAR MALIK, LIEUTENANT GENERAL (RETIRED)**. *See* MUSA, GENERAL (RETIRED) MUHAMMAD.

**AL-FARAN**. Al-Faran, a little-known militant group operating in the Indian part of the state of **Kashmir**, gained considerable international attention in the summer of 1995 with the kidnapping of Western tourists, including an American. The group sought the release of a number of Kashmiri activists who were held in Indian jails. The Indian response was clear: They were not prepared to give in to the demands of "terrorist" groups operating in Kashmir. With the Indians holding their ground, the group attempted to increase its pressure on the government by beheading one of its captives, a Norwegian tourist. The Indian position did not change, and Al-Faran, after months of negotiations with the authorities, continued to hold the tourists as hostages. One victim escaped, but the fate of the remaining four remains unknown, although the governments of India, as well as Jammu and Kashmir governments, in 2003 issued death certificates for them. Al-Faran faded from prominence as the situation in Kashmir stabilized.

**AL-HUDA INSTITUTE OF ISLAMIC EDUCATION FOR WOMEN**. The Al-Huda Institute of Islamic Education for **Women**

was started in 1994 in **Islamabad** by Farhat Hashmi. The Institute offers a number of programs that teach selected *surahs* of the Koran, *tajweed*, *seerah* of the *sahaba* (teachings of the companions of Prophet Muhammad), and *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence). The Institute began with only 50 students; however, its success led to its expansion into other parts of the country. The Al-Huda Model School for Girls was set up in 1996. It concentrates on teaching the Koran, including *hifz* (memorizing the entire text of the holy book). Another program, the Al-Huda School of Islamic Studies, was also added the same year. In 1997, the government provided the Institute with a plot of land to build a new campus. Expansion plans include starting similar institutions in other major cities of the country, including **Lahore** and **Karachi**.

**AL-ZAWAHIRI, AYMAN (1951– )**. Ayman Al-Zawahiri was born in Cairo, Egypt, at a time when his country was marred by corruption, violence, and political assassinations. A year after his birth, a group of army personnel who called themselves Free Officers, working under the leadership of Gamal Abdul Nasser, took power in a coup d'état after dethroning King Farouq and putting an end to his dynasty. President Nasser breathed new life into Arab nationalism and in the process implemented socialist policies that destroyed the careers of educated and salaried classes to which the Al-Zawahiris belonged.

In 1967, following its campaign against a conspiracy that President Nasser and his associates believed had been launched by a political group called the Muslim Brotherhood, the regime arrested, condemned, and executed Sayyid Qutb, the foremost Islamic scholar in the country. Qutb was defended by Mahfuz Azzam, a grand uncle of Al-Zawahiri. This incident left a deep impression on the young man. Ayman Al-Zawahiri joined the Muslim Brotherhood to carry forward the teachings of Qutb. In 1980, Al-Zawahiri, who had now become a physician, joined an Islamic non-government organization whose assignment was to provide assistance to the Afghan Mujahideen who were then in the first year of their war against the troops from the Soviet Union that had occupied their country. He left Cairo and went to **Peshawar**, Pakistan and stayed there for a number of months. The stay in Pakistan convinced him that armed struggle would lead to Islam's eventual triumph and that **Afghanistan** would be the first battleground for the ultimate Islamic victory. He had by then fallen under

the spell of Muhammad Abdul Salam Al-Farag, who had written a pamphlet advocating the assassination of Anwar Sadat, the president of Egypt. Sadat was assassinated on 6 October 1981, and Al-Zawahiri was among the many people who were arrested and tortured by the Egyptian authorities. In prison, Al-Zawahiri came into contact with the major players of radical **Islam**. Among them was the blind Sheikh Omar Abdal-Rahman, who was to play a leading role in the first attack on the World Trade Center in New York, in 1993.

After his release from prison, Al-Zawahiri left Egypt for Saudi Arabia in 1985. He relocated in Jeddah, which was also the seat of the bin Laden family and had become the hub of enlistment in the Afghan struggle against the Soviet Union. In 1986, Al-Zawahiri returned to Peshawar in Pakistan, which by then had become the global capital of radical Islam. In Peshawar, he met with Abdallah Azzam, an Islamic militant of Palestinian origin. In Afghanistan, Azzam introduced the language and thought of the Muslim Brotherhood to bin Laden. However, Al-Zawahiri and Azzam, who had both settled with their wives and children in Peshawar, soon fell out. Al-Zawahiri gradually managed to replace Azzam as bin Laden's spiritual mentor and his second in command.

As the differences among various Islamic groups were being played out in the mosques of Peshawar, the Soviet army completed its withdrawal from Afghanistan on 15 February 1989. The Soviet departure did not bring peace to Afghanistan or to the border areas of Pakistan. There were violent clashes involving these Islamic groups. In one of these, on 24 November 1989, Azzam was assassinated. Al-Zawahiri was believed to have masterminded the killing. After Azzam's death, he became the trusted aide of Osama bin Laden. The two became close associates in planning and helping to launch various acts of terrorism, including the attacks of 11 September 2001 on the United States. After the fall of Kabul to the resurgent attack by forces of the United States and its allies, Osama bin Laden, Al-Zawahiri, and several other associates escaped, apparently using an escape route out of the Tora Bora mountains on the border of Pakistan and Afghanistan.

**AL-ZULFIKAR.** Al-Zulfikar was formed by **Murtaza Bhutto** and **Shahnawaz Bhutto**, in 1979. Named after their father, **Zulfikar Ali**



**Bhutto**, the organization's main aim was to avenge their father's execution by the government of President **Zia ul-Haq**. Al-Zulfikar initially operated out of Kabul, Afghanistan, in the late 1970s and early 1980s. It moved its operations to Damascus, Syria, after Afghanistan was invaded by the Soviet Union.

The organization's most spectacular act was committed in 1981 when its members hijacked a Pakistan International Airlines plane on a flight from **Karachi** to **Peshawar**. The plane was first taken to Kabul, where the hijackers killed one passenger and threw his body on the tarmac. It was then flown to Damascus. It was only after President Zia ul-Haq agreed to free more than 50 political prisoners that Al-Zulfikar released the plane and its passengers. The plane remained under the control of Al-Zulfikar for 11 days.

Al-Zulfikar was also said to have been behind the campaign launched by the **Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD)** in 1983. A series of cases were filed by the Zia government against **Murtaza Bhutto**, which made it difficult for him to return to the country, even after his sister, **Benazir Bhutto**, became prime minister in 1988. He came back in 1995 and was promptly jailed where he stayed for several months.

President Zia ul-Haq's death in 1988 and the return of democracy eliminated the need for the existence of Al-Zulfikar, and it disappeared from the political scene. Most of its members joined the Murtaza Bhutto wing of the **Pakistan People's Party (PPP)** after Bhutto was released from prison and formally entered politics. Murtaza Bhutto's death in September 1996 dealt another blow to Al-Zulfikar, in particular to its original membership. *See also* MURTAZA BHUTTO.

**ALI, BABAR (1927– )**. Babar Ali belongs to a family with deep roots in **Lahore**, Pakistan's second largest city. The family also has ties to the countryside. It has been active for many years in **agriculture** as well as **industry**. After education in the United States, Babar Ali founded Packages, one of the most successful modern enterprises in Pakistan. Using Packages as the base, he moved into the food-processing business. In 1974, he was named by Prime Minister **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto** to manage the Fertilizer Corporation of Pakistan, one of several public-sector enterprises established by the government to manage nationalized industries. In 1993, Babar Ali served briefly as

minister of finance in the caretaker administration headed by **Moeen Qureshi**.

Babar Ali's most important contribution was the establishment of the **Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS)**, a business school modeled after the Harvard Business School. The success of LUMS opened the sector of **education** to private initiative, especially at the university level, an important development, since Pakistan was faring poorly in providing quality education.

**ALL-INDIA MUSLIM LEAGUE (AIML)**. *See* THE MUSLIM LEAGUE; THE PAKISTAN MUSLIM LEAGUE (PML).

**ALL-PAKISTAN MUHAJIR STUDENTS ORGANIZATION (APMSO)**. The All-Pakistan Muhajir Students Organization was formed by **Altaf Hussain**, a *muhajir* (refugee from India), at Karachi University in 1978. The APMSO's aim was to protect the interests of the *muhajir* students of Karachi University and other educational institutions in the city. It was a couple of years before the new organization was accepted by the *muhajir* students. Although the *muhajirs* constituted a majority on the campus of Karachi University, the APMSO candidates secured only 95 of the 10,000 votes cast in the student elections of 1979. The Organization's performance improved dramatically in the elections of 1980, when it obtained 900 votes, putting it in second place after Jamiat-e-Tuleba, the student organization affiliated with the **Jamaat-e-Islami**. It surpassed the Jamiat-e-Tuleba by a wide margin in subsequent elections. The APMSO's success in the *muhajir* student community encouraged Altaf Hussain to launch the **Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz**.

**ALL-PAKISTAN WOMEN'S ASSOCIATION (APWA)**. The All-Pakistan Women's Association was formed soon after the establishment of Pakistan. Its objective was to promote and protect the social and economic rights of **women** in a country where the conservative elements in the society interpreted dictates of **Islam** in ways that were highly detrimental to women. **Begum Raana Liaquat**, the wife of **Liaquat Ali Khan**, Pakistan's first prime minister, took an active interest in women's affairs and became the first president of APWA.

APWA set up branches in all provinces of the country, staffed

mostly by the spouses of senior government officials. As such, the organization was often not in a position to work actively for women's advancement when the government in power adopted policies that were not supportive of giving women social, economic, and political rights equal to those of men. The most critical test for APWA came during the presidency of **Zia ul-Haq**. His administration (1977–1988) introduced into the country Islamic laws that discriminated against women. APWA proved unequal to the challenge posed by the Zia regime, and several new organizations, such as the **Women's Action Forum**, had to be established by women to protest and fight this encroachment on their rights.

Although APWA was unable to assist the women of Pakistan in dealing with the challenge posed by Islamists in the country, it helped hundreds of thousands of women improve their economic situation. This mission included setting up training centers for women to acquire some basic skills and the establishment of retail stores that sell products made by the women in these training centers. APWA's close association with the officialdom served it very well.

**ALL PARTIES HURRIYAT CONFERENCE (APHC).** The All Parties Hurriyat Conference—an alliance of 26 political, social, and religious organizations—was formed on 9 March 1993 as a political organization to further the cause of Kashmiri separatism. The Conference was consistently promoted by Pakistan in its effort to create a united front against the Indian occupation of the State of **Jammu and Kashmir**. It was initially shunned by India. However, speculation that Delhi was prepared to talk to the APHC began in early 2000, shortly before the visit to South Asia by U.S. President Bill Clinton. This did not happen; the APHC had to wait for another four years before the senior leaders of India began formal discussions with it. This was done by **Lal Krishna Advani**, the deputy prime minister of India.

According to the constitution adopted in March 1993, “the APHC shall be a union of political, social, and religious parties of the state of Jammu and Kashmir with its headquarters in Srinagar.” It will “make peaceful struggle to secure the [Kashmiri] people the exercise of the right of self determination, in accordance with the UN Charter, and the resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council. However, the exercise of the right of self-determination shall also include the

right to independence.” The organization “pledged to project the ongoing struggle in the state, before the nations and governments of the world . . . as being a struggle directed against the forcible and fraudulent occupation of the state by India, and for the achievement of the right of self-determination of its people.” With an eye on the ideology to which the vast majority of the insurgents fighting the Indians subscribed, the APHC said that it would “endeavor, keeping with the Muslim majority character of the state, to promote the build up of a society based on Islamic values, while safeguarding the rights and interests of the non-Muslims.”

A decade after it was founded, the APHC split into two factions. On 7 September 2003, dissenters representing 12 of its constituents removed the chairman Maulana Muhammad Abbas Ansari, and appointed Mussarat Alam in his place. The split was engineered by S. A. S. Gellani, the leader of the avowedly pro-Pakistan Jamaat-e-Islam. The remaining 14 groups formed the organization’s moderate group, led by Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, the hereditary leader of many Kashmiri Muslims and the head cleric of the Jamia Masjid, in Srinagar. Following reconciliation between the moderates and the APHC supporters in Pakistan, a delegation of the APHC, led by Mirwaiz Farooq, visited first Azad Kashmir and then Pakistan. This was the first time that such a large group of Kashmiri separatists was allowed by the Indian authorities to travel to Pakistan. During this 14-day visit, from 2 to 16 June 2005, the group met with President **Pervez Musharraf** and several other senior leaders of Pakistan. The Pakistani leadership assured the Kashmiri group that no solution to the decades-old Kashmir problem would be viable if it did not have the support of the state’s people. The Pakistanis suggested a forum that included not only the governments of India and Pakistan but also a representative group of Kashmiris to begin discussions to resolve the issue.

Later in the year, on 5 September 2005, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of India had a two-hour meeting with a delegation representing the APHC. As was the case with the visit to Pakistan, this group was also led by Mirwaiz Umar Farooq. This was the first meeting of India’s senior leaders with the organization in more than a year. An Indian government spokesman said after the meeting that Singh had raised the possibility of reducing troop strength in the state in return for a reduction in violence.

**ALLIANCE FOR THE RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY (ARD).** In keeping with Pakistan's turbulent political history in which various political groups formed alliances to deal with a particular situation rather than evolve permanent mechanisms for ensuring coordination among diverse political groups, several political parties formed the Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy on 4 April 2001 to challenge the military's rule under General **Pervez Musharraf**. The **Pakistan People's Party (PPP)** and the **Pakistan Muslim League** (Nawaz Sharif Group) PML(N) were the main components of the ARD. The group was reminiscent of earlier political entities, such as the **Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD)** that had been formed to challenge the rule of President **Zia ul-Haq**, Pakistan's third military president (1977–1988).

The absence from the country of **Benazir Bhutto**, the chairperson of the PPP, and **Mian Nawaz Sharif**, the most prominent leader in PML(N), made it difficult for the ARD to become an effective organization or to provide a platform that could be shared by the main opposition parties. Serious differences emerged between the two parties following talks between the senior representatives of the PPP and the Musharraf government. The PPP seemed willing to support Musharraf's continuation as president provided the pending cases of corruption against Benazir Bhutto were withdrawn and she was allowed to take part in political activities. However, the PML(N) was opposed to talks with the government unless General Musharraf took off his uniform, restored the 1973 Constitution to its original form, and constituted an independent election commission. The most active leaders of the ARD were Raja Zafarul Haq, the chairman of the PML(N), and Makhdoom Amin Fahim, the leader of the **Pakistan People's Party Parliamentarians (PPPP)**.

After remaining dormant for several months, the ARD began to actively agitate against the government in the fall of 2005, following local elections that were held over a period of several weeks in August and September. The governing PML did well in the elections, at the expense of both the PPP and the PML(N). The candidates who had the support of the government also did well against the candidates sponsored by the **Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal**, the coalition of six religious parties. Various opposition parties and groups accused the government of election rigging, and ARD threatened to withdraw its

candidates from the provincial assemblies unless the government agreed to hold fresh elections.

**ALLIED BANK LIMITED.** Allied Bank Limited was one of the five state-owned domestic commercial banks to emerge from the nationalization of 1972. It was the second bank to be privatized by the government of Prime Minister **Nawaz Sharif**. The privatization of the first nationalized commercial bank, the Muslim Commercial Bank, had led to a court battle between two interested parties. This dispute earned a measure of skepticism for the entire privatization effort of the administration. An impression was created that the Privatization Commission, headed by Lieutenant General (retired) **Saeed Qadir**, was neither able nor prepared to resist the government's pressure to transfer publicly owned assets to the friends and associates of the prime minister. In handling the privatization of Allied Bank, therefore, the Commission adopted a different approach. It accepted the offer of the bank's employees to purchase it. The employees had campaigned hard to convince the government that their offer, made under the Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP), would help to win back public confidence in the government's privatization scheme.

The government took this advice and handed over the bank to its employees. Privatization was completed in the fall of 1991, but the government continued to hold a sizable share of the institution's capital. In the 1992–1993 financial year, the bank reported an impressive turnaround in terms of the return on assets and the cost of doing business from when it was under the control of the government. Its performance under the management of **Khalid Latif** was cited as an example of the benefits that accrued to the economy, from the privatization of publicly owned financial institutions.

The change of government in October 1993, which saw **Benazir Bhutto** return to power in **Islamabad** as prime minister, proved difficult for Khalid Latif, the bank's president and the person who had negotiated the privatization deal with the Privatization Commission. The government used its leverage as a large shareholder to remove Latif from office and to appoint a president whom it could influence and work with. Latif was sent to prison, accused of conspiring to defraud the government. He was denied bail by the courts and spent five months in jail before he was able to win his release. The shares held

by the government were liquidated in 2004 as a part of the program of privatization implemented by the government of President **Pervez Musharraf**.

**ALTAF HUSSAIN (1953– )**. Altaf Hussain is the founder/president of the **Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz (MQM)**. He was born into a lower-middle class family that had migrated to Pakistan after British India's partition in 1947. The family was originally from the city of Agra, in the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh. In **Karachi**, the family lived first in government housing in Abyssinia Lines and then moved to Jehangir Road.

Altaf Hussain's first move into politics was made in 1978 when he organized the **All-Pakistan Muhajir Students Organization (APMSO)**. The APMSO had to initially compete, sometimes violently, with Jamiat-e-Tuleba, the student organization affiliated with **Jamaat-e-Islami**. Recurrent violence on the campus of Karachi University—sometimes at the instigation of the APMSO but more often in response to provocation by the Jamiat—resulted in the arrest and imprisonment of Altaf Hussain on 14 August 1979. This was the first of many incarcerations he was to suffer at the hands of the military authorities. His first imprisonment lasted nine months; on his release, Altaf Hussain decided to expand his political activities beyond the campus of Karachi University. The ground for such a move had already been prepared—the APMSO had done a great deal of social work in the predominantly *muhajir* (refugees from India) colonies of Golimar, Korangi, Malir, Nazimabad, and New Karachi.

The MQM was officially launched on 18 March 1984 as a movement to protect the interests and aspirations of Karachi's muhajir community. After the ethnic riots in the winter of 1986–1987, involving the three largest ethnic communities of Karachi—the **muhajirs**, the **Pathans**, and the **Punjabis**—the leadership of the MQM decided to convert the movement into a political party and to extend its reach beyond Karachi to other cities of Sindh province, where the muhajir community had a large presence.

The National Assembly elections of November 1988 presented the MQM with the first opportunity to demonstrate its strength; it did so by capturing an impressive 11 of 13 Karachi seats. A few days after the 1988 election results were announced, Altaf Hussain strengthened

the hand of **Benazir Bhutto** by declaring his support for her, indicating, however, that even if she succeeded in forming a government, the MQM members would not join her Cabinet. In 1989, within a year of Bhutto's return to political power, relations between Hussain and the prime minister had deteriorated to such an extent that he formally withdrew his support for her government.

Soon after the rupture between Bhutto and Altaf Hussain, the government decided to allow the army authorities in Karachi a free hand in launching a vigorous campaign against the MQM. The reason for the army's move against the MQM was the belief that much of the violence in Karachi could be laid at the door of Altaf Hussain and his followers. To support this view, the army authorities announced the discovery of "torture chambers" in the areas MQM considered to be its strongholds. It was claimed that these chambers were used to discipline errant MQM members. The army leadership also encouraged a split in the ranks of the MQM, and a splinter group, the **MQM (Haqiqi)**, was formed. The split in the ranks of the MQM led to further worsening of the law-and-order situation in Karachi as the members of the two groups fought pitched battles in the streets of Karachi.

The problem in Karachi contributed to the decision by President **Ghulam Ishaq Khan**, in August 1990, to dismiss the government of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, dissolve the National and Provincial Assemblies, and ask the electorate to go back to the polls for the third time in five years. The **elections of 1990** reconfirmed the hold of Altaf Hussain on the muhajir community of Karachi and southern **Sindh**. The MQM once again won 11 out of Karachi's 13 seats. It was invited to join the Cabinet of **Mian Nawaz Sharif** whose coalition, the **Islami Jamhuri Ittehad (IJI)**, had won a comfortable majority in the election. The MQM accepted the offer and sent its representatives to Islamabad, while Altaf Hussain stayed in Karachi to manage the affairs of his party. The understanding with the new prime minister also proved to be short lived, however, and the MQM withdrew its support from the IJI administration. Violence returned to Karachi as the army was once again called in to deal with Altaf Hussain and his followers. For the second time in two years, the situation in Karachi resulted in the ouster of the government in Islamabad. President **Ghulam Ishaq Khan** dismissed the prime minister, and called the voters to return to the polling booths.



In the **elections of October 1993**, the MQM once again demonstrated that it had not lost any of its political appeal. While it boycotted the National Assembly elections, it participated in the elections to the Sindh Provincial Assembly, in which it won almost all of the seats in Karachi and several in Hyderabad. In October 1993, Benazir Bhutto was back in power as prime minister, but showed little interest in reaching an accommodation with Altaf Hussain. In late 1994, the army was withdrawn from Karachi, which resulted in a sharp escalation in violence in the city, most of it the consequence of MQM activists who battled with law-enforcement agencies. In 1995, 1,800 persons were killed in Karachi, while Altaf Hussain slipped out of Pakistan and took up residence in London, as an exile.

From his exile in London, Altaf Hussain continued to guide the MQM, including authorizing his representatives to begin formal discussions with the administration of Benazir Bhutto to find a solution to the problem of Karachi. Numerous discussions were held, but the two sides failed to bridge their differences, and Karachi remained in the grip of violence for all of 1995. Benazir Bhutto's dismissal in November 1996 and the elections of February 1997 brought the MQM into the mainstream of Pakistani politics. Mian Nawaz Sharif, who took office as prime minister after the 1997 elections, invited the MQM to join the federal Cabinet. The invitation was accepted, but Altaf Hussain continued to live in exile in London. However, in 1998, the MQM members resigned from the federal and provincial governments.

The MQM continued its streak of impressive electoral victories by winning 14 seats in the National Assembly and 21 seats in the Sindh legislature. President **Pervez Musharraf** and Prime Minister **Zafarullah Khan Jamali** invited the party to join the government coalition. The invitation was accepted. The MQM also entered the coalition administration assembled by the **Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid-e-Azam)**, in Sindh. This prevented the Pakistan People's Party, the largest single party in the provincial assembly, from forming a government of its own.

In late 2004, Altaf Hussain visited India and addressed several audiences. In one of his speeches, he seemed to suggest that the partition of British India had been a mistake, implying that it was also a mistake to create Pakistan, a homeland for the Muslim communities

of the Indian sub-continent. This statement was resented in Pakistan, but Hussain was able to navigate his way out of the crisis, and his party continued to cooperate with the administration headed by President Pervez Musharraf.

### AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF 1973, EIGHTH.

*See* ARTICLE 58.2(b) OF THE CONSTITUTION OF 1973.

### AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF 1973, THIR-

**TEENTH.** The Thirteenth Amendment to the constitution was passed by the two houses of the Majlis-e-Shoora—the National Assembly and the Senate—at midnight, on 2 April 1997. It was signed by the president on 3 April, and published in the official gazette on 4 April. The Thirteenth Amendment took away most of the powers that had been given to the president by the Eighth Amendment, including the power to dismiss the prime minister and dissolve the National Assembly. This power, given to the president by **Article 58.2(b) of the Constitution**, was used four times by the persons occupying this position: in May 1988 by President **Zia ul-Haq** against Prime Minister **Muhammad Khan Junejo**; in August 1990 by President **Ghulam Ishaq Khan** to dismiss Prime Minister **Benazir Bhutto**; in April 1993 by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan against Prime Minister **Nawaz Sharif**; and finally in November 1996 by President **Farooq Ahmad Khan Leghari** to dismiss Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. Nawaz Sharif, back as prime minister with a large majority, was anxious to take these powers away from the president.

Sharif moved secretly and with dispatch. The Senate and the National Assembly suspended the rules of business under which each operates in order to move the amendment quickly through the two houses. After the bill was passed—it had the full backing of the opposition—Prime Minister Sharif flew to Choti, the ancestral village of Farooq Leghari, to inform the president of the action taken. The president did not object to the move and agreed to sign the bill as soon as it was presented to him.

The constitutionality of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments was challenged in the Supreme Court, and on 1 December 1997, Chief Justice **Sajjad Ali Shah** ordered the suspension of the

Thirteenth Amendment. For a few hours—and at a time when the conflict between the president and the prime minister had reached the point at which it was clear that there could be no resolution if the two feuding leaders stayed in their positions—the president had the authority to dismiss the prime minister. He chose not to use the restored power and announced his own resignation. Following the president’s resignation, 10 judges of the Supreme Court removed Chief Justice Sajjad Ali Shah from office. *See also* ARTICLE 58.2(B) OF THE CONSTITUTION OF 1973; JUDGES’ CASE.

**AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION (PROPOSED), FIFTEENTH.** On 28 August 1998, the government of Prime Minister **Mian Nawaz Sharif** brought the draft of the proposed Fifteenth Amendment to the constitution before the National Assembly. Under the proposal, it was to be declared that “the Holy Quran and Sunnah of the Holy Prophet shall be the supreme law of Pakistan,” that “the Federal Government shall be under an obligation to take steps to enforce the *Shariah*, to establish *salat* (prayer), to administer *zakat*, to promote *amr bil ma’roof* (what is right) and *nahi anil mumkar* (to forbid what is wrong), that corruption would be eradicated at all levels, that substantial socio-economic justice would be provided in accordance with the principles of Islam, as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah,” and that “the Federal Government may issue directives for the provisions set out in the clauses,” and “take the necessary action against any state functionary for non-compliance of the said directive.” The proposed amendment’s initial draft also contained a provision that would have allowed the constitution to be amended by a majority vote rather than by two-thirds of the membership of the two houses of the parliament.

The amendment was widely viewed in the country as an attempt by the prime minister to establish a religious dictatorship in the country. Even the more liberal elements in Sharif’s own party were reluctant to support the amendment. Their acceptance was obtained after the prime minister agreed to drop the provision with respect to the procedure for amending the constitution. The bill was finally tabled before the National Assembly on 9 October 1998, and was passed by a vote of 151 in favor (142 by the governing **Pakistan Muslim League (PML)**, 7 by **Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA)** members,

and 2 from **Balochistan**), and 16 voting against it. However, since the prime minister did not have the number of votes needed for approval in the Senate, he decided not to put the bill in that chamber until March 2000. By that time, the elections to the Senate were expected to significantly increase the PML's presence in the Senate. Mian Nawaz Sharif's removal by the military, on 12 October 1999, effectively killed the new amendment.

### AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION, SEVENTEENTH.

The Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act 2003 was passed in December 2003, after a year of political wrangling between supporters and opponents of President **Pervez Musharraf**. While the members of the National Assembly representing the **Pakistan People's Party** and **Pakistan Muslim League** (Nawaz) continued to oppose the amendment, the government was able to secure the support of **Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal** on the promise that Musharraf would retire from the military no later than end of December 2004. It incorporated the **Legal Framework Order** (LFO) issued by the Musharraf administration.

A new article 63(1)(d) was inserted that prohibited a person from holding both a "political office" (such as that of the president) and an "office of profit" (such as a career civil or military office, including the chief of army staff). However, a loophole was provided in the article, according to which the Parliament could pass a law permitting the president to hold the office of chief of army staff (COAS), an option which Musharraf later exercised. For the incumbent president to remain in office, he had to win a vote of confidence in the electoral college, made up of the National and four Provincial Assemblies, within 30 days of the passage of the amendment. Musharraf was able to meet this requirement on 1 January 2004, when he secured 658 of 1,170 votes, a majority of 56 percent.

The Seventeenth Amendment essentially reversed the effects of the **Thirteenth Amendment**. As was the case in the **Eighth Amendment**, later repealed by the Thirteenth Amendment, the president could dissolve the National Assembly, thus effectively removing the prime minister. However, the power to exercise this authority was made subject to the approval, or veto, of the Supreme Court. Provincial governors were given the same authority, in the case of provincial assemblies.

Of the 10 laws added to the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution (“laws that are not to be altered, repealed or amended without the previous sanction of the President”), five were to lose their protection after six years. The laws that were thus affected included those that established the system of local government. President Musharraf agreed to the exclusion of this clause from the amendment. The clause would have established the **National Security Council** (NSC). Under the agreement with the opposition, the NSC could be formed on the basis of an act passed by the National Assembly.

**ANTI-TERRORISM ACT OF 1997.** Troubled by the growing incidence of violence in the country, some of it related to the conflict among different religious, ethnic, and social groups, the government of Prime Minister **Mian Nawaz Sharif** decided to take extraordinary measures to deal with the situation. The Anti-Terrorism Act of 1997 was one consequence of these moves. The government’s concern—if not the precise initiatives taken by it—was shared by most segments of the population. It was troubling for many people, however, that the government chose to rush the legislation through the National Assembly with little debate. The passage of the act was seen as one more indication of the consolidation of power in the hands of the executive, which had transpired since the assumption of power by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.

The legislation empowered the government to prosecute people accused of **terrorist** acts by bypassing normal judicial channels. Special tribunals could be established that could move expeditiously by sidestepping the cumbersome procedures that had to be followed by courts. The passage of the act was challenged by its opponents—especially human rights activists—on the grounds that it was unconstitutional. In March 1998, the Lahore High Court gave the government 90 days within which to bring the provisions into line with the constitution.

**ANWAR, KHURSHID (1912–1984).** Khurshid Anwar was one of the best-known popular musicians of Pakistan. His main contribution was to popularize classical music. He was born in **Lahore** and studied philosophy before turning to music. He chose Tawakhul Hussain Khan of the Gawaliar Gharana (a music school) as his *ustaad*

(teacher). His first big break came when he was invited to Bombay (Mumbai) by A. R. Kardar, a well-known producer of Indian musicals, to write the score for *Kurmai*, a Punjabi production. The score was a great success, and Kurshid Anwar stayed with the film industry for the rest of his life. He moved to Lahore after the birth of Pakistan and wrote the scores of popular films such as *Intizar*, *Zehr-e-Ishq*, *Jhoomar*, *Koel*, *Ghoongat*, and *Heer Ranja*. His last composition was for *Mirza Jat*, a Punjabi film.

**ANWARUL HAQ, CHIEF JUSTICE SHEIKH (1925–1995).** Pakistan’s judiciary played an active role in the country’s political development. It chose on several occasions to uphold the decisions of the executive on matters that profoundly affected politics. The “**doctrine of necessity**” was invoked to justify even the seemingly unconstitutional acts of governors-general, presidents, and prime ministers in order not to create political havoc. Chief Justice Anwarul Haq continued this tradition when he presided over the Supreme Court for more than three years, from 1977 to 1981.

Born in Jullundhur, East Punjab, into a prominent Muslim family, Anwarul Haq joined the prestigious **Indian Civil Service** (ICS). Instead of remaining with the executive branch, however, he chose to join the judicial branch of the ICS. After serving as a judge of the Lahore High Court for a number of years, he was appointed to the Supreme Court in 1975. He was appointed chief justice of the Supreme Court in 1977. During his tenure as chief justice of the Supreme Court, he delivered several controversial decisions, including the decision to uphold the death sentence imposed on **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto** by the Lahore High Court. In confirming the death sentence, the seven-member court split four to three, with Chief Justice Anwarul Haq siding with the majority.

Chief Justice Anwarul Haq also presided over the Supreme Court bench that awarded legitimacy to **Zia ul-Haq**’s coup d’etat, against the government of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. In *Nusrat Bhutto vs. Government of Pakistan*, the Supreme Court once again invoked the “doctrine of necessity” to keep in place an established political order, no matter how that order had come into being.

In March 1981, Anwarul Haq retired from the Supreme Court rather than take the oath of office under the Provisional Constitu-

tional Order promulgated by the administration of Zia ul-Haq. *See also* JUDICIARY.

**ARIF, GENERAL (RETIRED) KHALID MAHMUD (1930–)**. General Khalid Mahmud Arif served President **Zia ul-Haq** from 1977, when the military took over political control of Pakistan, to 1987, when he retired from the military. He was **Zia ul-Haq**'s principal advisor during this period. The most momentous decision of the Zia period came in 1978–1979. In 1978, **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto** was tried for murder and sentenced to death by the Lahore High Court. In early 1979, the death sentence was upheld by the Supreme Court, and Bhutto was executed in **Rawalpindi** on 4 April of that year. General Arif was by Zia's side as he made these decisions. It was also during this period that General Zia promised several times to hold general elections but each time failed to keep his word. Once again, he turned to Arif for advice and counsel, as he prolonged his stay in power. In 1983, the opposition launched its most serious challenge to the military regime in the form of the **Movement for the Restoration of Democracy** (MRD). Both Zia and Arif, turning to history for a lesson, decided to deal firmly with the opposition. They did not want to commit the mistakes made in 1969 by President **Muhammad Ayub Khan** and in 1977 by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, when both sought to accommodate the opposition.

General Arif was important to **Zia ul-Haq** not only because of the loyalty he showed to his friend. He was also President Zia's main link with the armed forces and, as such, played a critical role in ensuring that the president continued to receive the support of the senior officers. As Zia became more involved with the affairs of state, he left military matters mostly to General Arif. In March 1984, K. M. Arif was promoted to the rank of full (four-star) general, and was appointed vice chief of army staff (VCOAS). As the VCOAS, General Arif was the effective head of the army. He was perhaps the only person Zia could have trusted to lead the armed forces at that time. General Arif retired in March 1987 after completing his three-year term and was replaced by General **Aslam Beg**.

Unlike some of his other colleagues—Generals **Hameed Gul** and **Aslam Beg**, among them—General Arif did not seek a political career for himself after retiring from the army. He chose instead to influence public opinion on important matters by publishing two books

and by contributing columns to *Dawn*, Pakistan's largest-circulating English-language newspaper.

**ARTICLE 58.2(b) OF THE CONSTITUTION OF 1973.** Article 58.2(b) was inserted into the **constitution of 1973** by the Eighth Amendment, a price exacted by President **Zia ul-Haq** for bringing back democracy to Pakistan. The amendment was passed by the National Assembly in November 1985 with little debate. Once the constitution was amended, President Zia lifted martial law and democracy began its slow return.

Article 58.2(b) read as follows: "Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (2) of Article 48, the President may also dissolve the National Assembly in his discretion where in his opinion, a situation has arisen in which the Government of the Federation cannot be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and appeal to the electorate is necessary." Zia used Article 58.2(b) to dismiss Prime Minister **Muhammad Khan Junejo**, on 29 May 1988, on the grounds of incompetence and inefficiency. Zia's action was challenged by Junejo but was declared by the Supreme Court to be within Zia's constitutional rights. The article was used again two years later by President **Ghulam Ishaq Khan** when he dismissed Prime Minister **Benazir Bhutto**. This happened on 6 August 1990, and Ghulam Ishaq Khan used a long list of accusations to justify the constitutionality of his action. Once again, the Supreme Court went along with the president.

The article was used for the third time on 18 April 1993 by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan to send home the administration of Prime Minister **Nawaz Sharif** and the National Assembly that supported him. The charge sheet prepared by the president was similar to the one that had caused the dismissal of Benazir Bhutto. This time the Supreme Court was not persuaded, however. It passed a landmark judgment setting aside the president's order and restoring both the government of Nawaz Sharif and the National Assembly. By the decision in the Nawaz Sharif case, the Supreme Court gave a considerably more restricted meaning to the article than did the interpretation used by the two preceding presidents.

The fourth use of the article was by President **Farooq Leghari** when he dismissed the administration of Benazir Bhutto on 5 November 1996. As required by the constitution, new elections were



held on 3 February 1997, in which Mian Nawaz Sharif's **Pakistan Muslim League** won an overwhelming victory. Sharif did not lose much time in using his massive presence in the national legislature to pass the **thirteenth amendment to the constitution**, the main provision of which was to repeal Article 58.2(b). This happened in March 1997, and President Farooq Leghari gave his assent to the amendment, thereby losing the power that he had used to set the stage for the return of **Nawaz Sharif** as prime minister.

However, the article reappeared in 2004, as a part of the **Seventeenth Amendment to the Constitution**, approved by the Parliament in 2003, to clear the way for the handover of some political authority by President (General) **Pervez Musharraf** to elected Prime Minister **Zafarullah Khan Jamali**. *See also* AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF 1973, THIRTEENTH.

**ASGHAR KHAN, AIR MARSHAL (RETIRED) (1928– )**. Asghar Khan entered politics after two successful careers in government: as the first commander in chief of the Pakistan air force and then as chairman of **Pakistan International Airlines**. He left the air force soon after Pakistan's 1965 war with India convinced him that **Muhammad Ayub Khan** had failed the country and that Pakistan needed a new type of leader.

Asghar Khan began his political career by joining, in 1969, the Justice Party, but then decided to form his own political organization, the **Tehrik-e-Istiqlal**. He played an active role in the agitation that led to the resignation of President Muhammad Ayub Khan in March 1969 and the demise of the political system founded by the discredited president. The political agitation against the government of Muhammad Ayub Khan, proved to be the high point of Asghar Khan's political career. During the peak of the campaign, in the early part of 1969, Asghar Khan shared the limelight with **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto**. This fact was recognized by the Ayub regime, and both Asghar Khan and Bhutto had to spend several months in prison.

Asghar Khan ran for a seat in the National Assembly in the general **elections of 1970**, the first election to be held in Pakistan since independence. He chose **Rawalpindi** as his constituency in the belief that the city, with a large voting population associated in one way or the other with the armed forces, would appreciate the contributions that

could be made by a retired air marshal. However, he lost the election to Khurshid Hasan Mir, a close associate of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and a prominent member of the **Pakistan People's Party (PPP)**. The success of Bhutto's PPP in the 1970 elections and Bhutto's quick ascent to power after the election diminished the political stature of Asghar Khan. He remained in opposition during the Bhutto years, ignored by both the government and the middle-class constituency that he sought to cultivate.

Asghar Khan took part in the elections of 1977, the first to be held after the breakup of West Pakistan into four provinces—**Balochistan**, the **Northwest Frontier**, **Punjab**, and **Sindh**, and the first to be conducted under the **constitution of 1973**. He was instrumental in organizing the **Pakistan National Alliance (PNA)**, a coalition of political parties opposed to Bhutto. The results of the elections, as announced by the government, surprised Asghar Khan and other leaders of the PNA. The opposition had expected to perform much better than indicated by official results. Asghar Khan and several other important members of the opposition, failed to win seats in the National Assembly. They refused to accept the outcome of the elections and launched a movement against the government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. As had happened in 1969, Asghar Khan did not reap the fruits of his endeavors. The agitation against the regime of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, brought the army back to power, this time under General **Zia ul-Haq**.

Asghar Khan spent the early years of Zia ul-Haq's martial law under house arrest. Although the military government was prepared to work with a number of political parties that had come together under the umbrella of the PNA, it ignored Asghar Khan's Tehrik-e-Istiqlal. The Tehrik joined the **Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD)** in 1981, participated in the agitation launched by the MRD in 1983 against the government of Zia ul-Haq, but left the movement in 1986.

The confrontation between **Mian Nawaz Sharif** and **Benazir Bhutto** that was to dominate Pakistan's politics so completely after the death of President Zia ul-Haq in August 1988 left little space for any other politician not aligned with the two main parties. Asghar Khan saw the handwriting on the wall and retired from politics in early 1996 after dissolving his political party.

**ASHRAF, JAVED (1951–1996).** Javed Ashraf, a young activist of the **Pakistan Muslim League (PML) (Nawaz Group)**, was generally regarded as a rising star in the party's leadership. He was secretary-general of the **Lahore** chapter of the PML and also worked as a political secretary to **Mian Shahbaz Sharif**, brother of **Nawaz Sharif** and the leader of the opposition in the Punjab Provincial Assembly. While Shahbaz Sharif was in jail, waiting to be tried on charges of corruption, Javed Ashraf looked after the affairs of the party in the provincial legislature.

Ashraf's political career was cut short when he was killed in Lahore in an encounter with the police on 3 April 1996. His death added another chapter, a bloody one, to the feud between Prime Minister **Benazir Bhutto** and Nawaz Sharif, the leader of the opposition in the National Assembly.

**ASIA COOPERATION DIALOGUE.** Pakistan played a central role in organizing the Asia Cooperation Dialogue. According to Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri, minister of foreign affairs in the cabinet of Prime Minister **Shaukat Aziz**, this effort was part of a vision that "aims at interlocking political and economic relations with the countries of Central, East, and North-East Asia. Pakistan wants to integrate itself in the process unfolding in greater East Asia, a region which is steadily acquiring increasing economic and political weight. We are pursuing this in tandem with our efforts to organize both SAARC and Economic Cooperation Organization."

The fourth session of the Dialogue was held in **Islamabad** on 5 April 2005 and was addressed by Wen Jiabao, prime minister of **China**. It was attended by foreign ministers from 25 Asian countries.

**ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION (APEC).** On 24 June 1992, during a three-day meeting held in Bangkok, attended by 14 countries, the decision to convert the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation into a permanent institution was taken. A small secretariat was set up to guide the APEC toward its new role. The APEC, created in 1989, had made little progress; its main achievement during the first three years of its existence was to hold annual conferences and to devise 10 programs of economic cooperation in fields ranging from fisheries to lowering trade barriers. The Bangkok meeting chose to push

the 14 members of the organization—Australia, Brunei, Canada, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and the United States—toward greater economic and trade cooperation in order to protect the region from the possible collapse of the Uruguay round of trade negotiations and the consequent deglobalization of world trading.

Whether the APEC develops into a major trading bloc would depend in part on the success of the European Union's effort to move toward greater economic integration and the speed with which the United States, Canada, and Mexico are able to develop the North American Free Trade Area. If these difficulties are overcome, the APEC has the potential to become one of the largest trading blocs in the world. If that were to happen, the consequences for countries such as Pakistan could be serious, since these countries would be excluded from all major regional trading arrangements.

**ASIAN-AFRICAN STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP, NEW.** The New Asian-African Strategic Partnership was the outcome of a two-day summit attended by about a hundred leaders from Africa and Asia, on 22–23 April 2005 in Jakarta, Indonesia. The summit was chaired by Presidents Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Thabo Mbeki of Indonesia and South Africa, respectively. The conference concluded with the issue of a four-page declaration that recognized “that the current global situation and prevailing conditions in Asia and Africa necessitate the need to actively pursue a common view and collective action. . . . We envision an Asian-African region at peace with itself and with the world at large, working together as a concert of nations in harmony, non-exclusive, bonded in dynamic partnership and conscious of our historical ties and cultural heritages.” The declaration pledged to boost trade and investment, and stressed multilateral approaches to resolving conflicts. The partnership will also seek to address issues such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and organized crime.

This meeting of a hundred senior leaders from the continents of Africa and Asia was one of the largest gatherings of nations outside the United Nations. The summit was attended by, among others, President Hu Jintao of China, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of India, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi of Japan, President Pervez Mushar-

raf of Pakistan, Prime Minister Khalida Zia of Bangladesh, and King Gyanendra of Nepal. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan was also present. The summit was originally called to mark the 50th anniversary of the Asian-African Conference 1955 held in the Indonesian city of Bandung. *See also* THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT.

**ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK (ADB).** The Asian Development Bank was established under the aegis of the United Nations in 1968 as a part of the regional development banking system. The ADB is headquartered in Manila, the Philippines, and has over 50 members, including the Central Asian states of the former Soviet Union. Japan and the United States are the largest contributors of funds to the ADB, each with a share of 16 percent of the prescribed capital of US\$23 billion.

Pakistan is one of the principal recipients of assistance from the ADB. It has received loans worth US\$1.75 billion since 1968, making it the second largest beneficiary of the bank's operations. About 55 percent of the loans made by the ADB came from the Asian Development Fund (ADF), the soft arm of the bank. Credits from the ADF are free of interest; beneficiaries pay only a small service charge. The ADB has provided assistance for a number of important projects, including the Swabi Salinity Control and Reclamation Project (US\$118 million). In 1995, the ADB joined the **World Bank** and a number of other donors to finance the **Ghazi Barotha Hydroelectric** project.

In 2005, the bank decided to assist Pakistan in developing its infrastructure, long neglected because of the paucity of public resources. It was especially interested in funding projects for improving transport and services in **Karachi**, the country's largest city. An initial provision of US\$100 million was made for this purpose. The bank also indicated its interest in tapping the local financial market, by using its good credit rating which was better than that of the government. Also in 2005, following the devastating earthquake that leveled parts of northern Pakistan, the ADB provided US\$1 billion of the more than US\$6 billion raised by the government to bring relief and rehouse the affected population.

**ASIF NAWAZ, GENERAL (1937–1993).** Born on 3 January 1937 in his ancestral village of Chakri Rajghan (Jhelum District), Asif Nawaz belonged to a military family of the Janjua Rajput clan from the Salt

Range area of the **Punjab** well known for producing soldiers. Educated at the Roman Catholic Convent of Jesus and Mary in Srinagar in pre-partition India and then at St. Mary's School in **Rawalpindi**, he joined the Pakistan army training program for officer cadets at the age of 16, and after an introductory course in Kohat, he was selected for the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst, England, where he received his commission in 1957.

Asif Nawaz managed to escape martial law duties for most of the period during which General **Zia ul-Haq** ruled Pakistan. However, he was promoted to major general and given command of the Seventh Infantry Division in **Peshawar** in 1982. He took over as commandant of the **Pakistan Military Academy** in Kakul in 1985. On 23 May 1988, he was promoted to lieutenant general, among the last group of promotions approved by the civilian Prime Minister **Muhammad Khan Junejo**, and posted as corps commander of V Corps in **Karachi**. Asif Nawaz was brought from Karachi to Rawalpindi as chief of general staff under General **Mirza Aslam Beg** in April 1991 and was nominated a month later by President **Ghulam Ishaq Khan** as the chief of army staff-designate to succeed General Beg on 17 August 1991. Asif Nawaz was the tenth army chief of Pakistan and the eighth Pakistani in this job. He died in Rawalpindi after suffering a massive heart attack while he was exercising on a treadmill. He was buried in his native village.

**ASKARI, HASAN (1924–2005)**. Born in Delhi and educated at Delhi and Lucknow University, Hasan Askari joined the British Indian Army in the public relations section. Released from the army in 1945, he joined the newspaper *The Statesman* as a staff writer. He migrated to Pakistan in 1947 and worked for Radio Pakistan for several years, after which he was inducted into Pakistan army's Inter-Services Public Relations. In 1972, he went first to Paris and then to New Delhi as press counselor in the embassies there. Upon returning to **Karachi**, in 1980, he joined the newspaper *Dawn*, first as a columnist and then later as assistant editor. He wrote insightful columns on South Asian affairs. After retiring from the newspaper, he continued to write a weekly column. He was the founder member of the Pakistan Writers Guild, which went on to become an influential lobby group for journalists and writers. Its influence was notable during the periods in

which governments in **Islamabad** had sought to curb freedom of the press.

**ASMA JAHANGIR (1951– )**. Asma Jahangir—also known by her maiden name, Asma Jilani—has played a significant role in promoting human rights in Pakistan. She has concentrated in particular on the rights of women and minorities, thereby inviting the wrath of conservative and religious forces in the country. In 1986, she founded a non-governmental organization, the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), for documenting and thus making people aware of “the rampant mistreatment and exploitation of women, children, minorities, and laborers by religious zealots.” She was the Commission’s first secretary-general.

In 1995, Asma Jahangir came to the attention of the international human rights community for taking up the cause of two Pakistani Christians who had been sentenced to death under the “blasphemy laws.” Although her role in this case drew a great deal of hostile criticism from religious elements, including death threats, it did, however, bring her international fame and recognition. In July, she was chosen to receive the Ramon Magsaysay Award for public service. She was cited for “challenging Pakistan to embrace and uphold the principles of religious tolerance, gender equality, and equal protection under the law.”

In December 1997, when the **Pakistan Muslim League (PML)** put forward **Muhammad Rafiq Tarar** as its candidate for president, Asma Jahangir joined the chorus of voices raised in protest at the party’s choice. She opposed Tarar because of his poor record in human rights, while he was a magistrate and later a judge of the High and Supreme Courts. The opposition of human rights activists did not prevent Tarar from being elected president.

Jahangir continued to work in the human rights area after the military takeover of October 1999. She was actively involved in bringing to international attention the case of **Mukhtaran Bibi**, a woman ordered to be raped in a village in **Punjab** following a verdict given by a tribal council.

**ASSOCIATION OF PAKISTANI PHYSICIANS IN NORTH AMERICA (APPNA)**. The Association of Pakistani Physicians in North America—better known by its acronym APPNA—

was established in 1978 by a group of Pakistani doctors working in Chicago. Its original purpose was to provide support to the professionals who had come from Pakistan to the United States. Over time, as Pakistani physicians from all over the United States and Canada joined the association, it broadened its objectives to include social work in Pakistan. It also sponsored a political action committee, PAKPAC, to protect what it saw as Pakistan's interests in the United States. APPNA holds two annual meetings, one in the summer, in a major U.S. city, and the other in the winter, in a large Pakistani city. It operates out of Chicago.

**ASSOCIATION OF PAKISTANI SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS IN NORTH AMERICA (APSENA).** The Association of Pakistani Scientists and Engineers in North America was founded in 1984 to work as a lobby group for Pakistani professionals working abroad. Over time, APSENA also developed a work program to improve the quality of technical education being imparted by colleges and universities in Pakistan. A fund, Promotion for Education in Pakistan (PEP), was launched to provide financial assistance to those families in Pakistan who could not afford to send their children to the institutions operating in the private sector. The members of APSENA meet annually at the headquarters of one of its major chapters in North America.

**ATTIQR RAHMAN, LIEUTENANT GENERAL (RETIRED) (1928–1996).** Attiqur Rahman was one of the many army generals who held important political positions after leaving active service. In 1970, he was appointed governor of West Pakistan by the government of President **Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan**. Rahman replaced Air Marshal **Nur Khan**, who held that position for several months following the imposition of martial law in March 1969. Rahman was the last person to hold this job; it was during his tenure that the decision was made to break up West Pakistan into four provinces—**Balochistan**, the **Northwest Frontier**, **Punjab**, and **Sindh**.

**AURAT FOUNDATION.** The Aurat (Women's) Foundation was established in **Lahore** in January 1986 by a group of professional



**women** under the leadership of Nigar Ahmed. It is one of the many organizations that sprang up in Pakistan during the time (1977–1988) in which President **Zia ul-Haq** was in power. Zia had encouraged the conservative point of view, that in a Muslim society women’s roles were in the house as wives, mothers, and housekeepers. Even after the death of President Zia, Pakistani society continued to be pulled in two different directions. Accordingly, the Aurat Foundation concentrated its energies and resources on training women and providing them with information on the economic opportunities available to them. The Foundation produced cassettes and videos that women could use to acquire the skills they needed in the marketplace. It has also set up “Hamjoli,” a producer cooperative to market simple products that women produce in their homes. The Foundation also conducts workshops to familiarize non-governmental organizations working in Pakistan with the problems women face in the country.

**AWAMI LEAGUE (AL).** The Awami League was formed in 1949 by a group of leaders from East Bengal (present day **Bangladesh**) who were not satisfied with the role they were playing in the evolving political structure in Pakistan. There was a widespread impression in East Pakistan that the leaders of West Pakistan were discriminating against the people of the eastern wing. The first set of leaders of the AL belonged to the left wing of the **Muslim League**, the party that had fought successfully for the establishment of Pakistan. They took control of the new party, with **Maulana Bhashani** as their leader. The AL was the most important component of the **United Front**, which won the **provincial elections of 1954** and effectively marginalized the Muslim League in East Pakistan. However, serious dissension within the ranks of the **United Front** leadership led to Bhashani’s resignation and the election of **H. S. Suhrawardhy** as president. Following Suhrawardhy’s death in 1963, **Sheikh Mujibur Rahman** became the party’s president. It was under Mujibur that the party developed its **Six Point Program** for obtaining greater autonomy for the federating provinces of Pakistan. The program announced in 1966 prepared the ground for the Awami League’s extraordinary victory in the **elections of 1970**. Following the breakup of Pakistan in December 1971 and the return of Mujibur Rahman in January 1972 from imprisonment in West

Pakistan, the Awami League came to power in Dhaka, the capital of Bangladesh.

Hosina Wajid, Mujibur Rahman's daughter, succeeded her father as the president of AL when he was assassinated by a group of army officers. For two decades, Bangladesh was governed by military presidents. The Awami League emerged on the political scene once again when democracy returned but had to share power with the Bangladesh National Party, led by Khalida Ziaur Rahman, the widow of the first military president of the country. While the Awami League retained a close relationship with India, developed during East Pakistan's conflict with the western wing, the BNP drew closer to Pakistan. Bangladesh's relations with Pakistan accordingly followed a roller coaster ride, depending on which of the two parties was in power in Dhaka.

**AWAMI NATIONAL PARTY (ANP).** The Awami National Party was formed in 1986, following the merger of several left-leaning parties, including the Awami Tahrik, the National Democratic Party, the Mazdoor Kissan Party, and a splinter group from the Pakistan National Party. **Khan Abdul Wali Khan** was appointed the new party's president. The party's formation was hailed by its sponsors as the first step toward an effective presence of the left in the politics of Pakistan. But the unity that was forced on the traditionally fractious left by Wali Khan and the cofounders of the ANP proved to be weak. Within a year of the new party's birth, splinter groups began to assert their independence. In the **Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP)**, Wali Khan's political base, a group of ANP dissidents set up the ANP (Constitutional Group) as a separate organization, while another group broke away to establish the Pakhtoon Liberation Front. In spite of these divisions, the ANP retained an effective presence in the Northwest Frontier Province.

In the early 1990s, it became a strong ally of the **Pakistan Muslim League (PML)**, led by **Mian Nawaz Sharif**. It sided with Sharif when the **Pakistan People's Party (PPP)** assumed power in **Islamabad** under the leadership of Prime Minister **Benazir Bhutto**. The prime minister, upset by the ANP move, persuaded President **Farooq Leghari** to dismiss the provincial cabinet and maneuver the PPP into forming the government. The president's action further cemented the

ties between the PML and the ANP. The ANP was rewarded handsomely when the PML won decisively against the PPP in the elections of February 1997. It joined the PML-led governments both in Islamabad, the federal capital, and **Peshawar**, the capital of the Northwest Frontier Province. In 1995, an ailing Wali Khan surrendered the leadership of the ANP to **Ajmal Khattak**, while his wife, **Nasim Wali Khan**, took over the NWFP wing of the party. In 1998, following the development of serious differences with Nawaz Sharif, ANP left the coalition government in Islamabad.

**AYODHYA MOSQUE.** This mosque—also known as the Babri mosque, because it was constructed by Babar, the first **Mughul emperor** of India—had been the target of attacks by Hindu nationalists for some time. The mosque was constructed in the 16th century by the Muslim conquerors of northern India on a site that Hindus believe to be the birthplace of the god Rama. The mosque had long been a symbol of Islamic repression for those Hindus who believed that the Muslims had been singularly insensitive about their religion. It became a symbol of Hindu nationalism when it was razed by Hindu zealots in December 1992. The demolition of the mosque was encouraged by the Hindu nationalist **Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)**.

The destruction of the mosque led to the eruption of communal violence all over India, sparking nationwide riots between Hindus and Muslims that killed more than 2,000 people in the worst sectarian violence since the killing of Sikhs after the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1984.

The Ayodhya mosque may have contributed to the poor showing of the Indian National Congress Party in the elections held in May 1996, when Prime Minister P. V. Nasarimha Rao suffered a humiliating defeat, in part, it was said, because he lost the confidence of the important Muslim vote. Up until then, India's Muslims, constituting 12.5 percent of the population, had faithfully supported the Congress Party. They were comfortable with the secular stance of the party, as compared to the more Hindu militancy of some of the opposition parties, in particular the BJP. Rao, however, forfeited this trust in the way he handled the Ayodhya mosque incident. The loss of the Muslim vote was a major cause of the decline of the Congress Party as a political force in the country. In spite of strenuous efforts, the party

failed to recover the ground it had lost in the elections of 1996, when the country went back to the polls in 1998. *See also* ADVANI, LAL KRISHNA.

**AYUB, GOHAR (1937– )**. Gohar Ayub is the second son of General (later, Field Marshal and the first military president of Pakistan) **Muhammad Ayub Khan**. He was educated at St. Mary’s Academy in **Rawalpindi**, where he graduated in 1953. The same year, he joined the **Pakistan Military Academy** as a “gentleman cadet.” A year later, he was selected for training at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst. On his return from England, he was commissioned as a second lieutenant in the Pakistan army.

Soon after his return from England, Gohar Ayub married the daughter of Lieutenant General Habibullah Khan. In 1962, he resigned from the army to join Gandhara Industries, a business house founded by his father-in-law a few years earlier. The business included a number of flourishing enterprises such as textile units in the **Northwest Frontier Province** (NWFP) and an automobile assembly plant near **Karachi**.

Gohar Ayub’s first foray into politics was in January 1965 when he organized a street demonstration in Karachi to celebrate his father’s success in the presidential election—the first to be held under the **constitution of 1962**. The celebration turned into a riot when Ayub’s supporters were challenged by those who had voted in favor of **Fa-tima Jinnah**, the opposition’s candidate in the presidential poll. A number of people were killed and hundreds were injured. This incident was to leave a bitter memory in the minds of the people who had opposed Muhammad Ayub Khan—a memory that contributed to the success of the anti-Ayub Khan movement of 1968–1969.

President Muhammad Ayub Khan also paid a heavy political price for the perception that Gohar Ayub and his father-in-law had benefited enormously from the favors conferred on them by the government, including the granting of precious licenses for setting up industries and importing raw materials and equipment, as well as gaining access to cheap capital from government-owned investment banks.

Gohar Ayub won a seat in the National Assembly from his native Haripur in 1990, and was elected the speaker of the National Assembly

the same year; following the elections of 1997, he was given the portfolio of foreign affairs in the Cabinet of Prime Minister **Mian Nawaz Sharif**. He resigned from the Sharif Cabinet in April 1998 but was asked to stay on. He played an important role in Pakistan's decision to explode six nuclear devices in May 1998, following the tests carried out by India earlier that month. In August 1998, Gohar Ayub left the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and was appointed minister of water and power.

Gohar Ayub left active politics after the military takeover of October 1999. In the **elections of October 2002**, his seat was successfully contested by his son, Omar Ayub Khan. In the cabinet formed by Prime Minister **Shaukat Aziz**, Omar Khan was included as minister of state for finance.

### **AYUB KHAN, FIELD MARSHAL MUHAMMAD (1907–1974).**

Field Marshal Muhammad Ayub Khan was born in Rehana, a village in the **Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP)** district of Hazara. He went to Aligrah College to prepare for a career, in one of the several professions that were now attracting the Muslim middle classes. Noting his family background, his physique and bearing, and the fact that he belonged to a class that the British had designated as “martial,” a number of his teachers urged Ayub Khan to join the military. This he did, as a gentleman cadet in 1926; and after studying at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, in England, he received the King's Commission in 1928.

Ayub Khan rose quickly in the ranks of the British Indian Army and commanded a battalion in World War II. When the British announced their decision to leave India, he had already attained the rank of brigadier general. Being one of the most senior Muslim officers in the army at the time of the partition of British India, he was appointed to the Punjab Boundary Commission. A year later, he was promoted to the rank of major general and was sent to Dacca (now Dhaka) as the general officer commanding (GOC) of the army garrison in East Bengal (later, East Pakistan, and still later, Bangladesh).

In 1950, Prime Minister **Liaqat Ali Khan** invited Ayub Khan to become the first Pakistani to lead the army as its commander in chief. He was appointed to a second five-year term as commander in chief in January 1955. By this time Ayub Khan had decided to remove the civilian government and place Pakistan under martial law. The near-collapse of

civilian authority in 1956 was his reason for intervention, but he was not in any hurry to do so. He waited for 20 months before making his first move. He struck in October 1958, but moved cautiously. On 7 October, Ayub Khan forced President **Iskander Mirza** to place Pakistan under martial law. The president issued a proclamation to this effect and appointed Ayub Khan as the chief martial-law administrator. Twenty days later, on 27 October, Ayub Khan sent President Mirza into exile and appointed himself the president.

A tremendous amount of goodwill accompanied Ayub Khan's assumption of political power and motivated him to make significant structural changes in Pakistan's society, economy, and political system. The system of **Basic Democracies**, the **Constitution of 1962**, the **Land Reforms of 1959**, the **Family Laws Ordinance of 1961**, and the launching of the **Second Five-Year Plan in 1960** were all significant departures from the way political and economic business had been conducted in Pakistan in the first post-independence decade. Political tranquility, if only on the surface, and rapid economic growth were the outcome of these changes.

In September 1965, Pakistan went to war with India as a consequence of a number of ill-advised moves made by Pakistan in the summer of 1965—including the launching of **Operation Gibraltar in Kashmir**—the precise motives of which, despite a considerable amount of speculation, remain murky to this day. The war drained Pakistan of financial resources precisely at the time it was implementing its **Third Five-Year Plan (1965–1970)**. It brought to a sudden end the highly coveted U.S. military and economic aid, which had been critical for Pakistan's economic expansion. It exposed the military to the vulnerability of East Pakistan and contributed to the secessionist sentiment that surfaced in 1966, in the form of **Mujibur Rahman's Six Point Program** for political and economic autonomy for the eastern wing of the country. And, finally, the signing of the **Tashkent Declaration** on 10 January 1966 exploded the myth of Pakistan's military invincibility. India exacted a heavy price for its willingness to restore the status quo, but the price was too high for the people of Pakistan. The Tashkent "let down" was exploited to the full by **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto**, who as foreign minister, was a member of the Pakistani delegation that Ayub Khan took to Tashkent, but Bhutto distanced himself immediately from the position taken by the president on returning to **Islamabad**.

For the second time in four years, the opposition surprised Ayub Khan by its ability to organize itself. In the fall of 1964, the **Combined Opposition Party (COP)** had launched a credible challenge to him by nominating **Fatima Jinnah** as its candidate for the presidential elections of January 1965. In December 1968, the opposition parties came together again and organized the **Democratic Action Committee (DAC)** to mobilize and channel the growing resentment against the government. The formation of the DAC quickened the pace of the movement against Ayub; the government invited the opposition to participate in a “round table” discussion, but before the negotiations had concluded, the army intervened, under the leadership of General **Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan**. On 25 March 1969, Muhammad Ayub Khan surrendered power to Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan, who became Pakistan’s second military president.

Allowed to languish in his house in **Islamabad**, Muhammad Ayub Khan saw with dismay the dismantling of his system by Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan.

**AZAD KASHMIR.** Pakistan calls the small sliver of land it captured in the first **Kashmir** war with India (1948–1949) “Azad” (free) Kashmir. Ever since 1949, when the United Nations adopted a resolution that ended the brief war between the two countries and authorized Pakistan to administer this part of Kashmir, pending a plebiscite to determine the political future of the entire state, Azad Kashmir enjoyed some autonomy. It has its own constitution, according to which the people of the territory elect their own assembly. Azad Kashmir has its own president as its chief executive. In actual fact, the administration in Muzaffarabad usually has the same party affiliation as the administration in power in **Islamabad**, Pakistan’s capital. Muzaffarabad is the capital of Azad Kashmir and its only significant city. The city is about 80 kilometers from Pakistan and 30 kilometers from the border that currently separates Azad Kashmir from Indian Kashmir.

The boundary between Azad Kashmir and the Indian state of Kashmir was defined twice, once in 1949 and again in 1972. The first definition essentially followed the position of the troops of India and Pakistan when the two countries accepted the cease-fire brokered by the United Nations. The second demarcation grew out of

the **Simla Accord**, signed by India and Pakistan on 3 July 1972. The fact that the **Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)**, which took power in Delhi following the Indian elections of March 1998 formally laid claim to Azad Kashmir complicated once again the relations between Pakistan and India over the future of Kashmir. However, it was Atal Bihari Vajpayee, India's prime minister in a BJP led coalition, who extended his "hand of friendship" to Pakistan in a speech in April 2003. The speech given in Srinagar, in the Indian-administered part of Kashmir, led to the gradual easing of tension between Pakistan and India. On 7 April 2005, the border between Azad Kashmir and the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir was opened to permit a bus to operate between Muzaffarabad and Srinagar. This was the first time that travel was allowed between the two parts of Kashmir. *See also* EARTHQUAKE OF 8 OCTOBER 2005.

**AZAM KHAN, LIEUTENANT GENERAL MUHAMMAD (1908–1994)**. Of the three senior generals of the Pakistani army who helped **Muhammad Ayub Khan** stage his coup d'état in October 1958, Lieutenant General Muhammad Azam Khan was the most experienced in civilian affairs. He was the general officer commanding (GOC) Lahore garrison when in 1953 Governor-General **Ghulam Muhammad** called on the army to bring the anti-**Ahmadiya** movement under control. Azam Khan, as martial law administrator, became the virtual governor of **Punjab** province. Not only did he move with dispatch and quickly reestablish law and order, but the army under his command also performed a number of civic functions.

Muhammad Ayub Khan brought Azam Khan into his Cabinet as "senior minister" and put him in charge of the Department of Refugee Rehabilitation. The problem of rehabilitating the refugees from India, particularly those who had settled in the rural areas of Pakistan, had proved intractable up until then. The success of the operation launched by Azam Khan made him the most popular military figure in the martial government of Muhammad Ayub Khan. With the refugees resettled, Azam Khan was ready to move on to other things. In 1960, President Muhammad Ayub Khan sent him to Dacca (now Dhaka) as governor of East Pakistan.

The new governor not only put together a good administration in Dacca (now Dhaka) but gained a great deal of respect for advancing



Bengal's desire to participate meaningfully in government affairs. He concluded that political participation and not paternalism was a solution to East Pakistan's political problems. But Muhammad Ayub Khan was not prepared to accept this assessment. He was also worried that Azam Khan, having become popular in both wings of the country, had the credibility to effectively challenge him politically. Azam Khan was called back to West Pakistan in 1962 and was succeeded by Abdul Monem Khan, a little-known Bengali politician.

In 1964, the **Combined Opposition Party (COP)** toyed with the idea of nominating Azam Khan as its candidate to oppose Ayub Khan in the presidential elections of January 1965. The ultimate candidate was **Fatima Jinnah**, however, and Azam Khan, by campaigning for her with great enthusiasm, contributed to her relative success in the eastern wing of the country. After Fatima Jinnah's defeat, Azam Khan announced his retirement from politics.

**AZIZ, SARTAJ (1929– )**. Sartaj Aziz is from the **Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP)**. He was educated at the Hailey College of Commerce, **Lahore**, and joined the Pakistan Military Accounts Service in 1952. He served in the Planning Commission for a number of years. It was during his tenure on the Commission that the **Second** and **Third Five-Year Plans** were prepared. He attended Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government in 1965 as a Mason Fellow. He left Pakistan in 1970 to join the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization and, while in Rome, played an important role in launching the International Fund for Agricultural Development. He returned to Pakistan in 1980, at the invitation of President **Zia ul-Haq**, and was appointed minister of agriculture. He served as finance minister in all **Muslim League** governments that were in office during the 1990s. In August 1998, Aziz moved from the ministry of finance to the ministry of foreign affairs. He left active politics after the military came to power in October 1999, following the failure of an attempt to bring together various factions of the Muslim League. In 2004, he was appointed vice chancellor of Beaconhouse National University, one of Pakistan's first private universities.

**AZIZ, SHAUKAT (1949– )**. Pakistan's 23rd prime minister and prominent in international financial affairs, Aziz was born in **Karachi**.

Shaukat Aziz was educated at the city's St. Patrick's School and Rawalpindi's Gordon College, from where he graduated in 1967 and returned to Karachi to join the Institute of Business Administration (IBA), from where he obtained masters degree in business administration. He joined Citibank, Karachi, in 1969 and six years later moved into the international cadre of that institution. He served in the Philippines, Jordan, Greece, the United States, the United Kingdom, Malaysia, Singapore, and Saudi Arabia. His last assignment at Citibank before entering politics was as the head of its Private Bank group.

In November 1999, a month after the military take over of 12 October, Aziz was invited by General **Pervez Musharraf** to join the new cabinet as finance minister. He held this position until 2004, becoming the longest serving finance minister in the country's history. During this period he successfully negotiated a series of agreements with the **International Monetary Fund (IMF)**, under which, in return for a significant flow of IMF assistance to the cash-strapped country, Pakistan agreed to adopt a program of macroeconomic stabilization. The program was successfully implemented after Pakistan had stabilized its exchange rate, tamed fiscal deficits, reduced the rate of inflation, and accumulated more than US\$12 billion of external reserves, enough to pay for more than 10 months of imports. Finance Minister Aziz also led the drive to reduce the burden of debt carried by the country. This was done by getting the United States to forgive US\$1 billion of debt owed to it by **Islamabad**, and by signing a debt rescheduling agreement with other Western donors under the aegis of the Paris Club. These moves became possible after Pakistan began to be viewed in a favorable light in the post 9/11 war on **terrorism**. They resulted in lowering debt service significantly in 2003–2004.

Some of Aziz's critics maintained that he should have persuaded the IMF to let Pakistan proceed on the parallel tracks of achieving macroeconomic stability and reviving growth. Emphasis on the former meant that economic growth remained sluggish for the first three years of President Musharraf's rule. It picked up in 2002–2003 when the GDP increased by 5.1 percent per annum, followed by growth rates of 6.4 percent in 2003–2004, and 8.4 percent in 2004–2005. This growth spurt was helped by a sharp increase in external capital flows, particularly those originating from the Pakistanis living in the United States. The increase in growth did not, however, reduce the

large pool of absolute poverty which the country had accumulated in the 15-year period since 1989. It was also apparent that a significant amount of incremental income, generated by growth, was going into the hands of the top 10 percent of the population.

Impressed by Aziz's stewardship of the economy, General Musharraf engineered his appointment as Pakistan's 23rd prime minister, in 2004. He escaped an assassination attempt on 30 July 2004, in which his driver was killed, at Fateh Jhang near Islamabad, before he assumed office. In early 2005, the government uncovered a network of 19 people belonging to the **Jaishi-i-Mohammad** and **Jamaatal Furqan**, two Islamic terrorist groups banned by the governments of Pakistan and the United States. On 18 January 2005, the government announced the arrest of three brothers, Nisar Ahmad, Abdul Nasir, and Abdul Muneem, who were said to have been the masterminds of the assassination attempt. They were linked with Amjad Farooqi, who was allegedly involved in the assassination attempt on President Pervez Musharraf. The police said that the individuals arrested were deeply opposed to the Musharraf government's **Afghanistan** and **Iraq** policies.

On 24 August 2004, Aziz was sworn in after winning seats in the National Assembly from two constituencies, one in Attock in northern Punjab, and the other in Tharparkar in southeastern Sindh. He was also elected to lead the coalition of parties in the National Assembly, in which the **Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid-e-Azam)** had the largest number of seats. He retained the portfolio of finance in the large cabinet over which he now presided. The decision not to give up finance was motivated by his wish to retain a security blanket, in case he did not succeed in the political role that had been assigned to him.

Aziz was more active in the area of foreign affairs than in domestic politics. He had little competition in the former area, but in domestic affairs, **Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain**, president of the **Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid-i-Azam)** (PML(Q)), played a more effective role. The new prime minister traveled extensively, renewing the contacts he had made while serving as a senior official at Citibank.

**AZIZ KHAN KAKA, ABDUL (1906–1987)**. Abdul Aziz Khan Kaka was born in Zaida Village in Swabi Tehsil of Mardan district. He was

an active member of the **Khudai Khidmatgar Movement** and defeated **Sir Sahibzada Abdul Qayyum Khan** in the elections of 1936. Sahibzada was an established politician, knighted by the British in recognition for his services to his people. Aziz Kaka was a newcomer to the politics of the province, virtually unknown outside his district. Sahibzada's loss and Kaka's victory signaled the arrival of Khudai Khidmatgar as a potent political force in the province's political scene.

Kaka repeated his performance in the provincial elections of 1945 by defeating Abdul Qayyum Bacha of the **Muslim League**. Kaka was imprisoned several times after the birth of Pakistan in 1947, spending a total of 21 years in prison for "political crimes." He joined the **National Awami Party (NAP)** and was elected in 1970 to the provincial legislature as a representative of NAP.

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**BABAR, EMPEROR (1483–1530).** Babar was the first of the six great **Mughuls** to rule India. His rule began in 1526, after the defeat of the army of Emperor Lodhi, the last **Pathan** ruler of the Delhi sultanate. Lodhi's forces were defeated at the battlefield of Panipat, near Delhi. Although the Mughuls ruled India for 331 years, from 1526 to 1857, they were most powerful under Babar and his five successors: Humayun (1530–1540 and 1555–1556), Akbar (1556–1605), Jahangir (1605–1627), Shahjahan (1627–1658), and Aurangzeb (1658–1707). *See also* MUGHUL EMPIRE.

**BABAR, LIEUTENANT GENERAL (RETIRED) NASEERUL-LAH KHAN (1929–).** Babar was born in the **Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP)** and educated in the school of the province, after which he joined the Pakistan army in 1952 as a commissioned officer. He distinguished himself during Pakistan's war with India in 1965. Impressed with **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's** conduct during the war with India—Bhutto wanted the war to continue, while **Ayub Khan** negotiated a peace agreement with India—Babar decided to

join the **Pakistan People's Party (PPP)** on his retirement from the army. He won a National Assembly seat from his native NWFP in the **elections of 1993**, and when **Benazir Bhutto** was invited to form a government in **Islamabad**, he joined her cabinet and was given the important portfolio of Interior.

An interior minister, Babar had a mandate to maintain law and order in the country. It was in pursuit of this mandate that he carried out a highly controversial policy of repression in **Karachi** against the activists of the **Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz (MQM)**. The battle for Karachi began once the army was pulled out of the city in November 1995. The carnage that ensued claimed more than 1,800 lives in 1995 alone; many of them died as the result of the active pursuit of MQM activists by the forces under the command of the Interior Ministry.

The harsh measures adopted by Babar in dealing with the MQM brought relative calm to Karachi in the spring of 1996. However, Babar lost his position, along with other members of the federal Cabinet, when Prime Minister **Benazir Bhutto** was dismissed by President **Farooq Leghari** in November 1996. Babar continued to defend Bhutto, her family, and her administration when charges of corruption and mismanagement began to be leveled by the successor governments of caretaker Prime Minister **Meraj Khalid** and the elected government of Prime Minister **Mian Nawaz Sharif**.

**BABAR, ZAHEER (1928–1998)**. Zaheer Babar was one of a group of pioneering journalists who joined the Progressive Paper Limited (PPL), founded in 1950 by Mian Iftikharuddin. He edited *Imroze*, the Urdu-language newspaper published by PPL before General **Muhammad Ayub Khan** brought Pakistan under martial law. He refused to accept the rigors imposed by the military government and was arrested. He was confined in the notorious Lahore Fort prison for some time. With the rise of the **Pakistan People's Party (PPP)**, Zaheer Babar was able to return to active journalism. In 1988, he was appointed chief editor of *Musawat*, an Urdu-language newspaper owned by the PPP.

Babar also wrote short stories in Urdu. Two collections of his stories—*Raat ki Roshni* and *Sheeshey key Aabley*—were published and well received by critics. He died in **Lahore**.

**BADR, JEHANGIR (1948– )**. Jehangir Badr began his political career as a student activist. In 1969, he ran for the presidency of the Punjab University Student Union but lost narrowly to the candidate of the Jamiat-e-Tuleba, the student organization affiliated with the **Jamaat-e-Islami**. After finishing his studies he became active in the **Pakistan People's Party (PPP)**.

Badr was one of several young political activists given senior party positions by **Benazir Bhutto** when she returned to Pakistan in 1986 from self-imposed exile in London. Bhutto wanted to wrest control of the party from the “uncles,” friends of her father, **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto**, who had managed party affairs during her absence from the country. Badr and his associates were given PPP tickets for the elections of 1988, the first poll held after the lifting of martial law. Badr won a National Assembly seat from **Lahore** and joined the **Benazir Bhutto** administration as energy and petroleum minister. He was elected to the Senate in 1996 and was included in the federal Cabinet in 1996, shortly before it was dismissed by President **Farooq Leghari** on 5 November 1996. He remained active in politics after the military takeover in October 1999, concentrating his energies on rebuilding the People's Party base in **Lahore**.

**BAGHDAD PACT.** *See* IRAQ–PAKISTAN RELATIONS.

**BAGLIHAR DAM.** In 2001, **India** began the construction of a dam on the Chenab River at Baglihar, a site in the part of **Kashmir** that was under its rule. The dam was intended to produce 450 megawatts (MW) of power during the first phase of use in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. Another 450 MW of generation capacity was to be added later. But the government of Pakistan maintained that the dam, as engineered, could also divert water for irrigation, thus violating the **Indus Water Treaty of 1960**.

The design of the dam included gated spillways which, according to Pakistan's experts, were not required to generate electricity but could be used to divert water from the river. This would seriously affect the flow in the river as it passed into Pakistani territory. After a series of inconclusive talks between senior officials from the two sides that began on 13 January 2003 and continued intermittently for two years, Pakistan invoked the arbitration clause in the Indus Water

Treaty and in January 2005, referred the matter to the **World Bank** for resolution. This was done on 6 January 2005 after talks between the two sides failed. Pakistan wanted India to halt construction on the dam until all issues were resolved.

The subject of the dam was raised at the summit meeting between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of India and Pakistan's President **Pervez Musharraf**, on 19 April, 2005. While no specific mention was made in the joint statement issued at the conclusion of the meeting, India signaled that it would be willing to stop construction of the dam and change the design if Pakistan withdrew the complaint from the World Bank. It also signaled to Pakistan that it would be prepared to have the matter resolved with the help of a neutral expert appointed by the World Bank, with agreement of both sides.

**BAHAUDDIN (1170–1270)**. Bahauddin was born in 1170 in Leiah, a small town in **Punjab**'s southwest. He studied at Khorasan in Central Asia, under Shahabuddin Suhrawardi, a well-known Islamic scholar and Sufi saint of his time. He returned to India in 1222 and eventually settled at Multan. He died at the age of 100 and was buried with great ceremony at Multan. His shrine is still visited by thousands of devotees from all over Pakistan. His descendants—the Qureshis of Multan—take care of his shrine.

**BAHAWALPUR**. Bahawalpur was one of the several “**princely states**” that opted to join Pakistan after the partition of British India in 1947. About the size of Denmark, it was founded by Nawab Bahawal Khan Abbasi in 1748, exactly 100 years before the British occupation of **Punjab**. Bahawal Khan came from **Sindh** but claimed descent from the Abbasid Caliphs of Baghdad. The state carved out by Nawab Bahawal lay between **Punjab** and **Sindh**. On the northwestern side its boundary ran along three rivers, the Sutlej, the Panjad, and the **Indus**. For the most part, the southeastern boundary ran along the states of Bikanir and Jaisalmir, in what was to become the state of Rajputana in independent India.

In 1833, fearing invasion by the Sikh ruler Raja Ranjit Singh, the ruling nawab of Bahawalpur turned to the British for protection. The British, as had been their practice with other similarly situated princes, acted with dispatch and declared Bahawalpur to be a protected

princely state. In this way they not only kept the Sikhs out of Bahawalpur but also ensured that their southern flank would be in friendly hands when they decided to march into **Punjab**.

Bahawalpur remained a princely state until 1947 when the British partitioned India. After slight hesitation, the ruler of the state was persuaded to accede to Pakistan, in 1947. In 1955, the state was merged with the provinces and other princely states in the western part of Pakistan to create the **One Unit of West Pakistan**. When the one unit was dissolved in 1969, Bahawalpur became part of the province of **Punjab**.

**BAIT-UL-MAAL.** The Bait-ul-Maal was established by the government of Prime Minister **Mian Nawaz Sharif**, on 6 February 1992. By taking this step, the Sharif administration continued with the tradition started by President **Zia ul-Haq** to Islamize the economy. Zia ul-Haq, Sharif’s mentor, had introduced a number of Islamic instruments into the economy, including taxes such as *zakat* and *ushr*. The government of Prime Minister **Mian Nawaz Sharif** continued with the program begun by Zia. Islamists trace the institution of Bait-ul-Maal to Caliph Hazrat Umar, who enjoined all well-to-do Muslims to contribute funds to the state for the welfare of the needy.

Bait-ul-Maal survived the change in government in 1993, when **Benazir Bhutto** replaced **Mian Nawaz Sharif** as prime minister. This was one of the few initiatives taken by her predecessor that she was prepared to keep in place. It would have been exceedingly difficult for her to dismantle an institution which had been established in the name of Islam.

**BAKSH, DR. ILAHI (1904–1960).** Ilahi Baksh, a physician who had been a prisoner of war during World War II while serving in the British Indian Army, gained national recognition on being appointed “doctor-in-waiting” in 1947 after **Muhammad Ali Jinnah** became Pakistan’s first governor-general. He attended the terminally ill head of the new Pakistani state during the latter’s illness and eventual death. He was with Jinnah in Ziarat, a hill station in **Balochistan**, when he determined that Pakistan’s founding father was close to death. Dr. Baksh was at Jinnah’s side when the governor-general was flown back to Karachi and died the following day on 11 September



1948. Dr. Baksh's care of Governor-General Jinnah won him great affection and admiration in the country. General **Muhammad Ayub Khan**, Pakistan's first military president, consulted him on **health** policies. He wrote a long report on the state of health in Pakistan, completing it in early 1960, and presented it to President Ayub. He died on the same day.

**BALAWAL ZARDARI (1988– )**. Born in **Karachi**, Balawal Zardari is the first child and the oldest son of **Benazir Bhutto** and **Asif Ali Zardari**. The couple named their principal residence in Karachi after their son. Balawal House has been the center of political activity in the country, especially during the period when Bhutto was not in power in **Islamabad**.

**BALOCHISTAN**. Balochistan is Pakistan's largest province in terms of area (347,000 square kilometers), and smallest in terms of population (8.0 million estimated for early 2005). With only 23 persons per square kilometer, it has the lowest population density among Pakistan's four provinces. Much of the province is a high plateau, some 1,000 to 1,500 meters above sea level. The plateau is bounded by two mountain ranges: the Tabakkar range runs along the border with Afghanistan, whereas the Sulaiman range runs along the right bank of the **Indus River**. To the south lies the inhospitable Mekran desert, in which Alexander the Great almost succumbed as he was pulling his troops out of India. The Balochis, although constituting the majority of the province's population, share Balochistan with a number of diverse ethnic groups including the Brohis, the **Pathans**, and the Mekanis.

Present-day Balochistan was formed by the merger of a number of "**princely states**" that chose—or, in some cases, were forced—to join Pakistan. The province of Balochistan in its present form was created after the dissolution of the one unit of **West Pakistan**, in 1969. The creation of the separate province of Balochistan was well received by the tribal *sardars* (leaders) of the area, who worked with **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto** to launch Pakistan's third **constitution in 1973**. The new constitution provided the federating provinces with a great deal of autonomy within the Federation of Pakistan. In 1973, soon after the promulgation of the new constitution, Bhutto's **Pakistan People's Party (PPP)** formed governments in **Islamabad** and in the

provinces of **Lahore** and **Sindh**. The smaller provinces went to a coalition of the **National Awami Party (NAP)** and the **Jamiatul-Ulemai Islam (JUI)**. In 1974, however, Bhutto dismissed the Balochistan government on the charge of anti-state activities. This action was resented by the sardars, some of whom started an armed insurrection against the central government. Bhutto called in the army to help put down the rebellion, and the army remained engaged in the province for as long as Bhutto was in power. It was only after the military takeover in 1977 that the sardars laid down their arms and peace returned to the province. Some of the tribal leaders remained unhappy, and continued to support various forms of political movements aimed at securing more autonomy, if not outright independence, for the province of Balochistan.

During the time in which President **Zia ul-Haq** was in power (1977–1988), he was able to keep peace in Balochistan by working closely with the tribal sardars of the province. This policy of accommodation was continued by the two **Benazir Bhutto** administrations (1988–1990 and 1993–1996), and by the two administrations headed by Prime Minister **Mian Nawaz Sharif** (1990–1993 and 1997–1999). This approach brought tranquility to the province after years of turbulence, but its cost was the continued backwardness of the region.

The tribal sardars became restive again when the military returned to power under the leadership of General **Pervez Musharraf**. They began to agitate for a larger share in the government's revenues from the extraction and sale of natural gas from the fields in Sui, once one of the largest gas deposits in the world. The sardars also disapproved of the Gwadar port project in the northwestern port of the province, fearing that the port's development would attract new migrants from provinces outside Balochistan. When some Balochi activists began to attack construction workers in **Gwadar** and gas installations in Sui, the government announced that it would establish new military cantonments (bases) in the province to protect public assets from **terrorism**. The crisis deepened in the early months of 2005, with heavy loss of life in the Bugti areas, inhabited by one of the main tribes in the province. In March 2005, Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain, president of the **Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid-e-Azam)**, the party in power in **Islamabad**, worked out a deal with Sardar Akbar Khan Bughi, that once again brought peace to the troubled province.

Construction of a number of “mega projects” was part of the economic strategy pursued by the government of **Pervez Musharraf** to revive the country’s economy. Balochistan was allocated Rs 131 billion (US\$2.2 billion) for the projects located in the province. Apart from the port of Gwadar, they also included a number of small dams on the numerous hill torrents that caused significant damage when rains came, albeit, infrequently. **Sabakzai** was one of the several dams to be built in the province by the **Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA)**.

**BANGLADESH.** Pakistan was born with two “wings”: the western wing was made up of the provinces of **Punjab**, **Sindh**, the **North-west Frontier**, and **Balochistan**. The western wing also included dozens of **princely states**. East Bengal comprised the “eastern wing” of the country, separated from the western part by more than 1,600 kilometers of often hostile Indian territory. Soon after the birth of Pakistan in 1947, the people of East Bengal gave a strong signal that the new state would be politically viable only if the leadership of the western wing was prepared to accommodate Bengali interests. The first response from the leaders of West Pakistan came in 1948 when Governor-General **Muhammad Ali Jinnah** visited Dacca (Dhaka), the capital of East Bengal. This was his first visit since his successful endeavors to create Pakistan, an independent state for the Muslims of British India.

Jinnah told his Dacca (Dhaka) audience that, for the sake of national unity, he wanted only one national language: Urdu. In 1952, a similar suggestion from Prime Minister Khawaja Nazimuddin, himself from Bengal, led to bloody riots. The language riots of 1952 were the turning point in East Bengal’s relations with the western wing. Within 24 hours of Nazimuddin’s statement, the chief minister of East Bengal successfully carried through the provincial legislature a motion calling on the central government to adopt Bengali as one of the national languages. The full force of Bengali resentment at what was seen as the western wing’s political and economic domination and the insensitivity of its leaders toward Bengal’s legitimate demands was felt throughout the country, and in the provincial **elections of 1954** the **Muslim League** was trounced by the **United Front**.

From 1954 to 1971 Pakistan’s two wings remained attached, but the union was uncomfortable. Some of the solutions sought served

only to underscore the real nature of the relationship. For instance, in 1955, the leaders of the western wing agreed to merge all the provinces and the **princely states** in the west into the **One Unit of West Pakistan**. In this way, the western leaders tried to balance Bengal with their part of Pakistan. From now on East Bengal was to be called East Pakistan and was to have an equal number of seats in the National Assembly, even though its population was larger than that of the western wing. This was the formula of “political parity” that became the basis of the **constitution of 1956**.

Parity between the country’s two wings was retained in the **constitution of 1962**, promulgated by President **Muhammad Ayub Khan**, but the highly restricted political activity permitted within the new political framework was seen as a major step backward by the leaders of East Pakistan. By the close of the 1960s, however, Bengali nationalism began to reassert itself. On 12 February 1966, **Sheikh Mujibur Rahman**, the leader of the **Awami League** and East Pakistan’s most popular politician, announced his **Six Point Program** for obtaining greater political and economic autonomy for his province.

Beginning in the spring of 1969, events moved rapidly. Muhammad Ayub Khan resigned in March. He was succeeded as president by General **Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan**, the commander in chief of the Pakistan army, who imposed martial law and abrogated the constitution of 1962. Yahya Khan also promulgated an interim constitution under the name of the **Legal Framework Order** that did away with the principle of political parity and gave East Pakistan representation in the to-be-elected constituent Assembly on the basis of population. Elections to the constituent Assembly were held in December 1970, in which Mujibur Rahman’s Awami League won a clear majority. Had Yahya Khan kept his word for transferring power to the majority party, Mujibur Rahman would have become Pakistan’s first elected prime minister. If that had happened, Pakistan might have succeeded in keeping together its two wings. But Yahya Khan, encouraged by **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto**, hesitated and postponed the convening of the Constituent Assembly. This was a major blow for the hopes of the people of East Pakistan. In a large public meeting held in Dacca (Dhaka) on 7 March 1971, Mujibur Rahman made an emotional statement that virtually amounted to a declaration of independence. He was arrested soon after, flown to West Pakistan, and

imprisoned in a town in **Punjab**. The army followed these moves by attempting to quash the rebellion. The result was a civil war that lasted for nine months and led to the emergence of Bangladesh—the former East Pakistan—as an independent state on 17 December 1971.

It was revealed in a set of classified documents released by the U.S. Department of State on 27 February 2005, covering the period 1969 to 1972, that Washington believed that an overwhelming majority of UN members were against the breakup of Pakistan in 1971, but Russian vetoes prevented the UN Security Council from playing any role in resolving the crisis. According to an assessment prepared by the U.S. mission to the UN, “On 7 December, the UN General Assembly, acting under the Uniting for Peace procedure, recommended by an overwhelming majority a cease fire and withdrawal of troops to their own territories and the creation of conditions for voluntary return of [Bengali] refugees. The vote showed the strong sentiment [104 members voting in favor while 11 abstained] in the United Nations against the use of military force to a member state. Early attempts by Secretary General U Thant to persuade the permanent members of the Security Council to address the crisis over East Pakistan had foundered mainly on Soviet objections.”

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who took over as president from General Yahya Khan in December 1971, moved quickly to normalize relations with Bangladesh. Mujibur Rahman was released from prison and flown back to Dacca (Dhaka) where he was installed as president. On the eve of the Islamic summit held in **Lahore** in February 1974, Bhutto announced Pakistan’s recognition of Bangladesh. In return for this gesture, Mujibur Rahman flew to Lahore to attend the meeting. Bangladesh went through a number of political traumas after its birth in December 1971. Mujibur Rahman was assassinated in 1975 and the military assumed power in the country. President Ziaur Rahman, the military leader, was himself assassinated in May 1981, and was succeeded by General Hussain Muhammad Ershad, who ruled the country for six years before surrendering power to a civilian government led by Khaleda Zia, the widow of the slain president. The intense rivalry between Prime Minister Zia and Hosenia Wajid, the daughter of Mujibur Rahman, kept Bangladesh off balance for a number of years.

During these troubled times, however, Pakistan's relations with Bangladesh improved. The two countries began to work together within the framework of the **South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)** to forge closer economic ties with each other.

**BANK OF CREDIT AND COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL.** *See* ABEDI, AGHA HASAN.

**BANK OF PUNJAB.** The Bank of Punjab was established on 15 November 1989, with its head office located in **Lahore**, the capital of **Punjab** province. The main reason for the establishment of the bank was to provide an additional source of credit for the entrepreneurial class of Punjab. The bank's creation was an act of desperation on the part of the provincial administration of Chief Minister **Mian Nawaz Sharif**. At the time of the establishment of the bank, the Punjab administration, under the control of the **Islami Jamhuri Itehad (IJI)**, was engaged in a running political feud with the **Pakistan People's Party (PPP)** government headed by Prime Minister **Benazir Bhutto** in **Islamabad**. This dispute had economic ramifications, including implicit constraints imposed by the central government on access to development banks by Punjab's entrepreneurial community. All development banks were controlled by the central government, and the leaders of Punjab believed that Islamabad was discriminating against their province, in not allocating sufficient investment bank financing. Accordingly, and over the central government's strenuous objections, the Punjab government decided to set up a bank of its own in the public sector. Tajammul Hussain, an experienced investment banker, was appointed the bank's first chairman.

In October 1993, Benazir Bhutto was back in power as prime minister, and her party was also able to form a coalition government in Punjab. Despite this political change, and the program of bank privatization launched by the new government, the Bank of Punjab remained under state control. Neither the Bhutto government, the successor government of Mian Nawaz Sharif, nor the military government headed by General **Pervez Musharraf** revealed any plans to privatize the bank. It continued to operate in the public sector, one of the few banks to remain under government control after the privatization of such major commercial banks as **Habib Bank Ltd.** and **United Bank Limited**.

**BANKING.** The territories that were to become Pakistan were generally well supplied with commercial banking facilities in early 1947. Of the 3,496 offices of Indian commercial banks, 487 were located in what became Pakistan. However, the entire banking sector was owned by non-Mulims, mostly Hindus. The plan to partition British India was announced on 3 June 1947, and Pakistan became an independent nation on 14 August 1947, one day before India. In the intervening period of 10 weeks many of the banks transferred their headquarters, assets, and funds to the areas that were to be part of independent India. The Hindu bank owners as well Hindu bank professionals migrated en masse to India, leaving Pakistan underserved with commercial banking. In Pakistan the number of bank offices declined to only 69 immediately after partition. Banking facilities were curtailed even for government business. The Imperial Bank of India, which was responsible for government treasury work and worked as the agent for the Reserve Bank of India, the Indian central bank, had 19 offices in the areas that were now Pakistan; these offices ceased to operate after partition.

**Muhammad Ali Jinnah**, Pakistan's founding father, recognized that without a banking system the country would not be able to make economic advances. He had already persuaded the Habib family, a family that had built a large commercial business in Bombay (Mumbai) during World War II, to open a commercial bank. **Habib Bank Limited** started operations in Bombay and moved its headquarters to **Karachi**, which was initially selected to be the new country's capital, and began building a network of branches in West and East Pakistan. A number of new banks also began operations. Between 1 July 1948 and 30 June 1954, 180 offices were opened by the banks wholly owned by Pakistanis. In 1948, the government established the National Bank of Pakistan which assumed responsibility for government treasury functions. Despite this, the coverage of banking was still less than that at the time of partition.

Under the Pakistan Monetary System and Reserve Bank Order 1947, the Reserve Bank of India was authorized to operate in Pakistan until 30 September 1948. This interim arrangement was necessary because of the difficulties involved in establishing a new central bank, but the arrangement proved to be impractical since the two countries immediately became embroiled in disputes concerning the transfer of monetary assets. Accordingly, the government of Pakistan

took over all central banking functions, including public debt and exchange control, by establishing its own central bank, the **State Bank of Pakistan**. The bank was inaugurated on 1 August 1948 by Governor General Muhammad Ali Jinnah.

Pakistan's first investment bank, Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation (PICIC), was established in 1957 with assistance from the **World Bank** that provided the institution's capital. This was a semi-public sector institution since it was listed on the Karachi Stock Market with a small proportion of capital offered for private subscription. PICIC made loans and equity investments for the expansion of existing and/or the establishment of new enterprises. It was to act not only as financier but to undertake promotional activities as well. The World Bank later established several other public sector investment banks, among them the Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan (IDBP) for medium-sized industries, the Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan (ADBP), and the National Development Finance Corporation (NDFC) for providing finance to public sector enterprises.

It was during the administration of President **Ayub Khan** that commercial banking quickly developed in the country. What was distinct about the situation in Pakistan was that whereas most other developing countries, India included, developed banks in the public sector, Ayub Khan encouraged private entrepreneurs to step into this part of the economy. During this period, Allied Bank, Habib Bank, Muslim Commercial Bank, United Bank Ltd, and government-owned National Bank of Pakistan quickly expanded their operations, establishing new offices all over the country. By the end of the 1960s, Pakistan had a thriving banking sector. Some of the new banks were owned and operated by large industrial houses; this led to the widespread perception that people's savings were being used for the creation of private industrial wealth. This led to the decision by President **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto** in January 1972 to nationalize all privately owned commercial banks. Since investment banking was already in the control of the government, Bhutto's nationalization brought almost the entire banking system and all banking assets under government management.

The government's control of banking led to widespread corruption since those in power used the banks to provide loans to themselves and to their relatives and friends. Under pressure from the **Interna-**



**tional Monetary Fund**, to which successive governments turned in the 1990s in order to obtain capital for servicing foreign debt, a program was initiated to privatize the banking sector. Muslim Commercial Bank was the first bank to be privatized by the administration of Prime Minister **Mian Nawaz Sharif** in 1992. It was bought by Mian Muhammad Mansha, who owned and managed one of the largest industrial houses in the country. United Bank was the next large bank to be sold, this time to a foreign consortium that included a London-based businessman, Sir Anwar Pervez. In 2003, the Agha Khan Foundation bought Habib Bank.

In 2006, Pakistan's banking sector was made up of 36 commercial banks (four still owned by the government, 11 owned by foreigners, 21 owned by Pakistanis), six development financial institutions, and two micro-financed companies. As a result of privatization, 80 percent of the banking assets are held by privately owned institutions. There were 6,974 bank offices operating in the country in December 2004, of which 67 were owned by foreign banks.

Since the period of the presidency of **Zia ul-Haq**, Pakistan has also brought Islamic banking into the country. This has been done at two levels. The first was simply a change in banking terms, replacing interest-bearing accounts with profit-and-loss accounts. These changes did not alter in any significant way the operation of the banking system. However, some serious attempts were made to establish new institutions that operated according to the tenets of Islam. For instance, the Mizan Bank, an affiliate of the Pakistan-Kuwait Development Fund, accepted only those deposits on which returns were based on the institution's net earnings. The bank provided only equity finance for projects that met the requirements of a board familiar with Islamic principles. The government of President **Pervez Musharraf** has declared that it will operate Islamic banking along with the conventional system.

**BASIC DEMOCRACIES (BD).** The system of "Basic Democracies" launched by General **Muhammad Ayub Khan** in 1960 was meant to serve two purposes: to constitute the electoral college for the president and for the national and provincial legislatures, and to bring Khan's government closer to the people. "Basic Democracies" was a system of local councils and 8,000 Union Councils, 4,000 each in the

provinces of East and West Pakistan. Each Union Council had about 10 members and represented, on average, 1,000 people. The members of the Union Council were elected directly by the people; once elected they chose their chairmen from among themselves. All Union Council chairmen in a *tehsil*—the lowest administrative unit in the government’s structure—constituted the Tehsil Council. The Sub-divisional Magistrate (SDM) was the chairman of the Tehsil Council. The representatives of various government departments working in the tehsil were appointed ex-officio members of the council. The Tehsil Councils elected the members of the District Council, and the District Councils elected the members of the Divisional councils. The District Councils were chaired by deputy commissioners and the Divisional Councils by commissioners. Like the Tehsil Councils, the District and Divisional Councils also drew membership from among government officials stationed in these jurisdictions. When the system was inaugurated, West Pakistan had a dozen divisions and about 50 districts. East Pakistan had four divisions and about 20 districts.

The first batch of 80,000 “basic democrats” was elected in January 1960, 40,000 each came from East and West Pakistan, respectively. In January 1965, the country held its first presidential elections under the **constitution of 1962**. This was the only occasion in which the “basic democrats” served as the “college” for electing the president. In 1969, General **Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan** dissolved the system of Basic Democracies.

**BASIC PRINCIPLES REPORT.** The Basic Principles Report was the culmination of three years of effort on the part of the **First Constituent Assembly** of Pakistan. It was published in 1950 and dealt with such issues as the role of religion in politics and governance, the role of Urdu as the country’s only national language, and the division of power between the federal government and the provinces. The report was vigorously opposed by most politicians from East Bengal—Pakistan’s eastern wing, which was later to separate from the country and become **Bangladesh**. Most political parties of East Pakistan were not prepared to accept Urdu as the only national language. They demanded equal status for Bengali, arguing that the Bengali language was spoken by a majority of Pakistan’s population. East Bengal was also uncomfortable with the idea of a strong center that governed

provinces that had very limited power. The adoption of the report led to the electoral triumph of the **United Front** in the provincial **elections of 1954**.

**BEG, GENERAL (RETIRED) MIRZA ASLAM (1931– )**. Originally from Azamgarh, United Provinces (now Uttar Pradesh) in undivided India, Beg, who became vice chief of army staff, was a teenager when he became involved in the Pakistan movement as his family migrated to Pakistan, settling in **Sindh**. He joined the sixth officer cadet course of the **Pakistan Military Academy** at Kakul in 1950 and was commissioned as an infantry officer in the Baluch Regiment. He was successively major general with command of a division, posted as chief of the general staff (CGS) at General Headquarters (GHQ), **Rawalpindi**, by General Muhammad **Zia ul-Haq**. He was promoted to lieutenant general while still serving as CGS. After commanding a corps in **Peshawar** for two years, in March 1987 he was recalled to GHQ, promoted to general, and appointed vice chief of army staff, replacing General **Khalid Mahmud Arif** who was retiring.

Upon the death in an airplane crash of General Zia, along with the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, General **Akhtar Abdur Rahman**, and other senior military officers, Beg was elevated to the position of chief of the army staff, a three-year term that ended on 16 August 1991, when he was succeeded by General **Asif Nawaz**.

After leaving the army, General Beg did not fade away; instead, he activated the forum FRIENDS (the well-financed Foundation for Research on National Defence and Security), an organization that he set up while he was army chief and that included members of the local intelligentsia, such as former Foreign Minister Agha Shahi and pro-Iran columnist Mushahid Hussain. He continued to speak before public forums at home and abroad on political matters. In 1995, Beg formed his own Awami Haqooq Party (the Peoples Rights Party) but the new organization did not attain much public interest.

**BHARATIYA JANATA PARTY (BJP)**. The Bharatiya Janata Party, founded 1980, first came to power in **India** following the national elections held in May 1996. However, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee resigned less than two weeks later when he was unable to win the vote of confidence in the lower house, the Lok Sabha. The BJP

had campaigned for election by emphasizing a combination of Indian nationalism and the revival of Hinduism. It promised a hard look at the arrival of all foreign capital into India. It promised to cultivate what it described as *Hindutva*, a kind of all-embracing Hindu-based culture to which all Indians, no matter what their religion, would be required to subscribe. It also advocated an uncompromising stance toward Pakistan.

It was reasonable for Pakistan to worry about the ascent of the BJP. The BJP had links with a well-armed Hindu militia that had torn down a 16th century mosque at **Ayodhya** in 1992, sparking riots that left thousands dead, mostly Muslims. The BJP used the **Ayodhya** incident and its promise to construct a Hindu temple on the site of the mosque to its electoral advantage. Although the promise of Hindu revivalism in India was of concern to Pakistan, the Pakistani leaders were equally disturbed by another position taken by the BJP. It had been pushing the Indian leaders to openly develop nuclear arms and to use them, if the need arose, against Pakistan.

The BJP was returned to power in March 1998, following a hard-fought campaign in India's twelfth elections. The party renewed its previous promises; this time it also promised to remove the legislation that allowed Indian Muslims a separate status in that they could follow their own religion on matters pertaining to marriage and family formation. The party also pledged to force Pakistan out of Azad Kashmir. After having secured a more comfortable position in the Lok Sabha and having also persuaded a dozen or so small regional parties to join hands with it, the BJP was able to form a government in New Delhi and win the vote of confidence in the Lok Sabha. Once again the BJP chose Atal Bihari Vajpayee to lead the government as prime minister. The prime minister, a moderate, had to deal with such hardliners as **L. K. Advani**. From Pakistan's perspective it was troubling that Advani was assigned the responsibility for **Kashmir** affairs.

On 11 May 1998, the government of India surprised an unsuspecting world by exploding three nuclear devices at a site close to Pakistan. The Indian action was widely condemned by the world, but this reaction did not stop the BJP from ordering two more tests two days later at the same site. Pakistan was aghast at this turn of events. It did not follow immediately with nuclear tests of its own, hoping that the Western countries would impose severe sanctions on India. This did not happen at the G8 summit of the eight leading industrial countries,

held in Birmingham, England, on 16–17 May. On 18 May, a week after the nuclear tests, L. K. Advani, the Indian Home Minister, issued a stern warning to Pakistan concerning **Kashmir**, indicating that India would not tolerate any Pakistani opposition to its rule over the state. On 28 May, Pakistan responded to the Indian initiative by exploding five nuclear bombs of its own, and followed up with another test two days later.

On 18 April 1999, the BJP government lost a vote of confidence in the parliament. Prime Minister Vajpayee resigned immediately following the defeat in the legislature and called another general election, in which the BJP re-emerged once again as the single largest party. This time, Vajpayee was able to put together a more durable coalition. It was during this term that India and Pakistan almost went to war over the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir. The war was averted after General **Pervez Musharraf** promised to stop cross-border movement of Islamic fighters from the Pakistani-held Kashmir to that part of the state under Indian control. In April 2003, Vajpayee surprised the world—and also Pakistan—by extending the hand of friendship to his neighbor. This offer was followed by a gradual easing of tension between Pakistan and India. In 2004, confident that his party's slogan of “India shining” would bring it back to power, Vajpayee called another election. The Indian electorate surprised him—and the BJP—by voting in the Congress Party and its allies. The Congress-led coalition came to power under the leadership of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. Vajpayee resigned as the party's president following the defeat in the elections. He was replaced by Advani.

### **BHASHANI, MAULANA ABDUL HAMID KHAN (1885–1976).**

Born in the Tangail district of what was then the Bengal province of British India, Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani was a prominent **Muslim League** leader during the campaign for Pakistan. He left the Muslim League soon after Pakistan was born, and in 1949 he helped form the **Awami League**, reflecting both his socialist ideology and his desire to attain greater autonomy for East Bengal. He was an active supporter of the **United Front**, which decisively defeated the Muslim League in the East Bengal provincial elections of 1954. Major differences over foreign affairs with **H. S. Suhrawardhy**, the president of the Awami League, persuaded him

to leave the party that he had helped to create in favor of a new political organization that espoused a policy in favor of the People's Republic of China and some socialist countries. The new organization, the **National Awami Party (NAP)**, won Bhashani a great deal of support in Pakistan's western wing, particularly among the leaders of the smaller provinces of **Balochistan** and the **Northwest Frontier**. Although Bhashani was opposed to **Muhammad Ayub Khan's** domestic policies and was not prepared to accept the political system established under the **constitution of 1962**, he supported the president's overtures to the People's Republic of China.

**BHATTI, RAZIA (1955–1996)**. Razia Bhatti gained prominence as a journalist in the 1980s, after starting *Newsline*, an English-language monthly newsmagazine published from **Karachi**. The magazine published a number of reports exposing corruption in high places. Its work contributed to the dismissal of the first administration of Prime Minister **Benazir Bhutto** in August 1990. The magazine continued with its independent policy even after the death of Bhatti.

**BHUTTO, BENAZIR (1953– )**. Benazir Bhutto, twice prime minister of Pakistan, was the first child of **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto** and his second wife, **Nusrat**. She was educated in Murree, a hill station near **Islamabad**, in **Karachi**, and at Oxford and Harvard Universities. At Oxford, she was elected president of the Student Union. When Zulfikar Ali Bhutto became president of Pakistan, replacing General **Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan**, Benazir Bhutto returned to **Rawalpindi** and began assisting her father on foreign policy issues. She was with Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, in 1972, when he signed the **Simla Accord** with Indira Gandhi, India's prime minister.

Her first prominent role was bequeathed by her father, who, shortly before his execution on 4 April 1979, appointed her co-chairperson of the **Pakistan People's Party (PPP)**, along with his wife, Nusrat Bhutto. Following Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's execution, both Nusrat Bhutto and Benazir Bhutto were incarcerated for several months, either in jail or kept under surveillance by the authorities in their home. Life in Pakistan was made intolerable for them, and both decided to go abroad to live out Zia's martial law.

Benazir Bhutto's finest hour in public life came on 10 April 1986, when she returned to Pakistan after months of self-imposed exile in Lon-

don. Notwithstanding Pakistan's long history of governments being toppled by street agitation, the Zia-Junejo government did not seem troubled, either by the reception Benazir Bhutto received or by her insistence that the elections of 1985 could not be seen as signifying a return to democracy. On 18 December 1987, she married **Asif Ali Zardari** in Karachi; her wedding was attended by thousands of her followers.

A dramatic change occurred in Pakistan's political situation in August 1988. **Zia ul-Haq** was killed in an airplane crash, and the senior leaders of the armed forces agreed to abide by the constitution and invited **Ghulam Ishaq Khan**, chairman of the Senate, to take over the reins of the administration as acting president; Ishaq Khan announced that general elections would be held as scheduled in November 1988; and in September the Supreme Court ruled that political parties could participate in the elections. While these events were unfolding, Benazir Bhutto gave birth to her first child, a son, **Balawal**. She quickly returned to politics, and launched a vigorous nationwide campaign. Her efforts were handsomely rewarded, and the PPP emerged as the single largest group in the National Assembly, winning 92 out of 207 seats. The party won a clear majority in the **Sindh** legislature but lost **Punjab** to **Islami Jamhuri Itehad**, a coalition of right-wing parties, in which **Mian Nawaz Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League** was the dominant player.

After some hesitation, the **Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz (MQM)** announced its support for Bhutto and her party. This cleared the way for her to become prime minister. An invitation was issued to her to form a government in **Islamabad**, and she was sworn in on 2 December 1988 as Pakistan's thirteenth prime minister and the first **woman** to occupy the position. It soon became apparent, however, that to get that position, she had accepted an informal arrangement according to which all important decisions that concerned Pakistan's security were to be taken by a "**troika**." The troika was to include herself, the president, and the chief of the army staff (COAS). She also agreed to give the ministry of foreign affairs to Lieutenant General (retired) **Yaqub Khan**, a trusted member of the Islamabad establishment.

By mid-year 1990, President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and General **Aslam Beg** had reached the conclusion that Pakistan was not safe in Benazir Bhutto's hands, and that she had to be forced out of office. She was dismissed by the president in August 1990 on charges of corruption and incompetence. Asif Ali Zardari was imprisoned on

numerous charges of corruption, while a number of cases were filed against Bhutto.

In the **elections of 1990**, Bhutto and the PPP did less well, winning only 45 of the 206 seats in the National Assembly, less than half the number it had won in the 1988 elections. Bhutto was elected as the leader of the opposition, a position from which she launched a vigorous campaign to dislodge the Sharif government. She was helped by President Ishaq Khan, who had become progressively disillusioned with the way Mian Nawaz Sharif was running the country and managing the economy. Sharif was fired, and a caretaker government was appointed under the leadership of **Moeen Qureshi**. The **elections of October 1993** went in favor of Benazir Bhutto and she was back in power as prime minister.

This time Benazir Bhutto found the environment in Islamabad to be more conducive. The “troika,” which included the president, the prime minister, and the chief of army staff had survived, but Bhutto was now clearly in command. She managed to get **Farooq Leghari**, her trusted lieutenant, elected president; General **Abdul Waheed Kakar**, chief of the army staff, was not interested in politics. This favorable environment notwithstanding, Bhutto did not govern wisely. The **economy** performed poorly under her stewardship; Pakistan mismanaged its relations with Afghanistan; Bhutto’s inability to work with the MQM in Karachi resulted in a virtual civil war between the forces of MQM and her government’s law-and-order enforcement machinery; and there was widespread misuse of public funds by the functionaries of the government. Bhutto and the PPP quickly lost popularity, and by the fall of 1995, with the economy in trouble and the people restive, there was a great deal of talk in the country of yet another intervention by the army. These rumors contributed to a delay in the nomination of a new chief of the army staff. In early December 1995, President **Farooq Leghari** chose Lieutenant General Jehangir Karamat to succeed General Kakar. Karamat was the most senior serving general and was widely respected. His appointment brought some stability to the government.

In the spring of 1996, the Supreme Court surprised Benazir Bhutto by issuing an order that questioned the basis on which her government had appointed dozens of judges to the Supreme Court and the Provincial High Courts. She was ordered to regularize these appoint-



ments by first consulting the chief justices of the courts. In response, Bhutto was defiant, and the country came close to another constitutional crisis. After considerable hesitation, Bhutto compromised with the court and stopped the country from moving toward yet another political abyss.

However, her accommodation was grudging, and she continued to procrastinate. Her problem with the Supreme Court, the continued deterioration in the state of the economy, a sharp increase in the incidence of corruption, and a serious worsening of the law-and-order situation in the large cities of the country persuaded President Farooq Leghari, her onetime close associate, to use **Article 58.2(b)** of the constitution against her. Accordingly, on 5 November 1996, President Leghari dismissed Benazir Bhutto as prime minister, dissolved the National Assembly, and appointed a caretaker administration under **Meraj Khalid**, a veteran PPP politician, to oversee another general election. The **elections of 1997** were held on 3 February and resulted in a massive defeat of Bhutto's PPP by Mian Nawaz Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League.

The administration of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, which took office following the 1997 elections, pursued the cases of corruption against Bhutto and other members of her family that had been originally initiated by the caretaker administration of Meraj Khalid. In September 1997, the government of Switzerland, in response to a request by the Pakistan government, blocked a number of bank accounts held by the Bhutto family. Similar proceedings were begun in Great Britain, where the Bhutto family was reported to own a number of properties, including a large estate in Surrey. In July 1998, the Swiss and British courts authorized the authorities in their countries to provide assistance to the government of Pakistan in its pursuit of the corruption case against Benazir Bhutto and Asif Ali Zardari. In April 1999, Lahore High Court accepted the government's case against Bhutto and sentenced her to five years in prison. She was also barred from holding public office. Not willing to serve time in jail, she chose to go abroad and live in exile in Dubai.

The return of the military to power in October 1999, under General **Pervez Musharraf**, did not improve Bhutto's legal situation or make her more acceptable to those now in power. Her negotiations with the political authorities in Islamabad did not bring about reconciliation,

since she demanded the withdrawal of all cases of corruption against her and Asif Ali Zardari, her husband, as the price for cooperation. This Musharraf was not prepared to accept. In 2002, she allowed her party to contest elections under the banner of **Pakistan People's Party Parliamentarians (PPPP)**. The PPPP won 62 seats compared to 76 seats captured by the **Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid-e-Azam)**. Once again, there was an attempt by the military to bring PPPP into a broad coalition, and once again Bhutto demanded the same conditions for cooperation, and once again the military refused to accommodate her. In late 2004, Asif Ali Zardari was released from jail and was allowed to leave the country to join his wife in Dubai. Bhutto spent most of 2005 shuttling between Dubai and London, keeping in contact with the senior leadership of her party. However, the efforts to arrive at some kind of accommodation with the government of Pervez Musharraf did not succeed.

**BHUTTO, GHINWA (1958–)**. Ghinwa Bhutto, born in Lebanon but a citizen of Syria, married **Mir Murtaza Bhutto (Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's son)** while he was living in self-imposed exile in Damascus from 1981 to 1993. Ghinwa was Mir Murtaza Bhutto's second wife. His first wife was an Afghani woman whom he had married when he was living in Kabul, after leaving Pakistan in 1979. Ghinwa and Murtaza have one son, who was born in Damascus.

Ghinwa Bhutto accompanied her husband when he returned to Pakistan in 1993. She entered politics after her husband was killed in an encounter with the police on 20 September 1996. On 25 September, she filed a petition with the High Court of **Sindh**, alleging that her husband was “physically eliminated through a conspiracy hatched between the government functionaries, officials of the Intelligence Bureau, and senior police officers of the province.” Following the dismissal of the government of Prime Minister **Benazir Bhutto**, Ghinwa Bhutto sought to continue her husband's program of finding a place in **Sindh** politics for his party—the **Pakistan People's Party (Bhutto Shaheed)**, a PPP faction formed by her husband. She was a candidate for a seat in the National Assembly in the **elections of 1997** but lost to a PPP candidate.

**BHUTTO, MIR MURTAZA (1954–1996)**. Mir Murtaza Bhutto, born in 1954, was the second child of **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto** and **Nusrat**

**Bhutto.** He was 23 years old when **Zia ul-Haq** staged a coup that forced his father out of office. When Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was executed two years later, Murtaza vowed to take revenge. He organized a group called **Al-Zulfikar**, which carried out a number of terrorist operations in the country, including the hijacking of a **Pakistan International Airlines** plane in 1981.

Murtaza Bhutto spent several years in self-imposed exile in Damascus, Syria, where he met his second wife, **Ghinwa**. He returned to Pakistan in 1994 and was promptly arrested and was imprisoned for several months before being released on bail by the **Sindh** High Court. He subsequently formed his own faction of the **Pakistan People's Party (PPP)** and named it after his father. The **PPP (Bhutto Shaheed)** failed to gain much support even in rural Sindh. Murtaza was gunned down by a group of assailants on the night of 20 September 1996. His murder was one of several developments that led President **Farooq Leghari** to dismiss **Benazir Bhutto** and arrest her husband, **Asif Zardari**, who was charged with conspiracy to murder Murtaza Bhutto. Zardari was kept in custody from 1997 to 2004 on charges ranging from corruption to murder, but the prosecution failed to prove his involvement in any of the alleged cases. He was granted bail and released in November 2004. However, he was rearrested on 21 December 2004 after his failure to attend a hearing in a murder trial in Karachi. He was charged with conspiracy in the 1996 killing of a judge and his son.

**BHUTTO, MUMTAZ ALI (1936–).** Mumtaz Ali Bhutto was educated at Christ Church, Oxford, and entered active politics when his cousin, **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto**, launched the **Pakistan People's Party (PPP)**. He was a member of the federal cabinet for a few months after Zulfikar Ali Bhutto became president and chief martial law administrator in December 1971. He was appointed governor of **Sindh** in 1972 and served in that capacity until 1974. He returned to **Islamabad** in 1974 as a federal minister. Mumtaz Ali Bhutto was arrested by the army in July 1977, along with a number of other PPP leaders, when **Zia ul-Haq** moved against Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Following Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's execution on 4 April 1979, Mumtaz Ali Bhutto left Pakistan and stayed in London until 1986.

With **Benazir Bhutto** in full political command of rural Sindh, Mumtaz Bhutto became, at best, a minor player in politics. In

November 1996, however, following the dismissal of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, President **Farooq Leghari** appointed Mumtaz Bhutto the caretaker chief minister of Sindh. In this capacity, he had the satisfaction of witnessing the disastrous defeat of Benazir Bhutto in the February 1997 elections. Following the installation of **Mian Nawaz Sharif** as prime minister, Mumtaz Bhutto once again began to champion the cause of rural Sindh.

**BHUTTO, NUSRAT (1928– )**. Nusrat Bhutto, **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto**'s second wife—the first, **Shirin Begum**, led a secluded life—played a prominent political role. Married in **Karachi** in 1950, she entered politics during her husband's lifetime. She won a seat in the National Assembly in the **elections of 1970** as a representative of the **Pakistan People's Party**. In 1979, after Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's execution, she was appointed co-chairperson, along with **Benazir Bhutto**, of the PPP. After being confined to house arrest for several years by the administration of President **Zia ul-Haq**, she was allowed to leave the country for Europe, on medical grounds. She did not accompany her daughter, Benazir Bhutto, when the latter returned to Pakistan, in 1986.

Begum Nusrat Bhutto was again elected to the National Assembly in the general **elections of 1988** from a seat in Karachi. When Benazir Bhutto was invited to become prime minister, Nusrat Bhutto was appointed as “senior minister” in her daughter's cabinet. She left Pakistan for Europe after her daughter and her cabinet were dismissed by President **Ghulam Ishaq Khan** in August 1990. She returned to Pakistan a year later to launch a campaign to get her permission for her son, **Mir Murtaza Bhutto**, to return to the country. She was elected to the National Assembly for a third time, but was not invited to join the second administration of Benazir Bhutto, which took office in October 1993.

Although unhappy with the way Benazir Bhutto and her husband, **Asif Zardari**, had treated Murtaza Bhutto, her eldest son, and suspicious that Zardari may have been involved in Murtaza's murder in 1996, she agreed to represent her daughter's Pakistan People's Party in the **elections of February 1997**. She was one of the 17 PPP candidates to be elected to the National Assembly, but by that time she was too ill with Alzheimer's disease to play an effective political role.

**BHUTTO, SHAHNAWAZ (1956–1986).** Shahnawaz Bhutto was the third of the four children of **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto** and **Nusrat Bhutto**. He was born in **Karachi**, and named after his grandfather, Shahnawaz Bhutto. He left Pakistan in 1979, following the execution of his father, and joined with his elder brother, **Mir Murtaza Bhutto**, in founding **Al-Zulfikar**, an organization dedicated to avenging the execution of his father by the military regime headed by President **Zia ul-Haq**. After spending several years in Afghanistan, Shahnawaz Bhutto moved to southern France where he died in 1986 under mysterious circumstances, perhaps of a drug overdose.

**BHUTTO, SHIRIN AMIR BEGUM (1931–2003).** In 1951, at the age of 23, while he was still a student in Bombay, **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto** married his cousin Shirin Amir Begum. This was an arranged marriage from which the couple had no children. Shirin Begum spent only a brief time with her husband in Bombay, India. She returned to her native village Naudero after Zulfikar Ali Bhutto went abroad for studies. The two did not live together after his return from America and Britain. Bhutto went on to marry Nusrat, who became his second wife, but he did not divorce Shirin Begum since Islamic law allowed a man to have up to four wives. Shirin Begum died of cardiac arrest on 19 January 2003 in her village. She was buried in Garhi Khuda Buksh Bhutto, the family graveyard, near the grave of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.

**BHUTTO, ZULFIKAR ALI (1928–1979).** Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was born at Larkana, a medium-size town on the right bank of the **Indus River**, in the province of **Sindh**. His father, Sir Shahnawaz Bhutto, was one of Sindh's largest landlords, with extensive landholdings in the Larkana district. Khurshid, Zulfikar Ali's mother, was a Hindu woman of low social standing who had converted to Islam before becoming Sir Shahnawaz's second wife. Zulfikar Ali was Sir Shahnawaz's only son, and upon his father's death in 1949, he inherited most of the Larkana estate. Zulfikar Ali was twice married, the first time to a cousin, and the second, in 1952, to Nusrat Isphani, a woman of Iranian origin. He and Nusrat had four children; two of them, **Benazir** and **Mir Murtaza**, played active roles in Pakistan's politics.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was sent to Bombay for schooling and then to the University of California, Berkeley, and Christ Church, Oxford, for

education in law. He returned to Karachi in 1953 and started legal practice at the Sindh High Court. In 1958, General **Muhammad Ayub Khan** brought him into his cabinet as the minister of fuel, power, and natural resources. Bhutto's big opportunity came in 1963 with the sudden death of Foreign Minister **Muhammad Ali Bogra**. Bhutto persuaded Muhammad Ayub Khan to reassign him to the foreign ministry. Against the openly expressed unhappiness of Washington, Bhutto developed close ties with the People's Republic of China. Under Bhutto's leadership, Pakistan and China negotiated a border agreement and established commercial airline operations.

In the summer of 1965, Bhutto persuaded Muhammad Ayub Khan to allow Pakistani military personnel dressed as *mujahideen* (Islamic freedom fighters) to infiltrate Indian-held **Kashmir** from the Pakistani side of the border. There was an expectation in Pakistan that the mujahideen would succeed in provoking an uprising by the Kashmiri population against India's occupation of their state. That did not happen; instead, on 6 September 1965, India declared war on Pakistan. On 23 September, barely 17 days after the war began, Muhammad Ayub Khan announced a cease-fire agreement with India, negotiated with the help of the United Nations. Four months later, he, accompanied by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, and Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri of India went to the Soviet city of Tashkent and negotiated what Ayub Khan believed would be a more durable agreement of peace between the two neighboring countries. However, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto appears not to have endorsed the substance of the agreement. A few months after their return to Pakistan, Ayub and Bhutto parted company, with the latter using his opposition to the **Tashkent Declaration** as a political launching pad. Bhutto joined with a number of politicians from East and West Pakistan to launch a massive campaign against the government of President Muhammad Ayub Khan. The president sought to negotiate his way out of his political problems, but the opposition proved more stubborn than he had expected. On 25 March 1969, the army stepped in and forced Muhammad Ayub Khan to resign.

Bhutto had prepared himself well for the time when political power would pass from the army to the politicians. In 1967, a year after leaving the government of Ayub Khan and after weighing the offers from several opposition parties, Bhutto decided to form his own political organization, the **Pakistan People's Party (PPP)**. The PPP emerged as the single largest party from West Pakistan in the National Assem-

bly elected in December 1970. This was the first general election to be held in the country. While Bhutto's PPP won 81 seats, in a house of 300 representatives, **Mujibur Rahman's** Awami League won a clear majority. Bhutto, however, was not prepared to share power with Rahman, or to allow the Bengali leader to become Pakistan's first elected prime minister. Instead, he persuaded President **Yahya Khan** to postpone the convening of the assembly, which in turn provoked Mujibur Rahman to declare independence. After a sharp and bloody civil war, Pakistani forces were defeated by a combined force of the Indian military and *Mukti Bahir*, Bengal's freedom fighters.

Bhutto took office as president in December 1971, following the defeat of the Pakistani army in East Pakistan. Insofar as the conduct of domestic economic policies is concerned, the Bhutto era (December 1971 to July 1977) divided itself neatly into two periods: 1971 to 1974 and 1974 to 1977. During the first period, the Bhutto government pursued a socialist program, capturing for the government all of the commanding heights of the **economy**. In the second, starting with the departure of socialist ministers, such as **Mubashir Hasan** and **J. A. Rahim**, Bhutto took control of the economy. The result was a total loss of orientation and whimsical decision-making that together caused major economic disruption, reduced the rate of growth of the gross domestic product, increased the incidence of poverty, and did away with the fiscal and monetary discipline that had been the hallmark of the economic management during the period of President Ayub Khan. Bhutto's economic legacy was to affect the pace and nature of Pakistan's economic development for a long time after his departure from the political scene.

In foreign affairs, Bhutto proved to be a much more imaginative and flexible manager. He negotiated the **Simla Accord** with Indira Gandhi in 1972; hosted the second summit of the **Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC)** at **Lahore** in 1974; recognized **Bangladesh** as an independent state in 1974; and made some tangible advances in healing Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan. In keeping with the approach he had advocated during the Ayub period, he realigned Pakistan's foreign relations away from a close dependence on the United States.

In 1973, with his political skills once again on full display, Bhutto persuaded and cajoled the opposition into accepting a new constitutional arrangement for Pakistan. The constitution was passed by the

National Assembly and came into force on 14 August 1973, Pakistan's 26th anniversary. Bhutto stepped down from the presidency and became prime minister. In January 1977, when Bhutto suddenly called national elections—the first to be held under the new constitution—he expected to catch the opposition unprepared. The opposition surprised him by preparing itself quickly: the **Pakistan National Alliance (PNA)** was born, and a disparate set of parties agreed to compete with the PPP under a single political umbrella. The army took advantage of Bhutto's inability to settle his differences with the opposition. He was deposed by the military on 5 July 1977, sentenced to death by the Lahore High Court in 1978, and executed in **Rawalpindi** on 4 April 1979. He was buried in Larkana, his hometown, before the news of his execution was made public.

Bhutto's most important legacy was a program aimed at equipping Pakistan with a nuclear arsenal. He assembled a group of scientists and engineers, including **Abdul Qadir Khan**, and gave them money and encouragement to develop a nuclear bomb for Pakistan. His dream was realized 24 years after his death when Pakistan tested five nuclear devices on 28 May 1998. *See also* CONSTITUTION OF 1973; INDO-PAKISTAN WAR OF 1965.

**BIJARANI, KHIZAR KHAN (1948– )**. Khizar Khan Bijarani was among the new generation of provincial leaders to be given prominent positions in the **Pakistan People's Party (PPP)** in the late 1980s. This change in the senior personnel of the party was undertaken by **Benazir Bhutto** after she returned to Pakistan in April 1986 from self-exile in London. Bhutto wanted to replace the leadership that was associated with her father with people of her own choosing whom she could trust.

Bijarani was appointed president of the **Sindh PPP** and was entrusted with the task of reorganizing the party at the district level and preparing for the elections that were expected to be held in 1990. The party performed poorly in the local government elections held in 1987, however, and Bijarani was held responsible for the embarrassment suffered by Bhutto. She asked for his resignation, which she received in January 1988. In his letter of resignation, Bijarani blamed Ms. Bhutto for continuous interference in the affairs of the party. He maintained that in a democratic party setup, the affairs of the provincial chapter should be solely the responsibility of the provincial pres-



ident. The “Bijarani episode” demonstrated that the Benazir Bhutto style of leadership was similar to that of **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto**, her late father. Like her father, she did not believe in delegating much authority to party officials. This style of management was to cause considerable disaffection among the leaders of the party.

**BIMSTEC.** On 6 June 1997, a new sub-regional grouping was formed in Bangkok and given the name of BIST-EC (**B**angladesh, **I**ndia, Sri Lanka, Thailand Economic Cooperation). Later in the year, Myanmar, Bhutan, and Nepal were brought into the arrangement and its name was changed to BIMSTEC. Since the organization included all countries of the **South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)** except Pakistan and the Maldives, **Islamabad** saw it as a device to keep it out of an essentially South Asian grouping. Pakistan was also concerned that BIMSTEC would stand in the way of the development of the **South Asia Free Trade Area (SAFTA)**.

In fact, the BIMSTEC member countries agreed to launch a free trade area of their own by June 2005—seven months ahead of SAFTA. The relationship between the two free trading areas was not made clear. The BIMSTEC forum is unique as it is, to date, the only link between South Asia’s “Look East” policy and Thailand’s “Look West” policy. BIMSTEC has identified six sectors for cooperation. The trade and investment initiative is led by Bangladesh; technology by Sri Lanka; transport and communications by India; energy by Myanmar; tourism also by India; and agriculture and fisheries by Thailand. The first leaders’ summit under the auspices of BIMSTEC was held in Thailand on 30–31 July 2005, at which the decision was taken to move more rapidly toward trade and economic integration.

**BIN LADEN, OSAMA (1957– ).** Osama bin Laden, a member of the immensely wealthy bin Laden family of Saudi Arabia, came to the attention of the world’s intelligence community in the late 1970s after he had begun to establish industries in Sudan to manufacture materials that could be used by the Afghan **mujahideen** who were fighting against the Soviet Union in **Afghanistan**. After the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan in the late 1980s, bin Laden is said to have involved himself with the groups that opposed the Oslo Peace Accord concerning the Israeli-occupied West Bank. Under pressure

from the **United States**, the Sudanese expelled bin Laden, and in 1996 he moved to **Khowst**, a small town close to the Pakistan–Afghanistan border. From this hideout, bin Laden began operations against the United States and the countries he accused of supporting the “American campaign against Islam.” The **Taliban** forces in Afghanistan received support from bin Laden as they consolidated their hold on the country.

On 7 August 1998, terrorist bombs in Tanzania and Kenya exploded near the United States’ embassies, claiming nearly 300 lives, including 12 Americans. On the same day, the authorities in Pakistan arrested Muhammad Siddique Odeh, an alleged associate of bin Laden. During his interrogation, Odeh linked the embassy attacks to a group operating out of Afghanistan and headed by bin Laden. On 17 August, the United States ordered hundreds of its citizens to leave Pakistan. On 20 August, the United States launched air attacks on the camp that housed bin Laden. The United States linked bin Laden not only to the embassy bombings in East Africa but also to the activities of people such as **Ramzi Youssef**. The cruise missiles used by the United States in the attack on the bin Laden camp in Khowst flew over Pakistani airspace, prompting Pakistan to lodge a protest with the United Nations. However, bin Laden escaped unhurt.

From his various hideouts in Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden continued to plan terrorist attacks on the United States. On 11 September 2001, 19 young men, mostly from Saudi Arabia but led by the Egyptian Muhammad Atta, carried out simultaneous attacks on New York and Washington. Two planes hijacked by the terrorists rammed into the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York; the third hit the Pentagon, near Washington, D.C.; and the fourth, possibly headed toward the White House or the U.S. capitol building, was forced by the passengers to crash in a field in Pennsylvania. After winning Pakistan’s support and the support of those Central Asian countries neighboring landlocked Afghanistan, the United States retaliated against the terrorist attacks by launching a military campaign against the Taliban and Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda. The military operation began on 8 October 2001 and ended with the fall of Kabul 13 December. However, bin Laden, his deputy, **Ayman al Zawahiri**, and Mullah Omar, the head of the Taliban administration, managed to escape and have eluded capture despite an extensive manhunt. As of May 2006 he was

still at large and is believed to be hiding in the rugged mountains on the Afghanistan–Pakistan border. *See also* TERRORISM.

**BOGRA, MUHAMMAD ALI (1901–1963).** Muhammad Ali belonged to a landowning family from the Bogra district of Bangladesh. He entered politics in the late 1930s, and was elected to the Bengal provincial assembly in 1936. After winning a provincial assembly seat in 1946, he was appointed parliamentary secretary in the **Muslim League** administration led by **Khawaja Nazimuddin**. Following Pakistan's birth, Bogra held a number of diplomatic positions including Pakistan's ambassador to the United States. He stayed in Washington, D.C. for a year, from 1952 to 1953. In 1953, he was summoned back to replace his old mentor, Nazimuddin, as prime minister of Pakistan. He was the choice of Governor-General **Ghulam Muhammad**, who wanted the position to remain with a Bengali politician.

Bogra reorganized his cabinet in 1954 to include a number of professionals, among them General **Muhammad Ayub Khan**, the commander in chief of the Pakistan army. Bogra was dismissed as prime minister in 1955 and was sent back to Washington as ambassador, a position he held for three years. In 1962, following the promulgation of a new constitution, Bogra joined the first civilian cabinet appointed by President Ayub Khan. The president assigned him the important portfolio of foreign affairs, in part because of the close relations he had developed with the United States. He died in office in 1963 and was succeeded as foreign minister by **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto**.

**BONDED LABOR LIBERATION FRONT (BLLF).** The Bonded Labor Liberation Front was organized in 1974 in **Lahore**. Its main purpose was to improve the conditions of the people working in the unorganized sector. Most of the BLLF's efforts were directed at children employed in such small-scale businesses as carpet weaving and metal working. In **Iqbal Masih**, who had himself once been a child worker in a small carpet-weaving workshop, the organization gained a highly effective and visible spokesman. Masih's murder in 1995 further highlighted the importance of the work undertaken by the BLLF.

**BONUS VOUCHER SCHEME, EXPORT.** The Export Bonus Voucher Scheme was one of the major economic policy innovations

of the **Ayub Khan** period (1958–1969). It was introduced in January 1959 at the suggestion of two German experts who had been invited by the government to help the country increase the value of its exports. The experts devised a simple mechanism for allowing importers and consumers of imports to subsidize exporters and producers of exports. In its original form, the Bonus Voucher Scheme granted “vouchers” to exporters, equivalent to some prespecified proportion of the value of exports. Originally, only two different percentages were prescribed: 20 percent for commodities in “their natural state” (other than raw jute, raw cotton, leather, and hides), and 40 percent for all manufactured items.

The Bonus Voucher Scheme effectively introduced a system of multiple exchange rates, with values changing according to the premium quoted on the market for the vouchers. The scheme remained in effect for 13 years; it was abandoned in the spring of 1972 when the rupee was devalued with respect to the US dollar, from Rs 4.76 to Rs 11, and the exchange rate was unified.

**BRI-KOT-GHAWANDAI.** Bri-Kot-Ghawandai is the site of a town dating back to the Greek period. It was discovered and excavated in 1987 by a joint team of Pakistani and Italian archeologists. The town is situated on the left bank of the Swat River. Archaeologist Sir Aurel Stein and Professor Giuseppe Tucci identified the settlement as the town of Bazira, which was conquered by Alexander the Great in 327 BC.

**THE BROWN AMENDMENT.** The “Brown amendment,” named after its chief sponsor, Hank Brown, the Republican senator from Colorado, was passed by the U.S. Senate on 21 September 1995. The amendment was, in effect, a one-time waiver of the **Pressler amendment** that had virtually stopped all U.S. assistance, military and economic, to Pakistan. The Brown amendment allowed Pakistan to receive \$368 million worth of military equipment, for which it had already made the payment prior to the adoption of the Pressler amendment. Most of the senators from President Bill Clinton’s Democratic Party opposed the amendment, even though it had the approval of the White House. However, the amendment did not approve the supply of **F-16** aircraft for which Pakistan had already

paid. In the same amendment, the Senate also agreed to authorize re-sumption of U.S. aid to and cooperation with Pakistan in the areas of counterterrorism, narcotics, and other law-enforcement fields.

**BURKI, LIEUTENANT GENERAL WAJID ALI KHAN (1899–1989).** Lieutenant General Wajid Ali Khan Burki was born in Jullundhur to a prominent **Pathan** family. After graduating from St. Andrews University in Scotland, he joined the Royal Army Medical Corps. He saw active service in Burma during World War II. In 1947, he opted to join the Medical Corps of the Pakistan Army and moved to **Rawalpindi**. In 1955, he was appointed the director general of the corps.

General Burki was one of three senior officers of the military who helped General **Muhammad Ayub Khan** plan the military takeover of October 1958. He joined the first Cabinet of President Ayub Khan as minister for health, labor, and social development. A number of reforms were initiated under his watch, and he worked closely with President Ayub Khan and served as his deputy after the departure of General **Azam Khan**. He was appointed Pakistan's ambassador to Sweden in 1963. He returned to Pakistan three years later and devoted the rest of his life to developing modern medical institutions in the country, including Jinnah Post-Graduate Medical College in **Karachi**.

**BURKI, SHAHID JAVED (1938– ).** Shahid Javed Burki was born in **Simla** into a well-known **Pathan** family from Jullundhur, **Punjab**. After joining the **Civil Service of Pakistan** in 1960, he went to Oxford University a year later, as a Rhodes Scholar. In 1967, he went to Harvard University as a Mason Fellow. In 1974, he joined the **World Bank** as senior economist and served in several positions in the organization, including director of the China Department and vice president, Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Office. In August 1993, he advised **Moeen Qureshi**, the caretaker prime minister, and took an active part in developing the reform program announced on August 19. In November 1996, he was invited by President **Farooq Leghari** to take over responsibility for the portfolios of finance, planning, and economic affairs in the caretaker cabinet that took office following the dismissal of the government of Prime

Minister **Benazir Bhutto**. He was credited with the formulation of an ambitious program of structural reforms which was to become the basis for assistance by the **International Monetary Fund**. He returned to the World Bank after the **elections of 1997**, which brought **Mian Nawaz Sharif** back to power as prime minister. Burki retired from the World Bank in August 1999.

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**CABINET MISSION PLAN, 1946.** The plan submitted by a cabinet mission sent by the British government suggested provincial groupings before power was transferred to the Indians. Two groups—in the northwest and northeast of the country—were to be made up of the provinces in which the Muslims constituted the majority, whereas the rest of India was to form the third group. The three groups, as well as the Indian Union, were to have their own legislatures. The Indian Congress Party wanted to control the provinces from the union legislature, which it knew it could dominate, while the **Muslim League** wanted the authority for the central government to flow from the group legislatures. The plan was accepted by the Muslim League, but rejected by the Congress Party.

**CAROE, SIR OLAF (1901–1992).** Sir Olaf Caroe, a member of the **Indian Civil Service**, was appointed governor of the **Northwest Frontier Province** in September 1946 and held this position until the birth of Pakistan in August 1947. Sir Caroe stayed on as governor for less than a year; in August 1947, Governor General **Muhammad Ali Jinnah** replaced him with another British officer, **Sir George Cunningham**. Sir Olaf returned to England but returned to the Northwest Frontier Province in 1956 to work on his study of the **Pathans**. *The Pathans* was published in 1958 and was immediately acclaimed as the most comprehensive history of the people who inhabited several parts of Pakistan and constituted about two-fifths of Afghanistan's population.

**CENSUS OF 1941.** The census of 1941 holds special significance for Pakistan. It demonstrated that the Muslim community in India constituted an even larger minority than was generally believed. The Mus-

lim population, with a higher **total fertility rate** than the non-Muslims, was growing at a faster rate than the rest of **India**. According to the census estimates, some 30 percent of the Indian population—about 100 million people in all—were Muslim. The census also provided the basis for the partition of the large provinces of Bengal and **Punjab** into Muslim and non-Muslim parts, following the decision by the British to divide their South Asian domain into a Hindu majority (India) and a Muslim majority (Pakistan). Muslim Bengal was to become East Pakistan, and later attained independence in 1971 as **Bangladesh**. However, Sir **Cyril Radcliffe**, appointed to oversee the division of Bengal and Punjab, did not strictly follow the census results and allotted two districts, Jullundhur and Gurdaspur, that had small Muslim majorities to India. Had Jullundhur been included in Pakistan's Punjab, it would have also brought Amritsar with a large Sikh population and the site of the holiest shrine of Sikh religion, into Pakistan. Award of Gurdaspur to India gave that country land access to the state of Jammu and **Kashmir**.

**CENSUS OF 1951.** Pakistan held its first census four years after its birth. The population count was taken in March 1951. The census estimated the population at 33.780 million, of which 27.761 million—or 82.2 percent of the total—lived in rural areas, whereas the remaining 6.019 million—or 17.8 percent—resided in towns and cities. The estimated rate of growth was 1.8 percent per year. The urban population had increased at a rate more than three times that of the rural population: 4.1 percent, as against 1.3 percent. Pakistan added 5.458 million people to the population estimated in 1941. The increase was the result of both natural growth and migration of millions of people from **India**.

**CENSUS OF 1961.** The second Pakistani census was taken 10 years after the first. It showed the population to have grown at 2.4 percent a year, a rate considerably higher than the rate of increase estimated by the 1951 count. In 1961, the country's population was estimated at 42.880 million. Of this, 33.226 million, or 77.5 percent of the total, lived in the countryside. The remaining 9.654 million people—22.5 percent—lived in towns and cities. The urban population was estimated to be increasing at an annual rate of 4.7 percent, whereas the rural population was growing at an annual rate of 1.8 percent.

**CENSUS OF 1972.** The third census was delayed by a year, on account of the civil war in East Pakistan, from March to December 1971. It was held in the fall of 1972, and estimated the country's population at 64.890 million. The country had added more than 22 million to its population over a period of slightly more than 11 years, doubling its population in 25 years. The rate of growth had increased to 3.5 percent a year. Rural population, at an estimated 48.201 million, or 74.3 percent of the total, increased at a rate of 3.1 percent a year. The increase in the urban population was estimated at 4.6 percent a year, and 16.689 million people now lived in towns and cities.

**CENSUS OF 1981.** With the fourth census, held in February 1981, Pakistan briefly returned to the decennial approach for counting its population. The size of the population was estimated at 84.254 million, of whom 60.413 million lived in the countryside, and the remaining 23.841 million resided in towns and cities. The rural population accounted for 71.7 percent of the total, while the proportion of urban population was on the order of 28.3 percent. Population was estimated to have increased at a rate of 3.1 percent a year since the third census, held in 1972. The rural population increased at a rate of 2.8 percent per annum, and that of the urban areas at a rate of 4.3 percent per annum. There were 44.232 million men and 40.022 million women in Pakistan's population. This means that there were 111 men to 100 women in the population, so the male-female ratio is 1.11:1, making Pakistan one of the few countries with more men than women.

**CENSUS OF 1998.** It took 17 years for Pakistan's politicians to muster enough political courage to hold another population census. Under normal circumstances, a census should have been held in 1991, in keeping with the decennial approach, which the country was expected to follow along with the rest of the world. Also, the **constitution of 1973** had mandated that population censuses should be taken every 10 years to provide the basis for the allocation of seats in the National Assembly and the sharing among the four provinces of revenues collected by the federal government. This did not happen because the government of Prime Minister **Mian Nawaz Sharif** did not feel that it had enough political authority to overrule



the objections of provinces and powerful socioeconomic groups that would have lost some political ground as a result of an accurate count of the population. Accordingly, the census was postponed. The successor government of Prime Minister **Benazir Bhutto**, operating under the same set of constraints, also failed to hold a census while it was in office (October 1993–November 1996). It was only with the decisive victory of Mian Nawaz Sharif and his **Pakistan Muslim League** in the **elections of February 1997** that a government came to office that felt it had sufficient political authority to go ahead with a census.

The census was held over a period of 18 days in March 1998. The military assisted the government by having soldiers accompany enumerators as they went from house to house gathering data. Preliminary results from the census were announced in June 1998, according to which Pakistan had a population of 137 million, 10 million less than the estimates of most demographers.

**CENSUSES, POPULATION.** Pakistan has been less regular than most countries in holding population censuses. The first census was held in 1951, four years after the country's birth. The second was held on time, in 1961. The third census—having been delayed for a year because of the crisis in East Pakistan, which lasted through most of 1971, and the war with India fought in December of that year, was conducted in 1972. In 1974, the National Assembly passed the electoral law mandating that a census be held regularly at 10-year intervals in order to apportion seats in the national and provincial assemblies. With the fourth census, taken in 1981, Pakistan attempted to get back to the 10-year plan. However, it was interrupted once again when the country failed to take the fifth census on time, in 1991. It was scheduled three times, but was postponed every time. The first two postponements were due to political reasons. The last postponement was in October 1997 at the behest of the armed forces. The **military** wished to expand the scope of the census to include the gathering of information for defense purposes. The census was finally conducted in March 1998 with the active participation of the armed forces. *See also* CENSUS OF 1941; CENSUS OF 1951; CENSUS OF 1961; CENSUS OF 1972; CENSUS OF 1981, CENSUS OF 1998.

**CENTRAL TREATY ORGANIZATION (CENTO).** *See* UNITED STATES–PAKISTAN RELATIONS.

**CHARAR SHARIEF.** The struggle of **Muslim** Kashmiris against the occupation of their state by **India**, which turned exceptionally violent in 1989, acquired a new symbol six years later. On 11 May 1995, a fire totally destroyed the shrine of Sheikh Nooruddin Wali at Charar Sharief, a town 30 kilometers southwest of Srinagar, the state's capital. The shrine had been built in the 15th century by the disciples of Wali, a saint who had brought Islam to this part of the world.

The Kashmiri Muslim freedom fighters blamed the Indian security forces for setting the shrine and the town of Charar Sharief on fire. The Indians claimed that the Kashmiri militants had deliberately destroyed the shrine to win more converts to their cause. Whatever the motives, the destruction of the shrine had some immediate consequences. It resulted in the postponement of the elections in **Kashmir**, scheduled by the Indian government to be held in mid-July. It also evoked a bitter response in neighboring Pakistan. On 18 May, Prime Minister **Benazir Bhutto** went on national TV to announce that the destruction of the shrine would be mourned officially in Pakistan on the following day. On Friday, 19 May, President **Farooq Leghari** led “funeral” prayers for the mosque and the Kashmiris killed at Charar Sharief.

**CHATTA, HAMID NASIR (1950– ).** Hamid Nasir Chatta belongs to an established political family of **Punjab**. His differences with **Mian Nawaz Sharif** were to shape Pakistani politics for a long time. These differences were not ideological; they were the result of an intense rivalry between the two politicians, each of whom wanted to be recognized as the leader of Punjab. Mian Nawaz Sharif's effort to capture the **Pakistan Muslim League** (PML) following the death of its president, **Muhammad Khan Junejo**, in 1993 brought about a rupture between the two men. Chatta left the main PML, formed his own group, and named it the **Pakistan Muslim League (Junejo)** (PML[J]). He went on to associate himself with **Benazir Bhutto's** **Pakistan People's Party**, which made it possible for the latter to hold power in both **Islamabad**, the federal capital, and **Lahore**, the

capital of Punjab, from 1993 to 1996. However, both Chatta and the PML(J) fared poorly in the **elections of 1997**.

**CHAUDHRY, CHIEF JUSTICE IFTIKHAR MUHAMMAD (1947– )**. President **Pervez Musharraf** appointed Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry of the Supreme Court as chief justice to succeed Chief Justice Nazim Hussain Siddiqui. The appointment was announced on 8 May 2005, and Justice Chaudhry assumed his position on 29 June. He is expected to serve for seven years until 2012, when he will reach the mandatory retirement age of 65 years. This would be the third longest tenure in the court's history, following that of Chief Justice **A. R. Cornelius** (1960–1968), and **Muhammad Haleem** (1981–1989). The announcement of Justice Chaudhry's appointment put to rest the speculation that President Musharraf might ignore the tradition of choosing the most senior member of the court to become chief justice, by picking an individual regarded as more sympathetic toward him and his regime.

Justice Chaudhry was inducted into the Supreme Court on 4 February 2000, after a long career in **Balochistan** judiciary positions which included advocate general of Balochistan, additional judge in the Balochistan High Court, and chief justice of Balochistan High Court.

**CHHOR**. The army cantonments of **Pano Adil** and Chhor were established over a 10-year period, starting in the mid-1980s. The principal purpose of these two centers in the remote parts of **Sindh** was not to deter aggression against Pakistan. Instead, these locations were chosen to station the army close to the areas that had experienced political instability. One lesson learned by the army in its efforts to help the civil authorities maintain law and order was that it needed to position itself physically close to the centers of perpetual political turbulence. The decision to locate a cantonment in Pano Adil, taken during the **Zia ul-Haq**'s years, was an unpopular one, because it was widely advertised by the **Pakistan People's Party** (PPP) as a move by the military establishment to "colonize" the interior of Sindh.

The decision to establish a cantonment in Chhor, a village in Sindh's Tharparker district, was made in 1992 by the government of Prime Minister **Mian Nawaz Sharif**, but major civil works were begun only in 1994 and 1995. By early 1996, Chhor had started to

function as an army center, and the army felt confident enough about the wisdom of its move to mount a major public-relations effort. A group of prominent journalists was invited to visit the new cantonment, and they wrote glowing accounts of the positive changes that had resulted from the army's presence in this remote area.

**CHINA–PAKISTAN RELATIONS.** The Communists came to power in China on 1 October 1949. At that time, **Liaqat Ali Khan**, Pakistan's prime minister, was trying to cultivate close relations with the **United States**. Accordingly, China started official business with Pakistan by leaning toward support of **India** on the issue of **Kashmir**.

It was only with the arrival of military rule in Pakistan that the relations between the People's Republic of China and Pakistan began to improve. The initial overture to China was made by **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto**, a member of the **Ayub Khan** Cabinet. Bhutto found China in a receptive mood. It had severed relations with the Soviet Union in 1961; Japan was still not prepared to work with Beijing; Taiwan remained an irritant, supported by the United States. Despite the close personal relations that had developed between Prime Ministers Jawaharlal Nehru and Zhou Enlai, India was inclined to support the Soviet Union in its dispute with China. This left Pakistan, a close ally of the United States, a country at odds with both India and the Soviet Union.

The 1962 border war between China and India prompted President John F. Kennedy to get personally involved in South Asia. To bring pressure on Pakistan, Washington decided to withhold funding of some development projects. But the Pakistani leadership refused to buckle under this pressure. In January 1964, Pakistan and China announced that the two countries had agreed to demarcate the undefined 500-kilometer border between them. The border ran from the point where **Afghanistan**, China, and Pakistan meet, and included the strategic **Khunjerab Pass** in the Karakoram range. In August 1964, China and Pakistan announced an agreement to build a road connecting China's Xinjiang province with the northern areas of Pakistan. The United States retaliated by suspending all development assistance to Pakistan.

In 1965, Pakistan fought its second war with India over the state of Kashmir. The enormous investment that Pakistan had made in culti-

vating a close relationship with China now paid off. Although the United States and the countries of Western Europe stopped all economic and military assistance to Pakistan and India, Pakistan was able to procure military supplies from China. Despite the strained relations between the United States and Pakistan, Pakistan's close relations with China came in handy for the United States when, under President Richard Nixon, Washington decided to begin the process of normalization with Beijing. In July 1971, Pakistan facilitated the secret mission to China undertaken by Henry Kissinger, the U.S. secretary of state. Kissinger's first meeting with Chinese officials was on a Pakistani Airlines plane enroute to Beijing.

China continued to figure in an important way in Pakistan's relations with the United States. The United States suspected that the two countries had worked closely on the development of a nuclear bomb by Pakistan. In addition to the complication caused by the United States in Pakistan's relations with China, one other irritant has emerged in the way the two countries are dealing with one another. As Pakistan sought to strengthen its relations with the Muslim republics of Central Asia, a number of Islamic groups in the country began to work in these countries. But they did not confine their activities only to Central Asia. Some of them—in particular the **Jamaat-e-Islami**—extended their reach to Xinjiang province of China. This type of activity did not sit well with the authorities in Beijing.

These irritants notwithstanding, Pakistan looked to China once again when, on 11 May 1998, India tested three nuclear devices and followed the testing a week later with a strongly worded warning to its neighbor not to influence the ongoing agitation in Kashmir against Indian occupation of the state. Pakistan dispatched a high-level delegation to Beijing to secure support and protection from the Chinese in its conflict with India. Changes in China's leadership in 2002 when Hu Jintao was elected the Communist Party's Secretary General and later became the country's president did not affect its relations with Pakistan. Although Beijing initiated a program to develop close economic relations with Delhi, which resulted in a sharp increase in China-India trade, China continued to treat Pakistan as its closest ally in South Asia. At the insistence of Pakistan the **South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation** (SAARC), at its 13th summit held in Dhaka in November 2005, invited China to become an observer in the organization.

In December 2005, Pakistan and China agreed to cooperate further in the area of the peaceful use of nuclear power. It was revealed that China had agreed to provide six to eight nuclear power reactors to Pakistan that will produce 3,600 to 4,800 MW of electric power and will be constructed over a period of 10 years beginning in 2015. The two countries were already collaborating in the area. China was building the second nuclear reactor at Chasma in **Punjab** that, when completed in 2010, will produce 300 MW of power. *See also* INDO-PAKISTAN NUCLEAR ARMS RACE.

### **CHISTI, HAZRAT KHWAJA MUINUDDIN HASAN (c. 1232).**

Chisti, a Muslim Sufi order in South and Central Asia, named after Chist, a village near Herat in **Afghanistan**, was founded by the Syrian mystic Abur Ishaq. It was brought to India by Muinuddin Chisti in the 12th century. The Chistiya and other Sufi orders place emphasis on the doctrine of the unity of being (*whadat al-wujud*). Thus natural goods were rejected as distracting from the contemplation of God. The recitation of the names of God, both aloud and silently, led to the development of *qawwali*, devotional songs sung at the Chisti shrines. **Nusrat Fateh Ali Khan** was the most popular *qawwali* singer of recent times and has a large following in the Western world.

Muinuddin Chisti settled in Ajmer, Rajasthan (now a state in **India**, bordering Pakistan's province of **Sindh**), from 1190 until his death in 1232. His tomb in Ajmer, with the crown made of solid gold and to which the Mughul emperor Shah Jahan added a mosque, has become the most frequented Muslim pilgrimage site in the South Asian subcontinent. It is also visited by Hindu devotees.

The fact that President **Pervez Musharraf** of Pakistan chose to stop at Ajmer en route to Delhi on 16 April 2005 for a summit meeting with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of India had some symbolic significance. Visits to shrines and the teachings of Sufistic orders are frowned upon by fundamentalist sects of **Islam**, such as **Wahabism**, which had gained considerable ground in recent years in Pakistan. It was also the professed ideology of the **Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal**, which emerged as the main opposition to President Musharraf after the elections of 2002. The Chisti order also does not allow connection

with the state and embraces pacifism, while the Wahabis do not accept the doctrine of the separation of state and religion and espouse activism to achieve their goals. Earlier, Musharraf had planned to visit the shrine in July 2001, during his first visit to India for a summit with Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee. However, the Agra summit collapsed over the issue of **Kashmir**, and Musharraf, in a moment of pique, cancelled the visit to Ajmer and returned to Pakistan.

**CHRISTIANS IN PAKISTAN.** Christianity arrived in the areas that now constitute Pakistan as a result of the work done by European missionaries in the 16th to the 20th centuries. The missionaries concentrated their efforts mostly on the members of the **scheduled castes**, who were receptive to their overtures, given the low social status they occupied in the highly structured Hindu religion. When the Hindus and Sikhs left Pakistan at the time of partition in 1947, the Christians stayed behind. Some of them played important roles in Pakistan; one of them, **A. R. Cornelius**, became chief justice of the Supreme Court.

With **Zia ul-Haq's** program of Islamization—the introduction, in particular, of the **Hadud Ordinances**, which prescribed heavy punishment for defaming **Islam**—Pakistan became a progressively less tolerant society, especially toward the minorities. Among the religious groups that were especially discriminated against were the **Ahmadiyas** and the Christians. Although no firm estimates are available, the former number about 5 million and the latter 2 million, in a population estimated at 137 million during mid-1998.

**CHUNDRIGAR, ISMAIL IBRAHIM (1897–1960).** I. I. Chundrigar was born in Bombay and received a degree in law from Bombay University. He began his legal career in Ahmadabad, but on being elected to the Bombay Legislative Assembly, in February 1937, he moved his legal practice to Bombay. He was elected president of the Bombay Muslim League in 1940 for a period of five years. In 1943, he was elected to the **All-India Muslim League Working Committee**, which functioned as the policy-making body for the party. In 1946, he was one of the five members of the Muslim League to join the Interim Government headed by Jawaharlal Nehru.

After the establishment of Pakistan, Chundrigar moved to **Karachi** and was included as a minister in the first Cabinet under Prime Minister **Liaquat Ali Khan**. He left the Cabinet in May 1948 to become Pakistan's first ambassador to **Afghanistan** but was recalled from Kabul in 1950 to assume the governorship of the **Northwest Frontier Province**. In 1951, he was sent to **Lahore** as governor of **Punjab**. He resigned from this position in 1953 because of differences with Governor-General **Ghulam Muhammad** over the handling of the anti-**Ahmadiya** agitation. In 1955, he was invited back into the central Cabinet. When **H. S. Suhrawardhy** became prime minister, I. I. Chundrigar was elected to lead the opposition in the National Assembly. Upon **Suhrawardhy's** dismissal by President **Iskander Mirza**, he was invited to become prime minister. He remained in office for only 54 days, from 18 October to 11 December 1957, one of the shortest tenures of any prime minister in the country's history. He was succeeded by Feroze Khan Noon as prime minister.

**CITIZEN'S VOICE.** The launching of Citizen's Voice—a non-governmental organization sponsored by 18 prominent citizens of **Karachi**—was an indication that some segments of Pakistan's population were prepared to work toward the resolution of the problems which had brought the country's largest city to a point of virtual paralysis. "We are a group of professional men and women," the sponsors announced in newspaper advertisements carried on 27 December 1995. "We believe that it is time for concerned citizens to step into the breach, erect obstacles along the path of violence and warfare, and create a climate of purposeful politics. Else the jeopardy to state and society in Pakistan shall augment." The sponsors were worried about the direction in which Pakistan's major political parties had taken the country. "Successive governments had failed to rein in corruption, which is eating into the vitals of the society. The continuous criminalization of politics is widening the gulf between the state and the people." For this reason, the founders of the Citizen's Voice implored "Pakistan's leaders to embark on a process of peace and civility, abjure confrontations and embrace compromise by negotiation, and take a decisive turn toward progressive and democratic reforms for a humane and prosperous future. Karachi is the appropriate starting point [for these efforts]."



**CIVIL SERVICE OF PAKISTAN (CSP).** The Civil Service of Pakistan was established soon after Pakistan gained independence and followed the tradition of the Indian Civil Service (ICS) from which it inherited 81 Muslim officers who chose to serve in the new country. While Pakistan's post-independence politicians were busy squabbling over the form of government to give their new country, senior members of the civil bureaucracy took over the role of economic decision-making. For a period of four decades, from the late 1940s to the late 1980s, the civil servants, with few interruptions, remained in charge of economic decision-making. Interruptions came briefly in the late 1950s and the early 1970s: the first, when the military government of General **Ayub Khan** was still in the process of settling down; the second, when Prime Minister **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto** placed political ideologues in important economic positions. Even under Ayub Khan and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, members of the Civil Service of Pakistan played important roles as economic decision-makers. M. M. Ahmad was in charge of Ayub Khan's Planning Commission. Qamarul Islam held the same position under Bhutto.

In 1974, Prime Minister Bhutto decided to disband the service, creating in its place a new structure that was meant to be less elitist in outlook than the CSP. A number of politicians and supporters of the **Pakistan Peoples Party**, Bhutto's organization, were inducted into the bureaucracy, leading to its politicization. Some attempts were made after Bhutto's departure to restore the old structure, but they failed since the politicians found it convenient to work with civil servants who were beholden to them.

With the return of democracy in November 1988, politicians began to take over control of the economy. Even then, the process proved to be a slow one. When President **Ghulam Ishaq Khan** called on **Benazir Bhutto** to become prime minister, he persuaded her to appoint **Vaseem A. Jaffrey** as her economic advisor. Vaseem Jaffrey played a low-key role in this capacity, a role not typical of the civil servants who had occupied similar positions in the past. As such, he may have set in motion a new trend in which the senior civil servants were expected to render advice but not make decisions.

The dismissal of the government of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in November 1996 brought a number of former CSP members into the

caretaker administration, inducted into office by President **Farooq Leghari**, once a CSP member himself. Leghari was a part of the 1964 CSP class. He turned to a number of his former CSP classmates to take up important positions, including Shahid Hamid, who was appointed defense minister, and Abdullah Memon, who was put in charge of the Ministry of Water and Power. **Shahid Javed Burki**, who belonged to the 1960 CSP class, was put in charge of finance, planning, and economic affairs. Under **Pervez Musharraf**, civil servants lost more power. The military regime inducted a new breed of professionals into economic decision-making. **Shaukat Aziz**, a commercial banker, who came into the military administration as finance minister in 1999 and then went on to become prime minister in 2004, represented this new class.

**COMBINED OPPOSITION PARTY (COP).** The Combined Opposition Party was formed in the fall of 1964 to challenge President **Ayub Khan** at the presidential polls scheduled for December. This was the first election to be held under the **constitution of 1962**. The opposition to Ayub Khan had hoped to force the president to adopt a political structure more to its liking. It preferred a parliamentary system over the presidential form introduced by Ayub Khan in 1962. Once convinced that the president was not inclined to accept the demand of the opposition, a number of political parties chose to pool their resources and organize an electoral alliance of the type that had appeared before in the country's history. Among the more prominent parties that were assembled under the umbrella of the COP were the **Council Muslim League**, the **Awami League**, and the **National Awami Party**.

The COP leadership was able to persuade **Fatima Jinnah**, the sister of **Muhammad Ali Jinnah** and a persistent critic of the system introduced by Ayub Khan, to become its candidate in the presidential election. In spite of her advanced years, Ms. Jinnah campaigned well and was able to win the support of more "Basic Democrats" than was thought possible by the government. The COP was disbanded after the elections. It was succeeded by the **Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM)**—another opposition alliance—that was to successfully challenge Ayub Khan in 1968–1969. *See also* BASIC DEMOCRACIES.

**COMMISSION ON MARRIAGE AND FAMILY LAWS.** *See* FAMILY LAWS ORDINANCE OF 1961.

**COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY (CTBT).** Work on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty began in January 1994 and concluded on 28 June 1996. The treaty was opened for signatures soon after its adoption, and by the time **India** and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests in May 1998, 149 countries had already signed it. Only 13 have fully ratified it. The treaty cannot take effect unless it is ratified by 44 countries that have nuclear reactors. This includes India, Pakistan, and North Korea. Although the treaty was signed by Israel, it has yet to ratify it. The Western powers exerted a great deal of pressure on both India and Pakistan to sign the CTBT after the two countries conducted nuclear tests in May 1998.

**CONFERENCE OF MUSLIM WOMEN PARLIAMENTARIANS.**

The first Conference of Muslim Women Parliamentarians was held in **Islamabad**, from 1 to 3 August 1995, chaired by **Benazir Bhutto**, Pakistan's prime minister. The idea of the conference was conceived by Ms. Bhutto to prepare for the Fourth World Conference on Women, and to "give a correct view about the role of women in Muslim society to the West which often projects it negatively. We want to show that the Muslim **women** are playing a positive role in top decision-making levels as parliamentarians, journalists and in other fields." The conference was attended by over 100 delegates from 35 Muslim nations and adopted a declaration on the role of women and women's rights as envisioned in **Islam**.

**CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY, FIRST.** The First Constituent Assembly of Pakistan was created by the Indian Independence Act of 1947. It started with 69 members, but after the accession of the states of **Bahawalpur**, Khairpur, and **Balochistan** to Pakistan, the membership was increased to 74. Of the 61 Muslim members in the assembly, the **Muslim League**, with 59 members, had a clear majority. The two members who did not belong to the League were Abdul Ghaffar Khan of the **Northwest Frontier Province** and **A. K. Fazlul Haq** of East Bengal. The assembly met for the first time on 10 August 1947 in **Karachi**. On 11 August, three days before Pakistan

gained independence, the assembly elected **Muhammad Ali Jinnah** as its president.

Jinnah became too ill in early 1948 to be able to guide the process of writing the constitution. He died on 11 September 1948, prompting a series of changes that brought **Maulvi Tamizuddin** of East Bengal to the presidency of the Constituent Assembly and **Ghulam Muhammad** as governor-general. **Liaquat Ali Khan** stayed on as prime minister. None of these individuals had Jinnah's charisma or his moral authority; consequently, the process of constitution making bogged down in endless political disputes. Agreement could not be reached on two issues: the powers to be assigned to the provinces within the Pakistani federation, and the role of religion in the state of Pakistan. Eventually, the assembly was able to pass a bill labeled the "**Basic Principles**," which was adopted to guide the process of creating the constitution.

Under the Indian Independence Act, the Constituent Assembly had two separate functions: to prepare a constitution and to act as a legislative assembly. The assembly's legislative powers were to be exercised under the **Government of India Act of 1935**. Although the assembly failed in carrying out its first mandate, it functioned effectively as a legislative assembly until it was dissolved in 1954. On 21 September 1954, the assembly sought to limit the power of the governor-general, by moving a bill to amend the Government of India Act of 1935. Sections 9, 10, 10A, and 10B of the Act were amended, taking away from the governor-general powers to act independently, except on the advice of his ministers, and requiring the choice of new ministers to be made only from among members of the assembly. But Governor-General **Ghulam Muhammad** moved before the assembly was able to adopt the bill: On 24 October 1954, he precipitated a constitutional crisis by dissolving the Constituent Assembly.

**Maulvi Tamizuddin** took the case to the federal court and challenged the governor-general's dissolution as unconstitutional. In a decision that was to have profound implications for Pakistan's political development, the Court refused to overturn the governor-general's action. It took cover under the "**doctrine of necessity**," arguing that by not endorsing the dissolution of the assembly, the Court could create a serious constitutional crisis. The Court, however, ordered the governor-general to reconstitute the Constituent Assembly.

**CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY, SECOND.** The dissolution of the **First Constituent Assembly** resulted in a number of landmark decisions by the federal court. In the Usif Patel case, the federal court unanimously decided that the task of framing a constitution could not be assumed by the governor-general; it had to be performed by a representative body. On 10 May 1955, the federal court declared that the governor-general was not empowered to summon a constitutional convention, as was his intention, but had to form a Constituent Assembly to function under the provision of the Indian Independence Act of 1947. Accordingly, the Second Constituent Assembly was elected in June 1955 and met for its first session in Murree, on 7 July 1955. The session was presided over by Mushtaq Ahmad Gurmani, the governor-general's nominee. The assembly's regular sessions were held later in **Karachi**. As with the first assembly, it acted both as the federal legislature and as the body entrusted with the task of framing a constitution. In the former capacity, it passed the Unification of West Pakistan Bill on 30 September 1955. On 8 January 1956, it produced a draft constitution which, with some amendments, was adopted on 29 February 1956. On 23 March 1956, the Second Constituent Assembly reconstituted itself as the national legislature under the constitution it had adopted earlier. *See also* CONSTITUTION OF 1956.

**CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY, THIRD.** Pakistan's Third Constituent Assembly was convened in 1972 by President **Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto** to draft a new constitution. The **constitution of 1962**, introduced by President **Muhammad Ayub Khan**, had been abrogated by the military when it assumed power in March 1969. The new constituent assembly was made up of the National Assembly members elected in December 1970. A new draft constitution was submitted to the assembly on 31 December 1972, and became effective on 14 August 1973. *See also* CONSTITUTION OF 1973.

**CONSTITUTION OF 1956.** The **Second Constituent Assembly**, which first met in 1955, was successful in drafting and promulgating Pakistan's first constitution. The principle of **parity**, which gave equal representation to East and West Pakistan in the assembly, was adopted as the cornerstone of the new constitution. The provinces and states in the

western wing of the country were merged to form the **One Unit of West Pakistan**.

**Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardhy** and **Chaudri Muhammad Ali** were the principal architects of the constitution. Suhrawardhy was responsible for drafting the constitution bill when he was law minister in the Cabinet of **Muhammad Ali Bogra**. But he walked out of the assembly when the bill was put to vote in the National Assembly, proclaiming that East Pakistan's interests had not been duly protected. It was Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, as prime minister, who finally got the Constituent Assembly to pass the constitution bill. The constitution came into force on 23 March 1956, and Chaudhri Muhammad Ali became the first chief executive under the new setup.

The 1956 constitution created a federal republic in Pakistan with two units, East and West Pakistan. The president was to be the head of the republic. He was to be chosen by an electoral college made up of the National and Provincial Assemblies. The president was to select the prime minister from among the members of the National Assembly. The person most likely to command the confidence of the majority of the assembly members was to be chosen by the president to become prime minister. The prime minister was to be the head of the government who, along with his cabinet, was responsible to the National Assembly. The National Assembly was to have 300 members, 150 each from East and West Pakistan. The provinces were to have a form of cabinet government, similar in all essentials to that provided for the federation.

The federal court was to be reconstituted as the Supreme Court. The chief justice was to be appointed by the president and the other judges also by the president after consultation with the chief justice. A judge could be removed by the president, after advice of the National Assembly, with two-thirds of the members concurring.

The constitution remained in force for only two-and-a-half years. Preparations to hold Pakistan's first general elections were started in early 1958, but the constitution was abrogated on 7 October 1958 by a proclamation issued by President **Iskander Mirza**. Mirza's action was forced on him by General **Muhammad Ayub Khan**, who was commander in chief of the army at that time. Twenty days later, on 27 October 1958, Ayub Khan sent Iskander Mirza into exile and became Pakistan's first military president.

**CONSTITUTION OF 1962.** The process of consultation for devising a new constitution began in February 1960 when a constitutional commission was appointed to first elicit the views of the people on the structure of government and then to present its recommendations to the president. The commission, working under the chairmanship of Muhammad Shahbuddin, a senior judge of the Supreme Court, made its recommendations in a report to President **Muhammad Ayub Khan** on 6 May 1961. Rather than accept the structure proposed by the commission, Ayub Khan entrusted the job of writing the new constitution to **Manzur Qadir**, his foreign minister. Manzur Qadir produced a constitutional framework that used the system of **Basic Democracies** as its foundation. Adult franchise was confined to the election of 80,000 Basic Democrats, 40,000 for each of the provinces of East and West Pakistan. The Basic Democrats constituted the electoral college for the president and members of the national and provincial assemblies. The president appointed his own cabinet whose members were not responsible to the National Assembly. The president was given extensive executive, legislative, and financial powers, including power to issue ordinances, declare emergencies, and call referendums in case of persistent differences with the National Assembly. The constitution could be amended by the National Assembly only with the approval of the president.

The constitution became effective on 8 June 1962 and was used immediately to legitimize Ayub Khan's administration. Two sets of elections were held under the new political structure erected by the constitution. The first, held in 1962, was to elect the "Basic Democrats" who then went on to reaffirm Ayub Khan as president and to choose the members of the National and Provincial Assemblies. The second, held in 1965, reelected Ayub Khan as president but not with the kind of majority he had hoped. Ayub Khan had to fight hard against **Fatima Jinnah**, the candidate put forward by the **Combined Opposition Party**.

The constitution failed its most important test, that of transfer of power. In 1969, a prolonged agitation against Ayub Khan led to the president's resignation. Under the constitution, Abdul Jabbar Khan, a politician from East Pakistan and speaker of the National Assembly, should have become acting president, pending the election of a new head of state by the electoral college. Instead, Ayub Khan invited

General **Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan** to perform his “constitutional duty,” and take over the administration. General Yahya Khan became president, placed Pakistan once again under martial law, abrogated the constitution, and dissolved the National and Provincial Assemblies.

**CONSTITUTION OF 1973.** Pakistan’s constitutional history was complicated by its geography, but the situation was not eased by the secession of **Bangladesh** in December 1971. The new Pakistan that emerged in 1971 was reasonably homogeneous; it was geographically contiguous; its people, although speaking several different languages, shared a common history and were culturally more alike than was the case with the people of East and West Pakistan. The dramatic political change that occurred as a result of the breakup of Pakistan did not resolve the differences among the provinces in what was once the western wing of the country, however. A number of problems that had inhibited the writing of the constitution in the 1950s resurfaced. The question of defining the role of **Islam** in Pakistan’s **economy** and **polity** became even more difficult to resolve than in the earlier period. **Religious parties** had always been more powerful in the provinces of West Pakistan than in East Bengal. With East Pakistan no longer there to lend a moderating hand, the religious parties demanded the establishment of an Islamic state in what was left of Pakistan.

The issue of the sharing of power between the federal and state governments that had occupied the attention of the politicians when Bengal was a part of Pakistan did not disappear with the departure of the eastern wing. To these two perennial problems, **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto** added a third: the role of the head of state. Bhutto was now the president. He had inherited all the political power that his military predecessors—Generals **Ayub Khan** and **Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan**—had accumulated since 1958. He was not disposed to dilute the power of the presidency for as long as he could occupy the office.

The task of devising a new constitutional arrangement was entrusted to a Constituent Assembly—the **Third Constituent Assembly** in Pakistan’s history. Its membership was made up of the people who had been elected to the National Assembly from the provinces of West Pakistan in the elections held in December 1970. The **Pakistan People’s Party** (PPP) had a clear majority in the assembly, and it proceeded to



elect Zulfikar Ali Bhutto as the assembly chairman. In keeping with the tradition established by the **First** and **Second Constituent Assemblies**, the third assembly also functioned as the national legislature.

It took the assembly six months to draft a new constitution; an agreement was reached between the PPP and the smaller political organizations represented in the constituent body because of Bhutto's willingness to yield ground to them on most of the important issues. On 20 October 1972, leaders of the parties represented in the National Assembly agreed on a new constitution that provided for a two-chamber federal parliament, a president, and a prime minister. The president was to be elected by a joint sitting of the National Assembly, the Senate, and the four Provincial Assemblies. The president was to invite the member of the National Assembly or the Senate most likely to command a majority in the national legislature to become the prime minister. The prime minister was required to choose his ministers from among the members of the parliament. The four provinces were to have unicameral legislatures, with chief ministers chosen from among the members of the assemblies. Provincial governors were to be appointed by the president, on the advice of the prime minister. The new constitution took effect on 14 August 1973, Pakistan's 26th anniversary.

The **constitution of 1973** established a parliamentary system in which the prime minister was responsible to the National Assembly. The provincial legislatures, like the National Assembly, were to be elected directly by the people on the basis of adult franchise. Provincial chief ministers were to be responsible to the provincial legislatures. The president and provincial governors had very limited powers; all of the executive authority was in the hands of the prime minister and the provincial chief ministers.

Islam had a more prominent presence in the 1973 constitution than had been the case in the **constitutions of 1956** and **1962**. Apart from making reference to the "sovereignty of Allah" in the preamble, Article 2 declared that "Islam shall be the State **religion** of Pakistan." This phrase had not appeared in the earlier constitutions. Article 40 declared that the state "shall endeavor to preserve and strengthen fraternal relations among the Muslim countries based on Islamic unity."

In defining the power to be exercised by the provinces, the 1973 constitution was more explicitly in favor of the federating units than the constitutions of 1956 and 1962. It was because of these

provisions that Bhutto was able to obtain the support of the political parties that had a stronger provincial base than the PPP. The 1973 constitution made one significant departure from the traditions established in 1958 and 1962: it defined the role of the military and proscribed any intervention by the armed forces in the political life of the state. Article 245 stated that the military's role was to "defend Pakistan against external aggression or threat of war, and subject to law, act in aid of civil authority when called upon to do so." Article 6 defined the subversion of the constitution "by the use of force or show of force or by other unconstitutional means" to be an act of high treason and authorized the Parliament to provide punishment for those who ignored this provision. On 14 September 1973, the National Assembly passed a law that prescribed the death sentence, or life imprisonment, for the subversion of the constitution.

The 1973 constitution remained in force in its original form for four years. It remained suspended for eight years, from 1977 to 1985, when Pakistan was under martial law. The president's **Revival of the Constitution 1973 Order** of 1985 restored the constitution after amending 67 out of 280 articles. While the constitution remained in force after the military takeover that brought General **Pervez Musharraf** to power on 12 October 1999, it was amended by the adoption of the seventeenth amendment in January 2003. The amendment gave the president some extraordinary powers including the power to dismiss the prime minister and dissolve the national assembly.

**CONVENTION MUSLIM LEAGUE.** The Convention Muslim League was formed in 1963, a year after the promulgation of Pakistan's second constitution (the **constitution of 1962**). By this time, President **Ayub Khan** had reached the conclusion that he had made a mistake by not allowing political parties to reenter the political arena. Accordingly, Ayub Khan's supporters in the National Assembly summoned a "convention" of Muslim Leaguers in May 1963. The convention, held in **Rawalpindi**, agreed to revive the **Muslim League** and to offer the party's chairmanship to Ayub Khan. The president accepted the offer. However, several prominent Muslim Leaguers not invited to the convention in Rawalpindi refused to ac-

cept the legitimacy of this act. They convened their own “council” and declared that they, too, had revived the old **Muslim League**. By the middle of 1963, therefore, Pakistan had two Muslim Leagues, and they came to be distinguished by the manner of their revival. The official party was informally named the “Convention Muslim League,” whereas the party in opposition to President Ayub Khan was named the “Council Muslim League.”

In keeping with Pakistan’s political tradition, a political party need not have a program in order to attract support. All it required was official patronage. Once the Convention Muslim League was formed, it was able to attract a large following, not because the people who joined the party believed in the program it had to offer. They came for the reason which had attracted them before to the officially sponsored political parties: they were in search of jobs and official patronage. Once again, they seem to have made the right calculation. In the elections to the National Assembly held in 1965, the Convention Muslim League won 124 out of the 156 seats it contested, 69 of which were from West Pakistan and 55 from East Pakistan. Its overwhelming presence in the national legislature said little about its popularity, however.

The party was put to a real test in the general **elections of 1970** when, with Ayub Khan no longer in power and without any support from the government, the Convention Muslim League polled only 3.3 percent of the total votes cast. The party’s best showing was in **Punjab**, where it received 5.5 percent of the vote and was able to win two seats in the National Assembly. During the period of **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto** (1971–1977), the Convention Muslim League played a marginal role in politics. It was dissolved along with other political parties when General **Zia-ul-Haq** wrested the reins of government from Bhutto in July 1977. The party was resuscitated later as the **Pakistan Muslim League**.

**CORNELIUS, JUSTICE A. R. (1903–1991).** A. R. Cornelius was born in Agra, India, and studied at a college in Allahabad, Uttar Pradesh, and then went on to Cambridge University in England for further studies. He joined the Indian Civil Service (ICS) in 1926 and was transferred to the judicial branch of the service. Soon after the establishment of Pakistan, Cornelius was appointed to the Supreme

Court of Pakistan. While on the Court's bench, he displayed total independence, refusing to go along with his fellow judges in sanctioning political actions in terms of the "**doctrine of necessity.**" He was the sole dissenting voice in two landmark constitutional cases which dealt with the legality of executive decisions, both of which had profound implications for the country's political development. In a dissenting opinion in the **Maulvi Tamizuddin** case, filed to challenge Governor-General **Ghulam Muhammad's** dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, Justice Cornelius agreed with the finding of the **Sindh** High Court. The Sindh court had declared the governor-general's action to be unconstitutional and ordered the restoration of the Constituent Assembly. In the Dosso case, filed to challenge the military takeover of the government under the leadership of General **Ayub Khan**, he was once again the lone dissenting voice. He disagreed with the majority opinion that Ayub Khan's martial law was *de jure*, by virtue of its being *de facto*.

These dissenting opinions notwithstanding, Justice Cornelius will be most remembered for the report on the reform of the civil administration that he authored in 1964. The report was never released to the public; the government regarded its conclusions to be too radical for implementation. Despite the secrecy surrounding the report, it became widely known that Cornelius and his colleagues had recommended the abolition of the **Civil Service of Pakistan** and its replacement by a more broadly constituted administrative service that would not have a powerful influence on economic decision-making. In this respect, Cornelius had gone even further than the recommendations of Zahid Hussain in the **First Five-Year Plan** document.

Pakistan had to wait another eight years before the main recommendation of the Cornelius Commission was implemented. In 1974, Prime Minister **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto** dissolved the Civil Service of Pakistan and introduced a system of recruitment that allowed broad representation of the people to the civil service.

**COTTON.** Although cotton has been cultivated in the **Indus River** valley for centuries, it was grown mostly for household consumption. Very little of it was marketed. It took four developments, the full import of which were not realized at the time they occurred, to

make cotton one of the most important crops for the Indus plain. The first was the introduction of American cotton to **Sindh** and south **Punjab**; the second, the arrival of canal irrigation to the areas that could support the production of cotton; the third, the use of chemical fertilizer for cotton production; and the fourth, the use of chemical insecticides to save cotton from being damaged by disease and pests. The fourth development contributed to Pakistan's "**second green revolution**."

For the last 50 years—ever since the introduction of irrigation in Sindh and south Punjab—raw cotton exports have been important for the areas that now constitute Pakistan. It was because of the sharp rise in earnings from cotton exports, during the Korean War period, that Pakistan was able to finance its first industrial revolution. Cotton exports were handled by large privately owned companies; there was an impression, particularly among the socialist circles from which **Zul-fikar Ali Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party** drew its initial support, that the trading houses made large profits at the expense of the growers. Accordingly, on assuming power, Bhutto nationalized external trade in cotton and other **agricultural** commodities and established a public-sector trading company, the Pakistan Trading Corporation, to handle commodity exports. During the period of **Zia ul-Haq**, private-sector activity was encouraged, and large private entrepreneurs returned to industry, in particular to cotton-based manufacturing. In the 1980s and the early part of the 1990s, there was such a great deal of new investment in cotton-related industries that during lean years, Pakistan was forced to import raw cotton. Another unhappy development in the early 1990s—the arrival of a highly destructive fungus called "cotton rust"—inflicted heavy damage on the crop and hence on the economy. Cotton remained the main cash crop of Pakistan, although with the rapid development of the textile **industry** in anticipation of the removal in January 2005 of the quotas instituted on exports under the Multifiber Arrangement, its export declined significantly. Much of the crop produced at home was used by the domestic industry.

**COUNCIL FOR DEFENSE AND NATIONAL SECURITY (CDNS)**. The Council for Defense and National Security was established by President **Farooq Leghari** in December 1996. It had ten

members, four from the armed forces and six from the civilian realm, including the president, who was its chairman. The armed forces were represented by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the chiefs of staff of the army, air force, and navy. The civilian side was represented by the prime minister and the ministers of defense, finance, foreign affairs, and the interior.

The CDNS was created to provide a formal mechanism for the senior military officers to keep a watch on all matters concerning national security. Its establishment sought to formalize the “**troika**” arrangement, which had existed since the death of President **Zia ul-Haq**. The CDNS met three times during the tenure of the caretaker administration but was not convened by Prime Minister **Mian Nawaz Sharif**. *See also* MILITARY.

**COUNCIL MUSLIM LEAGUE.** The Council Muslim League was founded in 1963, after President **Ayub Khan** decided to revive political parties. The president’s supporters reorganized the **Muslim League** at a convention held in **Rawalpindi**, the interim capital. Although the party was formally called the **Pakistan Muslim League**, it came to be known instead as the **Convention Muslim League** to distinguish it from the party that was organized by another group of former Muslim Leaguers. The latter party came to be called the Council Muslim League, and drew the support of the members of the Pakistan Muslim League—the party, the military government dissolved in 1958—who did not support Ayub Khan’s political order, but wished, instead, to see Pakistan return to parliamentary democracy. Among those who were attracted to the Council Muslim League were **Fatima Jinnah**, **Mian Mumtaz Daulatana**, and **Chaudhri Muhammad Ali**. In 1964, the Council League joined a number of other opposition parties to form the **Combined Opposition Party (COP)**. The COP put Fatima Jinnah as its candidate for the presidential election held in December 1964. Ayub Khan won the contest but with a margin much smaller than generally expected. The Council Muslim League faded away after the resignation of Ayub Khan in March 1969.

**CRICKET.** Cricket is Pakistan’s most popular game. Introduced to the South Asian sub-continent in the late 18th century, it was played ini-

tially by the British administrators, soldiers, and businessmen working in their expanding Indian domain. Over time, several clubs were established in which cricket was the main sport. The clubs did not offer membership to the Indians. While being excluded from the formal part of the game, cricket became popular among the natives, with its rules learnt by watching it played by the British.

As the British allowed Indian participation in the country's administrative structure and in the **military**, they also permitted the Indians into their country clubs. Moreover, they allowed the mixed clubs to organize national cricket tournaments, which then led to the formation of an official team that began to formally participate in the sport at the international level. Several Indian Muslim princes—in particular, the rulers of Bhopal, Hyderabad, and Patudi—became important patrons and sponsors of the sport, and a number of Muslim players gained recognition during the fading days of the British rule of India. There were a number of talented Muslim players playing the game at the time of the birth of Pakistan; they migrated to Pakistan to form the backbone of the official Pakistani team. Among them was **Abdul Hafiz Kardar**, who was chosen to lead the first Pakistani visit to India in 1952, and to Great Britain in 1954, the home of cricket. The Pakistani team also included Fazal Mahmood, a medium pace bowler who became a legend in helping Pakistan to win “test matches” in both engagements.

In the 1970s, an Australian entrepreneur introduced “one day cricket international” into the sport to make it attractive for TV audiences. The introduction of a short one-day match in which each side is allowed to play one inning, and only 50 overs or 300 balls can be bowled, changed the nature of the sport and brought large audiences to watch the games shown on TV. It was also decided to launch a cricket world cup, patterned after the world soccer cup, to be contested every four years in a different location. Eight such cups have been played, the last jointly hosted by Kenya, South Africa, and Zimbabwe in early 2003. Pakistan having won the fifth cup in 1992, under the leadership of **Imran Khan**, performed poorly and did not reach the finals.

Cricket has also played a role in helping **India** and Pakistan to continue to talk to each other at difficult times in their relations. In April 2005, President **Pervez Musharraf** invited himself to watch the last

match played between his country's team and India, and used his visit to hold a summit with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.

**CUNNINGHAM, SIR GEORGE (1888–1974).** Sir George Cunningham served as the governor of the **Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP)** from 1937 to 1946, and again, at the invitation of Governor-General **Muhammad Ali Jinnah**, from 1947 to 1948. Jinnah's mission in the Frontier Province was still not finished when Pakistan was born on 14 August 1947. At the time of Pakistan's birth, the province was still being administered by a government representing the Indian National Congress. Dr. **Khan Sahib** was the chief minister. Jinnah called for Dr. Khan Sahib's resignation, but the chief minister refused to oblige. Sir George Cunningham, who was a year in retirement, was invited to come back as governor, being the man everyone trusted. He administered the last rites to the Khan administration on 22 August 1947, a week after Pakistan was born. Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan was invited to become chief minister. His mission accomplished, Sir George left the NWFP and Pakistan in 1948.

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**DACOITS OF SINDH.** **Sindh's** *dacoits* (bands of robbers) who harassed the countryside, with the rural poor as their main victims, go a long way back into history. These bands sometimes worked for the *waderas* (the large landlords), extorting taxes from the small peasants on behalf of the landlords. However, it was only after the agitation launched in 1983 by the **Movement for the Restoration of Democracy** (MRD) against the martial-law government of General **Zia ul-Haq** that the dacoits turned to politics and began to receive arms, training, and organizational support from the political parties that opposed military rule.

The army was called in to eliminate the threat that the dacoits now posed to the national economy. But its operations seemed more costly to the army in terms of personnel lost in the confrontation with the roving bands than to the dacoits themselves. Despite the presence of the army, the dacoits continued to operate with impunity from the sanctuary offered by the *katcha*, the bed of the **Indus River**, five to



seven miles wide between the river's protective embankments. With the flow in the river controlled by the **Tarbela Dam**, the bed now supported thick vegetation from which the dacoits could launch operations without much fear of detection. The army was reluctant to move into the katcha itself. For a number of years, the dacoits were not only able to harass the local authorities but were also able to disrupt traffic on the national highway connecting **Karachi** with the interior. On a number of occasions, they also disrupted traffic on the main railway line connecting Karachi and the province of **Punjab**. They staged raids on trains carrying both passengers and goods. It was only after the return of representative government in the province of Sindh in 1988, and the subsequent withdrawal of support to the dacoits, that the latter were brought under control. In the meantime, however, they had exacted a heavy toll on the province's economy.

**DAEWOO.** Daewoo, a Korean *chaebol* (industrial-business conglomerate), won the contract to build the **Lahore-Islamabad Motorway** in 1992. The contract was awarded by the first administration (1990–1993) of Prime Minister **Mian Nawaz Sharif** on terms that were considered by many in Pakistan to be favorable to the Korean enterprise. Daewoo also indicated interest in building a large industrial estate near **Karachi** and in developing the land alongside the motorway for industry and commerce. The motorway project was expected to be completed in three years; instead, it took six years to finish. The delay was caused in part by the less-than-enthusiastic support for the project by the second administration (1993–1996) of **Benazir Bhutto**.

**DAMS.** Storage dams on Pakistan's many large rivers are an important part of the country's **agricultural** and irrigation systems. They also contribute to the supply of electric power; in 2005, about 25 percent of the total power consumption came from hydroelectric resources. Three reservoirs have been critical for Pakistan's economic development. The **Mangla** dam built on the Jhelum, as a part of the **Indus River** Replacement Works in 1963–1967, generates 1,000 MW of electricity and also transfers water from the Jhelum to the Chenab. The **Tarbela** dam on the Indus River was also a part of the

same program for transferring waters from the rivers that were allocated to Pakistan under the **Indus Water Treaty of 1960**. Built in 1969–1974, it generates 3,500 MW of electric power. Feasibility studies for the construction of two additional dams on the Indus, one at **Kalabagh** and the other at Bhasha, upstream of Kalabagh, were prepared but have not been acted upon. There was opposition to their construction from the international community, which had become increasingly concerned about the latent costs of the projects, including the rehabilitation of displaced people, as well as the destruction of flora and fauna in the areas to be submerged.

There was also opposition to the dams—in particular, the one at Kalabagh—from the provinces of the Northwest Frontier, the site of the project, and **Sindh**, which was troubled by the further loss of water in the Indus that had already suffered deep declines since the construction of Tarbela. The only large hydroelectric project to be constructed since the completion of Mangla and Tarbela was the “run of the river” reservoir at **Ghazi Brotha**, also on the Indus.

Soon after assuming power in October 1999, the military government headed by President **Pervez Musharraf** declared its intention to complete the long-postponed water and hydroelectric projects, in particular the dam at Kalabagh. It was concerned about the serious shortage of water available in the country. Water supply in Pakistan was estimated at 1,200 cubic meters per head per day, in 2005, only slightly more than the 1,000 cubic meters per head per day considered to be a situation of acute shortage. By the end of 2005, the Musharraf administration signaled its intention to start construction of a series of large water storage projects, including the dams at Kalabagh and Bhasha. It said that its decision to proceed was based on expert advice. In 2004, two committees—the parliamentary committee on water resources, and a technical committee of experts on the same subject—were constituted to make recommendations about the sequencing of large water projects. Both committees recommended the construction of the dams with a number of safeguards provided to downstream users.

When and if completed the Bhasha dam will have storage capacity of 0.2 million cubic meters (MCM), and power generation capacity of 4,000 MW. The Kalabagh Dam has designed storage

and power capacities of .6 MCM and 3,600 MW, respectively. Another dam at Akhori is included in the list of government's "mega projects." This dam will have storage capacity of .06 MCM, and power generation capability of 600 MW. *See also* ENERGY.

**DAULATANA, MIAN MUMTAZ MUHAMMAD KHAN (1916–1995).** Daulatana, the scion of a well-established landowning family of Central **Punjab**, was educated at Oxford, in England. He was elected to the Punjab legislative assembly in 1943 and went on to win seats in both the Provincial and National Assemblies in the elections of 1946. He was elected president of the **Punjab Muslim League** in 1948 and joined the government of Chief Minister **Iftikhar Mamdot** as finance minister in 1951. Later in the year, he replaced Mamdot as Punjab's chief minister. In 1953, following his inability to control the **anti-Ahmadiya** movement, he stepped down as chief minister. He took an active part in organizing the **Council Muslim League** to challenge the **Convention Muslim League**, which supported the military government of Field Marshal **Ayub Khan**. He served as ambassador to England, during the administration of Prime Minister **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto**, in the early 1970s. He retired from politics following the completion of his tenure and lived in **Lahore** for the remaining years of his life.

**THE DAWOODS.** The Dawood industrial house got its name from Ahmad Dawood, the head of a Memon family that migrated to Pakistan from India at the invitation of **Muhammad Ali Jinnah**, the country's founder. Like a number of other families that came to dominate the industrial sector in Pakistan, the Dawoods were originally merchants. The family belonged to the village of Batwa in the Kathiawar peninsula of what is now the Indian state of Gujarat. The family's initial success came from supplying commodities and equipment to the Indian armed forces fighting in World War II. The family established its headquarters in **Karachi** and actively participated in Pakistan's initial efforts at industrialization.

The Dawoods seized the opportunity presented by Pakistan's first trade war with India, in 1949. The conflict with India over the question of the value of the Pakistani rupee persuaded the leaders of

Pakistan to launch a massive industrialization drive to achieve self-sufficiency in basic consumer goods. Generous incentives were provided to private investors to set up such basic **industries** as jute and **cotton** textiles, leather goods, food processing, and building materials. A number of people, particularly those who had reaped rich benefits from the commodity boom associated with the war in Korea, took advantage of the incentives provided by the government. The Dawoods concentrated their investments initially in cotton and jute textiles. In selecting jute, they took a calculated risk in going to distant East Pakistan (present-day **Bangladesh**). Ahmad Dawood's jute ventures turned out to be enormously profitable and encouraged him to diversify his holdings in East Pakistan. In the early 1960s, he purchased the massive Karanaphuli Paper Mills, built in East Pakistan by the **Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation** (PIDC).

After Ahmad Dawood's death in 1998, his industrial empire split into two parts, with most of the large enterprises inherited by his son, Hussain Dawood. The other part was taken over by his nephew, Razaq Dawood, who apart from managing the industrial units he inherited entered politics when General **Pervez Musharraf** assumed power in October 1999. He served as commerce minister for three years in the first military administration headed by General Musharraf.

**DEBT.** Pakistan's debt burden, both internal and external, mounted steadily over the years. In 1998, the two burdens taken together amounted to nearly 90 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP). The large burden of debt is the consequence of a very low domestic savings rate. In 1998, Pakistan's tax to GDP ratio was slightly more than 13 percent, whereas the public-sector expenditure was close to 19.5 percent. The difference between the two—the budgetary deficit—was traditionally financed by both domestic and external borrowing. This resulted in a progressive increase in the debt burden. Pakistan also had a large balance-of-payments deficit—the difference between total external earnings and expenditure. In the absence of large capital flows such as foreign aid and workers remittances, which Pakistan used to finance the external deficit in the past, the

country had to resort to heavy commercial borrowing. This had added to the debt burden. Servicing of debt became the largest claim on the budget before the military assumed power in October 1999. In the 1997–1998 fiscal year, debt servicing consumed 40 percent of government revenues. Servicing of external debt in the same year took up 38 percent of export earnings.

The government, headed by President **Pervez Musharraf**, decided to address the problem posed by the burden of debt by appointing a committee of professionals. Headed by Pervez Hasan, who had served at the **World Bank** for almost 30 years, the committee proposed a program of action that was adopted by the government. However, after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, several Western governments decided to provide debt relief to Pakistan through the mechanism of the Paris Club—an informal group of official creditors whose role is to find coordinated and sustainable solutions to the payment difficulties experienced by debtor nations. The United States wrote off \$1 billion of outstanding debt owed to it by Pakistan. With regard to domestic debt, a significant lowering of interest rates reduced the cost of service. In financial year 2004–2005, the country's debt outstanding amounted to US\$58 billion, equivalent to 64 percent of GDP.

**DEFENSE.** Pakistan's **military**, estimated to number 587,000, is the fifth largest force in the developing world, after China, India, North Korea, and South Korea. Some four-fifths of military personnel are enlisted in the army, while the remaining 20 percent are in the navy and the air force. The country spends 6.5 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) on defense, which is equivalent to US\$28 per capita. Defense expenditure broadly equals 125 percent of the combined expenditure on **education** and **health**. Successive governments have justified such a large outlay on defense because of the tensions with India. Pakistan and **India** have fought three wars since they gained independence in 1947.

While maintaining a large military force, Pakistan has not developed an indigenous defense industry. Consequently, a significant amount of expenditure is incurred procuring equipment from abroad. In 2004, the country spent US\$350 million on military imports,

equivalent to 3 percent of total export earnings. The **United States** was the major supplier for more than 40 years. Pakistan has had a close association with the United States on defense matters since the two countries entered into a number of agreements, including the **Central Treaty Organization (CENTO)** and **Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO)**. Under these agreements Pakistan has received a substantial amount of military assistance from the United States. The United States also assisted Pakistan after the invasion of **Afghanistan** by the Soviet Union in 1979. However, this close relationship was interrupted by the sanctions imposed by Washington on Islamabad as a result of the **Pressler amendment** when the government refused to accept the demand by the United States to stop the development of **nuclear weapons**. A new set of sanctions was imposed following the testing of nuclear devices by Pakistan in May 1998.

Pakistan's military contacts with the United States were renewed after the **terrorist** attacks of 11 September 2001. In 2003, Washington announced a US\$3 billion aid package for Pakistan, one-half of which was for military aid. In early 2005, Washington agreed to sell **F-16** fighter aircraft to Islamabad as a part of its program to reequip the Pakistani military with modern weapons.

The defense establishment has played an important role in shaping Pakistan's political development. Generals **Ayub Khan**, **Yahya Khan**, and **Zia ul-Haq** kept the country under martial law for 25 years. Even when the generals were not directly in control, they were able to influence decision-making in important matters by participating in such informal arrangements as the "**troika**." *See also* INDO-PAKISTAN WARS OF 1948–1949, 1965, 1971.

**DEMOCRATIC ACTION COMMITTEE (DAC).** The Democratic Action Committee was formed in December 1968 by eight political parties to coordinate and guide the movement against the government of **Ayub Khan**. The parties that gathered under the DAC umbrella included: the **Awami League** (Mujibur Rahman group), the Awami League (Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan group), the **Council Muslim League**, **National Awami Party** (Requisitionists), the **Jamaat-e-Islami**, the **Jamiatul-Ulemai-Islam**, and the **Jamiatul-Ulemai**. The **Pakistan People's Party** and the National Awami Party

(Bhashani Group) did not join the DAC. In a meeting held on 8 January 1969, the DAC put forward demands including the replacement of the **constitution of 1962** by a federal parliamentary system of government; full restoration of all civil liberties; and repeal of such “black laws” as the University Ordinance, the Press Act, and various public security laws that allowed the government to detain politicians; the withdrawal of all orders under Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code; and the return to their original owners of all newspapers nationalized by the government.

Ayub Khan’s response to these demands was to invite the DAC to a round-table meeting with himself and his associates. The consensus that had developed among the constituent parties quickly disappeared, however, once the discussions got underway. The main issue was the type of federal structure the opposition wanted in place once Ayub Khan’s constitution was abrogated. The parties from West Pakistan were not prepared to accept some of the demands pushed by the representatives from East Pakistan. The Awami League of East Pakistan wanted much greater political autonomy for the country’s eastern wing than West Pakistan was prepared to grant. Ayub Khan was not able to capitalize on these differences among the DAC leaders, however. By the time the round-table discussions got seriously underway, the military had become restive. It decided to move in and imposed martial law on 25 March 1969.

As was the case with other political umbrella groups in Pakistan’s political history, the DAC did not survive the achievement of its immediate purpose: the removal from office of President Ayub Khan. It disappeared from the political scene following the imposition of martial law by General **Yahya Khan**. *See also* OPPOSITION GROUPS.

**DIASPORAS.** Large movements of people have defined Pakistan in several different ways. The country’s **economy**, its society, and its political system were affected by these movements. The first of these occurred when the country gained independence in August 1947. At that time some 14 million people moved across the newly defined border with India; 8 million Muslims came into Pakistan while 6 million Hindus and Sikhs left in the opposite direction. The next movement occurred when **Karachi**, a small port on the Arabian Sea, was selected to be the capital of the new state of Pakistan. The building

activity that followed Karachi's choice brought millions of people from the northern **Punjab**, the **Northwestern Frontier Province**, and **Azad Kashmir** into Karachi to work on the thousands of construction sites. Most of these people stayed, often turning workers' camps into *katchi bastis*, or squatter settlements. These continue to dot the urban landscape of Karachi. Another movement of people brought some 3.5 to 4 million refugees from **Afghanistan** to escape the war in their country following the invasion by the Soviet Union in December 1979. The war against the occupation by the Soviet Union lasted for more than a decade, and even when it ended in 1989 peace did not return to Afghanistan. Hundreds of thousands of refugees slipped out of the camps and settled in the large cities of Pakistan. Karachi, already with a large **Pushtun** (Afghan) population, was a favored destination.

These were not the only movements of people that played an important role in Pakistan's development. There were other important demographic events including the establishment of three diasporas by people of Pakistani origin. The first of these was created by the semi-skilled workers from northern Punjab and Azad Kashmir. These people were invited to Great Britain to help revive the industrial heartland of the country that was devastated by World War II. These migrants settled in several industrial towns in the Midlands and stayed on to found communities of Pakistanis that were to play an active role in Britain in the early years of the 21st century. Numbering some 1 million people, the Pakistani diaspora in Britain has per capita income of about US\$20,000, considerably less than the national average. The combined income of the diaspora is about US\$20 billion. There is high incidence of poverty among these people, high levels of unemployment, poor literacy and education, and poor assimilation into the mainstream of the British economy, society, and the political system. Some members of the community prospered in the world of business and finance. One of them, Sir Anwar Pervez, was not only knighted by the government but became a major businessman and invested heavily in Pakistan, his home country. In 2001, he became one of the principal shareholders of the **United Bank Limited**, a commercial bank privatized by the administration of President **Pervez Musharraf**.

The British approach of "multiculturalism"—letting different groups of migrants who had come and settled in the country continue



to follow their cultural practices; use their own language; play their sports; create their own theater, music, and literature; and actively practice and propagate their own religion—eventually led to the creation of poorly integrated communities. The Pakistani community was the poorest and the least integrated of these groups; its youth provided recruits for the pursuit of various *jihadist* causes across the globe, such as the confrontation between radical **Islam** and the West which heated up following the **terrorist** attack on the United States on 11 September 2001. Three youths of Pakistani origin were among the four suicide bombers who carried out bombing attacks that killed 58 people in London’s transport system on 7 July 2005. They had visited Pakistan a year before they carried out the attacks and may have received some training in the *madrassas* that now dot the Pakistani landscape.

The second Pakistani diaspora came to be formed in the Middle East beginning in the early 1970s. Twice in that decade the oil exporting countries of the Middle East raised the price of oil several fold. A significant amount of the windfall income was spent on the construction of houses, office buildings, schools, hospitals and clinics, roads, and highways. Millions of Pakistani workers were brought in as construction workers. As the economies of the countries in the region developed, they needed other skills as well which were also supplied largely by people of Pakistani origin. By the late 1990s, this diaspora, spread over several Middle Eastern countries, also had about a million people.

The third Pakistani diaspora was formed over a period of a quarter century in North America. From about 1975 until the terrorist attacks on the United States of 11 September 2001, young professionals from Pakistan had relatively easy access to the labor markets in Canada and United States. Physicians, engineers, accountants, economists, and bankers were prominent among these migrants. Trained in Pakistani universities, they came to the United States in search of jobs that were not available in the domestic market. Once they were established in North America, laws concerning immigration allowed them to bring in members of their families. By the end of the 1990s some 250,000 people from Pakistan were in the United States.

The three diasporas together have about 2.75 million people with a combined income of US\$53 billion, equivalent to about 60 percent

of Pakistan's GDP. The members of these communities interact with their homeland in several different ways. They send about US\$4 billion a year as remittances to their families and friends, have begun to make investments in Pakistan, and have also entered the country's political system. *See also* ASSOCIATION OF PAKISTANI PHYSICIANS IN NORTH AMERICA; ASSOCIATION OF PAKISTANI SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS IN NORTH AMERICA.

**DIRECT ACTION DAY (16 AUGUST 1946).** Convinced that his demand for the creation of Pakistan, a separate state for the Muslims of British India, had not been treated with enough seriousness by either the British or the **Indian National Congress**, **Muhammad Ali Jinnah** asked the **Muslim League** legislators meeting in New Delhi on 27 July 1946, to call for a "direct action day." The meeting also endorsed a major change in the "Pakistan resolution" passed by the Muslim League at its annual meeting held in **Lahore** on 23 March 1940. The earlier resolution had called for the establishment of Muslim states. The resolution passed by the legislators in 1946 called for the establishment of a single Muslim state named Pakistan.

The call for the observance of the day was heeded by the Muslim community all over India. *Hartals* (work stoppages) by Muslim businesses marked the day. Jinnah had appealed for calm while the day was being observed, but that was not to be the case. There were serious clashes in Bengal between Hindus and Muslims, which left scores dead or injured. The "day" was a success in other ways. Its observance signaled the seriousness with which the Muslim community all over India viewed the creation of Pakistan.

**DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY.** In 1954, Governor-General **Ghulam Muhammad** dissolved the **first constituent assembly**. **Maulvi Tamizuddin**, the assembly president, challenged the constitutionality of the governor-general's action in the Supreme Court, under the Independence Act of India. In its judgment, the court upheld the governor-general's dismissal order on the basis of what it called the "doctrine of necessity." According to the doctrine, certain actions by politically powerful individuals created situations to which legal remedy could not be meaningfully applied. The

court argued that it was operating under considerable constraint and had only a limited degree of real freedom available to it. The chief justice felt that declaring the action by the governor-general to be constitutionally invalid would have created political chaos. The justices believed that the only viable course they could adopt was not to nullify the governor-general's act but to force him to return to the constitutional path. Accordingly, the court ordered Ghulam Muhammad to reconstitute the Constituent Assembly. This decision suited the governor-general, as it provided him the opportunity to rid the assembly of the representatives who had refused to follow his dictate.

The "Tamizuddin case," built on the doctrine of necessity, was to significantly influence Pakistan's constitutional and political development. The doctrine was to be applied several times subsequently by the courts to validate **military** coups d'état and other unconstitutional acts by a string of authoritarian leaders. It also weakened the development of an independent judiciary in the country. It was only in the 1990s that the judiciary began to take a course that was not totally subservient to the wishes of the executive. However, in 2002 the Supreme Court once again relied on the Doctrine of Necessity to provide legal cover to the assumption of political power by General **Pervez Musharraf**. Also, in keeping with the legal tradition, it put a limit on the exercise of power by the new military order. Musharraf was ordered to hold general elections within three years, and while he could amend the constitution, its basic character—parliamentary democracy—could not be changed.

**DURAND LINE.** The Durand Line is named after Sir Mortimer Durand who negotiated an agreement between the Afghan Amir Abdur Rahman and the Government of India in 1893, dividing their respective spheres of influence through the tribal belt on the northwest frontier of the Indian subcontinent. The Durand Line was frequently challenged in the 20th century as an international border. After the partition of India in 1947, the problem was inherited by Pakistan.

**DYARCHY.** The term *dyarchy* was used to describe the system of government created by the Government of **India Act of 1919**. Elected

members constituted a majority in the provincial councils established under the Act. Ministers, appointed by the governor to head the “nation-building departments”—agriculture, education, health, irrigation, and public works—were responsible to the provincial councils. However, a number of other departments—home, finance, and revenue—remained outside the purview of the councils. These departments were headed by executive councilors responsible only to the governor. This division of responsibility was captured by the term *dyarchy*. The Government of **India Act of 1935** created a system of provincial autonomy, thereby doing away with the system of dyarchy.

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**EARTHQUAKE OF 8 OCTOBER 2005.** The northern areas of Pakistan and the two parts of **Kashmir**, one under the control of Pakistan the other administered by **India**, were ravaged by an earthquake on the morning of 8 October 2005. Most of the damage was in **Azad Kashmir**, the Pakistani part of the state. Measured at 7.6 on the open-ended Richter scale, this was the worst earthquake to hit Pakistan since the founding of the country in 1947. In intensity, it equaled the 1935 tremor that destroyed much of **Quetta** and took 50,000 lives, almost the entire population of that city. The epicenter of the recent earthquake was located in the Hindu Kush Mountains near Garhi Habibullah, a small town close to the **Line of Control** that separates the two parts of Kashmir. The epicenter was only 100 kilometers north of the capital city of **Islamabad**. It took the earth a while to settle after going through the convulsion that jolted most of northern and eastern Pakistan. The big jolt was followed for several months by some 1,200 significant aftershocks measuring between 5 and 6.2 in magnitude.

The death count from the earthquake continued to mount as rescue and relief efforts proceeded. By the end of December, Pakistan’s government estimated that 86,000 people were killed and 300,000 injured, many of them seriously. Some three to four million people were displaced, needing to be housed, clothed, and fed as the weather became progressively worse. The number of people affected made the earthquake one of the most destructive in recent history.

There is no doubt that the Kashmir earthquake would have long-lasting impact. Since the government was slow to mobilize, initiative was taken by a number of Islamic groups that were present in the area at the time the disaster struck. The full magnitude of the disaster and the extent of the damage it had done also came to be slowly recognized in Islamabad. International interest in providing assistance was also not present to the extent seen at the time of the tsunami disaster of 26 December 2004. The most troubling consequence—again not fully appreciated by Islamabad—was the effect on the survivors.

International assistance was also slow in reaching Pakistan. A donor conference was held in Islamabad on 19 November 2005, attended by the representatives of 80 nations and multilateral development agencies. The participants announced total commitments of more than US\$6 billion, with the **World Bank** and the **Asian Development Bank** each pledging US\$1 billion. Saudi Arabia and the **United States** pledged more than US\$500 million each. The government in Islamabad took a number of steps to streamline its efforts to provide relief to the affected population and ensure transparency in the use of resources it was receiving. A new organization, the Earthquake Reconstruction and Relief Authority (ERRA), was constituted as an apex body that would oversee similar organizations at the provincial level. A website was created to inform the public of how money was being received and how it was being spent. And a reluctant opposition was persuaded to join a parliamentary committee to oversee the relief and rehabilitation effort. The government promised that all large contracts for repair and reconstruction and other earthquake aid will follow internationally recognized principles of procurement.

**EAST INDIA COMPANY.** The British East India Company was founded in 1600 and proved more durable than a number of similar enterprises created for the purpose of monopolizing trade in exotic products between countries of the East and the mercantile powers of the West. Although the company survived officially until 1874, it effectively ended after the **Great Indian Mutiny** of 1857. The company started as a commercial enterprise but went on to establish British dominion over India. This it did by first defeating the nawabs of Bengal (later **East Pakistan** and still later **Bangladesh**), liquidating the remnants of the Delhi-based **Mughul Empire**, and

annexing the provinces of **Punjab** and **Sindh**, now part of modern-day Pakistan.

**EAST PAKISTAN.** *See* BANGLADESH.

**ECONOMIC COOPERATION ORGANIZATION (ECO).** In 1985, **Iran**, Pakistan, and Turkey decided to essentially revive the **Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD)** which had been in place from 1964 to 1979 but had been disbanded after the Islamic revolution in Iran. Rather than retain the original name and structure of the RCD, the three countries decided to establish the Economic Cooperation Organization. Seven years after its creation, the ECO invited seven Muslim countries from Central Asia—**Afghanistan**, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—to join the organization. The organization has a secretariat located in Tehran, Iran. The Council of Ministers is the highest policy-making body and is made up of the foreign ministers of the member countries. Some of the projects being implemented by the organization include trade facilitation. An initiative launched in 2002 and funded by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) aims to “establish a regional agreement on trade between member states incorporating optimal and harmonized tariff and transit fee systems and reduced non-tariff barriers.”

The eighth summit of the organization was held on 14 September 2004 at Dushanbe, Tajikistan, and was attended by, among others, President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan, President Mohammad Khatami of Iran, Prime Minister **Shaukat Aziz** of Pakistan, and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey. After the meeting, the group issued the Dushanbe Declaration, calling for the establishment of a free trade area by 2015 and the early ratification and implementation of the Transit Transport Framework Agreement (TTFA).

**ECONOMIC REFORM ORDER OF 1972.** On 1 January 1972, only two weeks after assuming political power, President **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto** issued a presidential order entitled “The Economic Reform Order of 1972.” The Order gave the government the authority to nationalize 31 large industrial units belonging to 10 categories of “ba-

sic **industries.**” Its implementation brought about a major shift in the approach of the government toward industrialization. The Industrial Policy of 1948 and the policies pursued by the government of President **Ayub Khan** had assigned only a supportive role to the public sector. The Bhutto administration now required the public sector to scale the commanding heights of the economy. The impact of the 1972 nationalization and those that were to follow—the takeover of the vegetable oil industry in 1974 and of the rice husking, **cotton** ginning, and wheat flour industries in 1976—were to completely reorder the industrial sector. Private initiative, cultivated assiduously since the country’s independence, was discouraged to the extent that a number of prominent industrial families left Pakistan. Industrial efficiency suffered under state control.

**THE ECONOMY.** Since independence in 1947, Pakistan’s gross domestic product (GDP) has increased at a rate of 4.5 percent a year—one of the highest rates of growth in GDP in the developing world. But the performance of the economy during this period was not uniform; there were periods of exceptionally high growth rates as in the 1960s and the early 1970s, and periods of relative sluggishness, as in the 1950s, the early 1970s, and the 1990s. The governments were also not consistent in their approach to economic development and in the choice of the sectors to be given special attention.

From 1947 to 1958, governments depended on the private sector to develop the economy. The trade dispute with **India** in 1949 caused a great deal of hardship in Pakistan. There was a serious scarcity of goods of daily consumption, which Pakistan used to import from India but now had to buy from other sources. The country did not have the foreign exchange to pay for these imports, however. Rapid industrialization, therefore, became a high priority. The government encouraged the merchant class to invest in **industry.** This encouragement took the form of subsidized credit, high tariffs against imports, and public investment in physical infrastructure.

The government’s orientation toward economic development changed with the establishment of the first military government in 1958 under General **Ayub Khan.** Ayub Khan believed that without rapid economic growth, he would not be able to solve the country’s basic economic problems: persistent poverty and dependence on

foreign capital for investment. The economy responded to a number of initiatives taken by his government by growing at an unprecedented rate. The GDP grew at 6.7 percent a year during the Ayub Khan period (1958–1969). By the time Ayub Khan was forced out of office, Pakistan had achieved near self-sufficiency in food. Having established an efficient consumer industry, it had also made impressive strides in such producer-goods industries as cement, steel, and machinery. The private sector continued to lead the effort in industrialization. Another, but at that time little-noticed, accomplishment was the development of the finance sector in both the private and public parts of the economy. During the Ayub period, private commercial **banks** expanded their penetration of the economy, while specialized investment banks in the public sector began to function to fill the gap left by private entrepreneurship.

The third major shift in the government's approach toward economic development occurred in the early 1970s when **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto** and his **Pakistan People's Party** assumed power. Large parts of the economy were brought under the control of the government through nationalization. This was a wrenching structural change for the economy, for which the country paid a heavy price. The rate of growth slowed down to about the rate of population increase. Had the economies in the Middle East not taken off as a result of the "oil boom" produced by the sharp jump in the price of oil, Bhutto's socialist experiment would have resulted in a sharp increase in the incidence of poverty. With the Middle East offering millions of jobs for the unskilled and semi-skilled workers of Pakistan, however, the poor began to receive billions of dollars of remittances from relatives who had migrated to the Middle East. They used this largesse to meet their basic needs and to invest in the development of their human capital.

With the country going under martial law once again in 1977, the government was prepared to bring the private sector back as a major player in the economy. However, President **Zia ul-Haq**, Pakistan's new military leader, did not have the political strength to be able to dismantle the public sector economy that Bhutto had erected. Labor and the "economic bureaucrats" were not prepared to countenance the swift privatization of the "taken over" enterprises. Operating even under these constraints, the government of Zia ul-Haq succeeded in returning the economy to the rate of economic growth achieved dur-



ing the period of Ayub Khan. Industrial growth, which had stagnated under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, significantly contributed to the economic revival.

The end of military rule in 1988 and the reintroduction of democracy brought about another radical change in thinking about economic growth and development. First, the government of **Benazir Bhutto** (1988–1990), then the administration of **Mian Nawaz Sharif** (1990–1993), then again the government of Benazir Bhutto (1993–1996), and the second Nawaz Sharif administration (1997–1999) were prepared to allow a great deal of space to both domestic and foreign private initiative. They were also able to overcome the resistance of labor and “economic bureaucrats” to begin the process of privatization of the economic assets that still remained in the hands of the government. All four administrations actively encouraged foreign capital to move into the sectors that had been starved of investment for more than a decade and a half. These positive developments notwithstanding, the economy suffered during this period, mostly because of poor governance. There was widespread corruption involving senior politicians and public servants. The rapid change of political administrations eroded business confidence, and private sector investment declined. Most of the administrations in this period were highly profligate, spending large amounts of public money on projects with low or negative economic rates of return. The result was a sharp slowdown in the rate of economic growth, rapid increase in the incidence of poverty, and significant setback to social development. GDP increased at an average rate of 4.1 percent during the 1990s.

With the **military** back in power in October 1999 and General **Pervez Musharraf** as the head of the government, an administration of technocrats agreed to implement a program of economic stabilization with the support of the **International Monetary Fund**. The new government adopted a conservative fiscal stance and brought runaway public expenditure under control. Although GDP growth rate was sluggish in the first three years of President Musharraf’s rule, the government was able to lay the foundation for achieving sustained rates of growth in the future. The economy began to pick up; in 2002–2003, GDP increased by 5.4 percent and in 2003–2004 by another 6.1 percent. The rate of GDP growth accelerated considerably in 2004–2005, reaching 8.4 percent.

Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on the **United States** and the subsequent lifting of a plethora of sanctions that had been imposed on the country to punish it for developing and testing nuclear bombs, large amounts of foreign aid began to arrive once again. Pakistan was being rewarded for having become the frontline state in the United States' war against international **terrorism**. Remittances from Pakistanis working abroad also increased significantly. About a third of the increase in the rate of GDP growth was attributable to the increase in various types of capital flows.

Much of Pakistan's economic success in the period since independence occurred because of large influxes of foreign capital that came in mostly as foreign aid or as remittances sent home by Pakistanis working abroad. This foreign capital provided resources for attaining a reasonable rate of domestic investment. Pakistan cannot sustain a level of growth unless it begins to generate domestic resources for investment. *See also* AGRICULTURE; DEBT; DIASPORA; ENERGY; FISCAL DEFICIT; FIVE-YEAR PLANS; FOREIGN AID; FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT; PRIVATIZATION.

**EDHI, ABDUL SATTAR (1946– )**. Abdul Sattar Edhi is Pakistan's best known social worker. Born in India, Edhi migrated to Pakistan shortly after the birth of the country. He started modestly, establishing a small dispensary in 1971 in Mithadar, a poor neighborhood in **Karachi**, to honor the memory of his mother. Single-handedly—or more accurately, with the help of his wife, Bilquise—he turned this one small dispensary into a social-welfare organization that now operates 400 Edhi centers throughout Pakistan. The Edhi Foundation is responsible for running the centers. It employs more than 1,000 people and owns a fleet of 500 ambulances. The Foundation is funded entirely by donations, received mostly from the poor and middle classes. The emergency care provided by the Foundation is often all that is available to the poorly served people of Pakistan.

Edhi's work in a society in which the government had become dysfunctional was bound to attract a great deal of attention. It appears that an attempt was made in 1995 to recruit him as a member of a political movement that aimed to introduce a new political order in the country. Edhi refused to get involved, and when those who wanted him to lend his name and prestige to their movement persisted in their

efforts, he panicked and fled the country. He stayed in London for a few weeks but returned to Karachi to resume his work. By opening a center in Canada in 1997, he extended his social work to the communities of Pakistani expatriates in North America.

**EDUCATION.** In the late 1940s through to the early 1970s, Pakistan had a reasonably efficient system of education, not very different from other countries of the South Asian subcontinent. It was dominated by the public sector; educational departments in the provinces administered schools and colleges, while a small number of public sector universities provided post-graduate instruction. A few schools were run by local governments. The public sector also had teacher training schools and colleges. The main purpose of the system was to prepare students for government service. The government, including the **military**, was the single largest employer in the country.

There were not many private schools within the system of education for several decades following the birth of Pakistan. Those that existed were run mostly by Christian missionaries and Islamic organizations, each producing graduates for two completely different segments of the society. The first set of schools catered mostly to the elite. They followed their own curricula, taught from textbooks written mostly by foreign authors, and brought in experienced teachers from outside. The students who graduated from these schools usually sat for examinations administered by Cambridge University in England. A significant number of graduates from these schools went abroad for higher education. Upon return, or after graduating from institutions such as **Lahore's** Government College and Forman Christian College, they joined one of the superior **civil services** or entered the army. There were few opportunities for these people outside the public sector.

At the opposite end of the educational spectrum were religious schools, called *dini madrassas*, that imparted religious instruction. Some of the better institutions belonging to this genre were either imports from **India** or were patterned after the old madrassas in what was now the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh. The best known of these was the Darul Uloom at Deoband, which had developed its own curriculum and taught a highly orthodox or fundamentalist interpretation of **Islam**.

The private schooling system of that era imparting Western style education, therefore, produced members of what later came to be known as the Pakistani establishment—the military and the civil services. The religious schools, on the other hand, produced *imams* (preachers) for the mosques, teachers for the madrasa system of education, and political workers in the Islamic **political parties**. These two very different systems, with very different ideologies and pedagogic techniques, produced two very different social classes with very different worldviews and views about the way Pakistan should be managed. The two groups began to clash in the political and social arena in the charged political atmosphere generated by the **United States’** war against **terrorism** and the **elections of 2002** in which the religious parties did surprisingly well.

In between these two active social classes is a large inert group, the product of the public educational system. The public school system includes all aspects of the system of education. It starts with kindergarten and primary schools, includes secondary and higher schools, and has at its apex semi-autonomous but publicly funded universities. For several decades the standard of instruction provided by this system was adequate; the system’s graduates were able to provide a workforce for the large public sector and for the rapidly growing private sector of the **economy**. Those graduates of the system who went abroad for further education, either at their own expense or relying on the funds provided by various donor-supported scholarship schemes, did not have much difficulty in getting adjusted to the foreign systems.

The Pakistani educational system collapsed slowly over several decades, for basically four reasons. The first jolt was given in the early 1970s by the government headed by Prime Minister **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto**. Bhutto decided to nationalize private schools, in particular those run by various Christian missionary orders. His motive was simple. He was of the view that private schools encouraged elitism in the society, whereas he wanted equality and equal opportunity for all.

Bhutto was also responsible for delivering the second shock to the system—this time the motive was political expediency. His rise to political power was viewed with great apprehension by the religious forces in the country. They considered the socialism that Bhutto es-

poused as “godless” and were determined to prevent him, and the **Pakistan People’s Party** founded by him, from gaining ground. The two sides—Bhutto and the Islamists—chose to use the college and university campuses to fight the battle for the control of the political mind in the country. Both sought to mobilize the student body by establishing student organizations that were representative of their different points of view. For a number of years campuses of the publicly run institutions became the battleground for gaining political influence at the expense of providing education. It was in this battle, waged in educational institutions, that Pakistan witnessed the birth of another organization—the **Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz**—that was to use violence to spread its word and make its presence felt.

The third development to transform the system of education from adequate to dysfunctional occurred in the 1980s when a coalition led by the United States and including Pakistan and Saudi Arabia decided to use the seminaries as training grounds for the **mujahideen**, who were being taught to battle the Soviet Union’s troops occupying **Afghanistan**. This proved to be a potent mix: the United States was able to recruit highly motivated fighters to battle the occupying forces of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, Pakistan was able to further its influence in Afghanistan, and Saudi Arabia was able to introduce its extremely conservative interpretation of Islam into a large Muslim country that had hitherto subscribed to a relatively liberal, assimilative form of the religion.

The fourth unhappy development was the political confusion that prevailed in the country for more than a decade, from the time of the death of President **Zia ul-Haq** in August 1988 to the return of the military under General **Pervez Musharraf** in October 1999. In this period, four elected governments and three interim administrations governed the country. Preoccupied with prolonging their stay, the elected governments paid little attention to economic development in general and social development in particular. Under the watch of these administrations, public sector education deteriorated significantly.

The latest information available for Pakistan suggests an adult literacy rate of only 43.5 percent for the entire population above the age of 15 years. The rates for Sri Lanka and India are considerably higher than for Pakistan; 92.1 percent and 61.3 percent, respectively. Of the South Asian countries, only Bangladesh has a slightly lower rate,

41.1 percent. Since the level of literacy has a profound impact on the quality of human development, Pakistan ranks 142 in terms of the United Nations Development Program's Human Development Index. Sri Lanka ranks at 96, India at 127, and Bangladesh at 138.

There are noticeable differences in gender literacy and in the level of literacy in different parts of the country. Some 58 percent of the male population qualifies as literate, while the female literacy rate is estimated at only 32 percent. In other words, two-thirds of the country's women cannot read or write. There is no significant difference in the rates of literacy among different provinces. **Sindh**, because of **Karachi**, has the highest rate at 60 percent, while **Balochistan** at 53 percent has the lowest rate. However, it is among women living in different parts of the country that literacy rates vary a great deal: in Balochistan the rate is as low as 15 percent, while it is 36 percent for **Punjab**'s women.

In the year 2003, the number of children in the primary school age was 22 million, of which 11.5 million were boys and 10.5 million were girls. According to the Ministry of Education in Islamabad, 9.6 million boys were in school, giving an enrollment rate of 83.4 percent. The number of girls attending primary school was estimated at 6.6 million, giving an enrollment rate of nearly 63 percent. There was in other words a gender gap of almost 20 percentage points.

The gap between the rates of enrollment for the top 20 percent and bottom 20 percent of the population is two and half times as large in the urban areas as compared to the rural areas. Applying these numbers to overall literacy rates, it appears that while universal primary education has been achieved for the richest one-fifth of the population for both boys and girls, the enrollment rate for the poorest one-fifth is only a shade above 45 percent. As is to be expected, the well-to-do families tend to enroll their children in high performing privately managed schools while the poor are forced into the public sector system. According to a recent survey, while only 27 percent of the children from the richest 20 percent of the households were enrolled in government schools, these schools catered to as much as 75 percent of the children from the poorest 20 percent of the families. This means that the rich have been able to bypass the part of the educational sector managed by the government while the poor have no

recourse but to send their children to public schools. This process of selection according to income levels is reducing the quality of the student body in government schools.

There is a high drop-out rate in the public system, with the rate increasing as one goes higher up in the system. Barely 10 percent of the school age children complete 12 years of schooling; around 25 percent leave after eight years of schooling, and another 15 percent by grade 10. Such a high drop-out level has serious budgetary implications.

In 2004, President Musharraf's government began a program for reforming the educational sector. Javed Ashraf Kazi, a former three-star general of the army, who had also once headed the **Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)**, was appointed as minister of education with the mandate to reform the sector that was directly under the control of the government. Kazi was entrusted with the task of reforming religious schools after the London terrorist attacks in July 2005 in which three young men of Pakistani origin were involved who had attended some madrassas in the country. *See also* WOMEN.

**EHETASAB.** In Persian, *ehetasab* means accountability. The word entered Pakistan's political language in November 1996 following the dismissal of the government of Prime Minister **Benazir Bhutto**. The government was dismissed by President **Farooq Leghari** on a number of charges, the most prominent of which were allegations of corruption. The president instructed the caretaker government that took office on 5 November to begin the process of accountability against the functionaries of the government suspected of having abused power in return for private gain.

The president's dismissal of Benazir Bhutto was a popular move; there was a widely shared sentiment that the caretaker government should concentrate its efforts on bringing to justice a large number of people who were thought to have indulged in corruption while Ms. Bhutto was in power. A number of influential people believed that if the elections promised for February 1997 had to be postponed to bring corrupt officials to justice, that tradeoff would be acceptable to most people. Ardeshir Cowasjee, a popular columnist who wrote for *Dawn*, a **Karachi** newspaper, published a series of articles in

November and December advocating *ehetasab* before *intikhab* (elections). Although the president was not prepared to tinker with the election timetable—he was obliged by the constitution to hold elections within 90 days of the government’s dismissal—he worked closely with the caretaker administration to set up a mechanism for bringing those who had indulged in malpractice to justice. An Ehetasab Ordinance was promulgated by the president in early December that called for the establishment of an Ehetasab Commission. Mujaddi Mirza, a retired judge of the Supreme Court, was appointed the first Ehetasab Commissioner. The task of preparing cases against corrupt officials was entrusted to the Ministry of the Interior. The Ordinance required the commissioner to carefully examine all the cases submitted to him to ascertain if there was enough substance in them to warrant formal judicial proceedings.

On taking office and in presenting the presidential ordinance for approval by the National Assembly, the administration of **Mian Nawaz Sharif** introduced a number of important changes in the Ehetasab process. The most important of these was to exclude the period up to 1993 from investigation and to transfer the authority for preliminary work to an ehetasab cell that had been established for this purpose in the prime minister’s secretariat. Sharif also appointed Senator Saifur Rahman, a close political associate, to head the Ehetasab Commission. Under Rahman, the Commission began to be used for settling political scores rather than improving the quality of governance.

The Commission was disbanded by the military government that assumed power in October 1999. Its place was taken by the **National Accountability Bureau** created under a new law, the **National Accountability Ordinance**.

**ELECTIONS OF 1954, EAST BENGAL.** The first electoral contest of any significance since the establishment of Pakistan in 1947 was held in East Bengal, now **Bangladesh**, in March 1954. By then, the **Muslim League** had lost most of its popular support in the province. The opposition to the Muslim League government in Dacca (Dhaka) was able to organize itself under the banner of the **United Front**, led by **A. K. Fazlul Haq**. Election results were announced on 19 March. The United Front captured 223 out of the 309 seats in the provincial



legislature. The Scheduled Caste Federation came in second with 27 seats, the Minorities United Front won 10 seats, and the Communist Party captured 4 seats. Various small parties secured the remaining 11 seats. The United Front was expected to do well, but a total rout of the Muslim League had not been predicted. From this time on, and until the breakup of Pakistan in December 1971, no single political party was able to cultivate a large following in either of the two wings.

**ELECTIONS OF 1970.** The first direct elections to the National Assembly were held in 1970 under the **Legal Framework Order (LFO)** of 1970 promulgated by the martial law administration of President **Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan**. The elections, initially scheduled for October 1970, had to be postponed until December because of a cyclone that struck the coastal areas of **East Pakistan**. **Mujibur Rahman's Awami League** won 162 of the 300 seats in the National Assembly. The **Muslim League** managed to capture only one seat in East Pakistan, that by Nural Amin, a highly respected politician and one of the few who had remained loyal to the old party. **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party** emerged as the largest single party in West Pakistan, winning 81 seats. The elections polarized politics between the forces that wanted provincial autonomy and those that favored a strong central government. Mujib supported the first approach toward governance, Bhutto the second. The failure to reconcile these two points of view led to a civil war in East Pakistan in 1971 and the secession of East Pakistan from Pakistan later that year.

**ELECTIONS OF 1977.** In January 1977, Prime Minister **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto** decided to hold elections in order to seek a new mandate for himself and his organization, the **Pakistan People's Party (PPP)**. These were to be the first elections held under the **constitution of 1973**. The opposition, caught by surprise by this move, formed a coalition under the name of the **Pakistan National Alliance (PNA)**. The PNA was able to mount an effective campaign and was confident of obtaining a sizeable presence in the National Assembly, if not an outright majority. The elections were held in February, but the results announced by the administration were not acceptable to the

opposition. According to the Election Commission, the PPP had won a comfortable victory. A frustrated opposition decided to launch a protest against the government. The protest turned violent, and after dozens of people were killed, the military, under the command of General **Zia ul-Haq**, chief of the army staff, imposed martial law and forced Prime Minister Bhutto out of office.

**ELECTIONS OF 1985.** After having first promised and then postponed general elections a number of times, President **Zia ul-Haq** allowed the country to go to the polls in 1985 to elect a new National Assembly. The elections were not quite what the democratic forces in the country had been campaigning for ever since the proclamation of martial law in July 1977. Zia did not permit the participation of political parties in the contest. Participation was allowed only on an individual basis. Zia adopted this approach to keep the late **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party** from coming back to power. The PPP, now under the leadership of **Benazir Bhutto**, refused to put forward its candidates for the elections.

**ELECTIONS OF 1988.** The elections of 1988, held on 17 November, marked the first time in 18 years that Pakistanis went to the polls to choose among parties and candidates. The last time people were allowed to fully exercise their rights was in December 1970. Political parties were not permitted to participate in the elections held in 1985. The election was a contest between the late **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party** and the **Islami Jamhuri Itihad (IJI)**, a right-wing coalition of parties, including the **Muslim League**, which sought to continue the policies of the deceased president **Zia ul-Haq**.

The Pakistan People's Party obtained 37.4 percent of the total vote, and won 92 of the 204 seats contested. A new party, the **Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz (MQM)**, swept the polls in **Karachi** and parts of **Hyderabad** city. It captured 11 out of 13 seats in Karachi, and another two seats in Hyderabad. IJI was unable to win any seat in **Sindh**. Even **Muhammad Khan Junejo**, who represented the Muslim League as its president, was not returned from what was regarded as a safe seat. With 54 seats, IJI was the second largest party represented in the National Assembly. The PPP led by **Benazir Bhutto** was invited to form a coalition government.

**ELECTIONS OF 1990.** The dismissal of Prime Minister **Benazir Bhutto** by President **Ghulam Ishaq Khan** in August 1990 led to another set of elections. Elections to the National and Provincial Assemblies were held in October. The elections pitted Bhutto's **Pakistan People's Party** (PPP) against **Mian Nawaz Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League**. The League fought the elections as a part of a right-wing alliance called the **Islami Jamhuri Itihad** (IJI). The IJI won the most seats in the National Assembly—105 compared with 45 by the PPP—though a narrow majority in a house of 206 members. The IJI also obtained a majority in **Punjab**. The **Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz** retained its support in the *muhajir* (refugee) dominated areas of **Sindh**. The IJI-led governments were formed in **Islamabad**, the federal capital, with Nawaz Sharif as prime minister, and **Lahore**, the capital of **Punjab**.

**ELECTIONS OF 1993.** Following a prolonged struggle between President **Ghulam Ishaq Khan** and Prime Minister **Mian Nawaz Sharif**, which lasted for several months, the National Assembly was dissolved in July 1993 and the president and prime minister were forced out of office. These changes were the consequence of the army working behind the scenes. A caretaker government under Prime Minister **Moeen Qureshi** took office and organized another general election, which was held in October. The elections did not provide a clear mandate. The **Pakistan People's Party**, led by **Benazir Bhutto**, won 91 seats but did not obtain a majority. It was able to form a government in **Islamabad** with the help of the **Pakistan Muslim League (Junejo)** (PML[J]), a faction of the mainstream **Pakistan Muslim League**, which, under the leadership of Nawaz Sharif, was able to win only 54 seats. The **Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz** (MQM) won the usual 13 seats, 11 from **Karachi**, and 2 from Hyderabad. PPP was also able to form provincial governments in **Punjab**, **Sindh**, and the **Northwest Frontier Province**, although the Punjab government was led by a member of the PML(J).

**ELECTIONS OF 1997.** The elections of 1997, held on 3 February, followed another dismissal of the prime minister by the president. On 5 November 1996, President **Farooq Leghari** used **Article 58.2(b)** of the constitution to remove Prime Minister **Benazir**

**Bhutto** from office. The National Assembly was dissolved, and another general election was ordered—the fourth in less than nine years. For the first time, voting for the National and four Provincial Assemblies was held on the same day.

There was some expectation that these elections would bring a new political force onto the political scene. **Imran Khan's Tehrik-e-Insaf** was expected to do well, particularly in the urban areas. The party had mounted a vigorous campaign against both the **Pakistan People's Party** of Bhutto and **Mian Nawaz Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League**. The results surprised most political observers. The PML, by winning 138 out of 200 seats in the National Assembly, was given a mandate that was clear and unambiguous. The PPP, seeing only 17 candidates return to the assembly, received a message that the people were very unhappy with the way it had governed while it held power. The PPP was completely wiped out from **Punjab**, the largest province and the place of the party's birth.

**ELECTIONS OF 2002.** As directed by the Supreme Court in its verdict on the challenge to the legality of the takeover by the **military** in October 1999, Pakistanis went back to the polls on 10 October 2002. The Court had ordered that elections be held within a period of three years of the military's assumption of power. This was the eighth national election in the country's history. More than 70 parties took part. A total of 2,098 candidates contested 272 general seats in the National Assembly; the remaining seats were reserved for **women** (60 seats), and non-Muslim minorities (10 seats). The expanded house, therefore, had a total of 342 seats. The reserved seats were to be allocated on the basis of proportional representation of all parties securing at least 5 percent of the total general seats.

The **Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid-e-Azam) (PML[Q])** won 76 seats, **Pakistan Peoples Party Parliamentarians** won 62 seats, and 51 seats were won by the six-party religious alliance, the **Muttahida-Majlis-e-Amal (MMA)**. The **Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz)** obtained only 14 seats, while the **Muttahida Qaumi Movement** came in with 14 seats. The turnout was disappointing, only 25 percent of an electorate of 72 million. The low voter interest in the elections was explained by most political analysts as the result of the

absence from the country of **Mian Nawaz Sharif** and **Benazir Bhutto**, the two most popular politicians, who were barred by law from contesting in the election. The sharp increase in the number of registered voters was the result, in part, of the increase in population, and also the lowering of the voting age from 21 to 18 years. The Representation of the People's Act, promulgated by the military government before the elections were held, required all candidates to hold at least a bachelor's degree.

Elections to the four provincial assemblies were held on the same date. Under the new political dispensation, the **Punjab** provincial assembly had 371 seats (66 women, 8 minorities), the **Sindh** assembly 168 seats (29 women, 9 minorities), the **Northwest Frontier Province** assembly 124 seats (22 women, 3 minorities), and the **Balochistan** assembly 65 seats (11 women and 3 minorities). The MMA won a clear majority in the NWFP where it formed the provincial government; it was the largest party in Balochistan after entering into a coalition with a number of small parties. The PML(Q) won a majority in Punjab, while the PPP emerged as the largest party in the Sindh assembly. The PML(Q) managed to keep the PPP from forming the provincial government in Sindh by entering into an alliance with the MQM. The PML(Q) formed the government in Punjab.

By-elections to the national and the four provincial assemblies were held on 5 January 2003. The National Assembly seats, vacated by the members who had won from more than one constituency, were well contested. The PML(Q) and MMA each won three seats, the latter from a seat vacated in Rawalpindi by Information Minister Sheikh Rashid Ahmad. The seat was won by the MMA's Mohammad Hamid Abbasi. The coalition of religious parties thus maintained the momentum generated in the general elections.

**EMPLOYMENT.** Pakistan's 2005 population is estimated at 155 million. With a participation rate of 33 percent, this translates into a work force of 51.2 million people. The rate of participation is higher in the rural areas than in the urban areas—34.8 percent as against 29.8 percent. In all, 32.9 million people are in the work force in the countryside, compared to 18.3 million in towns and cities. The lower rate of participation in the urban areas is the result of the much lower

proportion of **women** working in towns and cities. The number of men in the labor force is estimated at 37.4 million, or 88 percent of the total work force, while only 15 million women are counted as working or seeking work. This means that although 54.8 percent of men are in the work force, the proportion of women is only 21 percent.

**Agriculture** now provides employment to some 24 million people, about 48 percent of the total work force. Manufacturing accounts for another 6.8 million, or 16 percent. The remaining 15.3 million are employed in the service sector. As in other poor developing countries, the service sector picks up the workers who cannot find employment in the formal sectors of the economy.

The same problem can be viewed differently. Large-scale **industry** and modern enterprises in the service sector employ only 1.5 million workers, all of them in the urban areas. This means that of the nearly 16 million workers in towns and cities, 14.5 million are employed either in small-scale enterprises or in informal parts of the service sector. It is this concentration of the work force in the less productive part of the **economy** that poses a serious economic and social problem for the country. This problem has become more acute in recent years, with a marked slowdown in the growth of the economy. The economy is now generating new jobs at a rate that is less than half the rate of growth of the labor force: 1.4 percent a year compared to 3.0 percent. In the 15-year period between 1975 and 1990, massive out-migration to the Middle East absorbed a large proportion of the work force that could not gainfully be accommodated at home. That safety valve is no longer available, which compounds the employment problem. *See also* DIASPORA.

**ENERGY.** Like all other developing countries, energy consumption in Pakistan has been increasing on average at a rate considerably higher than the increase in gross domestic production. Over the last 13 years, from 1991 to 2004, the energy supply has increased from 28.4 ton oil equivalent (TOE) to 50 TOE, implying a rate of growth of 4 percent a year. In terms of energy availability per head of the population, the increase has been from 0.253 TOE in 1991 to 0.352 TOE in 2004. This is still very low compared to the levels of energy consumption in more advanced developing countries, such as those in Southeast Asia.

Pakistan obtains energy from four different sources: petroleum products, gas, electricity, and coal. The average consumption of petroleum products increased at a rate slightly greater than the increase in total energy consumption: 4.1 percent as against 4 percent. The consumption of gas increased by 3.7 percent per annum, that of electricity by 4.8 percent per annum, and that of coal 2.2 percent per annum. This indicates that the share of electricity has increased in total consumption.

This trend reflects Pakistan's energy endowment, since the country has very few indigenous resources of oil and fairly rapidly declining reserves of gas. At one point, gas was in abundant supply, but no new large fields have been discovered in the last quarter century. The country has a fairly large deposit of coal, but it is of relatively low quality, and will need a great deal of careful handling in order not to have an adverse effect on the **environment**. Nevertheless, Pakistan has begun to work with **China** to exploit the reserves in the Thar region of **Sindh** province.

In 2004, the production of crude oil declined to 62,000 barrels a day from 65,000 barrels a day in 2003. The transport sector, with a share of 47.6 percent in total consumption, is the highest consumer of petroleum products, followed by the power sector at 31.9 percent, industry at 12.2 percent, households at 3.9 percent, government at 2.5 percent, and agriculture at 1.8 percent.

In 2004, the production of natural gas was estimated at 350 billion cubic meters (BCM) per day, compared to 289 BCM in 2003, an increase of 21 percent. The power sector is the main consumer of gas at 34.8 percent, followed by the commercial sector at 18.9 percent, and households at 17.7 percent.

The installed capacity of electricity increased by 9.6 percent over the 2003–2004 period. Total generation capacity in 2004 was 56,641 gigawatt hour (GWh), having increased from 54,426 GWh in 2003, implying an increase of 4.1 percent. The total installed capacity of the **Water and Power Development Authority** stood at 11,436 MW, of which hydroelectricity accounted for 58.6 percent and the thermal sector for 41.4 percent. About 3 percent of total electricity generation comes from two nuclear plants, one in **Karachi** and the other at Chasma. A third plant is being built at Chasma with Chinese assistance.

Pakistan has carried out an extensive program for the electrification of villages over the last several years. Some 68,820 villages, out of a total of about 100,000, have been provided with electrification.

If the economic rate of growth continues to increase at the rates registered in the last three years—in 2004–2005, GDP increased by 8.3 percent—Pakistan will need to see a significant increase in the supply of energy. For this reason, the government of General **Pervez Musharraf** is giving high priority to the construction of gas pipelines to bring in this fuel from Iran, Turkmenistan, and Qatar—the three countries in the region that have large surpluses of natural gas. *See also* DAMS; GHAZI BAROTHA; IRAN-PAKISTAN-INDIA PIPELINE; MANGLA DAM; TARBELA DAM; TURKMENISTAN-PAKISTAN-INDIA PIPELINE.

**ENVIRONMENT.** A decade ago, environmental institutions in Pakistan at the federal and provincial levels were too weak to enforce laws, with the consequence that the country has seen a significant deterioration in various aspects of its physical environment. Environmental awareness was non-existent, and whatever efforts were exerted made little change due to a low literacy rate. In 1983, the first environmental ordinance was formulated. Since the promulgation of this ordinance, Pakistan has made some progress in the institutional strengthening and capacity-building of institutions devoted to policy and planning, raising environmental awareness, and the promulgation of environmental legislation. A set of National Environment Quality Standards (NEQS) was established, and environmental tribunals were constituted in the late 1990s. The energy sector introduced lead-free petrol, and since July 2002, all refineries in the country are supplying lead-free petrol and promoting clean fuels, including compressed natural gas (CNG).

After the approval by the Pakistan Environmental Protection Council in 2001, the National Environment Action Plan (NEAP) was formulated, which includes various programs, both large and small, for improving the state of the environment. The major objectives of NEAP are to achieve a healthy environment and a sustainable livelihood by improving the quality of air, water, and land. The plan emphasizes civil society cooperation. For this purpose, the initial Environmental Examination (EE) and the Environment Impact Assessment



(EIA) have been made mandatory for public sector development projects. To implement NEAP, the government of Pakistan signed a NEAP Support (NEAP-SP) program with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in October 2001.

At the meeting of the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) 26 August–4 September 2002, Pakistan made a commitment to significantly improve various aspects of the country's physical environment. The country assessment report for WSSD focused on the protection of the atmosphere; developed an integrated approach to the planning and management of land resources; made a commitment to combat deforestation and drought; and committed to launch sustainable development of mountain areas, to promote sustainable **agriculture**, to conserve biological diversity, to undertake environmentally sound management of biotechnology, and to protect the oceans. The report is now the basis of some environmental operations supported by the **World Bank**.

Air pollution levels in Pakistan's most populated cities are among the highest in the world and are climbing, causing serious health issues. The levels of ambient particulates—smoke particles and dust that cause respiratory disease—are generally twice the world average and are more than five times as high as in industrial countries. The key factors contributing to air pollution in Pakistan are a rapidly growing **energy** demand and a fast growing transport sector.

Auto and industrial emissions are the main source of atmospheric pollution. The growth rate of numbers of vehicles in Pakistan is about 12 percent per annum, and over the last two decades the total number of motor vehicles on the road has jumped from 0.8 million to almost 5.0 million (an overall increase of more than 600 percent). Motorcycles and rickshaws using two-stroke engines burn fuel inefficiently and contribute significantly to air pollution. The number of rickshaws has more than doubled while motorcycles and scooters have increased sevenfold over the past 20 years.

Increased population, urbanization, and continued industrial development have placed immense stress on the water resources of the country. The extended drought in the late 1990s, and the non-development of additional water resources have aggravated the water scarcity situation, with water availability decreasing in the urban areas. Per capita water availability has decreased from 10,000 m<sup>3</sup> in

1951 to 5,630 m<sup>3</sup> in 2001–2002. Therefore, the provision of safe fresh water supplies is at risk in many parts of the country. Various estimates have been made over the years to determine water quality. National Environmental Quality Standards are used as a reference point to compare how the average quality of water fares with various parameters. While on most counts (including temperature, total dissolved solids, and biological oxygen demand) the urban supply of water is considered to be safe, increased demand for it is likely to result in the deterioration of quality.

Pollution levels are high in and around the big cities such as **Karachi**, **Lahore**, and Rawalpindi. As far as chemical characteristics are concerned, the value of turbidity in some areas, such as Rawalpindi, Bahawalpur, Gujarat, Hyderabad, Sukkar, and Ziarat, exceeds the World Health Organization's (WHO) standard value.

The chemical quality of the water was found to be within recommended levels with respect to calcium and chromium. However, higher arsenic contents were found in samples collected from seven sites, namely Lahore, Multan, Bahawalpur, Gujranwala, Kasur, Sheikhpura, and Hyderabad. According to the WHO, the groundwater of Lahore as far as 700-meters deep has been seriously contaminated and should not be used for human consumption.

Forests in Pakistan are also under considerable stress, particularly in the mountainous regions in the country's north and northeast. These areas are poorly served by gas and electricity grids, and wood remains the main source of fuel and heat. Deforestation is rampant, and forest cover is being lost at a troubling rate. Deforestation has exposed these areas to natural disasters, aggravating considerably the adverse impact of earthquakes and floods. *See also* EARTHQUAKE OF OCTOBER 2005.

**EQBAL AHMAD (1933–1999)**. Born in Bihar, India, Eqbal Ahmad migrated to Pakistan with his family soon after the country gained independence in 1947. An economics graduate from the Foreman Christian College, **Lahore**, he studied political science and Middle-Eastern history at Princeton University where he later received his Ph.D. After moving to Africa in 1960, he worked mainly in Algeria and joined the National Liberation Front as an associate of Frantz Fanon. He then returned to the **United States** and taught at various

institutions, including the University of Illinois at Chicago (1960–1963) and Cornell University (1965–1968). At the latter, he met with strong opposition as a staunch supporter of Palestinian rights during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. He was a fellow at the Adlai Stevenson Institute in Chicago from 1968–1972 and then senior fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies, Washington, D.C. for a period of 10 years. In 1982, he joined the faculty at Hampshire College and taught world politics and political science until his retirement in 1997. In his later years he tried his utmost to develop his multifaceted project—Khaldunia—as a center for higher learning in Pakistan. The project ultimately failed as a result of political interference.

Eqbal was editor of the journal *Race and Class*, cofounder of the Pakistan Forum, contributing editor of *Middle East Report* and *L'Économiste du Tiers Monde*, and an editorial board member of *Arab Studies Quarterly*. A prolific writer, he wrote for *The Nation*, the *New York Times*, the *New Yorker*, and various journals. Termed a “secular sufi” by Noam Chomsky and a close associate of Edward Said, he remained a political and peace activist throughout his life, with a strong attraction toward liberation movements—be it Vietnam, Bosnia, Iraq, the Indian sub-continent, or anywhere else in the world. He was a regular columnist for *Dawn*, Pakistan’s foremost English newspaper, where he concentrated on the rise of religious extremism in Pakistan, the **Kashmir** issue, relations with **India**, and domestic politics. He was a vocal critic of the Pakistani administrations of the 1990s. Eqbal Ahmad continued to write extensively until his death from heart failure in Islamabad.

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**F-16 AIRCRAFT.** On 25 March 2005, U.S. President George W. Bush ended a decade and a half long dispute with Pakistan concerning the sale of F-16 fighter aircraft to Pakistan. The aborted F-16 sale to Pakistan in 1990 had become a source of friction between Islamabad and Washington ever since President George H.W. Bush had decided that year that he could no longer certify that Pakistan was not developing nuclear weapons, and so under a 1985 law—the **Pressler amendment**—the deal was called off. The administration of President Bill

Clinton agreed in 1998 to reimburse Pakistan for much of the money it had already paid. In a nine-minute conversation with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of **India**, Bush announced the change in the U.S. policy. It signaled a final step toward tacit acceptance of Pakistan's possession of nuclear weapons. The sale initially involved 24 planes manufactured by Lockheed Martin. A U.S. official said the sale "will not change the overall balance of power between India and Pakistan, but the jets are vital to Pakistan's security as President **Pervez Musharraf** takes numerous risks prosecuting the war on terror." Singh expressed "great disappointment" at the U.S. decision, but the United States sweetened the deal with India by allowing American companies to bid for the multibillion dollar tender India was preparing for the purchase of advanced multipurpose aircraft for its air force.

The decision to sell the F-16 planes was criticized by some influential analysts and lobbyists in Washington, as well as by several American newspapers including *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post*.

While the offer to resume sales of F-16s to Pakistan had considerable symbolic significance, since it signaled a change in U.S. policy, the decision to allow India access to the manufacturers of advanced aircraft in America would have important long-term implications. American defense companies will be allowed to sell India "multipurpose combat aircraft," including the F-16s and F-18s. This was the first time that India has gained access to a major weapons platform from the United States, and the offer from Washington came with a hint that it will allow India to locally manufacture some of the planes. *See also* DEFENSE.

**FAISALABAD.** Originally named Lyallpur by the British, Faisalabad is now Pakistan's third largest city, after **Karachi** and **Lahore**. In 2005, its population was estimated at 3.5 million. The British founded the city in the late 19th century to service the **agriculture** sector, which had received a great boost as a result of the development of irrigation in central **Punjab**. Lyallpur, named after Sir John Lyall, governor of Punjab, was situated in the heart of the areas colonized (settled by new owners working the irrigated land) by the British. **Cotton** was one of the favored crops of the farmers who settled in these areas. The partition of British India separated the

**cotton**-growing areas of Punjab from the textile mills in India, most of which were located in the distant Gujarat and Maharashtra states. Pakistan adopted the policy of developing an indigenous textile industry based on home-grown cotton. Consequently, by the mid-1970s, Lyallpur had become the most important textile center of Pakistan. Also, in the mid-1970s, the authorities in Pakistan decided to change the name of the city to Faisalabad, in honor of King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, who had developed very close relations with Pakistan.

**FAIZ AHMAD FAIZ (1911–1984).** Faiz Ahmad Faiz was born in Sialkot and joined the Education Corps of the British Indian Army during World War II. After the war, he settled in **Lahore** where he became the central figure in a small but increasingly influential group that espoused socialist causes. The group included several politicians, including **Mian Iftikharuddin**, a wealthy landlord and businessman, who in the late 1940s founded an English-language newspaper, *The Pakistan Times*. Faiz was appointed the newspaper's chief editor. The paper's initial aim was to promote the idea of Pakistan, a separate homeland for the Muslims of British India. Once it became clear that the idea of Pakistan was close to realization, the paper turned its attention toward the social objectives that the new country should pursue. In recommending a course of action for Pakistan's first government, the editorial pages of the newspaper followed an approach close to that adopted by the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe.

Faiz Ahmad Faiz was deeply disappointed by the turn taken by Pakistani politics, especially after the death of **Muhammad Ali Jinnah**, Pakistan's founder and the new country's first governor-general. He and some of his associates were approached by a group of army officers and were asked to help them articulate a program for the social and political development that the army should pursue in the country if it were to assume power. These contacts led to the formation of a group of people drawn from the military and from Faiz's associates in Lahore who began to conspire against the government. The result was the **Rawalpindi Conspiracy**. Faiz and his fellow conspirators were arrested in early 1951 and were given long prison sentences by a military

court. Faiz was, however, released from prison in 1955, and went back to writing poetry.

The award of the prestigious Lenin Peace Prize by the Soviet Union made Faiz even more suspect in the eyes of Pakistan's conservative establishment. During **Zia ul-Haq's** period of martial law, Faiz spent several years in self-imposed exile in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Lebanon. While in Beirut, he edited a journal to promote the Palestinian cause. He returned to Lahore in 1982 and died in 1984. Several of his books of poems have been translated into Western languages. *See also* PRESS AND NEWS MEDIA.

**FAIZUL ISLAM.** Faizul Islam, Pakistan's large orphanage, was started in 1943 by Raja Ghulam Qadir of Faizabad near **Rawalpindi** in response to an appeal from **Muhammad Ali Jinnah**. Jinnah asked Muslim philanthropists all over British India to come to assist the people who were suffering from famine in the provinces of Bengal and Bihar. Qadir heeded Jinnah's call and brought hundreds of Bengali Muslim children, orphaned by the famine, to Rawalpindi where he housed them in a facility built for this purpose on the city's outskirts. He created an organization, Anjuman-e-Faizul Islam, to manage the orphanage. From these modest beginnings, the orphanage grew to be the largest institution of its kind in Pakistan. The Anjuman continues to manage the institution with the help of private donations.

**FAMILY LAWS ORDINANCE OF 1961.** Until the promulgation of the Family Laws Ordinance by the government of President **Muhammad Ayub Khan** in 1961, there was no legal requirement for the registration of *nikhanamas*—marriage contracts—and no legal obligation that a husband, in exercising his right to divorce, had to strictly follow the contract. It is not surprising that in a society in which less than one-tenth of the female population was functionally literate and in which the social status of **women** was very low, the Koranic injunctions about the rights of women entering marriage were not observed. The Family Laws Ordinance was one of several measures adopted by the martial-law government of Muhammad Ayub Khan to deal with this situation. The Ordinance was based on recommendations made by a long-forgotten Commission on Marriage and Family

Laws. The Commission's report, presented to the government in 1956, had suggested the compulsory registration of nikhanamas, adoption of a minimum age below which both men and women were considered legally not competent to enter marriage, limitations on the husband's right to divorce, and restrictions on men entering multiple marriages. The Family Laws Ordinance stipulated that all marriage contracts had to be registered with the Union Councils; that the decision to divorce had to be announced by the husband to an Arbitration Council, which included representatives of both husband and wife; and that the decision by a married man to take another wife must be presented to and approved by the Arbitration Council. The Ordinance also dealt with another thorny issue—the question of inheritance by the widow of the property left by the husband.

The provisions of the ordinance were not popular with conservative Islamic groups. After martial law was lifted in 1962, a private-member bill was introduced in the National Assembly asking for its repeal. The bill would have been adopted but for the strong opposition of a powerful coalition of women's organizations. Some political historians believe that the political agitation that succeeded in dislodging Muhammad Ayub Khan in 1969 was fueled in part by the perceived wrong done by the ordinance.

**FAMILY PLANNING ASSOCIATION OF PAKISTAN (FPA).** The Family Planning Association of Pakistan was founded in 1956 by a group of **women** who had begun to appreciate the importance of motivating couples to have smaller families and of providing them with information on modern family-planning practices. The Association received a major boost for its activities when it persuaded President **Muhammad Ayub Khan** to attend a seminar on population in 1959 in **Lahore**. As the head of the armed forces and the chief martial-law administrator, Ayub had the political power to make things happen. The seminar was addressed by a number of world-recognized authorities who spoke of the danger Pakistan faced if its leaders did not succeed in motivating people to opt for smaller sized families. The participants argued for an active role by the government in not only communicating this message to the people but also in providing family-planning services. Muhammad Ayub Khan left the seminar fully

persuaded that he had to incorporate family planning as an important element in his economic strategy and social modernization of the country.

The main result of Muhammad Ayub Khan's conversion was the adoption of an ambitious plan of action aimed at bringing about a significant decline in the rate of fertility. While the government-sponsored Family Planning Program held center stage, the FPA concentrated its efforts on education and dissemination of information. Its activities remained modest in scope and reach for as long as the government was willing to provide active support to family-planning activities. With the advent of the **Zia ul-Haq** era (1977–1988), however, the government effectively withdrew from family-planning activities, leaving the field to such non-governmental organizations as the Family Planning Association. The Association took up the challenge. It invited Atiya Inyatullah, a well-known social worker and formerly a minister in one of the cabinets of President Zia ul-Haq, to become its president. Under her leadership, the Association expanded its operations in the early 1990s and began to concentrate its activities on a number of socioeconomic groups. One novel feature of this approach was to convince the army *jawans* (enlisted men) not only to adopt family planning themselves but also to spread the word in the communities from which they were recruited that Pakistan was faced with a serious demographic crisis.

The Association's affiliation with the powerful Planned Parenthood Federation brought its activities to the notice of **non-governmental organizations** outside Pakistan, and helped Inyatullah to continue to put pressure on the government for providing some resources for family planning. She was also able to attract foreign funding, albeit in modest amounts, from the donor community.

**FAZAL MAHMOOD (1927–2005).** Fazal Mahmood, a medium-paced swing bowler, became a legendary figure in Pakistan's **cricket** circles. He began to play the game after joining the police service of Pakistan. He attracted notice as a prominent bowler when the country's cricket authorities began to assemble a national team to play in India. The visit to **India** established his place not only in the history of Pakistani cricket but much more broadly. For several years, he was among the most recognizable faces in Pakistan, with corresponding wide name recognition.



Fazal Mahmood had a number of “firsts” to his credit. He was a member of the Pakistan cricket team, led by **Abdul Hafeez Kirdar**, another cricket legend, that played its first-ever test match in 1952. That match was played in India. He starred in Pakistan’s first ever test-win in the same series against India. He then bowled Pakistan to a historic victory over England at The Oval in 1954. He was the most successful bowler of the earlier part of Pakistan’s cricket history.

**FAZLE HAQ, LIEUTENANT GENERAL (1929–1992).** Lieutenant General Fazle Haq belonged to the **Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP)** and came from a family with a tradition of military service. He was trained at the **Pakistan Military Academy (PMA)**, at Kakul. He was one of the corps commanders of the Pakistan army when General **Zia ul-Haq** moved against the government of Prime Minister **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto** on 5 July 1977. During most of Zia ul-Haq’s martial law, Lieutenant General Fazle Haq served as governor of the Northwest Frontier Province. He was appointed to this position in 1978, a year after the imposition of martial law by Zia, and remained in this position until 1985 when martial law was lifted and limited democracy was allowed to return to the country.

As the governor of the NWFP, Fazle Haq concentrated his considerable energies on promoting economic development in the province, at times working against the wishes of the central government. This approach helped him to develop a constituency of his own, which made it difficult for President Zia to sideline him. On leaving his official position, Fazle Haq entered politics and considered joining one of the traditional political groups in the province. To promote his political ambitions, he joined with some local entrepreneurs to launch an English-language newspaper, *The Frontier Post*, which was quickly identified as an independent voice in the politics of the NWFP. Zia ul-Haq brought Fazle Haq back to the center as a member of the caretaker cabinet that was inducted after the dismissal of Prime Minister **Muhammad Khan Junejo**. Zia’s death in August 1988, and the general elections in November, provided Fazle Haq with the opportunity to launch his political career. He stood as a candidate for the National Assembly but was not elected. Fazle Haq was assassinated in **Peshawar** by an assailant whose motives were not clear.

**FAZLI HUSAIN, SIR MIAN (1877–1936).** Fazli Hussain was born in **Lahore** and educated at Lahore’s Government College and at Cambridge University, in England. He was called to the bar in 1901 and practiced law for more than two decades, becoming president of the Lahore High Court Bar Association. He strongly believed in communal harmony and saw no reason why the followers of India’s major religions could not live together in peace, even after the protective umbrella provided by the British was removed. It was with the purpose of promoting understanding among the different communities of **Punjab** that he founded the **Punjab Nationalist Unionist Party**—commonly known as the Unionists—in 1923 and became its first president. He remained president of the party until his death in Lahore on 9 July 1936.

**FAZLUL HAQ, ABUL KASEM (1873–1962).** A. K. Fazlul Haq was one of the most prominent leaders of Muslim Bengal during the first half of the 20th century. He joined the **All-India Muslim League** in 1913 and remained an active member until 1942 when a dispute with **Muhammad Ali Jinnah** led to his resignation. While still with the Muslim League, he moved the “**Pakistan Resolution**” on 23 March 1940 at the annual meeting of the party in **Lahore**. In 1954, he led the Krishak Sramik Party into a grand coalition with a number of other parties, including the **Awami League**, to challenge the Muslim League in the provincial **elections of 1954**. This **United Front** swept to victory, and Fazlul Haq became the chief minister of **East Pakistan**. His government was dismissed within a few months of taking office by Governor-General **Ghulam Muhammad**. The central government accused Fazlul Haq of working toward the establishment of an independent Bengal. A year later, he was accepted into the mainstream of Pakistani politics and was appointed as a minister in the central government. He served as governor of East Pakistan for two years (1956–1958) but retired from politics when **Muhammad Ayub Khan** declared martial law.

**FEDERAL SECURITY FORCE (FSF).** The government of Prime Minister **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto** organized the Federal Security Force to limit its reliance on the **military**. Before the creation of the FSF, governments had to depend on the armed forces to handle law-and-

order problems that were beyond the capacity of the police force. Calling the army to aid civilian authorities had resulted in its politization, however. For instance, in 1954, the army was summoned to deal with the **anti-Ahmadiya** riots in **Punjab** province. The army's success in dealing with that situation ultimately led to General **Ayub Khan**'s martial law. Similarly, Muhammad Ayub Khan had relied on the army to bring order to the country when the campaign against his government turned violent in 1969. The army restored law and order but imposed martial law for the second time in Pakistan's history.

Bhutto was determined not to repeat these past mistakes. He needed a force that he controlled himself and that was independent of the military. The FSF was his answer. A number of retired army officers were brought into the force to provide training, while the services of some senior police officers were obtained to command the FSF units. The FSF command worked closely with the office of the prime minister. Once it was operational, the FSF's role changed and it began to gather intelligence about politicians and political organizations. It also began to interfere in political activities. Some personnel of the FSF were alleged to have been involved in the murder of a Bhutto political opponent, a charge for which the deposed prime minister was arrested in late 1977 and was tried, convicted, and executed. Masood Mahmud, the director general of the FSF and one of the closest associates of Bhutto while he was in power, was also charged with the plot to kill the Bhutto opponent. Once the trial began, however, Mahmud entered into a plea-bargaining arrangement with the prosecution. It was his testimony against former prime minister Bhutto on which the prosecution based its case and the one that persuaded the Lahore High Court to sentence Bhutto to death. After Bhutto was executed on 4 April 1979, Masood Mahmud slipped out of Pakistan and did not return to the country.

The FSF was disbanded in 1977 soon after the declaration of martial law by General **Zia ul-Haq**.

**FISCAL DEFICIT.** Pakistan's budgetary deficits, never very low, became the focus of great concern in the 1990s. The reason for the growing worry was the government's inability to finance them. Earlier, large flows of foreign aid and remittances sent by Pakistanis working abroad had made it possible for the government to manage

large deficits. In the 1990s, both revenue sources declined precipitously, and the government had to resort to expensive borrowing to meet its obligations. Poor credit ratings closed the cheaper options for the government; it had to turn to expensive sources of finance to meet its bills. This resulted in a rapid buildup of both internal and external **debt**. This situation was not sustainable.

The **International Monetary Fund (IMF)** made the reduction of the budgetary deficit its primary concern in the Standby Arrangements negotiated in October and December 1996, and in the IMF Extended Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) program that the government agreed to in October 1997. In the Standby Arrangement, the Fund endorsed a program of reform that would have had as its objective reduction of the fiscal deficit to 4 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) by the end of June 1997. In the ESAF program, this target was revised to 5 percent, and the deadline for achieving it was extended to the end of June 1998. These changes were made at the insistence of the government of Prime Minister **Nawaz Sharif**, which felt that the lower target and the earlier date for achieving it were not politically feasible propositions. Even the 4 percent target was contingent on the government's ability successfully to undertake a program that included at least four features: extending the **general sales tax (GST)** to retail trade, collecting the tax on **agricultural** incomes that had been levied by the caretaker administration of Prime Minister **Meraj Khalid**, overall improvements in tax collection, and having people respond positively to the tax amnesty announced in March 1997 by Nawaz Sharif.

In March 1998, the IMF carried out a review of the country's fiscal situation in preparation for the release of the second ESAF tranche. Although it agreed to release the tranche, the Fund expressed considerable concern about the government's fiscal performance. An example of poor performance was the lukewarm response by the people to the tax-amnesty initiative. India had introduced a similar scheme but had imposed a much higher tax on hidden incomes—30 percent compared to 7.5 percent by Pakistan. Although the amount collected by Pakistan was negligible, India was able to mobilize Rs 100 billion, equivalent to 0.5 percent of its GDP.

Pakistan renegotiated the program with the IMF after assumption of political power by General **Pervez Musharraf** in October 1999. A commitment was made once again to bring down the fiscal deficit,

but this time the government was able to meet the set targets. By 2004–2005, the last year of the program with the Fund, the deficit declined to 3.0 percent of GDP, slightly more than that in 2003–2004 (2.3 percent of GDP) but still well below the target specified by the IMF. *See also* ECONOMY.

**FIVE YEAR PLAN, FIRST (1955–1960).** Pakistan made a hesitant start at medium-term planning. The Pakistan Planning Board was established in July 1953 but without a clear vision about the country's future economic and social structure. The Board drew up a five-year development plan for the period 1955–1960 but was able to publish it in draft form only in May 1956 after the first year of the plan period had already passed. However, the Planning Board had to wait for the arrival of the military government under the leadership of General **Muhammad Ayub Khan** before being allowed to start implementing the plan. Muhammad Ayub Khan reconstituted the Planning Board as the Planning Commission and assumed its chairmanship.

The First Five Year Plan in many ways was a radical document— one reason why it took so long for the establishment to give it its formal approval. The Plan document bore the imprint of Zahid Hussain, the chairman of the Planning Board, who wrote the introduction as well as the chapters on **land reform** and public administration. Zahid Hussain wanted a profound structural change in Pakistani society and in the way the government was organized. In the chapter on land reform, he argued for a more equitable distribution of productive assets in the countryside. In the chapter on the organization of the government, he recommended the creation of an administrative structure that would permit personnel from Pakistan's many technical services to hold senior management positions rather than leave the appointments at that level as the exclusive preserve of the elitist **Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP)**.

If Zahid Hussain's recommendations had been accepted and implemented, two of the most important elements in the establishment that ruled Pakistan at that time—the landed aristocracy and the civil bureaucracy in the shape of the CSP—would have seen some loosening in their grip on the levers of power.

The Plan's overall targets were relatively modest: a 15 percent increase in per capita income over five years, which translated into a

growth rate of only 2.8 percent a year in gross domestic product (GDP). **Industry** was to contribute significantly to the increase in national income. The sector was to receive 31 percent of the resources during the plan period. Housing and the settlement of the refugees from India were to get 20 percent of the resources, **agriculture** 7 percent, and transport and communications 6 percent.

Even these modest targets were not achieved, however. National income increased by a mere 13 percent over the 1955–1960 period, and with the population growing at a much faster rate than that envisaged by the planners, per capita income increased by less than 1 percent a year. At such a low rate of increase, Pakistan added significantly to the number of people living in absolute poverty. Industry was the only sector that fared well; agriculture performed poorly; only 52 percent of the planned financial outlay was actually spent. It was during the period of the First Plan that Pakistan became a net importer of food grains. *See also* ECONOMY.

**FIVE YEAR PLAN, SECOND (1960–1965).** One of the first moves made by the military government of President **Muhammad Ayub Khan** was to strengthen the Planning Commission. Said Hassan, a senior civil servant, was appointed the commission's deputy chairman and was given the responsibility for formulating the Second Five-Year Plan. Muhammad Ayub Khan himself became the commission's chairman. The Plan did not put as much emphasis on poverty alleviation and increased social services as did the **First Plan**; the principal objective of the Second Plan was to accelerate the rate of economic growth. It provided the theoretical underpinning for Muhammad Ayub Khan's preoccupation with achieving rapid economic growth in the country without much concern for income distribution.

The Plan envisaged a total outlay of Rs 29 billion (US\$6.1 billion, at the rate of exchange then prevailing), of which 48 percent was to go to the public sector, 39 percent to the private sector, 10 percent for the Indus-basin replacement works, and 3 percent for rural works programs to be implemented by the local councils established under the system of **Basic Democracies**. The largest amount of planned expenditure in the public sector was to be for the development of water and power (31 percent of the total), with transport and communications (22 percent) assigned the second highest priority. **Agriculture**

was to receive 14 percent of the outlay in the public sector; housing and settlements 13 percent; **industries**, fuels, and minerals another 12 percent. The remaining 8 percent was to be spent on **education**, **health**, social welfare, and manpower development. These priorities reflected the martial-law government's economic philosophy: to leave industrial development in the hands of private entrepreneurs and to get the state to improve physical infrastructure so that the private sector could function more efficiently.

The Plan succeeded in increasing the rate of economic growth well beyond the modest level achieved by the First Plan; Pakistan's gross domestic product (GDP) increased at a rate of 5.2 percent per year during 1960–1965. With the rate of population increase greater than anticipated by the framers of the Plan, however, gross national product (GNP) per person increased by only 2.6 percent a year. The Plan also narrowed the economic gap between East and West Pakistan.

The greatest success of the Second Five Year Plan was to discipline the use of public resources. An institutional structure was put in place for the approval of public expenditure. This structure allowed the representatives of different tiers of government and different “nation building” departments to participate in the process of public resource allocation. *See also* ECONOMY.

**FIVE YEAR PLAN, THIRD (1965–1970).** Buoyed by the success of the **Second Five Year Plan**, the government of President **Muhammad Ayub Khan** launched the Third Five Year Plan in June 1965. Its objectives were similar to those of its predecessor: to produce rapid economic growth and to reduce income disparities between the two wings of the country by undertaking massive public-sector investment in **East Pakistan**. In West Pakistan, the private sector was to play an even more significant role than it did in the early 1960s.

Compared to the Second Five Year Plan, there was some change in sectoral priorities: water and power remained the largest recipient but with 26 percent of the total resources; transport and communications were still in second place with 20 percent of total commitment. **Industry**, fuel, and mineral sectors were to receive 17 percent of total public-sector outlays, 5 percentage points more than in the Second Plan in order to expedite the industrialization of East Pakistan. The public sector was to undertake the implementation of a number of

large-scale industrial projects in the province. **Agriculture** was to receive 19 percent of the public-sector expenditure; and the cluster of social sectors would receive the remaining 18 percent. Out of its expenditure for social sectors, education was to receive 8.5 percent of the government-financed development expenditure compared to 6 percent in 1960–1965; health was to receive 4 percent rather than 2.5 percent; social welfare and manpower was to see a near doubling in its share from 0.4 to 0.7 percent.

Soon after the Plan came into force, Pakistan went to war with **India**. More resources had to be committed to **defense** and the flow of economic assistance from abroad was interrupted. Despite these setbacks, the Plan's basic objectives were realized. GDP increased at the rate of 5.5 percent per year, and income per capita grew at the rate of 2.7 percent a year. *See also* ECONOMY; INDO-PAKISTAN WAR OF 1965.

**FIVE YEAR PLAN, FOURTH (1970–1975).** The formulation of the Fourth Five Year Plan was undertaken at an exceptionally difficult time for Pakistan. There was active debate among politicians and economists on two issues. First, there was a widespread perception that the rapid growth of the economy during the administration of President **Muhammad Ayub Khan** (1958–1969) had increased income inequalities in the country. A number of influential political figures—the most important among them being **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto**—demanded that the government actively intervene in the economy to correct this situation. The “**twenty-two families speech**” by **Mahbubul Haq**, the chief economist of the Planning Commission, lent credibility to this point of view. Second, there was a growing resentment in the country's eastern wing—present-day **Bangladesh**—that the domination of the national economy by West Pakistan meant the continuation of a subservient role for that province in economic matters. Again, powerful political forces wanted a direct role by the government to correct this imbalance. By now, the country was back under martial law, with General **Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan** as the president and chief martial law administrator.

The Planning Commission, working under the guidance of Mian Muzaffar Ahmad, its chairman, responded by setting up two panels of



economic experts, one from **East Pakistan** and one from West Pakistan, with the mandate to provide information on what had actually happened to “inter-regional income disparity” and what could be done within the framework of a five-year development plan to improve the situation if income disparities between the two provinces had indeed widened. The two panels could not agree on the Plan’s priorities. The debate over the Plan document produced a political crisis when the government announced the allocation of public funds for fiscal 1970–1971, the first year of the Fourth Plan period. The Bengali ministers in General Yahya Khan’s cabinet threatened to resign in bloc, and the president, succumbing to this political pressure, decided to send the Planning Commission back to the drawing board.

The Fourth Five Year Plan was formally launched on 1 July 1970. Its twin objectives of reducing interpersonal and interregional income disparities were given great prominence in the official proclamation that accompanied the launching of the Plan. Events in East Pakistan in 1971 made the Plan largely irrelevant, however. After the defeat of the army in East Pakistan and the emergence of Bangladesh, the administration of President (later Prime Minister) **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto**, which took office in December 1971, did not revive medium-term planning, and the Fourth Plan was shelved for good. *See also* ECONOMY.

**FIVE YEAR PLAN, FIFTH (1978–1983).** The work on the Fifth Five Year Plan began in the winter of 1977–1978 under the overall direction of **Ghulam Ishaq Khan**, who at that time was the principal economic advisor to the martial-law administration of General **Zia ul-Haq**. **Vaseem A. Jaffrey**, secretary of planning, was assigned the responsibility for preparing the draft of the Plan for consideration by the military government. The Plan’s principal objective was to restore the momentum of economic development that was severely interrupted during the closing years of the administration of Prime Minister **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto**. The Plan made three profound contributions to economic development in Pakistan. First, it instituted a set of policies aimed at rationalizing the role of the public sector in economic management and development. Second, it defined the role, scope, and speed with which the economy was to be Islamized. Third, it set the stage for the beginning of Pakistan’s **second “green revolution.”**

At the time of the promulgation of the Fifth Plan, the Zia government had three choices: it could have denationalized government-owned industries, curtailed further expansion of the public sector, or continued with the expansionary policies of the Bhutto administration. The Zia administration chose the second course. It limited the expansion of the public sector to the investments started during the Bhutto period. No new industrial investments were undertaken in the public sector during the Fifth Plan period. The Plan adopted an equally conservative approach toward the development of physical infrastructure. Emphasis was placed on improving the operation of existing facilities, rather than on building new ones. A number of projects that were on the drawing board when Bhutto was forced out of office were either put on the back burner or were abandoned altogether.

The Plan adopted a cautious approach toward the Islamization of the economy. Although it accepted the recommendation of a panel of experts to introduce such Islamic taxes as *zakat* and *ushr*, it postponed to a later date, pending a careful study of the matter, the elimination of *riba* (interest) from the economy. It also reversed the Bhutto government's benign neglect of the **agricultural** sector by committing a significant amount of resources to subsidies on agricultural chemicals, new irrigation works, reclamation of saline and water-logged land, and farm credit. It was hoped that by pursuing these approaches the Plan would reverse the virtual stagnation of the productive sectors of the economy during the Bhutto years. The gross domestic product (GDP) was expected to increase at a rate of 7 percent a year, made possible by an increase of agricultural output by 6 percent and of industrial production by 10 percent a year. These objectives were realized; during the Plan period (1978–1983), GDP increased at the rate of 6.8 percent a year, income per capita of the population by 3.7 percent, manufacturing output by 11 percent, and agricultural production by 4 percent. By the close of the Fifth Plan period, Pakistan's economy had regained the momentum it had lost during the years that Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was in power. *See also* ECONOMY.

**FIVE YEAR PLAN, SIXTH (1983–1988).** The Sixth Five Year Plan took 16 months to prepare; work on it began soon after the return of

**Mahbubul Haq** to Pakistan in February 1982. Haq's main objective was to use the Plan to bring about a major structural change in the **economy**, in particular to promote social development. In keeping with this promise, the Sixth Plan allocated Rs 20.5 billion for education and manpower development and Rs 14.6 billion for health. The two sectors together were provided Rs 35.1 billion worth of resources out of the cumulative Rs 242.49 billion that the public-sector expenditure envisaged for the five-year-plan period. This worked out to a share of 11.8 percent of total public resources. Had this amount of resource commitment been realized, the public sector would have spent 76 percent more on **education** and **health**, compared to the actual outlay during the **Fifth Plan** period. It was hoped that the increase in public-sector expenditure would be accompanied by greater private-sector interest in social development and that private entrepreneurs would be induced to invest in those areas of education and health care in which the population was willing to pay for the services provided.

The Plan also made an attempt to free Pakistan from excessive dependence on foreign savings—foreign borrowing and foreign aid—by aiming at a sharp increase in domestic resource generation. The gross investment rate was projected to increase from 16.4 percent realized in 1982–1983, the last year of the Fifth Plan, to 19.4 percent in 1987–1988, the last year of the Sixth Plan. At the same time, the national savings rate was to increase by 4 percentage points during the course of the plan, from 12.7 percent to 16.7 percent of gross domestic product (GDP).

The dependence on external capital resources was also to be reduced by following an export-led strategy. Although the plan projected a growth rate of 8 percent a year in the volume of exports, it expected export earnings to increase by almost twice as much, or 15 percent. The difference between volume exported and the value of exports was to result from a concentration of government and private effort on the export of high value-added products, such as fashion garments rather than cotton yarn. Export receipts in current prices were expected to reach the level of US\$19.4 billion during the five years of the Plan. Actual performance, however, was only 81.6 percent (US\$16.19 billion) of the target. The Plan was a success only in terms of continuing Pakistan's impressive growth performance. GDP increased at a rate of 6.6 percent, slightly higher than the target of 6.5

percent. In almost everything else, the Plan failed. The structural transformation that it sought and attempted to bring about by redirecting public-sector expenditure did not take place.

**FIVE YEAR PLAN, SEVENTH (1988–1993).** The Seventh Five Year Plan was launched on 1 July 1988 by the caretaker government that took office after the dismissal on 29 May of the administration of Prime Minister **Muhammad Khan Junejo**. **Mahbubul Haq**, the architect of the **Sixth Plan**, was back in office as the minister in charge of finance and planning. Five months after the launching of the Seventh Plan, there was another change of administration. On 2 December 1988, **Benazir Bhutto** was invited to form a government in **Islamabad**, returning the **Pakistan People's Party** to power for the second time in 20 years. Although the PPP government pursued an activist economic policy, it did not formally reformulate the Seventh Plan. The Plan's basic objectives and proposed policies were kept unchanged, and the first annual development plan for the financial year 1989–1990 was cast within the original framework.

The Sixth Plan had achieved a gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate of 6.6 percent a year, slightly higher than the target of 6.5 percent. The Seventh Plan went back to the target of the Sixth Plan. About 44 percent of the planned investment was to come from the private sector. This implied a rate of increase of 10.5 percent a year in private investment over that realized in the Sixth Plan. This rate of growth was also considerably higher than the 7.9 percent increase that was envisaged for public-sector investment. In other words, the planners were hoping to return to the pattern of investment that prevailed before the 1972 nationalization of private economic assets. Nationalization had not only significantly increased the economic role of the public sector, it had also discouraged new capital formation by the private sector.

As had been attempted repeatedly by the framers of five-year plans, those responsible for preparing the Seventh Plan also promised to provide a large flow of public resources for the development of social sectors. **Education** and **health** were to receive 10 percent of total public investment. The most striking feature of the budgetary performance during the Sixth Plan was the emergence of revenue deficits instead of the revenue surpluses that were anticipated by the

planners. Budgetary deficit as a proportion of GDP increased from less than 5 percent in 1982–1983 to 8 percent in 1987–1988. The Seventh Plan sought to address this situation and suggested a number of improvements in fiscal management. These included the requirement that all provinces must balance their current budgets by curtailing non-development expenditure and raising additional tax revenues. *See also* ECONOMY.

**FIVE YEAR PLAN, EIGHTH (1993–1998).** The work on the Eighth Five Year Plan began in earnest after Pakistan successfully dealt with an economic emergency in 1993. The emergency was caused by a serious political disagreement between President **Ghulam Ishaq Khan** and Prime Minister **Mian Nawaz Sharif**. The conflict between the two could not be resolved by constitutional means, and a caretaker government under **Moeen Qureshi** was inducted into office to organize another general election. The caretaker administration was in power for three months and worked successfully on improving the country's fiscal and external situations. There was not time for the Planning Commission to work on formulating the Eighth Plan while the caretaker administration was in office.

The Planning Commission worked on the new Plan document in the winter of 1993–1994 and made it public in the early months of 1994. At that time, **Benazir Bhutto** had returned to office as prime minister, and the Plan reflected her government's priorities. The Plan document dealt in considerable detail with the sectoral priorities that were to be assigned by the government, the amount of public resources that were to be committed to the realization of these objectives, and the role that the private sector would play in promoting development. The government did not indicate how it was going to achieve any of these objectives, however. The Plan remained a paper document; it was not acted on by the government. The Bhutto government was dismissed in November 1996, well before the end of the plan period. *See also* ECONOMY.

**FOREIGN AFFAIRS.** Soon after the partition of British India on 14 August 1947, Pakistan was preoccupied with one concern: survival. There was an impression on the part of the first generation of Pakistani leaders that **India**, which had also gained independence at the

same time, was determined to undo the partition that had resulted in the creation of two states out of British India, a predominantly Hindu state of India, and a Muslim Pakistan. Some of the early actions by New Delhi reinforced this impression.

In 1947, India held back the release of the “Sterling balances,” the debt owed by London to British India for helping to finance Great Britain’s war effort. It took intervention by Mahatma Gandhi for India to release a part of the owed amount to Pakistan. In 1949, India declared a trade war on Pakistan. The basis for this was the refusal on the part of the Pakistani government to follow India and devalue its currency with respect to the U.S. dollar. With the remarks that India would not exchange 144 of its Rupees for 100 Rupees of Pakistan, all trade came to a halt between the two countries. This would have crippled Pakistan had the country not taken urgent steps to develop its domestic **industry**. At that time, one half of Pakistan’s exports and imports were directed to or obtained from India.

In 1950, Pakistan became concerned with the Indian plan to divert the waters of the **Indus River** System for its own use. Pakistan threatened war if India persisted with these plans. And all along, the dispute over the State of Jammu and **Kashmir** continued to sour the relations between the two countries. Accordingly, for more than half a century, Pakistan’s foreign policy was directed at the perceived threat from India. This focus on India’s intentions, real or perceived, led Pakistan to first develop close relations with the **United States** and then to align itself with **China**.

In 1954, General **Muhammad Ayub Khan**, who was then the commanding chief of the Pakistani Army, concluded the **Mutual Defense Agreement** with the **United States**. The two countries concluded the agreement for different reasons. Pakistan was anxious to build up its **defense** capability. The only way it could acquire the weaponry it needed was to seek aid from the United States. The United States was interested in including Pakistan as a part of a system of buffer states it was amassing surrounding the Communist world. Following the Mutual Defense Agreement, Pakistan also became a member of two multi-country alliances led by the United States. The **Central Treaty Organization (CENTO)** brought Pakistan into a defense relationship with the United States, Britain, Turkey, **Iraq**, and several other European and Middle Eastern countries. The **South East Asia Treaty Or-**

**ganization (SEATO)** linked Pakistan with the countries in that part of the world as well as with the United States.

While the Pakistani **military** was becoming engaged in a series of defense pacts, there were powerful political voices in the country that urged Pakistan to distance itself from the United States and to work more closely with the countries in the region, in particular China. **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto**, a prominent member of the cabinet of President Muhammad Ayub Khan, was the most articulate voice representing this point of view. Accordingly, in the early 1960s, Pakistan began to reach out to Beijing, an initiative that proved to be very timely. In 1965, following a brief but sharp war between India and Pakistan, there was a break in Pakistan's relations with the United States. The United States stopped all military assistance to Pakistan. Consequently, Pakistan was forced into the welcoming arms of the Chinese. Relations with China continued to develop, and today, 40 years later, Pakistan counts Beijing as one of its closest allies.

Concern over India also dictated Pakistan's approach toward **Afghanistan**, its neighbor to the north. Military strategists in the country were anxious to create depth in defending the homeland. The belief was that Pakistan needed space in order to cushion the impact of a possible Indian attack on the country. This belief was to lead to the support that was provided first to the **mujahideen** in their campaign against the occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union from 1979 to 1989, and later to the **Taliban** regime in the country.

Perceived as well as a real threats from India meant that the latter remained the motivating force behind much of Pakistan's foreign policy up until 2004. While this was the case, there was, at the same time, a romantic notion that Pakistan, working with other countries of the Muslim world, could create an Islamic Ummah—an Islamic community of nations. This belief led to the formulation of close relations with a number of Muslim countries, in particular, **Saudi Arabia**, as well as the smaller countries of the Persian Gulf. These relations were strengthened following the increases in oil prices in the 1970s, which brought a great deal of wealth to a number of Arab nations. Since these countries embarked upon programs for the development of infrastructure and housing, they turned to Pakistan and other populous Muslim nations for the supply of labor. This created one of the three **diasporas** of Pakistanis around the world. The other two diasporas—in Britain

and North America—also developed and began to influence Pakistan's policies with respect to the countries beyond its immediate neighborhood.

Following the **terrorist** attack of 11 September 2001 on the United States, Pakistan was forced by Washington to decide whether it wished to continue its support of the Taliban in Afghanistan or would work closely with the United States in destroying the centers from which terrorists were operating against American and other Western assets and interests. General **Pervez Musharraf** decided to side with the Americans and brought about a total reorientation of his country's foreign policy. Pakistan once again became closely aligned with the United States. The 9-11 attack had other consequences for Pakistan's foreign policies. India's rapid economic growth in the 1990s, along with Washington's desire to work with a large Asian nation that could be of assistance both in both working with China as well as with forces representing radical **Islam**, led to the reorienting of Washington's policy toward Delhi. This was another reason why Pakistan had to rethink its approach toward India. It also became apparent to Islamabad that the continued animosity with India had been a costly enterprise. Starting with the Islamabad Declaration signed by President Musharraf and Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee of India, a new phase of the relationship between the two South Asian countries was initiated. Pakistan began to slowly reorient its vision of the world, which was no longer India-centered.

In 2005, Pakistan's foreign minister met with his Israeli counterpart in Istanbul, and a couple of weeks later President Musharraf addressed a gathering of important American Jewish and business leaders in New York. These initiatives constituted a dramatic shift in Pakistan's foreign policy. While President Musharraf and his government continued to insist that the developing rapprochement with **Israel** was a part of the campaign to help the Palestinians achieve some kind of accommodation with the Jewish state, it was quite clear that the real motivation for Islamabad was the desire to base its foreign policy on its own strategic interests. *See also* BANGLADESH; FOREIGN AID; IRAN; JAPAN; KOREA (NORTH); KOREA (SOUTH).

**FOREIGN AID.** Pakistan has a relatively low rate of domestic savings, estimated at 17.6 percent in 2003–2004. Consequently, in order to



sustain a high rate of growth, it needs to obtain foreign capital to have an adequate level of investment. For a growth rate ranging between 6 to 8 percent a year of gross domestic product, it must be able to invest between 25 to 30 percent of its GDP. The gap between domestic savings rate and gross domestic investment is of the order of 10 percent a year. This has to be met from external flows.

Pakistan has, in the past, used four types of external flows in order to augment domestic savings. The most important and cheapest form of inflow is foreign aid, which is provided either as a grant, or as loans at very low rates of interest. The second type of flow is borrowing by the government from international capital markets at prevailing interest rates. The third takes the form of remittances sent by Pakistanis working and living abroad. The fourth type of flow is **foreign direct investment** (FDI). Ever since the country became independent, Pakistan has relied more heavily on foreign aid and workers' remittances than on the other two types of capital inflows.

Foreign aid is provided by both multilateral development institutions and bilateral donors. While the flow from the former source has been fairly steady, the second type of assistance depends on the country's relationship with major donors such as the **United States**, Japan, Saudi Arabia, and smaller countries of the Gulf zone.

For a number of years, Pakistan did not receive official assistance that was positive on a net basis. The aid coming in was much smaller than the payments Pakistan had to make in order to service the **debt** it owed to foreign donors. In the five year period between 1994 and 1999, there was a positive flow of about US\$2 million a year. This, however, turned to a negative flow of over US\$1 billion as a result of the sharp reduction in new money provided to the country because of the sanctions imposed on it following Pakistan's decision to test nuclear bombs. These sanctions remained in place for a couple of years. In the year 2000–2001, there was another negative flow of almost US\$1 billion. The situation changed following the **terrorist** attack of 11 September on the United States; Pakistan began to receive large amounts of assistance from the United States. As a result, in 2000–2001, Pakistan had a positive flow of US\$340 million. It turned negative again in the following three years, averaging at US\$750 million as Pakistan began to restructure its outstanding debt by paying off the more expensive debts using the new easy money that had

become available. As Pakistan embarks upon a more ambitious program aimed at accelerating the rate of economic growth, it will have to increase domestic savings and reduce its reliance on borrowings, including relatively low-cost official development assistance. *See also* FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

**FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (FDI).** Cross-border flows of capital have increased significantly over the last couple of decades and have become an important source of investment in countries around the globe. The bulk of these resources comes from transnational corporations that have been diversifying their sources of production. With the extraordinary improvements in the flow of information over the last 15 years, it has become easier and cheaper for these corporations to relocate production and services to the areas in which there is comparative advantage for these operations. Consequently, the actions of transnational corporations have created a new system of production in which components are manufactured in many different locations before being assembled into final products. It is extremely important for developing countries to become partners in this production system.

Pakistan's performance in this area has been erratic, given the ups and downs in the state of its **economy**. In the 1990s, as a result of the opening up of the **energy** sector—in particular electricity generation—Pakistan was able to secure fairly large flows of foreign direct investment. At one point, in the 1990s, the amount being received crossed the US\$1 billion mark. However, by accusing some of the foreign investors of having bribed politicians and bureaucrats to obtain access to the Pakistani market, the second administration of Prime Minister **Mian Nawaz Sharif** discouraged further involvement by foreign investors. FDI declined significantly in the late 1990s, picked up a bit in the early years of this century, to US\$823 million in 2002, declined again to US\$534 million in 2003, and increased once again to US\$952 million in 2004. Pakistan's share, in 2004, was only 0.4 percent of the total flow of foreign direct investment to developing countries.

Largely because of the low rates of domestic savings, Pakistan has a larger presence of foreign capital in the stock of cross-border investment in the country than do other countries of South Asia. In 1990, this stock was estimated at US\$1.9 billion, but it increased to

US\$7.6 billion by the year 2004. The share of foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP increased from 4.7 percent, to nearly twice as much—9.2 percent in 2004. This percentage is much higher than that for South Asia. For India, the stock of foreign direct investment in GDP was only 5.9 percent, and for South Asia as a whole it was 6.3 percent. Pakistan also has a much higher proportion of foreign participation in total investment. In gross fixed capital formation, the share was 6.2 percent in 2004, compared with 3.7 percent for South Asia and 3.4 percent for India.

While Pakistan had been receiving about US\$1 billion of foreign capital investment every year over the last several years, it has not been investing abroad. In 2004, outward flow of foreign investment from Pakistan was only US\$56 million, compared to as much as US\$2.2 billion for India. In other words, while the Indian corporations have become active in obtaining assets abroad, companies in Pakistan have not ventured into this field. Consequently, Pakistan is not a player of any significance in mergers and acquisitions.

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**GANDHARA.** Some 2,000 years ago, the area now covered by the **Pe-shawar** and **Rawalpindi** districts of modern-day Pakistan was known by the name of Gandhara. Its people were known as Gandharas. At one point the kingdom of Gandhara also included **Kashmir**. In the third century BC, it was a part of the empire of Asoka (c. 273 BC–232 BC), the third emperor of the Maurya dynasty. Gandhara contained the two famous cities of Taxila and Pushkaravati. After the collapse of the Mauryan empire, Gandhara was parceled out among the Indo-Bactrian princes; still later, it formed part of the Kushan dominions. It thus became a meeting point of Eastern and Western cultures and gave birth to what came to be called Gandhara art.

**GENERAL SALES TAX (GST).** The General Sales Tax was introduced as a federal tax by the first administration (1990–1993) of Prime Minister **Mian Nawaz Sharif** in the budget presented to the National Assembly in June 1991. The GST was a variant on the

**value-added tax (VAT)** that had become the mainstay of the revenue raised by many developing countries. The authorities in Pakistan determined that it would have been premature to impose the VAT in the country, since that would have required that the transactions covered by the tax be fully documented. For cultural reasons—and also because of the deep distrust of tax administration prevalent in the country—a very large number of transactions were not formally recorded.

The rationalization of the GST so that it included only a few rates and its extension to cover retail trade were among the many conditions agreed to by the government of Prime Minister **Benazir Bhutto** and **Shahid Javed Burki**, the caretaker finance advisor with the **International Monetary Fund (IMF)**, in return for Pakistan's access to the **IMF's Standby Program**. In March 1997, the government of Mian Nawaz Sharif extended the GST to retail trade as a part of the structural-reform package it presented to the IMF so as to qualify for the **IMF Extended Structural Adjustment Facility**. The scope and coverage of the tax were expanded by the government of President **Pervez Musharraf** as a part of the program of economic stabilization agreed to with the International Monetary Fund in 2000.

**GHAFFAR KHAN, ABDUL (1890–1989)**. Abdul Ghaffar Khan was born in 1890 in the village of Utmanzai, near **Peshawar** in the **Northwest Frontier Province**. At an early age, Ghaffar Khan decided to involve himself with social causes and work for the betterment of the poor people of the region. The **Khudai Khidmatgars**, a popular sociopolitical group of the area, offered him an opportunity to pursue his interests, and he became one of its more enthusiastic members. He discovered that the Khidmatgars' social philosophy had a great deal in common with the policies advocated by Mahatma Gandhi. Accordingly, he forged a close link between the Khidmatgars and the **Indian National Congress**, which won him the title of the Frontier Gandhi. Although the title made him popular among the followers of Gandhi and the members of the Congress Party, it distanced him from the Muslims of the Frontier Province, who had begun to subscribe to the "idea of Pakistan."

Pakistan's birth on 14 August 1947 posed a difficult political dilemma for Ghaffar Khan. He had little affinity for the new country

or liking for its founder, **Muhammad Ali Jinnah**. Immediately after the birth of Pakistan, he began to espouse the cause of autonomy for the **Pathan** population. This campaign was often couched in a language that suggested to his detractors that he was working for the creation of an independent state for the Pathan population, which lived on both sides of the Afghanistan–Pakistan border. Such an entity was given the name of **Pukhtunistan**, and it attracted support from large sections of the Pathan community in both Pakistan and **Afghanistan**. For a long time, the idea of Pukhtunistan had the official support of the government of Afghanistan and was the cause of the uneasy relationship Pakistan had with its neighbor for more than 30 years, from 1947 to 1979. By endorsing the idea of Pukhtunistan, Ghaffar Khan could not join the mainstream of Pakistani politics. He had to endure long periods of incarceration at the hands of several regimes in Pakistan, which accused him of working against the integrity of the country. But Ghaffar Khan refused to either profess loyalty to the country of which he was now a citizen or to agree not to work toward its dismemberment.

In 1979, the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan presented another worrisome dilemma for the Pathan leader. Ghaffar Khan refused, however, to either condemn the Soviet move into Afghanistan or to distance himself from the communist government in Kabul. In 1987, during one of his frequent visits to India, Ghaffar Khan suffered a stroke that immobilized him permanently. Even from his deathbed, he managed to provoke controversy by suggesting that he did not wish to be buried in Pakistan. His wish was carried out, and he was buried in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.

**GHAZI BAROTHA.** Ghazi Barotha hydroelectricity plant represents a new type of **energy** project in Pakistan that must be replicated as the country begins to seriously address the problem of energy shortage. With the increased rate of growth of the country’s GDP in the early 2000s came a commensurate increase in the demand for energy. Ghazi Barotha is a “run-of-the-river” power plant on the **Indus River**, about 60 kilometers downstream from **Tarbela Dam**. Construction on the project began in 1998 and was completed five years later in 2003 when the first of its five generators became operational. The plant has five turbines and five generators, each with the capacity of producing

290 MW of power. The plant was constructed at a cost of US\$1.5 billion, partly financed by international aid and partly by suppliers' credit. A number of countries worked on the project. The power house and civil works were constructed by **China**; a 40 kilometer power channel that took water from the river and then returned it after running it through a battery of turbines was constructed by Italy; turbines came from Germany; and Japan supplied Toshiba generators.

Since Ghazi Barotha is a run-of-the-river project that does not store water, it can be operated the year round at full capacity. In that respect it does not suffer the fluctuations experienced by such reservoir-based power plants as Tarbela. Once it became fully operational in 2005, the project fed 1,450 MW of energy into Pakistan's unified grid, augmenting the supply of power by 7 percent by increasing it to 19,500 MW. *See also* WATER AND POWER DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY.

**GHULAM ISHAQ KHAN (1915–)**. Ghulam Ishaq Khan was born in Bannu, then a small town in the **Northwest Frontier Province** (NWFP). He was educated at Peshawar's Islamia College. He joined the Provincial Civil Service in 1938, and after the birth of Pakistan, he was inducted into the **Civil Service of Pakistan**. In 1958, President **Muhammad Ayub Khan** nominated him as a member of the Land Reform Commission. Ishaq Khan opted for fairly radical land reforms, but the majority of the commission chose to go for generous ceilings on ownership: 1,000 acres for non-irrigated and 500 acres for irrigated land. In 1962, President Muhammad Ayub Khan launched Ghulam Ishaq Khan on a career path that eventually led to his becoming the country's economic czar. He was appointed chairman of the **West Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority** (WAPDA). The WAPDA, under his chairmanship and that of Aftab Kazi, his successor, accomplished a great deal. It was particularly successful in implementing the gigantic Indus Water Replacement Works to bring water from the western rivers in compensation for that lost to India from the eastern rivers. One of Ghulam Ishaq Khan's proudest achievements of this period was to persuade the international community that without the **Tarbela dam** on the **Indus River**, the objective of the replacement works would not be achieved.

In 1966, Ghulam Ishaq Khan was put in charge of the Ministry of Finance as its secretary. In 1971, he went to **Karachi** as governor of

the **State Bank of Pakistan**; and in 1975, he was back in **Islamabad** as secretary-general of the Ministry of Defense. Within the space of a decade, Ishaq Khan was able to see the working of the central government from three very different perspectives: finance, development, and defense. The Ministry of Finance in Pakistan was always a very conservative institution inclined to keep in strict check public expenditure on both development and current (non-developmental) activities. Under Ishaq Khan's management, it kept to its original mandate and tradition. The State Bank of Pakistan, although not able to exercise much control over money supply, was nevertheless concerned about maintaining a watchful eye on the macroeconomic situation. While at the State Bank, Ishaq Khan became concerned about the free-wheeling ways of the government of Prime Minister **Zul-fikar Ali Bhutto**. He used the opportunity presented by the issuance of the State Bank's annual report on the health of the **economy** to question the wisdom of a number of policies that were being pursued by the Bhutto government at that time.

The publication of the report did not endear him to the government, and Ghulam Ishaq Khan was moved from the State Bank and was appointed secretary-general in charge of the Ministry of Defense. This was an unusual but fortuitous appointment for a person who had spent most of his career in the government dealing with economic matters. It was while in this job that he was thrown into close contact with General **Zia ul-Haq**, the chief of staff of the army. General Zia, after removing Bhutto from office on 5 July 1977, appointed Ishaq Khan secretary-general in charge of the entire civil establishment. Ghulam Ishaq Khan held several different jobs in the government under President Zia ul-Haq. Although his titles changed, he functioned virtually as the prime minister and the economic czar from 1977 to 1985. In March 1985, Ishaq Khan was elected to the Senate from a seat in the NWFP, and the Senate went on to elect him as its chairman. The portfolio of finance was given by President Zia ul-Haq to **Mahbubul Haq**.

On 17 August 1988, President Zia ul-Haq was killed in a plane crash near the town of **Bahawalpur** in southern **Punjab**. General **Aslam Beg**, the vice-chief of the Army Staff, and his senior colleagues met in **Rawalpindi** that same evening, before announcing to the public the news of the president's death. General Beg revealed

later that the attendees at the meeting decided that it would be prudent to adopt the constitutional course and invite the chairman of the Senate to assume the presidency. Had the Senate chair been occupied by a person with less experience and prestige than Ghulam Ishaq Khan, the military might well have decided to take over the reins of government once again.

Ghulam Ishaq Khan's presidency lasted for a little less than five years. During this time, he performed two very different functions. On three occasions—from 17 August to 2 December 1988, from 6 August to 6 November 1990, and from 17 April to 28 May 1993—he supervised the working of caretaker administrations appointed to hold general elections. During these periods, Ishaq Khan was the country's *de facto* chief executive. For the rest of the time, he kept a careful watch over the workings of the government. It was this watch that persuaded him to dismiss first the administration of Prime Minister **Benazir Bhutto** in August 1990 and then the administration of Prime Minister **Mian Nawaz Sharif** in April 1993.

It was the second dismissal—that of Nawaz Sharif and the way he handled the circumstances created by the decision of the Supreme Court to declare the dismissal unconstitutional—that left a cloud over a career that was remarkable not only for its longevity but also for its dedication to the cause of Pakistan. It was clear that the decision to remove Nawaz Sharif was taken out of personal pique rather than on the basis of the prime minister's incompetence. Once the Supreme Court restored the prime minister, Ishaq Khan went on to subvert the functioning of the government by attempting to create a difficult environment for the prime minister. This was done with the help of a group of loyal civil servants who made it impossible for the prime minister to function effectively. The result was a political and constitutional crisis that was resolved by the intervention of the military. General Abdul Waheed Kakar, the chief of the Army Staff, forced both Ishaq Khan and Nawaz Sharif to resign. A caretaker administration was appointed, and elections were held in October 1993 (*see* ELECTIONS OF 1993). The elections brought Benazir Bhutto back to power, and Ishaq Khan went into retirement. After making a half-hearted attempt to contest the presidential election held in December 1993, he left Islamabad and settled in Peshawar. *See also* THE MILITARY.



**GHULAM MUHAMMAD (1895–1955).** Ghulam Muhammad was born in the small state of Kaparthula, which is now a part of the Indian province of **Punjab**. After a distinguished academic career that included graduation from Aligarh University, he joined the Indian Accounts Service in 1920. He was deputized for two years (1930–1932) to serve in the Bhopal State Service, from where he returned to follow a successful career in the government of India’s Finance and Supply Department. In 1938, he was appointed to the Indian Legislative Assembly as an official member. For four years, from 1942 to 1946, he held the office of minister of finance in the state government of **Hyderabad**. In 1947, he was appointed minister of finance in the first cabinet to take office in Pakistan.

In 1951, when **Liaqat Ali Khan** was assassinated, Ghulam Muhammad engineered a bureaucratic solution to the deep political problem in which Pakistan suddenly found itself. Khawaja Nazimuddin was appointed prime minister, while Ghulam Muhammad took Nazimuddin’s position as governor-general. Once in this position, he brought back to it the power that **Muhammad Ali Jinnah** had wielded as the country’s first governor-general. In April 1953, he dismissed Nazimuddin’s government on grounds of ineptitude, and a little over a year later he dissolved the **First Constituent Assembly**. These actions stretched the powers of the governor-general beyond the provision of the Constitution, thus plunging Pakistan into its first constitutional crisis. In *Tamizuddin vs. the Government of Pakistan*, the Supreme Court gave highly qualified support to the governor-general’s action. The Supreme Court used the “**doctrine of necessity**” to justify the action of the governor-general but ordered him to reestablish the Constituent Assembly, which Ghulam Muhammad did by bringing in people who were more supportive of him. Rapidly failing health and the ascendancy of General **Iskander Mirza** forced Ghulam Muhammad out of office in 1955. He resigned as Pakistan’s third governor-general on 6 October 1955.

**GIK INSTITUTE OF ENGINEERING SCIENCES AND TECHNOLOGY.** President **Ghulam Ishaq Khan** took an active interest in the promotion of science and technology in Pakistan. A scientist by training, he had come to recognize the importance of science and technology for economic development when he was appointed by

General **Zia ul-Haq** to supervise Pakistan's nuclear program. Although Ishaq Khan was a strong believer in a prominent role of the state in economic and social management, the government's poor performance in these areas in the 1970s and 1980s seemed to have persuaded him to rely on private initiative. The success of the **Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS)** influenced his thinking. By the time he became president in 1988, following the death of Zia ul-Haq, he was prepared to accept a role for the private sector in the areas of special emphasis, including education, science, and technology.

In 1988, the **Bank for Credit and Commerce International (BCCI)** committed Rs 500 million to Ishaq Khan for the establishment of an advanced institution of learning in science and technology. The preparatory work for the design of the institution was done by **Abdul Qadeer Khan**, and the launch of the institution was announced in **Islamabad** on 7 January 1991. The institution was to be located at Topi, in the Swabi District of the **Northwest Frontier Province**. The land for the institution was donated by the provincial government. The institution received its first class of students in 1993. The institution was designed to accommodate 600 students each year. The program called for the establishment of a postgraduate facility after the year 2001.

**GLOBAL ALLIANCE FOR VACCINES AND IMMUNIZATION (GAVI)**. The GAVI was launched in 2000, with the goal of strengthening the immunization programs of the world's poorest countries, including Pakistan. It extends its services, including finance, through public-private partnerships consisting of national governments of developed and developing countries; international development agencies and institutions, such as the World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and the **World Bank**; philanthropic institutions, such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation; the private sector, such as the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers; and research and public health institutions. Pakistan became one of the largest recipients of support from GAVI, receiving \$33 million in the period between 2000 and 2004. Support was provided for the country's multi-year immunization plan, which focuses on building

**health** infrastructure, purchase of vaccines, and promotion of safe methods of immunization.

**GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT OF 1909.** The Government of India Act of 1909—also known as the Minto-Morley Act, after Lord Minto, viceroy of India, and John Morley, secretary of state for India in the British Cabinet in London, respectively—was a major initiative undertaken by Great Britain toward the introduction of self-government in India. The Act brought Indians into the viceroy’s executive council and in similar bodies aiding provincial governors. The Act also provided for the election of Indians to the legislative councils at both the central and provincial levels. Not all members of the legislative councils were to be elected, however. The Act gave the government of India the authority to nominate people to the legislative councils.

The Act made a major concession to the Muslim community by accepting the principle of “separate electorates.” This was a long-standing demand of the **Muslim League**. Separate electorates meant that Muslim voters voted only for Muslim candidates, whereas non-Muslims could vote for a candidate from any community except the Muslims.

**GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT OF 1919.** Also known as the Montagu-Chelmsford Act after Edwin Montagu, secretary of state for India in the British Cabinet, and Lord Chelmsford, the British viceroy of India. The Government of India Act of 1919 granted the Indians somewhat greater participation in managing their affairs by creating two legislative houses. In both houses—the Council of State and the Central Legislative Assembly—elected Indian representatives constituted a majority. The viceroy, however, who was nominated by the British government in London, had the final authority. The viceroy could appoint a cabinet of seven members, called the Executive Council, three of whom were Indians. This structure was repeated at the provincial level, with Indians constituting a majority in the legislative councils. The Act allowed the provinces some autonomy in decision-making. *See also* DYARCHY.

**GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT OF 1935.** The Government of India Act of 1935 granted provinces the right to govern themselves with

some constraints. The legislative councils set up under the **Government of India Act of 1919** were replaced with legislative assemblies. The provincial governor appointed a prime minister who, along with his cabinet, was responsible to the provincial assembly. In the case of breakdown of the cabinet government or in a financial emergency caused, for instance, by the failure of the assembly to pass a budget, the governor had the power to assume the functioning of the government. The Act envisaged a similar setup at the center, provided that the “**princely states**” could be brought into the constitutional structure created by the Act. This did not happen, since most princes refused to accept what would have been a considerable encroachment on their authority. The 1935 Act, amended by the Indian Independence Act of 1947, served as the constitution of both India and Pakistan until each adopted its own constitution.

Two sets of provincial elections were held under the Act of 1935—one in 1937 and the other in 1946. In the first, the **Muslim League** did very poorly; in the second, however, the League scored impressive electoral gains in most provinces in which the Muslims were in the majority.

**GRAND TRUNK ROAD.** The Grand Trunk Road was built by Emperor Sher Shah Suri during his brief rule of India. It was a marvelous feat of engineering. The road, some 2,000 kilometers long, connected **Peshawar** in the northwest of Suri’s domain with Bengal in the southeast. Trees were planted to provide shade on both sides of the road. Wells were dug to provide water to the travelers, who could also use numerous *serais* (rest houses) that were constructed at suitable intervals. The Grand Trunk Road—or GT Road as it is commonly called—remained the main communication artery for both West Pakistan and north India. It was only with the construction in the 1990s of the **Lahore-Islamabad Motorway** that an alternate route was developed in Pakistan.

**THE GREAT GAME.** The Great Game—the term commonly used for the struggle among the world’s great powers to dominate Central Asia—was played between two major imperial powers in the 19th century. Both Great Britain and Russia sought to gain the upper hand in the region; Britain in order to protect its dominion over **India** from

possible encroachment by Russia; and Russia in order to strengthen its soft southern belly against possible prodding by Britain. The Great Game became dormant after the emergence of the Soviet Union as a world power. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the grant of independence to the Central Asian Republics revived the conflict, however, especially when it came to be realized that the region held vast amounts of oil reserves.

The Great Game of the 1990s was about the access by Russia and the West to the oil reserves of Central Asia. As Western oil companies became involved in prospecting for oil in the region and in marketing the oil brought to the surface, the question of the direction to be taken by the pipelines carrying oil became of paramount importance. Of the several routes investigated, the Russians favored the one that terminated at Novorossiysk, their port on the Black Sea. The Western oil companies seemed inclined to bypass Russia altogether, taking the oil pipeline from Baku, the capital of Azerbaijan, through Georgia to the Turkish port of Ceyhan on the Mediterranean. The new Great Game and its outcome had tremendous significance for Pakistan. The countries involved included a number of Muslim countries to its northwest—Iran, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan among them. There was also some interest in laying down a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Iran, **Afghanistan**, Pakistan, and India.

The **terrorist** attacks of 11 September 2001 on the United States and Washington's decision to use its military to dislodge the **Taliban** regime in Afghanistan brought America into Central Asia. The United States set up military bases in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan to oversee its operations in Afghanistan. While the government of President George W. Bush encouraged the development of democracy in the Muslim world, it was prepared to turn a blind eye toward the despotic rule of most presidents of Central Asian countries. *See also* TURKMENISTAN-AFGHANISTAN-PAKISTAN GAS PIPELINE.

**GREEN REVOLUTION, FIRST.** The fortunes of the **agricultural** sector changed in the late 1960s with a suddenness that surprised most observers. This happened because of the advent of the “green revolution.” The revolution arrived in the form of high-yielding varieties (HYVs) of **wheat** and **rice** in the late 1960s, which came from research farms in Mexico and the Philippines. The HYVs spread very

quickly in **Punjab** and **Sindh**; wheat more rapidly than rice. In the four-year period between 1965–1966 and 1969–1970, the index of food-crop production increased from 107 to 177, a rise of 70 points. In this short period wheat production increased by 86 percent (an extraordinary rate of 16.8 percent a year), from 3.9 million tons to 7.3 million tons. Rice output increased by 54 percent (11.5 percent a year), from 1.3 million tons to 2.4 million tons.

There were two developments specific to Pakistan that explain the rapid spread of HYVs in the country. First, unnoticed by the government but indirectly encouraged by it, Pakistani farmers invested largely in sinking tube-wells. The government's encouragement came in the form of the **Salinity Control and Reclamation Projects** (SCARPs), which it initiated in the late 1950s. These projects demonstrated to the farmers the profitability of the conjunctive use of surface and ground water. Once the farmers became aware of this, they moved fast to install wells of their own. According to one estimate, farmers had installed about 25,000 wells in the irrigated districts of Punjab. Second, the creation of the “**Basic Democracies**” system of local government by the administration of President **Muhammad Ayub Khan** in the early 1960s brought the middle-scale farmers in close touch with the bureaucracy, particularly that part of it that had direct responsibility for promoting economic development. With this easy access available to the functionaries of the government, the farming community was able to procure the public services it required for making a success of the HYVs.

The transformation of agriculture, which had begun with the first green revolution, was interrupted during the period in which **Zul-fikar Ali Bhutto** was prime minister and resumed again with the start of the **second green revolution** in the mid-1980s.

**GREEN REVOLUTION, SECOND.** The second green revolution began in the mid-1980s, and its consequence was the move toward commercialization of **agriculture**. It was centered around the use of modern inputs in agriculture—in particular, farm chemicals and labor-saving machinery—and its beneficiaries were principally the producers of such cash crops as **cotton**, fruits, and vegetables. Three circumstances led to the launching of the second green revolution. First was the migration of millions of people from Pakistan to the

Middle East in the late 1970s. This movement of people created serious shortages of labor in the countryside of **Punjab** and the **North-west Frontier Province** and forced the farming community to mechanize some parts of their production process. Once the farmers came into the market to purchase and service machinery, they were also exposed to other features of commercial agriculture. As was the case with the **first green revolution**, it was the middle-scale farmer who led the agricultural sector in bringing its second revolution. Second, the nationalization of large-scale **industry** by the administration of Prime Minister **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto** in the early 1970s persuaded both old and new industrial entrepreneurs to concentrate their efforts in small industries. Denationalization of agro-industries by the government of President **Zia ul-Haq** in the late 1970s further encouraged these entrepreneurs. Most of these industries had strong links with the agricultural sector and required marketable agricultural surpluses as inputs; and they began to provide incentives to the farming community to produce them. Cotton growers were the first to respond to this increase in demand for their produce; they were soon followed by other producers of cash crops. Third, the establishment of Pakistani communities in the Middle East, Western Europe, and the United States created a demand for Pakistani products, particularly processed food, giving further impetus to both the small industrialists and commercial farmers.

The second green revolution had a decisive impact on the cotton-growing areas of Punjab and **Sindh**. Before its advent, some 700,000 tons of cotton lint were being produced in these areas; by the early 1990s, output had increased to well over 1.5 million tons. As a consequence, Pakistan is now one of the major cotton-growing countries in the world, producing, in good years, as much as 10 percent of the world's total cotton crop. It has an even greater presence in world cotton trade, accounting, again in good years, for some 20 percent of the total world trade in cotton. There were large increases of output of fruits and vegetables as well; for instance, the production of citrus doubled over the 10-year period from the late 1970s to the late 1980s, increasing from an average of 723,000 tons to 1.51 million tons. There was a corresponding increase in exports of fruits from the country. In the late 1970s, Pakistan exported on average some 74,000 tons of fruits, mostly to the markets in the

Middle East. This increased to an average of 100,000 tons in the late 1980s.

### **GUL, LIEUTENANT GENERAL (RETIRED) HAMEED (1932–).**

Hameed Gul was born in Sargodah, a city in central **Punjab** and was commissioned in the armored corps on 19 October 1958. After a distinguished career that included the command of an armored division, he was appointed director general of the **Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)**, a position that had been held for several years by General **Akhtar Abdur Rahman**. Under Rahman, the ISI had been deeply involved in training Afghan **mujahideen** in their war against the Soviets and in providing them with arms and equipment. Under Gul, however, the ISI's role in **Afghanistan** changed, as it attempted to bring the various Afghan factions under one political umbrella. He was still engaged in these efforts when in August 1988 he lost his mentor, General **Zia ul-Haq**. Zia was killed in an airplane crash, and a few months later **Benazir Bhutto** became prime minister.

The government of Benazir Bhutto was suspicious of the role played by both the ISI and its director general. Hameed Gul was transferred and appointed corps commander; his successor, Lieutenant General Shamsur Rehman Kallu, was a Bhutto loyalist. After the appointment of General **Asif Nawaz** as the chief of the Army staff in August 1991, Gul was transferred once again, this time to Taxila, as the commandant of a large military-industrial complex. Until then, this position had been held by engineers; Gul clearly was not well equipped for it. Rather than move to his new assignment, he chose to retire from the army, in early 1992.

After spending the mandatory two-year post-retirement period out of public view, Hameed Gul entered the political arena. He took the opportunity created by the war in Afghanistan to influence political development in that country. While retaining an active interest in **foreign affairs**, Hameed Gul decided that he could only influence the country's foreign policy if he were to develop a strong domestic political base for himself. The confidence that he could make some difference in the way Pakistan was to develop politically led him first to support Pasban, a social welfare organization affiliated with the **Jamaat-e-Islami**, and then, in July 1995, to become involved in bringing the government and the **Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz (MQM)** to the



conference table in order to find a solution to the rapidly deteriorating situation in **Karachi**. In July, Gul met with Benazir Bhutto in **Islamabad**, flew to London to hold talks with MQM's **Altaf Hussain**, and flew back to Karachi to announce that both the government and the MQM had agreed to dispense with their preconditions for holding talks and had decided to nominate teams that could begin immediate discussions. He had underestimated the ill-will between Bhutto and Altaf Hussain, however, and his efforts did not bear fruit.

By the late summer of 1996, as the government of Benazir Bhutto became increasingly unpopular because of numerous stories of corruption that began to circulate in the country involving her husband, **Asif Ali Zardari**, and as the economy came under a great deal of pressure, Hameed Gul gave the impression of a person who wanted to get involved to cleanse the system but was still trying to figure out the best way of achieving that objective. He would have wanted to be actively involved in politics after President **Farooq Leghari** dismissed the Bhutto government in November 1996. Such an opportunity did not arise, however. He continued to operate from the fringes of politics, espousing various Islamic causes.

### **GUL HASSAN KHAN, LIEUTENANT GENERAL (1921–1999).**

Born in **Quetta, Balochistan**, to a middle-class family, Gul Hassan Khan joined the Indian Military Academy in 1941 and was stationed in the Assam-Burma sector during the closing years of World War II. In August 1947, he was appointed assistant to **Muhammad Ali Jinnah**, Pakistan's first governor-general. In 1971, when the Pakistan army was fighting the Bengali separatists in East Pakistan, Gul Hassan occupied the important position of the chief of general staff.

Gul Hassan Khan was appointed commander in chief of the Pakistani army on 20 December 1971 by President **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto**. Earlier that day, Gul Hassan had reluctantly accepted Bhutto's offer to take over as the commander in chief of a demoralized army that had suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of the Indian army in East Pakistan. Gul Hassan did not serve Bhutto for long, however. His break with the new president came precisely because of the qualities Bhutto had underscored for choosing him in the first place. As Bhutto began to consolidate his hold over the country, he wanted the army to be led by a man who appreciated the imperatives of politics.

But Gul Hassan was a professional soldier, not willing to be drawn into politics. On 3 March 1972, he and Air Marshal Rahim Khan, the air force commander in chief, were summoned to the president's house and were accused by the president of not being fully supportive of the civilian authority; they were asked to resign. General **Tikka Khan** was appointed the new commander, with the title of chief of the army staff. Unlike many of his predecessors, Gul Hassan Khan chose not to remain active in public life after his retirement from the army. *See also* THE MILITARY.

**GWADAR.** The port of Gwadar on **Balochistan's** coast, close to Pakistan's border with **Iran**, has long served the people of the region as a means of gaining access to the Persian Gulf and the Arab lands across the sea. The port is strategically located at the mouth of the Gulf and at the opposite end of the strategic navigational points of the Straits of Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman; thus, it is an opportune place from which to watch over these busy sea lanes.

Pakistan long had the ambition to develop the port as an additional access to the sea, in addition to the twin ports of **Karachi** and Qasim. This ambition moved closer to realization with the signing of an agreement with the People's Republic of **China** in March 2002 in which China Harbour Construction Corporation was engaged to build the first phase of the port at a cost of US\$245 million. Of this, US\$198 million was to be provided by Beijing and the rest by Pakistan. The first phase of the project included the construction of three multi-purpose berths: each 200 meters long, capable of handling vessels up to 30,000 DWT. This phase was scheduled to be finished by 2005. The second phase, to be financed with private funds, would involve the development of 10 more berths, and a 5-kilometer approach channel that would accommodate vessels of up to 50,000 DWT. This phase was estimated to cost an additional US\$600 million.

In parallel with the construction of the berths, the government of Pakistan began constructing the Makran Coastal Highway, linking Gwadar with a series of small fishing ports strung along the Balochistan coast and to Karachi in the east. There were also plans to build a network of modern highways linking Gwadar with Pasni, Chaman, and Torkhan on the border with **Afghanistan**. These roads would

provide easy access to the sea for landlocked Afghanistan and to other landlocked countries of Central Asia.

While the Gwadar port project made a great deal of economic sense for Pakistan and had great promise for Balochistan, the country's most backward province, its development was viewed with some suspicion by Iran and **India**. It also troubled some traditional political elements in Balochistan. The Indians were concerned that Gwadar would provide China with access to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, thus challenging India's ambition to be the most important naval presence, after the **United States**, in these important seas. The Iranians were not happy to have prospective rivals in their aspiration to become the most important point of sea access for the countries of Central Asia. Working with the Indians, they started their own port construction project at Charbehar, just across from Gwadar, on their side of the sea. Compounding these challenges was the resistance offered by some Balochi tribal *sardars* (chiefs), who used the militia loyal to them to disrupt construction at the port. Undeterred by these provocations, the government of President **Pervez Musharraf** continued to press ahead with the construction of the port. The government also invited the private sector to develop the land in and around the port for commerce and high-end residential estates.

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**HABIB BANK LIMITED.** Habib Bank Limited was established in Mumbai on 25 August 1941 by the **Habibs**, a prominent Muslim family with business interests in the city. The bank's creation was encouraged by **Muhammad Ali Jinnah** to provide a source of institutional credit to the Muslim community. Habib Bank not only helped the Muslim commercial classes; it also became the repository of the various fundraising schemes which Jinnah launched to help the Muslim community of British India. After Pakistan was born, on 14 August 1947, the bank moved its headquarters from Bombay (Mumbai) to **Karachi**, the capital of the new country. In Pakistan the bank rapidly expanded its activities. In the industrial boom that followed Pakistan's first **trade** war with India, in 1949, Habib Bank provided seed

and operating capital to a number of new industrialists who came forward to take advantage of the opportunities the government offered. The Habibs themselves entered industry, tapping their **bank** for funding. The close association of finance and **industry** pioneered by Habib Bank and the Habib family prompted other large industrial families to enter the field of finance as well.

The advent of the socialist government of President **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto** in December 1971 suddenly changed the country's economic environment. Along with all the other private-sector banks, Habib Bank was nationalized by the new government on 1 January 1974. For the next two decades, the bank was run by the government, its officers were appointed by the Ministry of Finance, and it was subjected to all kinds of pressures to lend money to the political supporters of whichever government happened to be in power. As was the case with other banks under the control of the government, Habib Bank's financial situation deteriorated rapidly. By the middle of the 1990s, the administration of Prime Minister **Benazir Bhutto** revived the program to privatize public-sector banks, launched earlier by the government of Prime Minister **Mian Nawaz Sharif**. By then, however, Habib Bank's nonperforming assets far exceeded its capital. In 1996, there was a widespread impression in the market that the bank—like **United Bank Limited**, another large public-sector commercial bank—was insolvent. This market perception made it difficult for the government of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto to privatize the institution.

The government of Mian Nawaz Sharif that came to power in February 1997 took the position that professional managers appointed to public-sector banks, with the mandate to improve the quality of their assets, would be able to prepare the public-sector banks for privatization. Accordingly, Sharif appointed Shaukat Tareen, a respected Pakistani banker working for Citibank, as president of Habib Bank. Tareen and other professional managers were able to stem the deterioration of the banks that were under the government's control. However, Habib and other public-sector banks required large infusions of capital to restore their balance sheets. In 2002, the government of President **Pervez Musharraf** accelerated the program for the privatization of banks. Habib Bank was privatized in 2004, with the Aga Khan Foundation successfully bidding for 26 percent of the bank's equity. The new owners strengthened the institution's management and launched a number

of new products to expand its presence in the market. Zakir Mahmud—formerly of Bank of America and Crédit Agricole Indosuez—who had been appointed by the government of Nawaz Sharif as chief executive was retained in this position by the new owners.

**THE HABIBS.** The Habib family came originally from Bombay (Mumbai). The Habibs were principally traders when World War II began and the British started to rely heavily on **India** for a number of commodities required by their troops. The family made good use of this opportunity, as did a number of other established trading houses in Mumbai and Kolkata. After the war, Muhammad Ali Habib was persuaded by **Muhammad Ali Jinnah** to help finance the **Muslim League** movement for the establishment of an independent Muslim state in British India. **Habib Bank** was started by Muhammad Ali as a part of this effort. The Habib family made generous donations to the various funds established by Jinnah for the benefit of his people. For instance, the family led the drive to raise money for helping the victims of the communal riots in Bihar, in which thousands of Muslims perished and hundreds of thousands were injured. The Habibs migrated to Pakistan after India's partition and set up their headquarters in **Karachi**, the new country's capital. Like other trading families, they also moved into manufacturing when Pakistan began to industrialize.

By the end of the **Muhammad Ayub Khan** period (1958–1969), the Habibs were counted among the 22 richest families in Pakistan. They paid a heavy price for the attention they received during the movement against Muhammad Ayub Khan when it was alleged that the bulk of the rewards of the rapid growth during his decade of development had been claimed by the “**twenty-two families.**” Most of the **industries** owned by the Habibs, as well as Habib Bank Limited, were nationalized between 1972 and 1974 by the government of **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto**. Unlike some other industrial families, however, the Habibs did not show much resilience and did not recover from the waves of nationalization that swept Pakistan during the Bhutto period (1971–1977). By the mid-1990s, the family was no longer regarded as a major industrial player in Pakistan. Two branches of the family left Pakistan and founded commercial banks, one based in Zurich (Habib Bank AG Zurich), and the other (Habib Sons) based in London. Later, both banks acquired banking assets in Pakistan, the former under its

own name and the latter under the name of Metropolitan Bank. However, when the original Habib Bank was offered for sale by the government in 2004, the Habib family did not participate in the bidding process. *See also* TWENTY-TWO FAMILIES SPEECH.

### **HABIBULLAH KHAN, LIEUTENANT GENERAL (1916–1996).**

Born in the **Northwest Frontier Province**, Habibullah Khan joined the British Indian army in 1937 and the Pakistani army in 1947. He rose rapidly in the ranks and was a senior two-star general at the time of **Muhammad Ayub Khan**'s coup d'état. Among army circles he was considered to be highly competent and not without political ambitions of his own. President Muhammad Ayub Khan had good reasons to be wary of Habibullah Khan, even though his second son, **Gohar Ayub**, was married to the general's daughter. From Muhammad Ayub Khan's perspective, it was better to have Habibullah Khan out of the army and into a career from which he could not pose any real political threat to the president. Accordingly, Habibullah Khan was encouraged to move into **industry**, which he did by establishing Janana Demaluchoo, a large **cotton**-textile plant in Kohat, a town in the Northwest Frontier Province. The plant was very well managed and made money for its owner, which he invested in Gandhara Motors, an automobile assembly plant near **Karachi**, set up with assistance from General Motors. Gandhara Motors was equally successful, and also made a great deal of money for Habibullah Khan and Gohar Ayub, the latter in the meantime having joined his father-in-law's business.

The rapidly rising fortune of Habibullah Khan and his family seemed to vindicate Muhammad Ayub Khan's confidence in the ability of civil and military bureaucrats to become successful industrial entrepreneurs. However, a large number of Pakistanis saw Habibullah's rise to the position of wealth and influence as an example of governmental nepotism and corruption. At the time that Habibullah Khan began to count himself among Pakistan's wealthiest people, **Mahbubul Haq**, the Planning Commission's chief economist, delivered his "**twenty-two families speech**," in which he accused the government of following a model of economic development that deliberately favored the rich over the poor. The speech had a great political impact, and Habibullah Khan became the symbol of all that was considered

wrong with Muhammad Ayub Khan's economic philosophy. When **Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto** took over the reins of government from the armed forces in December 1971, he exploited the sentiment against Muhammad Ayub Khan and the distributive consequences of his economic policies by arresting Habibullah Khan and parading him handcuffed on national television. At the same time, the Bhutto administration nationalized Gandhara Industries and merged it with other automobile plants to form the Automobile Corporation of Pakistan.

Habibullah Khan survived Bhutto, however. He was appointed minister in charge of industry by President **Zia ul-Haq** in the first civilian cabinet to take office under the new military president. The cabinet was made up of technocrats. Habibullah Khan left the cabinet a few months later when President Zia decided to replace experts with politicians. He went back to managing his large industrial empire, while Gohar Ayub, Muhammad Ayub Khan's son and Habibullah Khan's son-in-law, entered politics.

**HADUD ORDINANCES OF 1979.** The Hadud Ordinances of 1979, promulgated by the government of President **Zia ul-Haq**, concerned crimes related to sex—adultery, fornication, rape, and prostitution. The ordinances were viewed with great concern by **women** partly because they termed criminal many activities that were regarded in most civilized societies as beyond the reach of law. Women in Pakistan were also apprehensive that the ordinances would provide a new set of instruments to those in the Pakistani society who were determined to reduce the status of women. There was particular concern about two provisions in the ordinances. One, in crimes relating to *zina* (adultery and fornication) and *zina-bil-jabir* (rape), the ordinances required that there must be four Muslim male adult witnesses present when the crime was committed for it to be recognized. Two, the law did not draw any distinction between adultery and rape. It was the latter provision that gave an enormous amount of authority to the state to regulate even those relations that had the consent of the men and women involved. In spite of the strenuous efforts by women's organizations, the ordinance remained on the books after Zia ul-Haq's death. A number of efforts were made by the government of President **Pervez Musharraf** to lighten the provision of the laws, but each time he was beaten back by the forces of conservative and extremist **Islam**.

**HAIDER, SYED IQBAL (1946– )**. Born in Agra, India, Iqbal Haider migrated to **Karachi**, Pakistan, after the partition of British India and the emergence of Pakistan. He entered Punjab University Law College, in **Lahore**, in 1964 and became active in student politics. He was present at the meeting in Lahore’s YMCA hall in 1966 when **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto** made the first public statement against the **Tashkent Declaration**. He went to London’s Lincoln’s Inn to study law. It was during his stay in London that he developed a close relationship with the Bhutto family. Iqbal Haider returned to Pakistan in 1971 and began to practice law in Karachi. Although given a ticket by the **Pakistan People’s Party** (PPP), he lost from Korangi district in Karachi in the National Assembly elections of 1977 and 1988. It was during this period that he turned his attention to another area of interest—human rights. In 1985, he joined with **Asma Jehangir** and other human-rights activists to establish the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan.

Iqbal Haider’s loyal service to the PPP was rewarded in 1991 when **Benazir Bhutto**, the party’s chairperson, gave him the ticket to contest for a safe seat in the Senate. He won the seat and was brought into the cabinet by Prime Minister Bhutto as law minister in 1993. He resigned from the cabinet in December 1994 over differences with the prime minister concerning her approach toward governance. He was back in the cabinet in September 1995, however, as minister in charge of human rights, a new ministry created as a result of the recommendations made to the prime minister by a commission headed by him. In October 1996, the prime minister appointed him attorney general as the controversy concerning her government’s reluctance to implement the Supreme Court decision in the **judges’ case** increased. Benazir Bhutto was dismissed by President **Farooq Leghari** a month later, and Iqbal Haider went back to Karachi to resume his law practice. In 1997, his term in the Senate was renewed by Bhutto, who retained a safe PPP seat for him.

Iqbal Haider continued to agitate for human rights, in particular, the rights of women. In May 2005, he was arrested briefly in Lahore along with Asma Jehangir when he was about to lead a procession protesting the government’s action, under the pressure of Islamists, to ban the participation of women in public sporting events.

**HALEEM, CHIEF JUSTICE MUHAMMAD (1925– )**. Muhammad Haleem, born in Lucknow, in what is today the Indian state of Uttar



Pradesh, migrated to Pakistan and began a career as a lawyer in **Karachi** when that city was Pakistan's capital. After serving as **Sindh** province's assistant advocate general, he was appointed judge of the High Court of Sindh in 1972 and then moved to **Islamabad** in 1974 as a judge of the Supreme Court. He was appointed chief justice of the Supreme Court on 25 March 1981 by President **Zia ul-Haq**. He served in that position until his retirement on 31 December 1989. His eight-year tenure was the longest in the country's history.

**HAMOODUR RAHMAN COMMISSION.** The Hamoodur Rahman Commission was appointed by President, later Prime Minister, **Zul-fikar Ali Bhutto** in 1972, to investigate the circumstances that led to the secession of East Pakistan and the emergence of **Bangladesh** as an independent state. The commission's appointment served to still the clamor for accountability in West Pakistan—now Pakistan—for the breakup of Pakistan in December 1971 and for the defeat of the Pakistan army at the hands of a combined force of the Indian army and **Mukti Bahini**, the Bengali freedom fighters. Bhutto turned to Chief Justice Hamoodur Rahman of the Supreme Court, himself a Bengali, to lead the inquiry. The commission investigated for two years, interviewed a large number of people, and issued its report to the government. The report was not released to the public, neither by the Bhutto administration nor by any of its many successor administrations. It is widely believed that the report portrays the army's performance in East Pakistan in a very unfavorable light. Accordingly, the **military** leadership has succeeded in keeping the report under wraps for more than a quarter century. However, parts of the report were leaked to the press after the re-entry of the military into politics under General **Pervez Musharraf**.

**HAQ, MAHBUBUL (1934–1998).** Mahbubul Haq was born in Jammu, **Kashmir**, and migrated with his family to **Lahore** after the partition of British India and the emergence of Pakistan as an independent state. He was educated at Lahore's Government College and at Cambridge University in England. On his return from England in 1957, he joined the Planning Commission. His first assignment at the commission was to work on the **Second Five Year Plan (1960–1965)**. He was the principal author of the Plan, which was released to the public in the spring of 1960.

The Plan maintained that a developing country such as Pakistan must first concentrate its efforts on increasing the rate of economic growth before attempting to solve the problems of poverty and poor distribution of income. Haq defended this approach in an influential book, *The Strategy of Economic Planning: A Case Study of Pakistan*, published in 1968. A few months later, however, he surprised the government by delivering what came to be known as the “**twenty-two families speech**.” In this speech, he argued that a significant part of the benefit of the rapid growth of the **economy** during the period of **Muhammad Ayub Khan** accrued to no more than 22 industrial and commercial houses that had accumulated vast fortunes.

Haq joined the **World Bank** in 1968 and worked as the director of the Policy Planning Department until his resignation 13 years later. It was largely because of his influence that the Bank began to address the problem of poverty by lending directly to the projects aimed at the poor and at meeting their basic needs. Haq left the Bank in 1981 and was appointed deputy chairman of the Planning Commission by President **Zia ul-Haq**. After supervising the preparation of the **Sixth Five-Year Plan**, he replaced **Ghulam Ishaq Khan** as finance minister. Following President Zia’s death in 1988, Haq stayed on as a member of the caretaker government. He left Pakistan in 1988 and joined the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) as a consultant; as such, he assumed responsibility for launching the annual *Human Development Report*. Working with Nobel laureate Amartya Sen, Haq developed the **Human Development Index** that is a better measure of the state of economic development and social welfare than is gross domestic product (GDP). Refined over time, the HDI is updated every year and published in the *Human Development Report*, the flagship document of the UNDP. Haq returned to Pakistan to establish the Human Development Center at **Islamabad**. He died while on a visit to New York. Shortly before his death, he had accepted an invitation from Prime Minister **Mian Nawaz Sharif** to spearhead the effort to improve the level of literacy in the country. He was also developing plans to set up a university specializing in social sciences in Islamabad. After his death, his wife Khadija Haq became the president of the Islamabad institute, which was renamed the Mahbubul Haq Center for Human Development. The Center has continued to prepare and publish annual reports on various aspects of social and

human development in South Asia. *See also* TWENTY-TWO FAMILIES SPEECH.

**HAQEE, SHANUL HAQ (1917–2005).** Shanul Haq was born on 15 December 1917, in New Delhi, and studied at Aligarh Muslim University and Delhi's St. Stephens College from where he obtained a masters degree in English literature. He migrated to Pakistan after the country's birth in 1947 and immediately immersed himself in the literary circles that were being formed in **Karachi**, the new country's capital. He added the pen-name Haqee to his name once he began to publish poetry and prose in Urdu. His two anthologies of poems, *Taar-i-Pairahan* and *Harf-i-Ditras*, were published in 1957 and 1979, respectively. He also wrote a book of poems for children, which was published under the title of *Phool Khilay Hain Rang Birangey*. In the early 1950s, he wrote musicals for Radio Pakistan and Pakistan Television.

Haqee consolidated his fame as a man of letters with the publication of his memoirs, which appeared in 41 parts in the 1980s and 1990s in the literary magazine *Afkaar*. While working at Pakistan Television he was also associated with the Urdu *Lughat* Board, a public sector institution responsible for compiling an Urdu language dictionary. His association with the institute lasted for 17 years, from 1958 to 1975, which resulted in the publication of a 24-volume dictionary of Urdu language. He left Pakistan for Canada in the mid-1990s, following several members of his family who had settled in Toronto. He died in Toronto, on 11 October 2005, and was buried in the city's Muslim cemetery.

**HARIS.** *Haris*, or tenants at will, constitute the majority of the **agricultural** work force in **Sindh** province. Their poverty was the subject of several government reports, the most detailed of which was produced by the Government Hari Enquiry Committee. The committee was established in 1947, and after working for a year, submitted its report in 1948. One member of the committee, Muhammad Masud Khadarposh, was convinced that the only way to solve the problem of the poverty faced by the haris was to give them the ownership of the land they cultivated. Other members of the committee were not prepared to accept such a radical approach. Their reluctance to go along with Khadarposh persuaded him to write his well-known "note of dissent."

Masud Khadarposh gave a vivid account of the plight of the haris. According to him, fear reigns supreme in the life of the hari—fear of imprisonment, fear of losing the land he is allowed to work on, fear of losing his children into servitude and his wife to the landlord, and fear of losing his life. The *zamindar* (landlord) can deal with him almost at will, unconstrained by law but encouraged by custom. The landlord has enough political and social power to have the officialdom always on his side. Section 110 of the Criminal Procedure Court, which allows the police to detain any person for four weeks without trial, was the weapon most feared by the haris. In order to incarcerate a hari, the police had only to show the magistrate that the person in question was *suspected* of disturbing public peace. Although Khadarposh was not able to persuade the committee to adopt a radical solution to improve the situation of the haris, his note of dissent had a profound impact. It is read to this day by social and political workers.

**HARRAPA.** Harrapa is situated in the Sahiwal district of **Punjab**. The ancient city was part of what is today called the Indus civilization. Archeological excavations have revealed a large, well-planned city with granaries, living quarters for workers, and a citadel with gates and cemeteries. Many seals discovered at the site have hieroglyphics that have yet to be deciphered.

**HEALTH.** In its *Human Development in South Asia 2004* report, the **Mahbub ul Haq Human Development Centre** at **Islamabad** took stock of the health situation of all countries in the region. It emphasized that while South Asia had only 25 percent of the world's population, it was home to 40 percent of the malnourished people; the region also accounted for 33 percent of the world's child mortality and 35 percent of maternal mortality. Considerable progress had been made by the South Asian countries—life expectancy had increased from 44 years to 63 years over the last four decades—but according to the index, with values assigned from zero to one, the situation in South Asia was precarious compared to several other regions in the world. Pakistan was the second poorest performer among the seven countries of South Asia in terms of the health index, a notch above Nepal, with a score of 0.458. India, at 0.476, was only slightly better than Pakistan. Pakistan's relatively poor performance was largely on account of the infrastructure component of

the index, with a score of only 0.283. There were six indicators for measuring the quality of infrastructure. They include public expenditure on health, child immunization rate, physicians per head of the population, skilled attendants at birth, access to safe water, and access to sanitation facilities. Pakistan did poorly on all these counts. It allocated only 1 percent of its GDP to health, there were only 68 physicians per 100,000 of the population, and only 20 percent of the births were attended by skilled health personnel. The last fact was one of the more important reasons for the high rates of infant and maternal mortality (83 per 1000 live births and 500 per 100,000 live births, respectively). It was largely because of this that Pakistan had life expectancy that was two years less than the weighted average for South Asia: 61 years as opposed to 63 years. The country spent only \$16 per person on health compared to the South Asian average of \$21. Of this total expenditure, slightly less than a quarter (24.4 percent) is spent by the government, and the rest is spent by the citizens themselves.

The relatively low expenditure on health, particularly by the public sector, had several unpleasant consequences. It hurt the more vulnerable groups in the population, especially children and **women**. While unattended births meant a high infant mortality rate, poor health services contributed to a high rate of child mortality. At 107 deaths per 1000, the under-five (child) rate of mortality in Pakistan was by far the highest in South Asia. Relatively poor performance in terms of immunization was one reason for high rates of death among children. Slightly more than one half of all children were immunized against measles, and slightly less than two-thirds against polio. Both diseases took a very heavy toll.

Diarrhea was another large killer of children, much of it the consequence of the poor quality of drinking water, poor quality of sanitation, and low levels of **education** among women. In 2000, according to Pakistan's government, 90 percent of the country's population had access to safe drinking water and two-thirds of the population had sanitation of a reasonable quality available to them. And yet 12 percent of the children in the period 1998–2001 had had diarrhea at some time. Diarrhea is not fatal, provided parents know how to deal with the disease. Oral rehydration—a cheap and readily available remedy—is an effective cure. However, only 19

percent of the children who had suffered from the ailment were treated with this remedy.

Women were the other vulnerable group in the Pakistani population that did poorly in terms of health. This was unfortunate, since women's poor health affected all members of the family, in particular their children. This was especially the case when, as was the situation in Pakistan, high rates of fertility meant that births were not spaced sufficiently well apart to ensure adequate parental attention. In 2001, at 5.4 births per woman, women in Pakistan's villages had one of the highest rates of fertility in the world. High fertility rates were the result of the relatively low status of women in the Pakistani society, prevalence of illiteracy among them, and either lack of familiarity with or inability to access family planning devices. Contraceptive prevalence rate among the Pakistani women was only 27.6 percent compared to 48.2 percent in India and 70 percent in Sri Lanka.

Some of the diseases that had been brought under control have returned to Pakistan in recent years, complicating the health situation and further burdening the health system. Malaria and tuberculosis were the most notable examples of diseases that reappeared. In 2000, the country had 58 cases of malaria per 100,000 of the population, and 379 cases of tuberculosis. These two diseases not only kill; they take a heavy economic toll since they result in a loss of energy of those who are afflicted. The return of both malaria and tuberculosis was caused by environmental factors—poor drainage of water and the presence of high levels of particulates in the environment.

Some lifestyle changes are also contributing to the poor status of health in the country. The most serious among these was the increased prevalence of smoking. Pakistan had a considerably higher rate of smoking (36 percent of the male population) than the average for Asia. Smoking is spreading among women also; in 2000, 9 percent of Pakistani women were smokers, compared with only 3 percent in India.

**HINDUTVA.** The concept of Hindutva—greater Hindustan—which would extend Hinduism to its “natural geographic frontiers”—was put forward by Hindu nationalists in the 1930s as a slogan. Its original proponent was V. D. Savarkar of the Hindu Mahasabha, whose slogan “Hindu, Hindi, Hindustan” envisaged a sacred geography of **India** that would extend from western **Iran** to the eastern Malayan

peninsula, from northern Tibet to the southernmost Sri Lanka. It would thus encompass all of today's India, Burma, **Bangladesh**, Bhutan, Nepal, **Kashmir**, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, and parts of **Afghanistan** and China. Various Hindu organizations were established to pursue this expansionist and exclusionist political philosophy. Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh—mostly known by its acronym RSS—was founded in 1925 by D. K. B. Hedgewar, followed by the establishment of Rashtra Sevika Samiti in 1936, by Rashtra Sevika Samiti to mobilize Hindu women. An attempt to convert students to the Hindutva philosophy was made in 1948 with the creation of Akhil Bahartiya Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP), while in 1955 the Bhartiya Mazdoor Sangh (BMS) was founded to work with the laboring classes. In 1951, the Bharatiya Jan Sangh (BJS) was formed as an alliance between the Hindu Mahasabha, another Hindu organization, and the RSS. To encourage these organizations to work toward a common goal, Hindu activists established the Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP) in 1964. The VHP in turn founded a number of educational institutions in which Hindu boys were taught not only the Hindu philosophy but were also given training in martial arts.

With the creation of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in 1980, led by Atal Bihari Vajpayee and **Lal Khrishna Advani**, the Hindu organization acquired a political arm. The BJP was effectively the political wing of the RSS. In 1990, Advani went on his Rath Yatra, “this rightful journey,” from Somnath on the west coast of India to **Ayodhya** in the country's north. Advani's journey was meant to underscore his view that Hindu India had been ravaged, plundered, and desecrated by Muslims for centuries and that the time had come to take the country back from the invaders, many of whom had stayed on. In 1992, a large crowd of Advani's supporters tore down Babir mosque and demanded that a temple dedicated to Rama should be erected in its place. The Muslims, horrified by this act of vandalism, rioted in Mumbai and other major cities. More than 2,000 people lost their lives.

The BJP under A. B. Vajpayee won three national elections and was in power for almost a decade at the head of a coalition government that included a number of other Hindu nationalist parties. It was during the BJP's term that India tested nuclear bombs (in May 1998), General **Pervez Musharraf** was invited to visit Agra to hold a summit with Prime Minister Vajpayee (July 2001), India almost went to

war with neighboring Pakistan (December 2001–January 2002), the Indian prime minister offered the hand of peace to Pakistan and to President Musharraf (April 2003) and signed the Islamabad Declaration pledging to create the South Asia Free Trade Area and resolve all outstanding issues with Pakistan through dialogue and not by the use of force (January 2004).

**HIZBUL MUJAHEDIN.** Hizbul Mujahedin (Hizb) emerged as one of the main rebel groups that challenged **India's** rule over **Kashmir**. Based in **Azad Kashmir**—the part of the state controlled by Pakistan—it sought to coordinate the activities of several groups of insurgents who were active in the Indian part of Kashmir. Hizb wants the divided territory reunited and joined with Pakistan. India, regarding Hizbul Mujahedin to be less radical compared to some other groups fighting in Kashmir, announced a unilateral ceasefire and hoped for a positive response from the organization. It withdrew the offer after six months in the absence of similar overtures by rival groups, including Hizb. On 23 April 2005, less than a week after the Musharraf-Manmohan Singh summit in New Delhi, in which India and Pakistan reiterated their wish to resolve the Kashmir dispute through bilateral dialogue, the Hizb leadership said that it would seriously consider any ceasefire offer by New Delhi. “If they [the Indians] are serious about it [a ceasefire], Hizbul Mujahedin would seriously consider it,” said Ghazi Misbahuddin, chief operational commander of the organization. However, he said that the Kashmir dispute should be resolved according to the Kashmiri wishes and on the basis of decades-old UN Security Council resolutions calling for a plebiscite in the region. This position, the long-standing basis of Pakistan’s stance on Kashmir, was virtually abandoned by the administration of President **Pervez Musharraf** as it became engaged in a serious dialogue with India starting in January 2004.

**HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX.** The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) defined a new index to measure human welfare. The index went beyond the gross domestic product (GDP)—the standard measure that had been used to gauge the size of an



economy. This index has three components: longevity, knowledge, and decent living standards. The index, first developed in the 1991 *Human Development Report* issued by the UNDP, rated Japan and Barbados as the top performers among developed and developing countries, respectively, and Rumania and Sierra Leone as the poorest performers in these two categories of countries. Among the 160 countries ranked by the report, Pakistan was ranked at 120, **India** 123, **Bangladesh** 136, Nepal 145, and **Afghanistan** 157. In 1998, the UNDP placed Pakistan at 134 among 174, only one place above India. By 2005, Pakistan's ranking had dropped below that of India. *See also* HAQ, MAHBUBUL.

**HUMAN RIGHTS.** Pakistan's record on human rights has been a source of concern for people in the country as well as the international community. While a Human Rights Commission was created in 1988 as an autonomous body that selected its own personnel, the commission has been effective only in advertising some of the more prominent problems. It has had minimal impact on public policy. A succession of governments has been willing to encroach on the rights of **women**, children, and some minorities. Changes in the constitution made by President **Zia ul-Haq** affected, in particular, the rights of women. He instigated new laws that have restricted the ability of women to protect themselves against crimes, particularly that of rape. Pakistan has been less than totally scrupulous in observing the rights of children with respect to labor as required by the International Labor Office. Various governments have also been indifferent to the rights of minorities, in particular the **Ahmadiya** community and the Christians. There are problems also in the way smaller provinces have been treated.

The issue of human rights continues to figure prominently in the concerns that are expressed by several Western countries, in particular the **United States**, in the ongoing dialogue with **Islamabad**. President **Pervez Musharraf** had to face considerable criticism during his visit to the United States concerning the treatment by his government of **Mukhtanan Bibi**, a rape victim.

**HYDERABAD STATE.** *See* KASHMIR.

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**IFTIKHARUDDIN, MIAN MUHAMMAD (1907–1962).** Mian Muhammad Iftikharuddin was one of the few Muslim politicians of pre-independence **Punjab** who gained prominence without aligning himself with the **Unionist Party**. He was born in **Lahore** into a prominent family and was educated at Government College, Lahore, and at Oxford University. Family riches notwithstanding, he was attracted to socialist causes and decided that his personal objectives would be better served by joining the All-India Congress, which he did in 1936. He was elected to the Punjab Provincial Assembly in 1936 on the All-India Congress ticket. He was arrested by the Indian British administration for his political activities and remained in prison for three years (1942–1945). On his release, he left the Congress, joined the **Muslim League**, and devoted himself with his customary enthusiasm and energy to advancing the League’s political objective of establishing a separate homeland for the Muslims of British India. In 1946, Mian Iftikharuddin spearheaded the Muslim League movement against the provincial government of **Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana** and was sent back to jail. His conversion to the idea of Pakistan was now complete; convinced that the establishment of a separate homeland for the Muslims of India would be possible only if it was championed by the urban intelligentsia, he used his abundant wealth to found two newspapers, the *Pakistan Times* in English, and *Imroze* in Urdu.

After the emergence of Pakistan, he served briefly as a minister in the cabinet of **Nawaz Mamdot**. Not happy with the intrigue and infighting that characterized Muslim League politics in Punjab, he organized a “forward bloc” of his own within the League, and used his newspapers to question the policies being pursued by the provincial government. These were not popular positions to take, and he was expelled from the League in 1951. He founded the Azad Pakistan Party soon after leaving the League and then merged it with the **National Awami Party (NAP)** of **Maulana Abdul Hamid Bhashani**, a left-leaning politician from East Pakistan. The *Pakistan Times* and *Imroze* were nationalized in 1958 by the martial-law government of **Muhammad Ayub Khan**, and their holding company, Progressive Papers Ltd., was dissolved. These were severe blows for Mian Iftikharuddin, and he never recovered from them.

**INDEMNITY CLAUSE.** The martial-law administration of General **Zia ul-Haq** faced one serious problem in its efforts to restore constitutional government in Pakistan. The **constitution of 1973** made intervention by the **military** a capital offense. This constitutional provision notwithstanding, General Zia ul-Haq had assumed power on 5 July 1977 by staging a successful coup d'état against the government of **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto**. Zia had to indemnify the actions taken by his government before he could lift martial law. Accordingly, by inserting Article 270-A in the **eighth amendment** to the constitution, all acts by the martial government were indemnified. The amendment was passed by the National Assembly in October 1985. According to Section 2 of the new article: "All orders made, proceedings taken and acts done by any authority or by any person which were made, taken or done, or purported to have been made, taken or done, between the fifth day of July 1977 and the date on which this Article comes into force, in exercise of the powers derived from any Proclamation, President's Orders, Ordinances, Martial Law Regulation, Martial Law Orders, enactments, notifications, rules, orders or by-laws, or in execution of or in compliance with any order made or sentence passed by any authority in the exercise or purported exercise of powers as aforesaid shall, notwithstanding any judgment of any court, be deemed to be and always to have been validly made, taken or done and shall not be called in question in any court on any ground whatsoever." Article 270-A came into force along with the amended constitution, on the withdrawal of martial law on 30 December 1985.

**INDEPENDENT DEMOCRATIC GROUP (IDG).** On 24 January 2005, a group of politicians, most of whom were once prominent members of the **Pakistan Muslim League**, formed a new political group to "wage a struggle for the restoration of the **1973 Constitution**, and undiluted parliamentary democracy in the country." The group held its first meeting at the **Islamabad** residence of former National Assembly speaker Syed Fakhr Imam and his wife Begum Abida Hussain, former Pakistani ambassador to the **United States**. They were joined by Elahi Baksh Soomro from **Sindh**, Sardar Wazir Ahmad Jogezi and Mir Taj Muhammad Jamali from **Balochistan**, and Mian Muhammad Azhar, Nawabzada Mohsin Ali Khan, and

Ghulam Sarwar Cheema, all from **Punjab**. The IDG announced its “willingness to cooperate with and join any anti-Musharraf movement launched by the **Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy**, or the **Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal**. It said that it would field candidates for the next general elections under its flag. It also called for an end to the military’s operation in Balochistan.

**INDIA–PAKISTAN RELATIONS.** **Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s** demand for the creation of a separate country for the Muslims of British India was bitterly opposed by the leaders of the **Indian National Congress**. When they finally accepted his demand for the partition of India along communal lines, they did not look kindly on Pakistan, the country that was established despite their efforts to preserve Indian unity. India and Pakistan began their independent existence highly suspicious of each other. The suspicion persists to this day.

A number of developments soured the relationship between the two countries soon after they became independent. Partition resulted in a massive exchange of population between the two countries: Muslims leaving India for Pakistan and Hindus and Sikhs going in the other direction. About 14 million people were involved in this exchange of population; 6 million left Pakistan, while 8 million arrived in the new country. The considerable bloodshed that occurred during this exchange affected the relations between India and Pakistan. In the fall of 1947, the government of India blocked payments to Pakistan from the joint sterling account that had been set up for the two countries by the departing British. In 1948, India-Pakistan relations were complicated by the question of the accession of a number of princely states to the two countries. India encouraged **Kashmir**—a predominantly Muslim state ruled by a Hindu prince, the Maharaja of Kashmir—to join the Indian union. Pakistan worked with the ruling elite of **Hyderabad**—a predominantly Hindu state ruled by a Muslim prince, the Nizam of Hyderabad—to become an independent country. Kashmir shared boundaries with India and Pakistan; Hyderabad was a landlocked state in the south of India, more than 1,600 kilometers from Pakistan. The geography of the two states ultimately dictated their political destinies.

The dispute over Hyderabad was resolved by a quick Indian military action undertaken in September 1948 while Pakistan was pre-

occupied with the situation created by the death of **Muhammad Ali Jinnah**. But Kashmir turned out to be a more difficult problem. India and Pakistan have fought three wars over it; one in 1947–1948 that led to the state’s division between **Azad Kashmir** occupied by Pakistan and the state of Jammu and Kashmir that became a part of India. The ceasefire line supervised by the United Nations became the boundary between the two parts of the state. Pakistan’s attempt in 1965 to gain the rest of the state resulted in an all-out war between the two countries that was fought between 6 and 23 September. The result was inconclusive and led to the signing of a peace accord, the **Tashkent Declaration**, with the encouragement of the **Soviet Union**. India and Pakistan fought their third war in 1971, but this time, although Kashmir once again was one of the battlegrounds, the immediate cause of the conflict was the civil war in East Pakistan.

The Tashkent Declaration did not improve Pakistan’s relations with India. There was a marked deterioration in 1971 when India, first covertly but then openly, sided with the secessionist forces operating in East Pakistan. When civil war broke out in East Pakistan, India supported the **Mukti Bahini** (the Bengali freedom fighters) and then sent in its troops to defeat Pakistan’s forces in Bengal. In December 1971, the Pakistani contingent surrendered to the Indians, and East Pakistan emerged as the independent state of **Bangladesh**.

**Zulfikar Ali Bhutto**, who succeeded General **Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan** as Pakistan’s president after the war in Bangladesh, went to the Indian city of Simla in April 1972 to conclude yet another treaty of understanding. The **Simla Accord**’s immediate consequence was the redefinition of the ceasefire line in Kashmir, renamed the **Line of Control** (LOC). It also resulted in sufficiently improved relations between the two countries for India to release 90,000 prisoners of war it had taken after the surrender of the Pakistani Army in East Bengal. But basic suspicions persisted and were aggravated once again by the Indian explosion of a “nuclear device” in 1974. The explosion by India persuaded Bhutto to initiate Pakistan’s own nuclear program. The program began in the mid-1970s, and by the late 1980s had made enough progress to concern both India and the **United States**.

In the early 1990s, the citizens of Indian-occupied Kashmir openly rebelled against India. India responded by sending 500,000 troops to

the state, and a bloody conflict ensued. India accused Pakistan of training the dissident forces in Kashmir and providing them with sanctuaries on its side of the border. The conflict in Kashmir took a heavy toll in terms of lives lost and damage to the economy of the state. For six years, Indian Kashmir remained under the direct control of Delhi. In 1996, the Congress Party government, led by Prime Minister Narasimha Rao, decided to hold elections in the state. The Kashmiris refused to participate in the elections. Pakistan also opposed the Indian move, arguing that India was likely to use the elections to legitimize its hold over the state.

The Indian elections of February 1998 further complicated the relations between the two countries by introducing a new element, the **Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)**. The elections resulted in the formation of a government led by the BJP, the party that won the largest number of seats in the Lok Sabha, the lower house of the Indian parliament. The BJP had taken a militant position against Pakistan in its election manifesto; it had argued for the open development of an Indian nuclear capability and its use against Pakistan if Pakistan continued to aid the Kashmiris in their struggle against India. The induction of the BJP government in Delhi caused a great deal of anxiety in **Islamabad**, which increased immeasurably on 11 May 1998 when India announced the successful test of three nuclear devices in the Rajasthan desert close to the border with Pakistan. The fact that a few years earlier India had successfully test-fired long-range surface-to-surface missiles called Agni meant that it now had the capacity to hit Pakistan with **nuclear weapons**.

Relations between the two countries continued to deteriorate as the insurgency in Indian-held Kashmir intensified. On 13 December 2001, a group of Muslim insurgents penetrated the compound of the Indian Parliament in New Delhi in an attempt to assassinate the country's senior political leaders. Twelve people were killed, including the five insurgents, but no members of parliament were killed or injured. The BJP government accused Pakistan of having masterminded the attack and amassed more than a million troops on its side of the border. Pakistan responded with its own mobilization, and it appeared that war was imminent between South Asia's nuclear-armed neighbors. Intense diplomatic efforts by the West, led by the United States, ultimately defused the situation, and the countries gradually pulled their forces back from the border. In April 2003, BJP Prime Minister

Atal Bihari Vajpayee surprised Pakistan and the world by offering the hand of friendship to his neighbor. Pakistan's response to the offer was quick and warm. Diplomatic relations, cut off after the attack on the Indian Parliament, were restored. In January 2004, Prime Minister Vajpayee visited Islamabad, Pakistan, to attend the 12th summit of the **South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation**. On 6 January, India and Pakistan issued a joint statement pledging to solve all their outstanding problems through dialogue. In March 2004, Pakistan entertained and warmly received India's cricket team. India received the Pakistani team in March 2005. On 15 April, President Pervez Musharraf traveled to Delhi to watch the final match of the Pakistani tour and held a summit meeting with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, who had succeeded Vajpayee. Once again, the two sides pledged to work toward resolving their differences through dialogue. *See also* ADVANI, LAL KHRISHNA; HINDUTVA; HIZBUL MUJAHEDIN.

**INDIAN CIVIL SERVICE (ICS).** The Indian Civil Service was established by the British Government in 1857 when it took over the administration of **India** from the East India Company. Recruitment to the service was initially open only to the British. The ICS quickly built a reputation as a premier public service once its recruits demonstrated their ability not only to administer India but also as scholars and statesmen. Induction into the service was on the basis of an entrance examination; once admitted into the service, new recruits were sent to reputable universities in Britain for training in public administration, Indian history, and various Indian languages. In 1899, Indians were allowed to enter this service. In 1947, when Pakistan was born, 81 ICS offices, some of them British but most of them Muslim, opted to serve in the new country. They were initially inducted into a new service, the Pakistan Administration Service. In 1951, the name was changed to the **Civil Service of Pakistan**.

**INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS.** The Indian National Congress was formed in 1885 by Allan Octavian Hume, a retired member of the **Indian Civil Service**. It held its first session in Mumbai (then Bombay), in December 1885. The group's initial purpose was "the consolidation of the union between England and **India**, by securing the modification of such conditions as may be unjust or injurious to

the latter country.” The formation of the organization—if not its stated official purpose—encouraged a group of younger politicians to begin to campaign for limited democracy, which would permit Indians to be elected to provincial councils. These efforts resulted in the **Minto-Morley** reforms of 1909.

The Congress adopted a more militant stance when in 1920 its leadership was assumed by Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi. The party now demanded “dominion status” within the British Empire, similar to that enjoyed by such former colonies as Australia and New Zealand. This campaign lasted for more than a decade, and at times provoked the British administration in India to repress the party’s activities and imprison its senior leaders, including Gandhi. Some progress was made, however. In 1935, the **Government of India Act of 1935** expanded Indian participation in the legislative councils at the provincial and central levels. The Congress participated actively in the elections of 1936–1937 held under the 1935 Act and succeeded in forming governments in eight of the 11 provinces. Its failure to accommodate the **Muslim League** in these governments contributed to the latter’s demand for the creation of Pakistan, an independent state for the Muslims of British India.

On the eve of the 1942 annual meeting, two years after the Muslim League had passed the **Pakistan Resolution** asking for the creation of a separate homeland for the Muslims, the Madras wing of the Congress party, under the leadership of C. Rajagopalacharia, asked for it to “acknowledge the All-India Muslim League’s claim for separation [of the Muslim areas] should the same be persisted in for framing the future constitution of India.” Had the Congress accepted this initiative, it might have prevented the total alienation of a vast number of Muslims from the majority Hindu population. That did not happen, however. Gandhi was not prepared to tolerate any attempt to break up “mother India.” Instead of working on preserving the unity of India, the 1942 annual meeting of the Congress asked the British to leave India. Its “Quit India” movement led to a great deal of unrest in the country at a time when Great Britain was locked in conflict with Germany, Italy, and Japan. The British administration did not appreciate this gesture on the part of the Congress’s leadership. It reacted by imprisoning most of its senior leaders, including Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru.



The Muslims by and large stayed out of the “Quit India” movement. In September 1945, the party opted in favor of a constitutional approach for advancing its cause. It decided to participate in the elections of the central and provincial legislatures which the British had promised to hold once the war in Europe was over. The elections were held in 1946, and this time around, the Muslim League gained ground in the Muslim majority provinces in the northwestern and northeastern parts of the country. Emboldened by its electoral success, the Muslim League pressed hard for the partition of India and the creation of Pakistan. On 3 June 1947, the Congress and the Muslim League accepted the plan put forward by **Lord Louis Mountbatten**, the viceroy of India, to partition India into the two independent states of India and Pakistan. *See also* GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT OF 1909.

**INDO-PAKISTAN WAR OF 1948–1949.** India and Pakistan were only a little more than a year old as independent states when they confronted each other on the battlefield over **Kashmir**. Hostilities arose with Pakistan’s unhappiness over the decision by the maharaja of Kashmir to accede to India. Pakistan’s response took the form of encouragement of thousands of **Pathan** tribesmen to invade **Kashmir**. The involvement of the Pakistan army was limited to advice and logistical support to the invading forces. The tribesmen were about to enter Srinagar, the capital of Kashmir, when India moved in large numbers of troops to aid the the maharaja’s weak forces. This confrontation between the two new countries could have erupted into a major conflagration had the United Nations not intervened. India and Pakistan agreed to abide by the resolution passed by the UN Security Council calling on the two countries to settle the issue of accession of the state by holding a plebiscite.

**INDO-PAKISTAN WAR OF 1965.** The 1965 war between India and Pakistan was fought for 17 days, between 6 September and 23 September. This was the second time India and Pakistan confronted each other on the battlefield over the issue of **Kashmir**. The war began when India opened a number of fronts on its border with West Pakistan, including a major artillery and armor attack on **Lahore**. The Indian action came as a response to the infiltration of *mujahideen* (freedom

fighters) into Kashmir from Pakistan. India accused Pakistan of instigating the rebellion in Kashmir; initially Pakistan denied these charges but later accepted responsibility for supporting the *mujahideen*. Pakistan lost some ground to the Indian forces around Lahore, while capturing some land on the border with Kashmir. There was no conflict on the border between East Pakistan and India. That notwithstanding, the Bengalis realized that Pakistan did not have enough resources to protect them against a possible Indian attack. This apprehension formed the basis of one point of **Mujibur Rahman's Six Point Program**, demanding the creation of a separate militia for East Pakistan. This particular conflict was settled when, under the auspices of the **Soviet Union**, India and Pakistan signed an agreement after a meeting held at Tashkent. *See also* TASHKENT DECLARATION.

**INDO-PAKISTAN WAR OF 1971.** Pakistan and India fought their third war in 22 years in December 1971. Unlike the two previous wars, the issue was not **Kashmir** but the political future of East Pakistan. By the time India decided to intervene directly, the civil war in East Pakistan between **Mukti Bahini**—the freedom fighters of Bengal—and the Pakistan army had gone on for seven months. During this period, India had provided covert support to the freedom fighters.

In late November, however, India's Prime Minister Indira Gandhi decided to intervene directly in the conflict by moving Indian troops into East Pakistan. The Indians advanced quickly, and Dacca (Dhaka) fell on 16 December 1971. In early December, Pakistan had responded by opening a number of fronts in the west, but even here it was overwhelmed by Indian strength. Unlike the 1965 war, India was able to capture large chunks of territory in West Pakistan. India might have pressed its advantage but for the **United States'** tilt toward Pakistan. India understood the message and agreed to cease hostilities in West Pakistan after East Pakistan had declared independence as the new republic of **Bangladesh**.

Final settlement of the conflict was achieved at the Indian city of Simla, following a meeting between Prime Minister **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto** of Pakistan and Indira Gandhi. The **Simla Accord** was reached without a major power looking over the shoulders of the two countries, as had happened at **Tashkent**. Bhutto won the release of over 90,000 prisoners of war captured by India in East Pakistan and

the withdrawal of Indian troops from the territory they had occupied in West Pakistan.

**INDUS RIVER.** The Indus River is Pakistan's longest river. It originates in the Kalias mountain range in Tibet and flows through **Kashmir** before entering Pakistan. At Muzzarafad, the capital of **Azad Kashmir**, the Neelum River (called the Kishenganga by the Indians) joins the Indus River. The Indus flows into the great **Punjab** plain north of **Tarbela dam**. Before entering Punjab, the Indus is joined by the Kabul River. In Punjab, it picks up five more tributaries, the Jhelum, the Chenab, the Ravi, the Sutlej, and the Beas. The river flows into the Arabian Sea through a delta south of **Karachi**. The river is 3,060 kilometers long.

The Indus and its tributary rivers supply a great deal of water for land irrigation in Pakistan's three provinces, the **Northwest Frontier**, Punjab, and **Sindh**. For the last 100 years, an extensive network of dams, barrages, and weirs have been built on the river and its tributaries to water the plains of Pakistan. Without these irrigation works, today much of Pakistan would be desert. With these irrigation works obstructing the flow of water, the Indus is not used for navigation. If boats ply the river, they are generally small and do not cover great distances. In fact, the Indus is the only one of the world's great rivers not used for transport.

**INDUS WATER TREATY.** The Indus Waters Treaty was signed in **Karachi** on 19 September 1960 by President **Muhammad Ayub Khan** of Pakistan, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India, and W. A. B. Iliff, vice president of the **World Bank**. It stipulated that the water of the **Indus River** system should be apportioned on the basis of a formula that gave both countries access to the system. The treaty gave the use of the three eastern rivers—Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej—exclusively to India, whereas the waters of the three western rivers—Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab—were available exclusively for use by Pakistan, except for limited exploitation by India in the upstream areas in Indian **Kashmir** and the Indian states of **Punjab** and Himachel Pradesh. India was allowed to build a specified storage capacity of no more than 3.6 million acre feet (MAF). The flow of the western rivers into Pakistan is estimated at 135.6 MAF. The actual division of wa-

ter was to be accomplished over a period of 10 years, during which a system of “replacement works” was to be constructed. At Pakistan’s request, the period of transition could be extended to 13 years.

The Indus replacement works were to cost \$1,070 million in 1960 prices, of which US\$870 million, or 81.3 percent, were to be spent in Pakistan. These works included two storage dams, one at **Mangla** on the Jhelum River with a capacity of 4.75 MAF, and the other on the **Indus River**, with a capacity of 4.2 MAF. Tarbela was later selected as the site for the dam on the Indus. The works also included five barrages and eight “link canals,” nearly 650 kilometers long, to be built to transfer water from the western to the eastern rivers. Although India argued that the expenditure under the treaty should be only for “replacement” works, the final agreement incorporated some developmental schemes as well. For instance, it was agreed that a power station would be built at Mangla, with a total generating capacity of 800 MW of electricity.

The World Bank established an Indus Basin Development Fund to finance the works to be constructed in Pakistan. The work on the replacement system began in the early 1960s and was completed 14 years later with the commissioning of the **Tarbela dam** in 1974. The treaty made it possible for Pakistan to use 80 percent of the waters in the Indus river system, extending the country’s already extensive irrigation network and thus preparing the ground for Pakistan’s first “**green revolution**” in the late 1960s. The Indus replacement works also provided 3,000 MW of electric power at a time when the demand for energy was increasing rapidly. The treaty did not fully resolve all disputes between the two countries. One particular problem occurred in the late 1980s when India decided to build a barrage at **Wullar** in the part of Kashmir that it occupied. In 2005, Pakistan referred the dispute over the construction of the **Baghhar** dam on the Chenab to the World Bank and began to communicate to the Indian government its concern about the proposed **Kishengonga** dam.

**INDUSTRY.** At the time of independence, Pakistan did not have an industrial sector of any significance. Two cement plants, one each in the provinces of **Punjab** and **Sindh**, and a few cotton ginning and vegetable oil factories made up the entire industrial sector, contributing no more than 6 percent to the gross domestic product (GDP). **Agriculture** was the predominant economic activity, producing not

only enough food to feed the population but leaving a significant amount for export to India. Agriculture also produced such cash crops as **cotton**, sugar cane, and tobacco, which also were exported to India to be processed in the mills of Kolkata, Mumbai, and Ahmadabad. The trade war between India and Pakistan that was fought in 1949 changed this relationship, however. From then on, with imports of consumer goods no longer coming from India, Pakistan was forced to industrialize, which it did with the help of the merchants who had made large profits exporting commodities during the boom years of the Korean War (1951–1954).

Pakistan industrialized quickly during this period, with industrial output increasing at a rate of more than 11 percent a year during the 1950s. By the time the military government of President **Muhammad Ayub Khan** took office (1958), the country's need for basic manufactured goods was being met from domestic output. Muhammad Ayub Khan's government changed the orientation of industrialization by giving much greater attention to the establishment of producer-goods industries. Because this type of industrialization needs a much larger amount of capital investment, the rate of increase in industrial output slowed somewhat during the 1960s, although at more than 8 percent per year, it was still well above the average for the developing world. By the end of the Muhammad Ayub Khan period, industry contributed 18 percent to the GDP.

By nationalizing 31 large-scale industries (steel, cement, fertilizer, automotive, chemical, etc.) in January 1972, the **Pakistan People's Party** government of **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto** (1971–1977) introduced a profound change in the structure of the industrial sector. Public ownership of a significant proportion of output became the most prominent feature of the new structure. Because commercial banks and insurance companies were also nationalized two years later, a symbiotic relationship was established between finance and industry, and was probably the cause of a considerable amount of wasteful expenditure in the sector. The rate of increase in the output of the industrial sector declined in this period to less than 2.5 percent a year.

The third military government under the leadership of President **Zia ul-Haq** (1977–1988) went back to the model followed successfully during the 1960s: the private sector was encouraged once again to participate in the creation of new industrial capital, while a serious attempt

was made to improve the efficiency of public enterprises. But there was one difference in the approach toward industrialization during the Zia ul-Haq period compared to the approach taken by Muhammad Ayub Khan. There was now greater reliance on market signals as opposed to direct bureaucratic controls in the 1960s. For instance, by delinking the value of the rupee from that of the American dollar, the Zia government introduced an element of flexibility in the management of the exchange rate. This policy option had not been tried in the 1960s. Zia, however, did not privatize the industries that had been taken over by Bhutto; he allowed them to remain with the public sector.

The growth rate in the output of the industrial sector picked up once again. From 1977 to 1988, industrial output increased at a rate of over 8 percent per year. In 1988 the share of industry in the country's GDP was more than 25 percent. **Benazir Bhutto's** government, which took office in December 1988, launched a program for the privatization of the industries and other assets that were still held by the public sector. This policy was continued with even greater vigor by **Mian Nawaz Sharif** when he became prime minister in November 1990. A number of industries—in particular those producing cement—were privatized, as were two commercial banks. Some of this momentum was lost when Benazir Bhutto returned to **Islamabad** as prime minister in October 1993, although her government actively implemented the policy of encouraging the private sector to invest in energy plants. Bhutto was dismissed in November 1996, and Sharif returned as prime minister in 1997. The political turmoil following Zia's death no doubt contributed to the slowdown of the growth in the output of the industrial sector. During the period 1988–1997, industrial production increased by only 3.7 percent a year, less than half the rate of increase in the first four decades following independence.

**INTERNATIONAL FINANCE FACILITY FOR IMMUNIZATIONS (IFFI).** Increased awareness in rich countries about the “**health gap**”—the widening gap between developed and developing countries in the provision of health care and expenditure on health per citizen in these two parts of the world—resulted in the launch of a number of new initiatives including the International Finance Facility for Immunizations. The IFFI's establishment was especially critical for countries such as Pakistan, which had lagged behind other

developing countries at the stage of development in terms of providing health care for its citizens. According to *The Health Challenge*, a report published by the **Mahbub ul Haq Human Development Centre** at Islamabad, there was a decline in the overall coverage of immunization in Pakistan for communicable diseases, such as tuberculosis, polio, and measles between 1995 and 2002.

The IFFI was established in September 2005 in London, with financing coming from several European countries including France, Great Britain, Italy, Spain, and Sweden. This innovative fund will provide an extra US\$4 billion for the **Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization**, an initiative launched in the 1990s. The donor countries would borrow money on capital markets and pay it back from aid budgets in an approach that development economists see as a way of realizing aid money early. The additional funds would be used to finance immunization and buy vaccines for the developing world to control diseases such as polio and hepatitis B. Britain pledged 35 percent of the funds that were initially committed for the facility, with France providing another 25 percent. The facility's launch coincided with the publication of a report sponsored by the Wellcome Trust, the London-based medical charity, according to which there was a greater payoff if stronger incentives were provided to smaller biomedical companies rather than to large pharmaceutical groups. Such an approach could help boost the development of treatment for "neglected" diseases of the developing world, such as malaria and tuberculosis. "Neglected diseases" mostly occur in poor countries where biomedical companies have little chance of making a big profit. These diseases kill an estimated three million people a year.

**INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF).** The IMF was established in 1944 after a number of governments, meeting at a conference held at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, decided to create two institutions to help the world recover from the devastation caused by World War II. The IMF was given the responsibility of stabilizing the economies of member countries, in the case of shocks delivered by events over which they had little control. The types of shocks envisaged by the Bretton Woods conferees included changes in terms of trade and the need to make large payments to external creditors that required temporary relief. By providing this form of assistance, the

IMF could help the member countries defend their exchange rates. The exchange rates were fixed to the U.S. dollar; the dollar, in turn, was fixed to the gold standard. This system of exchange rates collapsed in 1971 when the administration of President Richard Nixon decided to de-link the dollar from gold.

The IMF acquired a new mandate in the early 1980s when a number of developing countries—many of them in Latin America—were unable to meet their external debt obligations. The IMF-funded “work-out arrangements” were to save dozens of economies from collapse. It has continued to perform that function. On a number of occasions, the IMF came to the rescue of Pakistan by providing the country with assistance to meet external obligations. The latest IMF-Pakistan agreement was reached in October 1998.

**INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND'S (IMF) EXTENDED STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT FACILITY (ESAF).** The programs of structural adjustment supported by the IMF usually entail economic opening on the part of the countries agreeing to the conditions imposed by the institution. Economic opening implies cuts in the rates of tariff on imports, fewer obstacles for foreign direct investment, and greater freedom to the domestic banking sector to manager their resources without government intervention. These programs may initially result in increasing the balance of payments deficit because of higher levels of imports permitted by them. The assumption is that countries implementing these programs would, over time, become more competitive in the world markets and with an increase in the level of their exports would be able to narrow the gap between export earnings and the expenditure on imports. The IMF's Extended Structural Adjustment Facility was designed to help poor countries meet the additional burden imposed on them as a result of these programs. The resources from the facility have easy terms. The Fund charges only 0.5 percent interest a year. The amount lent is disbursed over a three-year period and is to be paid back over a period extending from 5.5 to 10 years.

The caretaker administration of 1996–1997 developed a major program of structural reform. The program was announced by President **Farooq Leghari** in a televised address on 25 December 1996. It became the core of the program introduced later by the government



of Prime Minister **Mian Nawaz Sharif**. In October 1997, the IMF pledged its support for the program by allowing Pakistan to borrow US \$1.8 billion from the ESAF facility. The first tranche of US\$250 million was released in November 1997.

**INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND'S (IMF) STANDBY PROGRAMS.** The purpose of the IMF's standby programs is to provide countries in economic distress access to resources on relatively easy terms. The funds are disbursed over an 18-month period, and the recipients have to pay interest rates of about 4.5 percent a year. The amount of money received is to be returned over a period extending from 3.24 to 5 years. Disbursements are made following "reviews" by the Fund, in which the institution's staff and its board of directors determine whether the country receiving help is successfully implementing the agreed program.

Pakistan has a long history of first negotiating standby arrangements with the Fund and then midway through the period of implementation seeing them canceled. The last two arrangements met the same fate. In October 1996, the government of Prime Minister **Benazir Bhutto** negotiated a standby arrangement in which she committed herself to reducing the fiscal deficit from 6.2 percent, estimated in fiscal year 1995–1996, to 4 percent of the gross domestic product by 30 June 1997. This target was to be achieved by the government's adoption of a series of fiscal measures that included widening the tax base, extending the coverage of the **general sales tax**, and reducing public sector expenditure. Following the fall of the Bhutto government in November 1996, the caretaker administration sent **Shahid Javed Burki**, its economic advisor, to Washington to renegotiate the arrangement. This was done in December. It was after a great deal of effort that the caretaker administration was able to meet the Fund's targets for the period ending 31 December 1996. These efforts by the caretakers resulted in the release of some US\$160 million by the Fund, at a time when the country's balance-of-payments situation was under a great deal of strain. In March 1997, however, the government of Prime Minister **Mian Nawaz Sharif**, following a review of the economic situation, determined that it would be politically difficult for it to meet the Fund's targets for the rest of the period. Accordingly, it withdrew from the arrangement, opting instead

to receive assistance from the IMF under its Extended Structural Adjustment Facility. *See also* INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND'S EXTENDED STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT FACILITY.

**INTER-SERVICES INTELLIGENCE (ISI).** The Inter-Services Intelligence was originally established in the 1980s to counter the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) of the government of India, which had managed to develop a strong presence in Pakistan. Unlike RAW, which operated under the control of civilian authorities, ISI was managed by the Pakistani army. Over time, the attention of ISI shifted from India to **Afghanistan** and other countries to the north of Pakistan. ISI gained strength and prestige in the 10-year war in Afghanistan during which arms and equipment were channeled through it by the United States and **Saudi Arabia** to the **mujahideen** (freedom fighters) fighting the Soviet Union. ISI also helped to organize training camps for the mujahideen. Most of them were located in the Pakistani provinces of **Balochistan** and the **Northwest Frontier**.

During this period the ISI was headed by General **Akhtar Abdur Rahman**, a close associate of President **Zia ul-Haq**. Rahman was succeeded by Lieutenant General **Hameed Gul**, who was convinced that Pakistan could gain considerable influence in Central Asia following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Gul succeeded in reorienting the mission of the organization by convincing some of its senior operators that they could spearhead the Islamization of the areas in Central Asia vacated by the Soviet Union. There were reports that under Gul, the ISI involved itself in supporting the insurrection in Indian-occupied **Kashmir**. In 1989, Prime Minister **Benazir Bhutto** replaced Gul with General Shamsur Rahman Kallu, who was summoned back from retirement and given the mission of cleansing the ISI of fundamentalist Muslim influence. Following the dismissal of Bhutto and the election of **Mian Nawaz Sharif** as prime minister, however, ISI was handed over to General Javed Nasir, an officer who was a strong believer in the mission initially launched by Gul.

During the war in Afghanistan, ISI was able to develop an identity of its own, independent of the army. The attempts by Generals **Asif Nawaz**, **Waheed Kakar**, and **Jehangir Karamat**, successive commanders of the army, to establish the control of the army establishment over the organization were only partly successful. For instance,

the ISI continued to lend support to the **Taliban** in Afghanistan even when the government of Pakistan wished to distance itself from them.

**INZAMAM-UL-HAQ (1970– )**. Born and raised in Multan, Inzamam made his first class **cricket** debut at the age of 15 and later played in the Under-19 Cricket World Cup in 1988. Chosen for the senior Pakistan squad after he impressed captain **Imran Khan** in a practice session, he rose to sudden prominence when he scored a quick and crucial match-turning 50 in the 1992 World Cup semi-final match against New Zealand and another important inning in the final, to help Pakistan win its only World Cup title to date.

Inzamam gradually became the backbone of the Pakistan batting lineup in both test and one-day cricket, and he was the batsman to whom the team turned in tough situations time and again. Regarded as one of the best players of fast bowling in modern times, some of his most brilliant performances resulted in memorable test victories for Pakistan, including wins against Australia (1994), England (1996 and 2001), Bangladesh (2003), and India (2005). He is the second highest Pakistani run-scorer in tests and the only Pakistani with more than 10,000 runs in one-day cricket. Inzamam is also one of the two Pakistanis to have scored a test triple hundred. He was appointed captain in late 2003 and given charge of a young and inexperienced team that went on to tie a test series against a much stronger Indian team in 2005. In late 2005, he became the highest scorer in the country's history in terms of centuries made in test cricket. He won for Pakistan the test series against England that was played in Pakistan in November and December 2005.

**IQBAL, SIR MUHAMMAD (1877–1938)**. Muhammad Iqbal was born in Sialkot, a city near the **Punjab–Kashmir** border. He was educated at **Lahore**, Cambridge, and Munich. He started his professional career as a teacher at Government College, Lahore. He returned to Europe after a brief stay in Lahore and in 1908 was appointed professor of Arabic at London University. He gained considerable reputation as a poet after publishing a long poem, *Asrari-i-Khudi*, in Persian in 1915. In spite of the success of this poem, he wrote most of his poetry in Urdu. He and **Faiz Ahmad Faiz** are generally regarded as the most

prominent Urdu poets of the 20th century. Iqbal also gained a reputation as a philosopher. His theme was the role of religion in the life of man. His philosophical essays were published in a collection entitled *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*. His poems and writings had a profound influence on Muslim India.

Iqbal was also to play an important role in the Muslim politics of British India. In 1930, he was invited to chair the annual session of the **All-India Muslim League**. The session was held at Allahabad, and in his inaugural address, he proposed the establishment of an autonomous Muslim state in northwest British India. He was one of the several prominent Muslims leaders who persuaded **Muhammad Ali Jinnah** to return to India from a self-imposed exile in London. Jinnah returned to India in 1931, and in an exchange of letters with Iqbal that lasted for several years, the two discussed the future of the Muslim community in South Asia. Iqbal died in Lahore and was buried in the compound of Lahore's Badshah-i-Mosque. Pakistan observes 21 April, the day of his death, as Iqbal Day.

**IRAN–PAKISTAN–INDIA GAS PIPELINE.** One consequence of the thaw in relations between India and Pakistan in the period following the then Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's friendship overtures in April 2003 was to advance the idea of building a gas pipeline connecting **Iran's** gas fields with India's industrial centers. The 2,708 kilometer pipeline would originate in Iran's South Pars gas field and pass through southwest Pakistan to the Indian border. At the border, the pipeline would connect with a pipeline grid proposed to be built by India. The US\$4 billion pipeline would be the most economical way to get natural gas from Iran to India. The high rate of GDP growth in India has turned the country into a major **energy** deficit area, increasingly dependent upon fuel oil imports from the Middle East. India's insatiable demand for fuel, when added to that of **China**, has put so much pressure on the world's oil markets as to force the price of crude oil to more than \$70 a barrel in the summer of 2006.

The pipeline will also bring considerable economic benefits to Pakistan. It was expected to bring US\$600 to \$700 million in transit fees annually to the country. There was also a provision that Pakistan, also an energy deficit country with a rapidly increasing economy, could tap into the pipeline to obtain gas supplies for itself. The leaders of India and Pakistan, as well as most political analysts, felt that

the construction of the pipeline would help bring peace to South Asia. It would help link the economies of the countries in the region, which would add to the incentives that already existed on both sides of the border for casting off the burden of history and moving toward a better future. The pipeline project was discussed by President **Pervez Musharraf** in his meeting with Manmohan Singh, the Indian prime minister, on 17 April 2004. “We cannot rewrite the past, but we can build a more secure future,” said the Indian prime minister at a banquet for the visiting Pakistani president. Both leaders agreed that the pipeline project was one way of writing the future.

The idea of the pipeline was supported by the large United States energy services companies that hoped to win lucrative contracts for its construction. However, before the American companies could bid for contracts, the U.S. Congress needed to ease its sanctions on Iran, put in place after the Islamic revolution in Iran and the taking of American hostages in 1979; Iran’s nuclear development program further strained relations between Tehran and Washington.

**IRAN–PAKISTAN RELATIONS.** Iran is one of the few countries with whom Pakistan has maintained warm relations throughout its history. Reza Shah Pahlavi, the emperor of Iran, was the first head of state to visit Pakistan. The visit took place in 1950, and the Iranian monarch was received with great affection. Both Iran and Pakistan joined the defense agreements sponsored by the United States in the 1950s. The two countries also organized a regional arrangement called the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD), which also included Turkey. The RCD, with headquarters in Tehran, the capital of Iran, was meant to achieve closer economic cooperation among the non-Arab Muslim states of West Asia. The RCD was launched with much enthusiasm by President **Muhammad Ayub Khan** in 1962 and survived for nearly two decades but did not achieve anything of great significance. In 1965, when Pakistan went to war with India, Iran offered both political and material support.

Relations between the two countries cooled a bit after the Islamic revolution in Iran, in 1979. The religious leadership in Iran sought to project Shia **Islam**, its brand of Islam, in the countries in which Shias constituted sizable minorities. Pakistan and **Saudi Arabia** were two such countries. Although Iran’s relations with Saudi Arabia deteriorated to the point where the two countries broke all diplomatic

contacts, Pakistan managed to retain reasonable contacts with Tehran. However, the success of the **Taliban in Afghanistan** and their effort to impose very strict Sunni Islam in their country and Iran's strong belief that Pakistan was encouraging these moves created tension between the two countries in the late 1990s. There was also an impression in Pakistan that Iran was providing assistance to the Shias in sectarian violence that claimed hundreds of lives in Pakistan during 1995–1998. *See also* INDO-PAKISTAN WAR OF 1965.

**IRAQ–PAKISTAN RELATIONS.** Pakistan's relations with Iraq go back to the early 1950s when Pakistan joined the Baghdad Pact, a U.S.-sponsored defense arrangement among the countries in the Middle East and West Asia. These countries had expressed a strong commitment to contain the spread of communism to their areas. The assassination of the king of Iraq in 1958 took Iraq out of the pact, which was renamed the Central Treaty Organization. In the quarter century after the revolution in Iraq, trade was the only contact between the two countries. Iraq continued to be an important market for basmati rice from Pakistan. In 1991, however, General **Aslam Beg**, the chief of the army staff at the time, signaled a definite Pakistani tilt toward Iraq during the buildup of the first Gulf War. Beg predicted heavy losses by the allied forces led by the United States if they moved against Iraq. He also implied that the action against Iraq was somehow a part of the West's desire to dominate the Islamic world. These reactions on the part of the head of the armed forces soured Pakistan's relations with the United States and Saudi Arabia. They also raised some serious issues about Beg's judgment on military strategy.

Beg's successors, Generals **Asif Nawaz**, **Abdul Waheed Kakar**, and **Jehangir Karamat**, sought to rebuild relations with Saudi Arabia and the United States. They met with limited success. In 1998, with some easing of the economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations on Iraq, Pakistan was able to resume commercial ties with the country. It entered an agreement to export 400,000 tons of basmati rice to Iraq. Pakistan was opposed to the decision by Washington to invade Iraq in March 2003. Although the United States requested Islamabad to contribute troops for keeping peace in Iraq after the conclusion of the second Gulf War, Islamabad chose not to get involved.

**ISHRAT HUSSAIN (1941–)**. Ishrat Hussain was educated at Williams College and Boston University from where he obtained his doctorate in economics. He joined the **Civil Service of Pakistan** in 1964 and held various positions in the field and later served in the Finance, Planning, and Development Departments in the Secretariat. In 1979, he joined the **World Bank** as an economist and held various managerial positions in the institution, including director of the Poverty and Social Policy Department and director of the Central Asian Republics Department. During his career at the Bank he also served as chief economist for Africa. In 1999, he took early retirement from the Bank to become governor of the **State Bank of Pakistan**—the country's central bank.

Since assuming the office of governor, he has implemented a major program of restructuring of the state bank, making it one of the leading central banks in Asia. He steered the **banking** sector reforms, transforming the largely public sector owned and inefficient institutions into privately owned and managed banks. These banks had extended their reach to the middle and lower income groups and to underserved sectors such as agriculture, small and medium enterprises, housing, micro finance, and consumer finance. As a member of the economic team of President **Pervez Musharraf**, Hussain played a key role in the turnaround of Pakistan's economy during the 2002–2005 period. In recognition of his achievements, he was declared the central bank governor of the year by *The Banker* magazine of London and received the award of Hilal e Imtiaz from the president of Pakistan—the first ever award received by any central bank governor in the history of Pakistan.

Ishrat Hussain has written extensively on the Pakistani economy. His books include *Pakistan: The Economy of an Elitist State* and *Economic Management in Pakistan 1999–2002*.

**ISKANDER MIRZA, GENERAL (1899–1969)**. Iskander Mirza belonged to the family of the nawabs of Murshidabad. He was the first Indian to graduate from the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, although he did not serve for very long in the British Indian Army. He joined the Indian Political Service in 1931 and opted to serve in Pakistan after the partition of British India. He was appointed defense secretary in 1947 and held that position for seven years. It was in this

capacity that he developed close relations with the senior officers of the Pakistani army, including General **Muhammad Ayub Khan**. Following the dismissal of the provincial government headed by A. K. Fazlul Haq in 1954, he was appointed governor of the province of East Pakistan. He returned to **Karachi** a year later and was appointed minister of defense. In 1955, he took over as governor-general from the ailing **Ghulam Muhammad**. A few months later, after the promulgation of Pakistan's first constitution, the **constitution of 1956**, he was appointed president. He remained president until 27 October 1958 when General Muhammad Ayub Khan, having proclaimed martial law, sent him into exile in London.

**ISLAM.** While Pakistan was founded on the basis of the notion that the Muslim community of British India was a separate nation, distinct from the majority Hindu population, it was not meant to become an Islamic state. **Muhammad Ali Jinnah**, Pakistan's founding father, was a secular Muslim who wished to create a modern and democratic state for British India's Muslims. Jinnah might have realized his dream had he lived longer—he died on 11 September 1948, less than 13 months after Pakistan's birth—and had ethnic cleansing not occurred following the British decision to partition their South Asian domain into a majority Hindu India and a majority Muslim Pakistan. At least the push toward Islamization would not have manifested as strongly as it did. Within a few months of the decision, announced on 3 June 1947, some 14 million people left their homes, with 8 million Muslims leaving India for Pakistan and 6 million Hindus and Sikhs moving in the other direction. By the time the new leadership of Pakistan began the process of constitution-making, the proportion of Muslims in its population had increased by 20 percentage points, from 75 percent to 95 percent. With this increase came the increasing influence of such Islamic parties as **Jamaat-e-Islami**.

Immediately after Pakistan's birth, the Jamaat went to work to introduce Islam into the new country's society, polity, and economy. These attempts were initially resisted by the mainstream political parties, in particular the **Pakistan Muslim League**. The Jamaat's campaign to have the **Ahmadiya** community declared a non-Muslim minority led to the limited **Martial Law of 1953**, while its efforts to introduce the Islamic *sharia* as the law of the land was equally unsuccessful.



The **Constitution of 1956** made a gesture to the demand of introducing Islamic precepts into the political system by incorporating a preamble to the main document. The “directive principles” incorporated in the preamble were not enforceable in the law courts but were to serve as a guide to the formulation of state policies. Also, the country was to be called the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the head of the state, the president with no executive authority, had to be a Muslim. The **Constitution of 1962** retained most of the Islamic provisions of the 1956 document. While it created a presidential system, the provision that only a Muslim could hold that position remained. That notwithstanding, the administration of **Muhammad Ayub Khan** made no attempt to further Islamize the society or to bring religion into politics or the economy. His one concession was to call the new capital he had built for the country **Islamabad**, the city of Islam. Muhammad Ayub Khan was a modern and a secular person and did not encourage any aspect of Islamization.

It was under **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto**, Ayub Khan’s successor, that Islam first gained a strong foothold in the Pakistani society. This was surprising since Bhutto, even more than Muhammad Ayub Khan, had a strong secular outlook and was thoroughly modern and Westernized in the way he lived and behaved. Nonetheless, two of his acts were to profoundly affect the pace of Islamization; the first of these was unwitting, but the second was a deliberate political move.

In 1975, Bhutto chose a little known three-star army general, **Zia ul-Haq**, to become the chief of army staff. He turned to Haq knowing full well that the general did not have a strong base of support in the army. Deeply religious, Lieutenant General Zia did not fit well into the overtly Western and secular atmosphere that prevailed in the army, in particular in the messes and clubs in which the members of the corps of officers spent most of their non-work time. Once installed as the head of the army, General Zia began the process of bringing religion into the service.

Bhutto’s second move was taken in 1976 when, to take the sting out of the growing opposition move against him, he agreed to a number of demands that religious groups had made over time. These included the designation of the Ahmadiya community as non-Muslim; prohibition of alcohol and gambling; and the designation of Friday, the Muslim Sabbath, as the weekly holiday. These steps did not placate the

Islamic groups. Bhutto was ultimately overthrown by the military, under the command of General Zia ul-Haq.

Bringing Islam into the economic and political systems and strengthening its hold on the society became important policy planks for the Zia government. General Zia also sought to legitimize his rule by his commitment to Islamize the country. In this effort he received support from two external sources. The **United States** helped Pakistan to develop or set up *madrassas*, which could train Islamic zealots to battle the Soviet troops that had moved into **Afghanistan** in 1979 and stayed on in the country for a decade. The madrassas received financial support and religious indoctrination from **Saudi Arabia**. The Saudis were anxious to export the **Wahabi** interpretation of Islam to other Muslim countries, and Pakistan, being the second largest Muslim country in the world after Indonesia, was an attractive place to begin this work.

Setting up and supporting madrassas was one of the many ways that General Zia ul-Haq brought Islam into the country. He also changed the legal system in various ways. A *Sharia* bench was set up as a part of the Supreme Court to determine whether the laws passed by the national and provincial assemblies conformed to the injunctions of Islam. A new set of laws were enacted which seriously eroded the status of **women** in society. Zia also enacted the blasphemy law that made denigration of Islam a criminal offense. Some of these acts were punishable by death.

The United States response to the **terrorist** attacks of 11 September 2001 on its territory, and the American retaliatory attack on Afghanistan, followed by the invasion of Iraq, strengthened the Islamic parties in Pakistan and contributed to the unexpectedly strong performance of the **Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA)** in the **elections of 2002**. The MMA became the leading opposition party in the National Assembly and was able to form the provincial government in the **Northwest Frontier Province** and become a coalition partner in the government that took office in **Balochistan**. These two provinces bordered with Afghanistan, thus complicating Pakistan's effort against terrorism inspired by Islamic extremists.

The advent of the era of President **Pervez Musharraf**, after the general assumed power in October 1999, ultimately led to the first strong government challenge to the Islamic groups in the country. Initially, the military government sought to use the Islamic groups to

counter the power of the mainstream parties, the **Pakistan Peoples Party** and the **Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz)**, that General Musharraf opposed. Later, once the Pakistani president had agreed with the Americans to end support of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, the religious groups turned against him with some vehemence that included three assassination attempts. In return, the general declared war on Islamic extremists and set out to advocate the adoption of a strategy that he labeled “enlightened moderation.” He also began to regulate the madrassas by requiring them to register with the government and to teach modern subjects along with religious instruction. Furthermore, he declared that his administration would review the laws on the country’s books that had infringed on the basic human rights of some segments of society, in particular those of women. His political reforms included reserving a large number of seats for women in the national and provincial assemblies. When, in 2005, the legislature of the Northwest Frontier Province passed the Hisab Act, aimed at creating a mechanism to force the people of the province to follow “Islamic ways,” he introduced a motion in the Supreme Court which declared the act unconstitutional. For the first time in Pakistan’s history, the government of the day had decided to check the growing influence of the Islamic groups and block the march toward Islamization.

**ISLAMABAD.** Soon after placing Pakistan under martial law, General **Muhammad Ayub Khan** decided to move the country’s capital from **Karachi** to a place inland. Karachi did not suit the military regime. It was 1,600 kilometers from **Rawalpindi**, the general headquarters of the army. It was dominated by the business and industrial communities with which Muhammad Ayub Khan at that point had little affinity. Culturally, linguistically, and ethnically, Karachi had little in common with the Pakistan military’s homeland—the districts in **Punjab**’s north and in the **Northwest Frontier Province** (NWFP). The decision to move the capital from Karachi, therefore, was a political one. The objective was to move the country’s political center of gravity to a point located within indigenous Pakistan.

Having made the decision to move the capital, Muhammad Ayub Khan appointed a commission under the chairmanship of General **Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan** to suggest a new site. The commission worked diligently, examined many sites, and investigated the

possibility of retaining Karachi as the seat of government, but finally, it came up with the not surprising conclusion that the area just north of Rawalpindi would be the most appropriate place. From the several names suggested (including Jinnahabad), Muhammad Ayub Khan chose to call the new capital Islamabad—the city of Islam.

The **Constitution of 1962** confirmed Islamabad as the executive seat of the central government but located the legislative branch near Dacca (Dhaka), the capital of East Pakistan. A site named Ayubnagar was to be developed in the vicinity of Dacca as the seat of the legislative branch of the government, thus carrying to an absurd extent the concept of separation of powers. Construction on the new city of Islamabad began in 1961, and the city's first residents began to be accommodated in 1963. The **Indo-Pakistan War of 1965** and the resultant constraint on resources slowed the city's development. The presidency and several other important departments were temporarily housed in Rawalpindi.

With **Bangladesh** becoming an independent country, Islamabad's ambiguous status as the national capital was finally resolved. There was no longer any need to physically separate the executive and legislative branches of the government. When **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto** summoned the national legislature in the spring of 1972, it met in Islamabad in a building constructed for the State Bank of Pakistan. It was from this building that the National Assembly, in 1973, produced Pakistan's third **Constitution of 1973**. A new set of buildings to house the National Assembly was commissioned by the Bhutto government in 1974. Completed in 1986, it now houses the Senate and the National Assembly.

In the late 1970s, a construction boom began in Islamabad and continues to this day. Karachi's ethnic problems and the breakdown of law and order in the city in the winter of 1986 induced hundreds of business and professional firms from Karachi to relocate in Islamabad. In 1998, Islamabad's population was estimated at 600,000 and was increasing at the rate of 6 to 7 percent per year.

**ISLAMI JAMHURI ITEHAD (IJI).** The Islami Jamhuri Itehad (Islamic Democratic Alliance) was organized in September 1988 to challenge the **Pakistan People's Party (PPP)** in the elections of November 1988. The alliance was made up of nine parties, including

the two factions of the **Muslim League** into which the party split after the death of President **Zia ul-Haq**.. The IJI also included the powerful **Jamaat-e-Islami** as well as the **Tehrik-e-Istiqlal**. The alliance won only 53 seats in the National Assembly, against 92 secured by the PPP. Most of its seats were won in **Punjab**. Most important IJI leaders lost the election; the only exception was **Mian Nawaz Sharif**, Zia ul-Haq's protégé from Punjab. Mian Nawaz Sharif resigned from his National Assembly seat and went to **Lahore**, where he formed an IJI provincial government.

The IJI won the majority of National Assembly seats in the 1990 elections, which were held following the dismissal of the PPP administration by President **Ghulam Ishaq Khan**. It was invited to form the government with Mian Nawaz Sharif as prime minister. The IJI government was dismissed by President Khan in April 1993, on charges of corruption and incompetence. The Supreme Court overturned the president's action, declaring it unconstitutional, and restored the government of Mian Nawaz Sharif. The Supreme Court's action did not end the conflict between the president and the prime minister, however. Working behind the scenes, General Abdul Waheed Kakar, the army chief of staff, forced the president and the prime minister to resign. Another round of elections was held in October 1993 (*see* ELECTIONS OF 1993), in which the Muslim League decided to participate independently, rather than as a member of the coalition. This decision led to the demise of the IJI.

**ISMAILI.** The Ismaili sect of Islam owes its origin to a series of disputes between the sons of a Shia *imam* (leader) in the 18th century. Ismail was one of the two sons. With their claims unsettled, the followers of Ismail became the Ismailis; the followers of his brother remained in the mainstream of Shiism. The Ismailis, fearing persecution, went into hiding for more than a century but emerged to establish sovereignty over Egypt and North Africa. The Ismaili missionaries traveled far and wide and established communities of their followers in a number of areas, including the northern parts of Pakistan, southern Russia, and western **China**. In the mid-1800s, the head of the Ismaili community was forced to leave Iran. He took his followers to **Sindh**, now a province of Pakistan, and proclaimed himself the Aga (father) Khan. His grandson, Sultan Aga Khan, played an active role in the Muslim

politics of British India, was associated with the decision to form the **All-India Muslim League**, and became a close associate of **Muhammad Ali Jinnah**. After the death of Sultan Aga Khan, his grandson, Karim Aga Khan, was nominated to succeed him as the Aga Khan. Sultan Khan established a number of charitable organizations that work not only among the Ismaili communities but also among other groups of poor Muslims. These organizations expanded a great deal under the leadership of Karim Aga Khan.

The Ismailis are estimated to number about 15 million, with their largest communities in Pakistan and India. There are also pockets of Ismailis in China, Russia, **Afghanistan**, Syria, and East Africa. In Pakistan, the largest communities of Ismailis are in Gilgit and Hunza. The Aga Khan Foundation and the Aga Khan Fund for Economic Development, both based in Geneva, established the Aga Khan University in **Karachi**, and are financing an imaginative program of rural development in Gilgit and Hunza.

**ISRAEL–PAKISTAN RELATIONS.** Pakistan was one of several Muslim countries that refused to recognize Israel as long as it refused to vacate the land it had occupied on the West Bank after the war with Egypt and Syria in 1967. This stance did not change even after the Camp David Accord between Egypt and Israel that led to the recognition by the former of the latter. Pakistan did not change its position even after **India** gave full recognition to the Jewish state and it began to use Israel’s proven military prowess and technology to improve its own defense capability. Following some informal contacts between Israel and Pakistan, Islamabad sought help from a Muslim country that had the closest ties with Jerusalem. On 1 September 2005, the Turkish government arranged a meeting between **Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri**, Pakistan’s foreign minister, and Silvan Shalom, his Israeli counterpart. The meeting was held in Istanbul. Kasuri and Shalom described the meeting as a “historic first,” and called on “all of the Muslim and Arab countries to reconsider their relations with Israel.” Pakistan described the meeting as part of a broader initiative. The Israeli response was even more euphoric. “Pakistan, as the second largest Muslim country after Indonesia, has great weight. They themselves took a very brave step. We know that they were under harsh attack, from the clergy and from others,” said the country’s foreign minister.

On 17 September 2005, while on a visit to New York to attend a summit of world leaders sponsored by the United Nations, President **Pervez Musharraf** of Pakistan addressed the Jewish community at a dinner hosted by the World Jewry Council. He reiterated that the Muslims and Jews had to work together toward creating conditions that would contribute to world peace. *See also* FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

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**JAFFREY, VASEEM A. (1925– )**. Born in Allahabad, India, Jaffrey joined the elitist **Civil Service of Pakistan** in 1949 soon after independence and after a brief tenure as a district officer moved to the West Pakistan secretariat in **Lahore** to hold senior economic positions. While Lahore was the capital of West Pakistan, Jaffrey held the positions of secretary of finance, additional chief secretary of planning and development, and chairman of the planning board. In 1971, he was transferred to the central government where he served as secretary of commerce, secretary of planning, and finally governor of the State Bank, Pakistan's central bank. Some policy differences with **Mahbubul Haq**, President **Zia ul-Haq**'s finance minister, led him to resign from the State Bank in the summer of 1988. In December 1988, following the assumption of office by **Benazir Bhutto**, he was appointed economic advisor to the prime minister.

He left office on 6 August 1990, following the dismissal of the government of Benazir Bhutto, but he returned to the position he had held in Benazir Bhutto's first administration when she returned to power as prime minister in October 1993. This time, Jaffrey had to share even his advisory position with a number of other officials who were influential in different ways. The group included Shahid Hassan Khan, who was the prime minister's advisor on energy and power; Qazi Alimullah, the deputy chairman of the planning commission; and Javed Talat, secretary of the finance division. This division of power among so many different people produced a sense of drift on economic matters during Benazir Bhutto's second tenure in office. It was widely believed that **Asif Ali Zardari**, the prime minister's husband, exercised the real authority in economic decision-making. Vaseem Jaffrey left

the government following the dismissal of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto by President **Farooq Leghari** on 5 November 1996.

**JALIB, HABIB (c. 1952–1994).** Habib Jalib was a poet in the tradition of **Faiz Ahmad Faiz**. Like Faiz, he used the idiom of poetry to communicate political messages to his diverse audience. Jalib’s poetry called for an end to exploitation, feudalism, obscurantism, and imperialism. He gained prominence during the 1960s when Field Marshal **Muhammad Ayub Khan**, Pakistan’s first military ruler, held power and succeeded in silencing all voices of dissent. Jalib’s was one of the few voices that continued to challenge military authority by calling the poor and the underprivileged to fight for their economic, social, and political rights. Jalib was imprisoned several times for expressing views that ran counter to those of the government of the day. He continued to be out of favor even with the government of **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto**, which succeeded the military regimes of Muhammad Ayub Khan and **Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan**. Jalib’s view of the quality of governance provided by Bhutto and his **Pakistan People’s Party** was no less critical.

**JAM GHULAM QADIR KHAN OF LASBELA (c. 1915–1994).** Jam Ghulam Qadir Khan belonged to what was once the “**princely state**” of Lasbela, in **Balochistan**. His state became a part of the province of Balochistan. The Jam—as he was usually called—gained political prominence during the administration of **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto**. In 1973, Bhutto had alienated all the major tribal *sardars* (chiefs) of Balochistan by dismissing the provincial government that had been formed by the **National Awami Party (NAP)** and the **Jamiatul-Ulemai-Islam (JUI)**. Bhutto accused the NAP-JUI coalition of anti-state activities. The result of this action was open revolt against the central authorities, and Bhutto had to call in the army to bring peace to Balochistan. However, peace did not return while Bhutto was in power. In these difficult circumstances, Bhutto needed the support of a reasonably well-placed tribal *sardar* to help him in the province. He turned to the Jam and appointed him chief minister of the province. The Jam served in that position for almost three years. He left office on 31 December 1975, when Bhutto again brought Balochistan under “president’s rule.”



Jam of Lasbela returned to politics in 1985 when President **Zia ul-Haq** lifted martial law and appointed **Muhammad Khan Junejo** prime minister of Pakistan. Junejo, in turn, appointed civilian governments in the four provinces. The government in Balochistan was headed by the Jam, who served as the chief minister of the province for the second time. He was dismissed by President Zia on 29 May 1988, along with Prime Minister Junejo and all other provincial chief ministers. Jam Qadir Khan died in **Karachi**, in 1994.

**JAMAAT-E-ISLAMI.** The Jamaat-e-Islami (Islamic Organization) was founded by **Maulana Abul Maududi** in 1941 as an ideological movement to reindulcate Islamic values among all Muslims—in particular, those who lived in British India. The Jamaat’s appeal was initially limited to a small number of people, all of them dedicated followers of Maulana Maududi. Its opposition to the idea of Pakistan—the creation of a separate homeland for the Muslims of British India—inhibited the Jamaat from expanding its presence among the Muslim masses. In 1940, by getting the **Muslim League** to pass the **Pakistan Resolution**, **Muhammad Ali Jinnah** had succeeded in galvanizing the Muslim masses.

The Jamaat changed its position once it became obvious that Jinnah had succeeded in persuading both the British and the Hindu-dominated **Indian National Congress** to agree to the establishment of Pakistan. In 1947, following the birth of Pakistan, Maulana Maududi moved the headquarters of his organization to a suburb in **Lahore**. Lahore at that time was the largest city in Pakistan, and Maududi knew that the base of his support was basically among the more literate urban communities. Once in Lahore, the Jamaat’s main objective was redefined as the establishment of an Islamic state in Pakistan.

In order to cleanse Pakistan of “aberrant and deviant” behavior, the Jamaat launched a campaign against the **Ahmadiya** community in 1953 in most large cities of **Punjab**. The campaign resulted in thousands of deaths as the party’s followers fought pitched battles with law-enforcement authorities in Lahore and other cities of Punjab. The Jamaat did not immediately succeed in its purpose since the government was not prepared to declare the Ahmadiyas a non-Muslim minority. It had to wait for two decades before this objective was realized and Prime Minister **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto** accepted its demand in

1974. The Bhutto administration moved a bill through the National Assembly that classified the Ahmadiya community as “non-Muslims” and deprived it of the right to practice its religion.

The Jamaat took part in a number of opposition movements against the government of the day. It supported the **Combined Opposition Party (COP)** in the presidential elections of 1965; it worked with the **Pakistan National Alliance (PNA)** that agitated against the government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto following the elections of 1977; it participated, off and on, in the **Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD)** that worked against the government of President **Zia ul-Haq**. In spite of all of this, the Jamaat did not succeed in expanding its political base. In the National Assembly elections of 1970, it won only four seats in a house of 300, all of them from West Pakistan. Out of the 33 million total votes cast in the elections, the Jamaat polled less than 2 million, 1 million each in East and West Pakistan. The entire contingent of 70 candidates it fielded in East Pakistan lost, and only 4 of the 78 it nominated in West Pakistan won in the elections. In the “party-less” elections called by the martial-law government of Zia ul-Haq, the Jamaat was able to significantly increase its representation in the National Assembly. Of the 237 members in the house, 12 were said to be associated with the Jamaat.

Maulana Maududi resigned as the Jamaat’s *amir* (president) in 1972 and was succeeded by the considerably less charismatic **Mian Tufail Muhammad**. Under the new leadership, the Jamaat attempted to work with the government of President Zia ul-Haq. The Jamaat supported Zia’s program of Islamization. The party entered into an electoral alliance with the **Pakistan Muslim League** in 1988 and 1990 and joined the **Islami Jamhuri Itihad (IJI)** administration led by Prime Minister **Mian Nawaz Sharif**, which took office in November 1990. In the elections of 1993, however, the Muslim League decided to dissolve the IJI, and the Jamaat once again had to fight the elections on its own. It did not fare very well, winning only three seats in the National Assembly. In 2002, the Jamaat became an active member of **Muttahida Mujlis-e-Amal**.

**JAMALI, SARDAR ZAFARULLAH KHAN (1944– )**. Born on 1 January 1944 at Deva Murad Jamali in **Balochistan**, Zafarullah Khan Jamali was educated at Lawrence College in Muree and Aitchison

College and Government College, both in **Lahore**. He began his political career as a member of the **Pakistan People's Party**, which he joined in the 1970s. In 1977, he was elected to the Balochistan provincial assembly. In the 1980s, he served in one of the administrations put into office by General **Zia ul-Haq**, Pakistan's third military president. He was one of the three contenders to become prime minister in 1985 when Zia ul-Haq decided to lift martial law and hand over power to a civilian government. When **Muhammad Khan Junejo** was chosen by the president to be prime minister, Jamali joined the cabinet as minister for war and power. In November 1996, President **Farooq Ahmad Khan Leghari** appointed him chief minister of Balochistan after dismissing Prime Minister **Benazir Bhutto** and the federal and provincial governments.

After the decision by **Mian Nawaz Sharif** to accept exile over long incarceration, a group of senior members of the Pakistan Muslim League decided to form their own faction, the **PML (Quaid-e-Azam)**. Jamali became the secretary general of this new party. The party gained the most seats but not a majority in the assembly elected in October 2002. On 21 November 2002, Jamali was elected the twenty-first prime minister, after securing 172 votes from a house of 329 members. He was the first person from Balochistan to hold that position. He was in office for 581 days and resigned on 26 June 2004 after it became known that General **Pervez Musharraf** was not pleased with the way the prime minister had handled the volatile National Assembly. The assembly had a messy start as the opposition refused to accept the **Legal Framework Order** promulgated by President Musharraf as part of the **constitution**; refused to accept that a constitutionally elected president could retain his army uniform; and indicated that the president would not be welcomed into the chamber if he sought to address the parliament as required by law. It took months before this impasse could be resolved. Jamali was deemed to be a weak leader.

**JAMIATUL-ULEMAI-ISLAM (JUI)**. The Jamiatul-Ulemai-Islam was formed in 1919, in the wake of the Khilafat Movement. The Khilafat Movement, in turn, was the result of Turkey's war with Great Britain and the apprehension on the part of a segment of the Muslim leadership in India that the collapse of the Ottoman Empire was the result of a Western conspiracy to subjugate Islam. Accordingly, the

leadership of the JUI was intensely suspicious of British rule. The JUI did not initially align itself with the **Muslim League**, the mainstream Muslim organization in British India, or support the idea of Pakistan, which was being espoused by the League under its president, **Muhammad Ali Jinnah**. In November 1945, however, a group of Jamiatul-Ulemai-Hind (JUH) *ulema* (clerics) left the organization to form a splinter group named the Jamiatul-Ulemai-Islam and declared their support for the idea of Pakistan.

The JUI went through a number of organizational changes after its leaders migrated to Pakistan in August 1947, most of whom settled in **Karachi**, Pakistan's first capital. In the 1960s, the party developed a strong presence in **Balochistan** and the **Northwest Frontier Province**. The JUI's support base was in the intensely conservative countryside of these two provinces. Its leaders, in particular, **Maulana Mufti Mahmud** in the Northwest Frontier Province, used the Friday sermon as an effective way of communicating political messages. This grassroots work by the *ulema* in Balochistan and the Frontier paid off handsomely in the elections of 1970 when the JUI captured seven seats in the National Assembly.

In December 1971, the military handed over power to President **Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto**, and Bhutto allowed the formation of political administrations in the country's four remaining provinces—Balochistan, the Northwest Frontier Province, **Punjab**, and **Sindh**. The JUI joined with the **National Awami Party (NAP)** to put coalition governments in place in both Balochistan and the Frontier Province. Maulana Mufti Mahmud became the chief minister of the NWFP. Bhutto, however, not at ease with the provincial governments that he could not control, dismissed the JUI-NAP administration in Balochistan and the NWFP on the pretext that they were acting against the integrity of Pakistan. The dismissal of the JUI-NAP-headed administrations was to have many profound consequences for the evolution of democracy in Pakistan. The removal of the two provincial Cabinets sent the signal to the parties not aligned with Bhutto's **Pakistan People's Party (PPP)** that the prime minister was not prepared to tolerate any opposition to his rule. The opposition reacted by coming together, in spite of ideological differences.

In 1977, the JUI joined the **Pakistan National Alliance (PNA)** and organized to oppose the PPP in the elections that were held in Febru-

ary of that year (**elections of 1977**). The ability of the religious parties to muster popular support—particularly, after the Friday sermon—galvanized the opposition, put Bhutto on the defensive, and created an opportunity for the army to intervene once again in politics. The JUI played an important role in the campaign against Bhutto and inadvertently set the stage for Pakistan’s third martial-law administration.

When Maulana Mufti Mahmud died, and was succeeded by his son, **Maulana Fazlur Rahman**, an even closer relationship was forged between the PNA and JUI. Maulana Rahman’s move caused a split in the party, and resulted in its regionalization. The JUI (Fazl Group[F]) remained a force only in the NWFP, while the Balochistan wing of the party went its separate way.

In the **elections of 1990**, the JUI (F) captured six seats in the National Assembly, four of them from the Northwest Frontier. In the Frontier Provincial Assembly, the party took 15 seats in a house of 80 members. This performance was repeated in the **elections of 1993**. After 1993 Maulana Fazlur Rahman became a vocal supporter of **Benazir Bhutto**, and was rewarded by her with the chairmanship of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the National Assembly. The **elections of 1997** saw a considerable reduction in the base of support for the JUI, both in the provincial and national legislatures. The tide seemed to have turned against the party, in favor of the moderate but still conservative **Pakistan Muslim League**.

**JAMSHORO.** Jamshoro in **Sindh** province is the site of the third largest thermal power station in the system developed by the **Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA)**. **Guddu** and **Kot Addu** are the largest plants in the system. The Jamshoro power plant houses four oil-fired units, each capable of generating 220 MW of electric power, thus providing the plant with a total capacity of 880 MW. In 1994, the government of Prime Minister **Benazir Bhutto** initiated a phased program for the privatization of the WAPDA. This program included the power plant at Kot Addu as well as the one at Jamshoro. The plant was privatized in 1996—it was sold to a consortium of companies led by a British firm. *See also* ENERGY.

**JANSHER KHAN (1969– )**. In 1987, then only 18 years old, Jansher Khan of Pakistan took the world squash crown from Jehangir Khan,

his countryman. World squash was dominated by two families, both from the **Northwest Frontier Province**. Jansher Khan belonged to one of these families. Before he arrived on the scene, these families had provided such champions as Hashim Khan—considered by many to be the father of modern squash and the first person to win a world title—Azam Khan, Roshan Khan, and Mohibullah Khan. By 1995, eight years after winning his first world title, Jansher Khan made squash history by capturing seven world titles in succession. At 26, he reigned supreme. Jansher continued to rule the world of squash in 1996–1998 by maintaining his extraordinary winning streak.

**JAPAN–PAKISTAN RELATIONS.** The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the disintegration of the Soviet Union made Pakistan take greater notice of Japan and vice versa. During the Cold War, Pakistan was concerned mostly with maintaining good relations with the United States and **China**. The United States provided economic and military assistance, and China offered a good counterpoint to India. The end of the Cold War also coincided with the emergence of Japan as the largest source of bilateral economic assistance to the developing world.

Although Pakistan was anxious to move closer to Japan, the latter failed to assign a high priority to the country. Japan was deeply troubled by a number of developments in Pakistan. It viewed Pakistan's **nuclear weapons** program with great concern. It was not pleased that Pakistan continued to commit a large proportion of its gross domestic product to maintaining and equipping a sizable military force. It was unhappy with Pakistan's neglect of social development. These concerns were openly communicated to Pakistan in bilateral exchanges and in the pronouncements made by Japan in such multilateral institutions as the **Asian Development Bank**, the **World Bank**, and the **International Monetary Fund (IMF)**, and in such forums as the **Aid to Pakistan Consortium** where, in the 1980s and 1990s, Japan's influence continued to increase along with the increase in its development budget.

A number of governments in Pakistan made serious attempts to improve economic relations with Japan. General **Zia ul-Haq** visited Japan, as did Prime Minister **Mian Nawaz Sharif** and Prime Minister

**Benazir Bhutto.** It was only with the visit of Benazir Bhutto in January 1996, however, that Japan began to show some understanding of Pakistan's geopolitical situation. While on this visit to the country, Prime Minister Bhutto spoke with great passion about the need for creating a nuclear-weapons-free region in South Asia. Her approach resonated well with her hosts. She reminded the Japanese that it was India that continued to resist these moves, it was India that was now preparing to test a nuclear weapon, and again, it was India that was spending a large sum of money on developing ballistic missiles.

These arguments paid off, and Benazir Bhutto returned from Japan with an assurance from Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto that "Japan will work closely with Pakistan in expanding and promoting bilateral relationship in the ever deepening interdependence in the international community." During her visit, Japan and Pakistan signed a number of agreements for Japanese support of projects in Pakistan. Japan agreed to contribute US\$764 million for the construction of four important projects, including the **Ghazi-Barotha** hydropower project, a 13-kilometer elevated light-rail-transit system in **Lahore**, the national drainage project, and the **Balochistan** portion of the World Bank–sponsored **Social Action Program (SAP)**. The amount pledged by Japan was 50 percent more than the previously indicated amount of US\$500 million. Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto also succeeded in persuading the business community in Japan that Pakistan had about the most liberal laws for **foreign investment** in South Asia. Once again, she managed to elicit a positive response, although she was reminded that the continuing troubles in **Karachi**, weak human development, especially a poor educational system, and a dysfunctional legal system were some of the major obstacles in the way of increased direct foreign investment in Pakistan.

Bhutto's dismissal on 5 November 1996 did not sit well with the Japanese authorities. It demonstrated once again the weakness of Pakistan's democratic institutions. By canceling some highly visible development projects for which Benazir Bhutto had received Japanese funding during her visit to Tokyo, the caretaker administration led by Prime Minister **Meraj Khalid** added further to Pakistan's strained relations with Japan. The projects canceled by the caretaker administration included the Lahore elevated railway. In January 1996,

**Shahid Javed Burki**, the adviser to Meraj Khalid and the caretaker's de facto finance minister, visited Tokyo to detail the caretaker's program for economic restructuring and to explain the decision to cancel some of the projects supported by Japan. He also sought the government's support for the launch of a "yen bond" in the Japanese financial market. He was listened to patiently but received a cold reception. Then, in early 1998, Prime Minister **Mian Nawaz Sharif** signaled to the Japanese authorities that he was prepared to implement the entire program of assistance that Tokyo had negotiated with Benazir Bhutto. However, after Pakistan exploded six nuclear devices in May 1998, Japan joined the Western nations and imposed economic sanctions on the country.

These sanctions remained in place even after similar sanctions imposed by the American government were lifted following 9/11 and the promise by General **Pervez Musharraf** to provide assistance to the U.S. war on **terrorism**. It was only in January 2005 that the Japanese restored **foreign aid** to Pakistan. The announcement came following the visit to **Islamabad** by Shoichi Nakagawa, Japan's minister for economy, trade, and commerce. The minister met with President Musharraf and Prime Minister **Shaukat Aziz** on 8 January. Japan agreed to provide US\$500 million of annual assistance under the Yen Loan Package Program and Official Development Assistance Programs starting in March 2005. When asked by the press whether his government was concerned by President Musharraf's decision not to retire from the **military**, the minister said that "our government is assessing the situation in Pakistan as a whole, and not in individual instances. Japan appreciates Pakistan's commitment to peace, the war on terror, and domestic economic reforms, in addition to the improvement in the quality of life of its people."

**JATOI, GHULAM MUSTAFA (1934– )**. Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi is one of the largest landowners in Pakistan. According to one reckoning, he and his family own more than 80,000 acres of land. Ghulam Mustafa entered the national political scene in 1956 when, following the merger of **Sindh** into the **One Unit of West Pakistan** and the dissolution of the Sindh Assembly, he inherited the Nawabshah seat from his father, Ghulam Rasool Jatoi. The 1962 election to the National Assembly, created under the **Constitution of 1962**, took Ghulam



Mustafa Jatoi to **Rawalpindi**, Pakistan's interim capital, as a member from Nawabshah. When President **Muhammad Ayub Khan** allowed the revival of political parties and joined the **Convention Muslim League**, Jatoi followed him into the new organization. He remained with the party until the departure of his friend, **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto**, from the Cabinet of Ayub Khan. He resigned from the **Muslim League** in 1968 and joined the **Pakistan People's Party (PPP)**, founded by Bhutto. It was as a PPP candidate that Jatoi returned to the National Assembly, elected in December 1970. When Bhutto took over as president from **Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan** in December 1971, he invited Jatoi to join the federal Cabinet as a minister. In December 1973, Bhutto sent Jatoi to **Karachi** as the chief minister of Sindh province. He remained in that position until the declaration of martial law by General **Zia ul-Haq** on 5 July 1977.

In 1986, following the return of **Benazir Bhutto** from self-imposed exile in Europe, Jatoi was removed from the chairmanship of the Sindh PPP. In July 1986, following a convention held in **Lahore**, Jatoi launched his own political movement under the banner of the **National People's Party (NPP)**. The NPP was able to attract some of the "uncles"—including **Ghulam Mustafa Khar**—who had been forced out of the PPP earlier. Jatoi and the NPP fared very poorly in the **elections held in 1988**. He was unable even to win his traditional Nawabshah seat, losing it to a virtual newcomer in politics. However, Jatoi was able to get into the National Assembly in a seat vacated by his friend, Ghulam Mustafa Khar.

In August 1990, Ms. Bhutto was dismissed by President **Ghulam Ishaq Khan**. Jatoi became the caretaker prime minister and supervised the **elections held in October 1990**, in which Bhutto lost to a coalition that called itself **Islami Jamhuri Itihad (IJI)**. **Mian Nawaz Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League (PML)** was the most important component of this coalition. In November 1990, Sharif became prime minister and Jatoi receded into the background.

**JINNAH, FATIMA (1893–1967)**. Fatima Jinnah was the youngest sister of **Muhammad Ali Jinnah**, the founder of Pakistan. She was born in **Karachi** and was educated in Bombay and Calcutta. After graduating in dental science, she started clinical practice in 1923 but did not stay in the profession for very long. She moved in with her

brother in 1929 when he lost his wife, and she stayed by his side for nearly 20 years, right until his death on 11 September 1948. She provided invaluable support to him as he redefined his political objectives. Jinnah had initially worked for Hindu-Muslim unity within the context of one independent India. Once he decided to campaign for Pakistan, however—an independent Muslim country to be established in India, once the British left the subcontinent of South Asia—Fatima Jinnah’s untiring support proved critical for his success. She was always with him as he traversed India, persuading the Muslim community to join his efforts to establish Pakistan. She played an active role in organizing Muslim women to support Jinnah’s efforts. In 1938, she was instrumental in getting the **Muslim League** to create a women’s subcommittee headed by her, which would include 30 women from every province, as well as from Delhi.

After her brother’s death, Fatima Jinnah maintained an interest in politics. She opposed the imposition of martial law by General **Muhammad Ayub Khan**, arguing that her brother had fought for the establishment of a country that would be governed by democracy rather than by the **military**. She had little use for Muhammad Ayub Khan’s political philosophy of guided democracy, which curtailed what she viewed as fundamental human rights—the right to vote for a parliament, the right to freely express oneself, and the right for free political association. Muhammad Ayub Khan became weary of her constant opposition to his rule. That notwithstanding, he was surprised when she accepted the offer of the **Combined Opposition Party** to oppose him in the presidential elections of January 1965. Despite her advanced years and frail health, she campaigned vigorously and might have upset Muhammad Ayub Khan in the polls had not the government thrown its entire weight into getting the president reelected. The margin of her defeat was narrow, particularly in East Pakistan. She died in Karachi, and was buried in the compound of the mausoleum built in the city to honor her brother.

**JINNAH, MUHAMMAD ALI (1876–1948).** Muhammad Ali Jinnah was born into a Shia Muslim family that did business in **Karachi**. In 1892, at the age of 16, Mahemdali Jinnahbai went to London to acquire business experience. While in London, Jinnah decided to prepare himself for a legal rather than a business profession. It was also

during this time that he changed his name from Mahemdali Jinnah-bai to Muhammad Ali Jinnah. He was called to the bar in 1895, returned to Karachi in 1896, and in 1897 moved to Bombay to set up his law practice.

It took Jinnah some time to get acquainted with the aspirations of the Indian Muslim community because Bombay was remote from the center of Indian Muslim politics. Although Jinnah was based in Bombay, it was in Delhi and Aligarh that the Muslims were seeking to be recognized politically. Once he moved to the center stage of Indian politics and had to rub shoulders with the leaders of Muslim India, he began to appreciate that independence from the British rule was not the most important political objective of many of his co-religionists. Their principal objective was the protection of the political, social, and economic interests of the Muslims when the British finally departed from India.

Jinnah took a long time to make the transition from being an Indian nationalist to becoming an Indian Muslim politician. It took him 20 years to cover this distance, and he did it in several small steps. He joined the **All-India Muslim League (AIML)** in 1913 without giving up membership in the **Indian National Congress**. As an active AIML member, he began to interest himself in Muslim issues and took advantage of his membership in the Imperial Legislative Assembly to speak on these issues.

Jinnah was befuddled by the rapid developments in Indian politics as Gandhi gained ground in the Congress Party, as the Congress changed its tactics to employ more confrontational means for securing concessions from the British, and as religion began to assert itself in both Hindu and Muslim politics. Disenchanted by all these developments, he decided to leave the Indian political stage. In June 1931, he left for England and settled in London. The change in residence did not help to distance him from Indian politics. He came under intense pressure to return to India. Several Muslim leaders were looking for a person who could not only lead the **Muslim League** but also discipline the independent-minded leadership of the Indian Muslim-majority provinces. Jinnah was the obvious candidate to perform this task. He returned to India on 1 April 1935 and was given a warm reception by the Indian Muslim community. By now, his own political objective had been defined clearly. He

was no longer interested in working for Indian independence, as he had before he left. Instead, he wanted to work for the protection of the social, economic, and political rights of the Indian Muslim community once India gained independence.

In the early 1940s, Jinnah persuaded the Muslim League—in particular the provinces in which Muslims were in a minority—to opt for the idea of Pakistan. His own experience dealing with the leadership of the Indian National Congress had convinced him that the only way the Muslim community could protect itself once the British left was to establish an independent country for themselves. Accordingly, on 13 March 1940, the Muslim League passed the historic “Lahore resolution,” demanding the establishment of a separate homeland for the Muslims of British India. The Pakistan slogan won Jinnah and the Muslim League mass political support in the Muslim majority provinces. Jinnah was now in a powerful position with respect to the provincial leaders, able and willing to exert his authority over them and to bring them into line with his thinking. He was now the sole spokesman for India’s Muslims.

The provincial elections of 1945–1946 confirmed this position for Muhammad Ali Jinnah. The Muslim League polled 75 percent of the total votes cast by the Muslims, compared to only 4 percent in the 1937 elections. This was a profound improvement. Jinnah and his demand for Pakistan had struck an exceptionally responsive chord with the Muslims of British India. The Pakistan bandwagon had now begun to roll. On 3 June 1947, the British government in India announced a plan to partition the country along religious lines. The idea of Pakistan was now a reality; the country to be created for the Muslim community was to have two wings, separated by India. On 14 August 1947 Pakistan achieved independence, and Muhammad Ali Jinnah was sworn in as the governor-general of the new country. Karachi became the new country’s capital.

By the time Pakistan gained independence, Jinnah was a very sick man. He suffered from tuberculosis, a secret that had been kept closely guarded right up to the announcement of his death on 11 September 1948. Jinnah’s death came as a great shock to the people of Pakistan. They were still struggling with the aftermath of the partition of British India, and his sudden departure left a void that was never entirely filled.

**JINNAH, RUTTIE (1901–1929).** Ruttie Petit was born in Bombay on 20 February 1901. She was the daughter of Sir Dinshaw and Lady Dina Petit. At age eighteen, she married **Muhammad Ali Jinnah**, a prominent Muslim lawyer. Jinnah was 43 years old at that time. The marriage lasted for 11 years and ended with Ruttie's death in Bombay on 20 February 1929. She was buried in the Khoja Isha'asherio cemetery.

**JIYE SINDH MOVEMENT.** *See* SYED, G. M.

**JUDGES' CASE.** The judges' case—the name given to an important Supreme Court decision announced on 20 March 1996—was to have a profound impact on Pakistan's political development. The case concerned the criteria for the appointment of judges to the provincial high courts and the Supreme Court. The case was brought to the Supreme Court by Wahabul Khairi, a lawyer from **Islamabad**. Khairi wanted the court to stop the practice of packing the judiciary with hand-picked judges who could be relied on to rule in favor of the appointing authorities whenever they made decisions that were not strictly constitutional. Because such decisions had been made in Pakistan's history, it was important for the rulers to have a supportive judiciary.

The Supreme Court, under the leadership of Chief Justice **Sajjad Ali Shah**, heard Khairi's petition in the early months of 1996 and came to a decision that limited the discretion of the executive in appointing judges to the courts. The Supreme Court held that the prime minister, in recommending people for appointment to the superior courts, had to be guided by the principle of seniority. The decision to bypass a judge had to be recorded and accepted by the chief judge of the court to which the appointment was being made. The application of the decision in the judges' case was made retroactive, and Prime Minister **Benazir Bhutto** was ordered to resubmit the names of the people she had appointed to the courts since assuming power. The prime minister's reluctance to implement the Court's order eventually led to her dismissal by President **Farooq Leghari** on 5 November 1996.

The judges' case also seriously soured the relations between Prime Minister **Nawaz Sharif** and Chief Justice Sajjad Ali Shah. The disagreement between the two led Pakistan to the brink of a severe constitutional crisis. The situation was saved by the resignation of President

Leghari on 2 December 1997 and the removal of Chief Justice Sajjad Ali Shah by his fellow judges. *See also* JUDICIARY.

**JUDICIARY.** Pakistan inherited a judicial system with limited autonomy. With independence, the judicial system became even more subservient to the executive. The tendency on the part of the executive branch of the government to disregard the **constitution** inevitably brought the judiciary and the executive into conflict. Still, in the vast majority of cases the judiciary accepted the final authority of the executive, even on constitutional matters.

The effective subordination of the judiciary resulted in a number of landmark decisions by the high courts. These started with the decision by General **Ghulam Muhammad** in 1954 to uphold the dissolution of the **First Constituent Assembly**. The series continued with the acceptance of three martial-law regimes imposed on the country in 1958, 1969, and 1977, and the validation of the dismissal of three prime ministers in 1988, 1990, and 1996.

It was only in 1993 that the Supreme Court took a position contrary to its tradition. Under Chief Justice Nasim Hasan Shah, the Court declared President **Ishaq Khan**'s dismissal of Prime Minister **Mian Nawaz Sharif** and the dissolution of the National and Provincial Assemblies to be unconstitutional. The prime minister was restored, only to be forced out of office by the **military** acting in concert with the president. Another general election brought **Benazir Bhutto** back to power in October 1993 as prime minister. She decided to follow in the footsteps of General **Zia ul-Haq** by ensuring that the judges appointed to the Supreme Courts and the provincial high courts would not be tempted to follow the newly declared independence of the Nasim Hasan Shah court. Her government made 45 judicial appointments to the high courts but did not consult the chief justices of the courts as required by the constitution. The courts were now totally beholden to the executive, refusing even to grant bail to politicians who were incarcerated for political reasons.

A lawyer, Wahabul Khairi, filed a petition in the Supreme Court questioning the appointment of new judges. On 20 March 1996 the Supreme Court, meeting under the direction of Chief Justice Sajjad Ali Shah, issued a short judgment declaring that "any appointment to a High Court made without consulting the Chief Justice of that High

Court, the Chief Justice of Pakistan, and the Governor of that province would violate the constitution and would, therefore, be invalid. In the case of the Supreme Court Judge, consultation with the Chief Justice of Pakistan was mandatory.” The government was given 30 days to regularize the appointments of the judges who had not been reviewed and approved by the chief justices. The prime minister’s reluctance to implement the court’s decision was one of the charges leveled against her by President Farooq Leghari in his order of 5 November 1996 dismissing her.

In keeping with the tradition, the dismissed prime minister challenged the president’s decision in the Supreme Court. The Court, after intensive deliberation, upheld the constitutionality of the president’s action. The conflict between the judiciary and the executive did not disappear after the induction of **Mian Nawaz Sharif** as prime minister. By the fall of 1997, the differences between the two pillars of government created a constitutional crisis. The issue once again was the appointment of judges to the Supreme Court. It was finally resolved with the resignation of President Farooq Leghari, who had sided with the chief justice, and the subsequent removal of Chief Justice **Sajjad Ali Shah**. The judiciary again ruled in favor of the executive in 2000 when the deposed Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif took his case to the Supreme Court against his removal by General **Pervez Musharraf**. The court, while ruling in favor of the military takeover, ordered the military to hold elections no later than three years after its intervention. *See also* JUDGES’ CASE; SHARIAT COURT.

**JUNAGADH STATE.** *See* KASHMIR.

**JUNEJO, MUHAMMAD KHAN (1932–1993).** Muhammad Khan Junejo was born in Sindhri village in Sanghar district and attended Karachi’s St. Patrick School before going to the Agricultural Institute at Hastings, Great Britain. He returned from Hastings with a diploma in agricultural sciences. He won a seat to the West Pakistan provincial assembly from his native Sanghar district in 1962. The 1962 elections were the first to be held under the **constitution of 1962**, which limited the franchise to 80,000 “basic democrats,” 40,000 each from East and West Pakistan. After being elected to the provincial assembly, he was

invited to join the provincial administration as minister in charge of railways and communications.

Junejo adopted a low political profile when General **Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan** brought back martial law to Pakistan in March 1969 and again when **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto** became president and later prime minister. He reappeared on the political scene in 1977 as a member of the **Pakistan National Alliance (PNA)**, organized by Bhutto's opposition to challenge him in the elections held that year. After Bhutto was overthrown by General **Zia ul-Haq**, Junejo came to **Islamabad** as a minister in the cabinet formed by the president in order to provide a civilian appearance to his martial-law administration. He did not stay with Zia for long, however. A number of his PNA colleagues left the cabinet once it became clear that Zia was in no particular hurry to hold elections in the country. Zia called **general elections in 1985** but banned the participation of political parties in the polls. This arrangement was not acceptable to the **Pakistan People's Party (PPP)**, but Junejo and his PNA associates decided to take part in the elections. Junejo was elected to the National Assembly, and after Zia agreed to lift martial law, Junejo was invited to serve as prime minister. Martial law was lifted on 31 December 1985.

A number of differences on important policy matters that developed between the president and the prime minister—in particular those concerning Pakistan's stance toward **Afghanistan**—led to the dismissal of Junejo by Zia on 29 May 1988. Zia chose his moment well. Junejo had just returned from a visit to **China** and **Japan** and was given the news of his dismissal shortly after landing at the Islamabad airport. Along with Junejo went not only his cabinet but also the National and Provincial Assemblies. In dismissing Junejo, Zia invoked **Article 58.2(b)** of the constitution. As required by the constitution, Zia promised fresh elections within 90 days of the dismissal order. Zia made an attempt to maneuver Junejo out of the chairmanship of the **Pakistan Muslim League**, but Junejo refused to oblige. As had happened on so many previous occasions in the history of the Muslim League, the party promptly split into two factions, one that supported Junejo and the other that favored Zia ul-Haq. The party failed to reunite even after the death of Zia ul-Haq and went to the polls in November 1988 as two opposing groups.



Muhammad Khan Junejo died in Washington, where he had gone for treatment. His death was to lead to another constitutional crisis in the country, prompted by the move by **Mian Nawaz Sharif** to take over as the president of the Muslim League. This move was not endorsed by President **Ghulam Ishaq Khan**. The president interpreted it as an effort by the prime minister to consolidate his power. *See also* BASIC DEMOCRACIES; POLITICAL PARTIES.

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**K-2.** At 8,611 meters, Mount Goodwin Austin (more commonly known as the Karokoram or K-2) is the second highest peak in the world. It is only 219 meters lower in height than Mount Everest in Nepal, the world's highest mountain. K-2 is Pakistan's highest mountain peak, located on the border with **China**. It was first scaled in 1954 by two Italian mountaineers, Lino Lacedelli and Achille Comagnoni. It is regarded as a more challenging peak to scale compared to other high mountains including Mount Everest.

**KALABAGH, AMIR MUHAMMAD KHAN (1900–1970).** Amir Muhammad Khan, the *nawab* of Kalabagh, achieved political prominence in the early 1960s. Up until then he was known only in his native district of Mianwali in northern **Punjab**, where he had extensive landholdings. He had made little effort to use his local position to carve out a prominent political position for himself either in Punjab or in national politics. This political detachment was not typical of landlords of his scale and local prominence. He had stayed out of active politics largely because of the role he had played as a **Unionist** in the period before the birth of Pakistan. The Unionists had opposed the idea of Pakistan, and although a number of them were able to once again enter politics after Pakistan became a reality, Amir Muhammad Khan preferred to stay quiet.

However, in 1960 he was appointed governor of West Pakistan by President **Ayub Khan**, a position he held for six years. The *nawab* was responsible for bringing the landed community, sidelined by its opposition to the idea of Pakistan, back to the center stage of politics.

However, his style of governance alienated a number of important people, and by about the middle of the decade President Ayub Khan had come to the realization that the nawab was no longer a political asset but, instead, was becoming a liability. The governor was blamed for the heavy-handed way in which the civil bureaucracy was alleged to have interfered in the presidential elections of 1965. The nawab was persuaded to resign and was replaced in 1966 by General **Muhammad Musa**. Amir Muhammad Khan went back to his lands in Mianwali. In 1970 he was murdered by his son over a dispute concerning the management of his large estate.

**KALABAGH DAM.** Unlike several other countries with large river systems, Pakistan was able to construct a number of water-diversion projects without meeting serious opposition from environmental groups or from the people residing in the lower reaches of the rivers. This relatively complacent attitude toward large water-usage projects changed in the early 1980s when the country initiated preliminary works on design and construction of the Kalabagh dam. Kalabagh is a site downstream from the **Tarbela dam**. At Kalabagh, the **Indus River** leaves the hills of the northern areas and enters the plains of **Punjab**.

With the people of **Sindh** and the **Northwest Frontier Province** opposed to the construction of the Kalabagh dam, not much progress was made on the project in the 1980s and 1990s. The dam was opposed on a number of grounds. Its opponents argued that a large dam in Punjab would deprive the farmers in the lower reaches of the river of adequate water, would cause grave environmental damage to the Indus delta, and would displace hundreds of thousands of people by submerging the city of **Nowshera**. The first administration of Prime Minister **Mian Nawaz Sharif** (1990–1993) was of the view that by getting the four provinces to agree on a formula to apportion the water in the Indus river system, it had set the stage to begin work on the dam. That did not happen. The government of **Benazir Bhutto** appointed **Ghulam Mustafa Khar** minister in charge of water and power. Khar was in favor of constructing the dam, but his enthusiasm for the project could not overcome the political difficulties the project continued to face.

Prime Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif tried to revive the Kalabagh dam project when he returned to power in February 1997. In a nationally televised speech announcing the news that Pakistan had

tested six nuclear devices in **Balochistan** on 28 and 30 May, the prime minister promised to begin work on the dam as a way of eliminating Pakistan's dependence on imported fuel. Once again, however, the opposition to the dam by Sindh and the Northwest Frontier Province stalled the government's efforts.

The idea of constructing the dam was revived by General **Pervez Musharraf** after he assumed political power in October 1999. The new military leader let it be known that he was in favor of constructing not only the Kalabagh Dam but also a number of other water storage reservoirs on the country's major and minor rivers. His government made strong efforts to get broad support for these "mega projects." In December 2005, President Musharraf announced that his government was intending to go ahead with the construction of the dam. *See also* WATER AND POWER DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY.

**KANSI, MIR AIMAL (1964–2003).** On 26 January 1993, Mir Aimal Kansi shot and killed two employees of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) as they were waiting in their cars to enter the agency's vast complex located in Langley, Virginia, outside Washington, D. C. At least one of Kansi's two victims—Frank Darling—had worked in Pakistan as a communications expert during the height of the Afghan-Soviet war. Mir Aimal Kansi was born in **Quetta, Balochistan**, the only child of Abdullah Jan Kansi, a **Pathan** tribal *malik*. He took up residence at Herndon, Virginia, only a few minutes by car from CIA's Langley headquarters. After drifting for awhile, he found a job as a courier with Excel Courier Inc., a firm that worked with the CIA.

On the evening of 26 January 1993, within hours of having committed the murders, Kansi boarded a **Pakistan International Airlines (PIA)** flight from New York to **Karachi**. Arriving in Karachi 22 hours later, he boarded a connecting PIA flight to Quetta, his hometown, and went underground. Kansi's name was later to be linked with **Ramzi Youssef**, who was accused of participating in the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York. Kansi was ultimately returned to the United States where a court in Virginia convicted him of the murders and sentenced him to death. He was executed in 2002 in Virginia and his body was flown to Pakistan for burial in his native village.

**KARACHI.** Before becoming Pakistan's first capital in 1947, Karachi was a small port city with a population of only 200,000. The choice of Karachi was the result, in part, of its geographical location. The city expanded rapidly but haphazardly after 1947, largely because of migration by people seeking to avail themselves of the opportunities it seemed to offer. Migration was to play an important role in Karachi's growth, more so than in other cities of Pakistan. Migrants arrived in three "waves"; the first involved people displaced by the partition of British India and the creation of Pakistan; the second was comprised of the people who arrived a few years later to seek jobs in the rapidly expanding economy of the city; the third wave consisted of Afghans who sought both shelter and jobs in the city after their country was invaded by the **Soviet Union**.

While the migrations associated with these waves added significantly to the growth in the population of Karachi, regular movements of people into the city from other parts of the country also brought hundreds of thousands of people to the growing metropolis. In 1961, Karachi had a population of 1.9 million; by 1972, the population was estimated at 3.5 million; it grew to 5.1 million by 1981. In 1992, when Pakistan should have taken its fifth population census, Karachi had 6.7 million living within its boundaries. By the end of 1997, 50 years after the creation of Pakistan, Karachi's population had exceeded 9 million; the **census of 1998** estimated the city's population at 9.3 million. In 2005, the city's population was estimated at 13 million.

In the 1980s the *muhajir* (refugees from India who arrived in Pakistan after the country gained independence in 1947) community organized itself into an effective political force under the banner of the **Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz (MQM)**. The MQM won an impressive victory in the local elections held in November 1987 and went on to repeat its performance in the national elections held a year later. Its electoral triumph in the national elections was at the expense of two powerful but competing political forces: the **Pakistan People's Party** and the **Jamaat-e-Islami**. It was clear that the MQM had drawn a larger number of people from these two parties. In the national **elections of October 1990**, the MQM repeated its performance. It was now a potent political force that had to be dealt with. The MQM went on to capture most of the seats on the National and Provincial Assemblies from Karachi in the **elections of October 1993, February 1997, and October 2002**.

Migration from India—in particular from what is now called Uttar Pradesh—brought exponents of conservative and political Islam to the city. Many of the new arrivals were influenced by the teachings of seminaries such as Deobandi Darul Uloom. Some of the refugees established *dini madrassas* in Karachi patterned after the school at Deoband. These schools turned Karachi into one of the centers of extremist Islam in West Asia. *See also* ORANGI.

**KARAKORAM HIGHWAY.** The Karakoram Highway—also known as KKH—connects the northern parts of Pakistan with the Chinese province of Xinjiang. The road follows the **Indus River** from Abbottabad in Pakistan to Hunza, also in Pakistan. From Hunza it follows the Hunza River, a tributary of the Indus. It crosses into **China** at the **Khunjerab Pass**, and then cuts across the great Pamir Plateau in Xinjiang. It ends in the ancient city of Khashakar, now called Kashi. The road's alignment is generally the same as the old Silk Road that was supposedly taken by Marco Polo, the Italian explorer. The decision to build the road was taken after China and Pakistan demarcated their border in the early 1960s. It took a dozen years to build, from the late 1960s until the early 1980s. The Chinese provided assistance to Pakistan's Frontier Works Organization in completing the Pakistan side of the road. The road became a major trade route between China and Pakistan.

**KARAMAT, GENERAL (RETIRED) JEHANGIR (1941– ).** On 8 December 1995 President **Farooq Leghari** appointed Lieutenant General Jehangir Karamat chief of the army staff (COAS). On 8 January 1996 General Karamat took command of the army from General Abdul Waheed Kakar, becoming the twelfth person to lead the army and the tenth Pakistani to occupy that position. His appointment was well received. Even though he may not have wished to be involved in politics, a number of developments in 1996–1997 thrust Karamat onto the center of the political stage. In November 1996, he supported President Farooq Leghari's decision to dismiss Prime Minister **Benazir Bhutto**. A year later, he tried to mediate between President Leghari and Prime Minister **Mian Nawaz Sharif** in their dispute over the role of Chief Justice **Sajjad Ali Shah** of the Supreme Court. Karamat failed in his efforts, and

President Leghari resigned on 2 December 1997. Karamat resigned from the army in October 1998 after giving a speech in **Lahore** that was critical of the government of Mian Nawaz Sharif. He was succeeded by **General Pervez Musharraf** as the COAS. *See also* JUDGES' CASE.

**KARDAR, ABDUL HAFEEZ (1925–1996).** Abdul Hafeez Kardar was born in **Lahore** on 17 January 1925. He was the youngest member of the Indian **cricket** team that went to England in 1946 for the first postwar tour of that country by an Asian side. He played 26 “test matches” during his career, three of which he played for India. After the tour was over, he stayed in England, changed his name to Abdul Hafeez Kardar, went to Oxford to study philosophy, politics, and economics, and played cricket for Oxford University. He returned to Pakistan in 1949 and led the country’s cricket team in test victories against England at the Oval, London, over Australia in Karachi, over India in Lucknow, and over the West Indies in Port of Spain.

Kardar joined **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party** soon after it was formed, won a seat in the **Punjab** provincial assembly in the elections of 1970, and served as minister of food and education in the PPP government. His last government appointment was as Pakistan’s ambassador to Switzerland from 1991 to 1993.

**KASHMIR.** The state of Kashmir lies to the northeast of Pakistan. When, in August 1947, the British left India in the hands of the successor states of India and Pakistan, Kashmir had a population of some four million, 75 percent of whom were Muslims, the remaining were Hindus. The Hindus were concentrated in the Jammu district in the state’s southwest, close to the border with Pakistan. Although the state was predominantly Muslim, it had been ruled by a Hindu maharaja for as long as the British had ruled India.

The British decision to leave India was taken without any clear indication as to the political future of the hundreds of **princely states** that dotted the South Asian subcontinent. The assumption was that the princes would seek association with either India or Pakistan, depending on the geographical location of their areas. This policy did not pose a problem for most states as the princes decided to join the country that was the closest to them. However, this did not happen in the

case of two large estates, **Hyderabad** and Kashmir, and one small one, Junagadh. The case of Hyderabad was clear; while ruled by a Muslim—the Nizam of Hyderabad—its population was predominantly Hindu. When the Nizam showed some hesitation in joining India, the Indian government simply took over the control of the state in 1948 by sending in its army in what it euphemistically called a “police action.” Junagadh was also annexed by India in the same way.

The problem of Kashmir proved to be more difficult to resolve, however. Hyderabad was surrounded by India; Kashmir, on the other hand, shared borders with both India and Pakistan, as well as **China**. Pakistan clearly expected the Hindu maharaja to file the instruments of accession in its favor. When it seemed that the maharaja was deliberately stalling for time, Pakistanis encouraged a force of **Pathan** tribesmen to move into the state. The Pathans advanced quickly toward Srinagar, the state capital, in the spring of 1948 and would have conquered it had the Indians not moved in their troops following the formal accession by the maharaja to India. The Indian troops, airlifted into the state, were able to push the Pathans back but not completely out of the state. At this point, Pakistan formally joined the fighting, thus launching the **First Indo-Pakistan war**. In January 1949, the Indian and Pakistani governments agreed to a United Nations–sponsored ceasefire with the promise that a plebiscite would be held in the state in order to ascertain whether the Kashmiris wished to join India or Pakistan. They were not given the choice to opt for independence.

The Kashmir case was referred to the United Nations Security Council almost every year, mostly by Pakistan; but Indians gradually changed the status of the state by applying to it the provisions of their constitution and holding elections to the state assembly. Delhi argued that by holding elections in the state they had fulfilled the UN’s demand for a plebiscite.

The Chinese invasion of India in 1962 seemed to create an environment for the possible resolution of the issue. With the United States and Great Britain pushing hard, Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s prime minister, agreed to hold discussions with Pakistan. Five rounds of talks were held in 1962–1963 but no progress was made, which provoked Pakistan to encourage the citizens of Kashmir to rebel against the occupation of the state by India. “**Operation Gibraltar**,”

launched in the summer of 1965, infiltrated commandos from the Pakistan army into Kashmir. The Indians retaliated by invading Pakistan on 6 September 1965, thus starting the **Second Indo-Pakistan War** over the state. Once again the United Nations intervened and the Indian and Pakistani troops returned to the positions they had occupied before the start of the war.

The **Third Indo-Pakistan War**, fought in November-December 1971 was not over Kashmir but over the future of East Pakistan. By signing the **Simla Accord** in July 1972, however, **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto** accepted the Indian demand that the issue of Kashmir should be resolved by bilateral discussions. The Indians understood that by accepting this provision of the accord, Pakistan had agreed not to go back to the United Nations. In other words, Pakistan seemed to have given up the demand to determine the future of the state by holding a plebiscite. The Simla Accord also established a new border between the Indian and Pakistani held parts of the state. It was called the “**line of control**” (**LOC**).

In the early 1990s, some Kashmiris, inspired by the success of the Afghan *mujahideen* in expelling the Soviet Union from their country, decided to launch a struggle of their own against Indian occupation. Some of the mujahideen were trained in the camps based in Pakistan. India responded to these developments by sending hundreds of thousands of troops into the state but was not able to suppress the movement. In May 1998, when India exploded five nuclear devices and Pakistan followed two weeks later with six explosions of its own, Kashmir once again drew the world's attention. By then some 10,000 Kashmiris had reportedly been killed in battles with the half a million strong Indian force, which was determined to keep the Indian hold over the state. Pakistan seemed ready to retaliate with **nuclear weapons** if the Indian troops invaded its territory in pursuit of Kashmiri freedom fighters. In the summer of 1998, there was considerable apprehension that the unresolved Kashmir problem could lead to a nuclear war between India and Pakistan.

The Pakistani army, by launching an operation to occupy the Kargil heights in the spring of 1999, once again tried to use force to alter the status quo in Kashmir. The Indian response was much more aggressive than Pakistan had anticipated. On 4 July 1999, following a meeting between the U.S. President Bill Clinton and Pakistani



Prime Minister **Mian Nawaz Sharif**, Pakistan agreed to pull out its troops from Kargil.

Kashmir was back in focus in 2001 when a group of Islamic militants attacked the compound of the Indian Parliament on 13 December. India, after having accused Pakistan of instigating the attack, responded by massing half a million troops on the border with Pakistan. **Islamabad** responded by mobilizing on its side of the border. It took active diplomacy by the United States and Great Britain to defuse this crisis between the two nuclear-armed South Asian rivals. In January 2004, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the prime minister of India, visited Pakistan and met with President **Pervez Musharraf** on the sidelines of the twelfth summit of the **South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation**, and signed the Islamabad Declaration that promised that the two countries would resolve their differences through dialogue not force. Relations warmed quickly after the Islamabad summit and led to a series of high level talks between the two sides. On 7 April 2005, bus service was started between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad, the capital cities of the Indian and Pakistani parts of Kashmir. Ten days later in a summit in New Delhi, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh pledged once again to resolve all disputes between the two countries, including that of Kashmir, through discussions and dialogue. On 8 October 2005, an **earthquake** destroyed much of Azad Kashmir, the area administered by Pakistan. More than 85,000 people were killed and another 150,000 were injured. In response to the tragedy, India and Pakistan agreed to open five more crossings in the LOC. These developments notwithstanding, not much progress was made by the two countries to find a solution to the long-lasting problem of Kashmir.

#### **KAYANI, CHIEF JUSTICE MUHAMMAD RUSTAM (1902–1962).**

Muhammad Rustam Kayani was born in 1902 in the village of Shahpur in Kohat district, **Northwest Frontier Province**. He joined the **Indian Civil Service (ICS)** in 1922 and then went to Cambridge University for training in law and administration. He joined the judicial branch of the ICS early in his career and held several judicial positions in **Punjab** and the Northwest Frontier Province. Soon after the establishment of Pakistan, he was appointed to the **Lahore** Court as an associate judge.

In 1953, Justice Kayani was appointed the head of the commission set up by the government of Pakistan to inquire into the circumstances that resulted in the **anti-Ahmadiya** riots in Punjab. The Kayani Inquiry Commission Report was a tour de force in the sense that it offered an assessment of how the various organs of the state, including the Civil Service, should operate particularly in time of crises. In April 1958, Kayani was appointed chief justice of the Lahore High Court. He used this position to speak openly about what ailed Pakistan at that time. In a number of speeches given around the country, he spoke about social justice and the importance of the rule of law.

It was inevitable that the outspoken chief justice of the Lahore High Court, the most prestigious of Pakistan's superior courts, would come into conflict with the military when Pakistan was placed under martial law by General **Muhammad Ayub Khan** in October 1958. His open criticism of many facets of martial law cost him elevation to the Supreme Court. He retired from the Lahore High Court in October 1962 and died in Chittagong in November of the same year while on a visit to East Pakistan. *See also* AHMADIYAS.

**KHAD.** Following the Soviet Union's invasion of **Afghanistan** in December 1979, the security services in the country were reorganized. The KAM, the Workers Intelligence Department, was rechristened as the KhAD, the State Information Department. It soon became obvious that the communist rulers of Afghanistan would rely extensively on the KhAD not only to keep a watchful eye on their citizens but also to intimidate Pakistan. While Pakistan was actively supporting the Afghan *muhajideen* in the struggle against the communist rulers and their Soviet supporters, the KhAD masterminded a series of attacks in the major cities of Pakistan. In carrying out this mandate, it came into direct conflict with Pakistan's **Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)**. The war between the two intelligence agencies was to take a heavy toll in both countries.

The KhAD worked in Pakistan by getting its agents to infiltrate the Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan and the Afghan communities in such major cities as **Karachi** and **Peshawar**. It made use of the weapons found in the armories of all intelligence agencies in the countries of the former Soviet bloc; the KhAD murdered people it suspected of collaborating with Pakistan and the mujahideen and set

off car bombs in Pakistan's cities. In 1987 alone, bomb explosions in Pakistan's major cities claimed 350 lives.

The withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan in 1989 and the collapse of the communist regime soon thereafter resulted in the demise of the KhAD. Most of its personnel were either killed or went underground. With the demise of the agency, Afghanistan lost the capability of fomenting trouble in Pakistan.

**THE KHAKSARS.** *See* MASHRIQI, ALLAMA INYATULLAH KHAN.

**KHALID, MERAJ (1915–2003).** Meraj Khalid was born in **Lahore** into a family of modest means. He chose to pursue a legal career and attended Lahore's Law College, from where he obtained a bachelor degree. His principal interest was in politics, however. He pursued this interest first at the local level, taking advantage of the devolution of authority that was part of the design of the system of **Basic Democracies** introduced by the government of President **Ayub Khan** in 1962. In 1967, he joined a number of people in Lahore with socialist leanings to support **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's** efforts to bring a new force into Pakistani politics. The **Pakistan People's Party (PPP)** was the consequence of these efforts. The PPP was formally launched in 1969 and almost immediately after its creation the socialist bandwagon began to roll. The **general elections of 1970**—the first to be held in Pakistan on the basis of adult franchise—brought unanticipated victory to the PPP. The party's electoral triumph—it won 81 out of the 139 seats in West Pakistan—launched a number of political careers, including that of Meraj Khalid.

Meraj Khalid held a number of important political positions while Bhutto was in power (December 1971–July 1977). Bhutto's removal by the military in July 1977 sent Meraj Khalid back to grassroots politics. He remained loyal to the PPP and its new chairperson, **Benazir Bhutto**, during the period when Pakistan was under military rule, from July 1977 to August 1988. When Benazir Bhutto returned to Pakistan in 1987 from self-exile in London, however, she dispensed with the "uncles"—her term for her father's old associates—in favor of a younger group of politicians. Meraj Khalid was one of the few uncles to be awarded the party's ticket for the **elections of October**

**1988.** He won a seat in the National Assembly from Lahore and, in the first sitting of the assembly, was elected its speaker. Bhutto's dismissal in August 1990 sent Meraj Khalid back to Lahore. He returned with her three years later in October 1993, when Bhutto became prime minister for the second time. He was not given a political position, however. Instead, he was appointed as rector of the **International Islamic University in Islamabad**.

Meraj Khalid watched Benazir Bhutto's performance as prime minister from fairly close quarters and was terribly disappointed with the way she conducted herself. He made no secret of his unhappiness with the prime minister's performance and shared it with President **Farooq Leghari**, an old PPP associate. He did not hesitate when, on November 5, 1996, the president called him to take over as caretaker prime minister following the dismissal of Benazir Bhutto.

He was caretaker prime minister for 104 days, from 5 November 1996 to 17 February 1997. During this time, his administration concentrated its attention on three things: promulgating the legislation and creating the institutional infrastructure to hold all public officials accountable for their actions, stabilizing the economy, and organizing another general election. The elections supervised by the caretaker administration were held on 3 February 1997 and resulted in the massive defeat of Benazir Bhutto's PPP at the hands of **Mian Nawaz Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League**. Mian Nawaz Sharif became prime minister on 17 February and brought back Meraj Khalid as rector of the Islamic University in Islamabad.

**KHALID SHEIKH MUHAMMAD (1960– )**. Khalid Sheikh Muhammad—or KSM as he came to be known in the Western intelligence community—is a Kuwaiti citizen of Pakistani origin. According to the U.S. government's *The 9/11 Commission Report*, “no one exemplifies the model of the terrorist entrepreneur more clearly than Khalid Sheikh Muhammad, the principal of the 9/11 attacks.” Like his nephew, **Ramzi Youssef**, KSM grew up in Kuwait but traces his ethnic lineage to the **Balochistan** province of Pakistan. He joined the Muslim Brotherhood in 1976, at the age of 16, but went to the United States for a degree in mechanical engineering which he was awarded in December 1986 by North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University. He visited Pakistan for the first time in 1987 during the

concluding phase of the Afghan war against the Soviet occupation. He was introduced in **Peshawar** to Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, head of the *Hizbul Ittehad El-Islamia*, one of the seven groups of **mujahideen** who were fighting against the **Soviet Union**. He received military training at a school run by Sayyaf's group, which he put to use fighting alongside the Islamic mujahideen Bosnia. In 1992, he became involved in Ramzi Youssef's plans to bomb the World Trade Center in New York. According to the 9/11 Commission Report, "KSM's animus toward the United States stemmed not from his experiences there as a student, but rather from his violent disagreement with US foreign policy favoring Israel." In 1994, he joined Youssef to plan the "Bojinka plot"—the intended bombing of 12 U.S. commercial passenger jets over the Pacific during a two-day span. The plan was aborted following action by the U.S. and Filipino intelligence agencies.

KSM moved to Pakistan in 1996 and was introduced to **Osama bin Laden** who had also moved to Afghanistan at that time. The two met at **Tora Bora**, a mountainous redoubt on the Afghanistan–Pakistan border, and began discussing the outline of a plan to use commercial aircraft to ram into important buildings in the United States. In 1997, KSM settled his family in **Karachi**. In 1997 KSM received bin Laden's green light to proceed with the plans to launch terrorist attacks on America. The planning for the attacks continued for four years during which KSM helped to recruit the suicide bombers who would participate in the actual operation.

The full extent of KSM's involvement in the 9/11 came to be recognized after the attacks. He then became the target of U.S. and Pakistani intelligence services. Moving from sanctuary to sanctuary in various cities of Pakistan, he was finally arrested in **Rawalpindi**, the headquarters of the Pakistani army, on 11 March 2003. The Pakistani authorities handed him over to the United States. His interrogation appears to have provided valuable details about the planning and execution of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, on the working of al Qaeda high command, and about some of the operations al Qaeda had in the planning stage. That notwithstanding, the interrogation techniques used to obtain information from KSM and other senior al Qaeda operators became the subject of controversy in the United States when it was asserted in various investigative reports in the American press that the Central Intelligence Agency had kept some of these prisoners in

secret prisons in various parts of the world, including eastern Europe, and had used interrogation methods that could be considered torture under various international conventions.

**KHAN, IMRAN (1952– )**. Imran Khan belongs to a famous **cricketing** family from Pakistan that has produced three “test” captains. In 1987, his team won the test series against England in England and against India in India. His team performed better than expected against the West Indies, at that time the world’s best team. In three series in 1986, 1988, and 1990, Pakistan drew with the West Indies. His ambition to crown his career by winning the World Cup for Pakistan in 1987 was not realized when the Pakistanis, having played very well in the league matches, lost to Australia in the semifinals played at **Lahore**, Imran Khan’s hometown. Australia went on to win the cup by defeating England in the finals at Calcutta. Khan retired from the game following the World Cup series and was replaced as captain of the Pakistani side by his deputy, Javed Miandad. But Miandad was not appointed captain and Imran Khan was persuaded to return to lead the team by President **Zia ul-Haq**, who was also the patron of Pakistan Cricket Control Board.

The president’s decision was vindicated and Imran Khan’s ambition was finally realized in 1992 when the team led by him came from behind and won the Fifth Cricket World Cup. The series was held in Australia and New Zealand and at one point it seemed that Pakistan would not be able to make it even to the semifinals. This extraordinarily thrilling series brought new prominence to Imran Khan, and he and his team received an extremely warm welcome on their return to Pakistan. The crowds that greeted them at Lahore’s airport matched in size and enthusiasm the crowds that had received **Benazir Bhutto** in 1986 when she returned to Pakistan from a period of self-imposed exile. After this victory, Khan once again announced his retirement from the game.

Even though he left the game of cricket, Imran Khan remained in the public eye as he launched an ambitious program to raise funds to build a cancer treatment and research center in Lahore in memory of his mother, who had succumbed to the disease at a relatively young age. Imran brought the same level of commitment to this enterprise

as he had done to the game of cricket, and the people of Pakistan—both native and emigrant—responded with equal enthusiasm. Fundraising for the Shaukat Khan Memorial Trust Hospital brought Imran Khan in direct contact with hundreds of thousands of people as he traveled the country. During this long crusade, he decided that it would be appropriate for him to play a political role in the country. In reaching this decision he was encouraged by General (retired) **Hameed Gul** and Pasban, a social-service organization associated with the **Jamaat-e-Islami**.

With this shift in ambition also came a shift in his political and social outlook. In 1994 Imran Khan gave a number of interviews in which he projected the image of a born-again Muslim, resentful of the influence of the West on Muslim cultures. He also alienated Pakistan's upper-class **women** by suggesting that in a Muslim society such as Pakistan's, the most appropriate role for women was in the household as housewives. It was with considerable surprise, therefore, that the people of Pakistan received the news of his marriage to Jemima Goldsmith, the daughter of a prominent Jewish businessman from England. On 25 April 1996, Imran Khan announced the launching of a political movement rather than a party. He called the movement **Tehrik-e-Insaf** (Movement for Justice) and focused on corruption as the most serious problem confronting the country. Neither Khan nor his party were prepared for the general elections called by President **Farooq Ahmad Khan Leghari** following the dismissal of the government of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. The Tehrik performed very poorly in the elections held on 3 February 1997. It did not win a single seat in the National or Provincial Assemblies. Imran himself contested half a dozen seats but lost in all of them.

There was some speculation that the military under **Pervez Musharraf** might bring in Imran Khan as the civilian head of the administration. That did not happen, and he became one of the most vocal critics of President Musharraf and military rule. In the national elections of October 2002, Khan once again fielded a number of candidates from his party but won only one seat when he was elected from Mianwah, the district of origin of his father. While there was pressure on him to merge his party with the **Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid-e-Azam)**, Khan chose to retain a separate identity

and took up a seat in the National Assembly as a member of the opposition. Imran Khan and Jemima were divorced in 2004.

**KHAN SAHIB, DR. (1882–1956).** Dr. Khan Sahib, one of the “two Khan brothers”—the other being Abdul Ghaffar Khan—was born in the **Northwest Frontier Province**. His initial inclination was to pursue a career in medicine rather than in politics. Accordingly, he studied medicine, received a degree from London University, and began clinical practice in **Peshawar**. He did not pursue the medical career for long and joined his brother in promoting the objectives of the **Khudai Khidmatgar Movement**. The movement, also known as the Red Shirts, had caught the imagination of a large number of people in the Northwest Frontier Province largely because of the work done by the Khan brothers.

Unlike Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Dr. Khan Sahib was not averse to holding public office. After the provincial elections of 1937 in which he associated his movement with Gandhi’s **Indian National Congress** and won an impressive victory for the Congress Party, he was invited to become the province’s chief minister. He resigned two years later along with all other Congress provincial chief ministers to protest the entry of British India in the war against Germany. He was back as the chief minister of the Frontier Province after leading the Congress-Khudai Khidmatgar coalition to another electoral triumph in the elections of 1946. This victory was even more impressive than the one in 1937 because in the interim **Muhammad Ali Jinnah** and his demand for the establishment of an independent homeland for the Muslims of British India had begun to draw considerable support from the Muslims of the country. With the Muslims accounting for 95 percent of the province’s total population, the Northwest Frontier Province was expected to follow Jinnah and the rest of Muslim India in favoring the idea of Pakistan.

The Khan brothers and their Khudai Khidmatgar supporters had vigorously opposed the idea of Pakistan, and their opposition to Jinnah was strong enough for the British administration to insist that a referendum should be held in order to ascertain whether the people of the Frontier Provinces wished to join Pakistan. The referendum was held, and the supporters of Pakistan won easily; the Khan brothers lost their bid to keep their province out of Pakistan. That notwith-



standing, Dr. Khan Sahib refused to leave office. When Pakistan was born on 14 August 1947, Dr. Khan Sahib was still the province's chief minister. This situation was clearly unacceptable to Governor-General Jinnah, who intervened by ordering the governor of the province to dismiss the Khan administration and order **Abdul Quyyum Khan** to form a new government.

The emergence of Pakistan did not put an end to Dr. Khan Sahib's political career. In 1955 he reappeared as a member of the federal cabinet headed by **Muhammad Ali Bogra**. In 1955, when the four provinces and the **princely states** in the country's west wing merged to form the one unit of **West Pakistan**, Governor-General **Iskander Mirza** sent Dr. Khan Sahib to **Lahore** to head the new administration as West Pakistan's first chief minister. This was a shrewd move on the part of the governor-general, since the creation of West Pakistan had been opposed by the smaller provinces, in particular by **Balochistan** and the Northwest Frontier. These provinces were afraid of total domination by **Punjab**, the largest province in Pakistan's western wing. At the same time, Dr. Khan Sahib's decision to accept the governor-general's offer represented a significant shift in his position because he had spent his entire political career in promoting a separate identity for the **Pathan** people.

In April 1956, Dr. Khan Sahib joined hands with Governor-General Iskander Mirza to start a new political organization, the aim of which was to provide the Pakistani establishment with a political vehicle that it could dominate. The **Muslim League** was too large an organization to be dominated by one faction. Iskander Mirza and his associates called their group the **Republic Party of Pakistan**. Dr. Khan Sahib remained the chief minister of West Pakistan. He was murdered in Lahore by a young Pathan while still in office. The assassin was unhappy that the chief minister had not helped him to secure a job in the government.

**KHAR, GHULAM MUSTAFA (1934– )**. Ghulam Mustafa Khar, a landlord with large holdings in south **Punjab**, was one of the founding fathers of the **Pakistan People's Party (PPP)**, the political organization created by **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto** in 1967. Khar served Bhutto in several capacities, including governor of Punjab, Pakistan's largest province. He remained with the party after Bhutto's removal

by the military in 1977 and his execution two years later. Zulfikar Ali's death brought **Benazir Bhutto**, the late prime minister's daughter, to the center stage of politics in Pakistan. She was elected the PPP's chairperson with the support of her father's old associates, including Khar.

In 1986 Benazir Bhutto, after spending several years in self-imposed exile in London, returned to Pakistan. Buoyed by the very warm reception she received, she decided to reshape her father's party in her own image. She sidelined the first generation of leaders, including Mustafa Khar. Not happy with this move, Khar joined with **Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi**, another leader who had suffered at the hands of Benazir Bhutto, to form the **National People's Party**. The party was unsuccessful in the **elections of 1988**, the first to be held after the return of democracy in Pakistan.

Khar returned to the fold of the PPP following the party's win in the **elections of 1993**. Benazir Bhutto included him in her cabinet and gave him the important portfolio of water and power. There was an expectation that Khar would succeed in producing the political consensus needed to start the construction of another dam on the **Indus river** at a place called **Kalabagh** on the border of Punjab and the **Northwest Frontier Province**. Success eluded Khar, however. He had made little progress by the time President **Farooq Ahmad Khan Leghari** dismissed the Bhutto government on 5 November 1996. Khar contested in the **elections of 1997** and won a seat for himself from south Punjab. The return of the military to power in October 1999 under General **Pervez Musharraf** consigned several senior leaders, including Khar, to the margin of Pakistani politics.

**KHARIAN.** *See* MUTUAL DEFENSE AGREEMENT.

**KHIZAR HAYAT KHAN TIWANA (1900–1986).** Sir Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana was born in 1900 into the politically powerful Tiwana family of Shahpur (Sargodah) in northwest **Punjab**. He was educated at Oxford and briefly served in the British Indian Army in the closing days of World War I. He was elected to the Punjab assembly in 1937 and served as minister of public works in the **Unionist** cabinet headed by Sir **Sikander Hayat Khan**. In 1942, following the death of Sir Sikander, he was elected president of the Unionist Party, a de-

velopment that was to profoundly effect not only the politics of his native Punjab but of the entire Muslim community of British India.

Khizar took the Unionist Party out of the **Muslim League** in 1946 and decided to fight the elections held that year on a platform that supported the concept of a united India, presumably under continuing British rule. The Muslim League won a plurality in the Provincial Assembly but did not have enough seats to form a government on its own. Khizar refused to cooperate with the League; instead, he aligned the Unionists with the Hindu-dominated **Indian National Congress** and the Sikh-dominated Akali Dal to form a coalition government in April 1946. These moves, including the decision to ban the Muslim League National Guards as a paramilitary organization, won him the permanent wrath of the majority of Muslims in Punjab. A mass agitation was launched against him by the Muslim League, and hundreds of thousands of people came out in the streets all over the province. Jails were soon filled with agitators, and Khizar was unable to cope with the situation. He resigned in March 1947, a few weeks before the British announced their intention to leave India after partitioning it into the independent states of India and Pakistan. He did not play any role in politics after Pakistan came into being, although some attempts were made to draw him back into the political arena. *See also* TIWANAS.

**KHOWST.** Khowst is a small town in a plain of that name west of Pakistan's border with Afghanistan. **Mujahideen** forces besieged Afghan and Soviet garrisons in Khowst almost from the beginning of the war in December 1979. The Soviets tried hard to dislocate the mujahideen from Khowst while Pakistan and the United States provided the mujahideen with heavy equipment by land and by air. Once the mujahideen were equipped with such sophisticated anti-aircraft weapons as stinger and blowpipe missiles, the supply of the garrison by air became hazardous. In December 1987 the Soviet and Afghan troops launched a massive operation to open the 120-kilometer road through the mountains to the plain of Khowst. The battle for Khowst was the most important land battle fought during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

After the departure of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan, Khowst became an important training center for the "soldiers of Islam," the

followers of **Osama bin Laden**, who fought in conflicts around the world including those in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Chechnya, **Kashmir**, and Kosovo. Those who were trained in the camps at Khowst were also allegedly involved in several acts of **terrorism**, including the bombing in August 1998 of the United States embassies in East Africa. On 20 August 1998, U.S. President Bill Clinton ordered missile attacks on Khowst in the hope of destroying the training facilities and killing bin Laden. The attacks were unsuccessful. Even after the fall of the Taliban regime and consolidation of power by the administration headed by President Hamid Karzai, Khowst remained restive.

**KHUDAI KHIDMATGAR MOVEMENT.** The Khudai Khidmatgar Movement, or the Servants of God Movement, was launched in the 1930s. Its main political purpose was to obtain some form of autonomy for the **Pathan** population living in the **Northwest Frontier Province** of British India. The movement was backed by uniformed but unarmed shock troopers who wore homespun and hand-woven garments dyed a dirty red. The color of the uniform gave the Khudai Khidmatgars (KK) another name: the Surkhposhan, or the Red Shirts.

The Red Shirts operated at two different levels: first, they mobilized the landless peasants and village workers against the khans or the large landlords of the Northwest Frontier Province. They also appealed to the urban intelligentsia to campaign against the British rule of India. The movement's popularity with the less privileged segments of the Pathan society gave it a distinct socialist—almost Marxist—flavor, and its anti-British stance brought it close to Mahatma Gandhi and his **Indian National Congress**. These two antiestablishment orientations—against the landlords and against the British—explain why the movement developed a strong antipathy toward the **Muslim League** which had many landlords in the ranks of senior leadership.

The Khan brothers—Dr. **Khan Sahib** and **Abdul Ghaffar Khan**—were the movement's most prominent leaders, and their politics made them close associates of Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru. In the critical elections of 1946, the brothers guided the Congress Party to an impressive victory. With the help of other non-Muslim League members of the provincial legislature, the Red Shirts were able to

form a government with Dr. Khan Sahib as the chief minister. The Red Shirt government was still in power when Pakistan was born on 14 August 1947. The administration was dismissed by Governor Sir **George Cunningham** on 22 August 1947, and **Abdul Quyyum Khan**, president of the provincial Muslim League, was invited to form a new administration. This change resulted in the political demise of the Khudai Khidmatgars.

**KHUDA-KI-BASTI.** The establishment of Khuda-ki-Basti—or God’s village—was one of the initiatives taken in 1987 by the government of Prime Minister **Muhammad Khan Junejo**. It was designed to address the problems posed by hundreds of squatter settlements in **Karachi**. The enormous and unrelenting increase in Karachi’s population since 1947, when the city was chosen to become Pakistan’s first capital, had not been matched by the supply of suitable living space for the migrants who came in search of jobs. This led to the development of *katchi abadis*—or temporary settlements—in all parts of the city. These abadis were usually located on public lands and resembled squatter settlements in all major cities of the developing world.

The establishment of Khuda-ki-Basti, first in **Hyderabad** and then in Karachi, was one response to the problem of urban spread in south **Sindh**. The concept was pioneered by Tawfiq Siddiqui, a civil servant, who gave operational meaning to the idea originally promoted by Prime Minister Junejo. The *bastis* survived even after the departure of Junejo. The troubles in Karachi in most of the 1990s encouraged the provincial government to keep focusing on the basti concept for depressed shanty towns in Karachi and other parts of Sindh.

**KHUNJERAB PASS.** The **Karakoram Highway (KKH)** leaves Pakistan and enters **China** through the Khunjerab Pass. The pass is located at a height of 5,000 meters in the Karakoram mountain range. The pass was opened to the public by the Pakistani and Chinese authorities on 1 May 1986. Since then, it has become a popular attraction for tourists who take the KKH from northern Pakistan into Kashgar in China’s Xinjiang province.

**KHYBER PASS.** The Khyber Pass is the main pass in the mountain range that runs along Pakistan’s border with **Afghanistan**. It has been

traveled extensively for centuries. Bringing Afghanistan under their influence was an important part of the “**Great Game**” played by the British once they became masters of India. This meant turning the Khyber Pass into an important military artery through which troops and equipment could be easily moved. Accordingly, the British laid an all-weather road that traversed the pass and also built a railway that connected the city of **Peshawar** with Landikotal, a small town on the Indian side of the pass. A number of forts were constructed all along the Khyber road and railway.

It was only after the establishment of Pakistan that the Khyber became an important crossing point for commerce—mostly goods smuggled into Pakistan from Afghanistan. However, military action returned to the Khyber Pass after the invasion of Afghanistan by the **Soviet Union** in 1979. Millions of refugees used this gateway to enter Pakistan from Afghanistan while hundreds of thousands of Afghan mujahideen used the pass to launch military operations into their country. The unsettled conditions all along the pass during the Afghan war turned it into a route for the transport of drugs, mostly heroin manufactured in hundreds of crude workshops that sprang up all along the pass. Even after the withdrawal of the Soviet troops, the rise of the Taliban, and the establishment of the governments in Pakistan and Afghanistan that had the support of the United States, Khyber remained an active place for the manufacture, trade, and transport of drugs.

**KOREA (NORTH)–PAKISTAN RELATIONS.** Pakistan developed strong ties with the communist regime of North Korea during the tenure of President (later Prime Minister) **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto** (1971–1977). In 1975, Bhutto invited President Kim Il Sung to visit Pakistan. The Korean president was received in **Islamabad** with a lavish display of hospitality. It is not clear whether Bhutto and his government sought military assistance from North Korea; this certainly happened in the 1990s after the United States imposed a total ban on the sale of military equipment to Pakistan. It was during this period that Dr. **Abdul Qadeer Khan**, the head of Pakistan’s program to develop nuclear capability, began to provide technical assistance to Pyongyang for enriching uranium. The North Koreans, in turn, provided Pakistan with medium-range missiles and the technical know-

how to manufacture them. Pakistan was to claim later that the contacts between Dr. Khan and the North Koreans were not authorized by the government. In December 2003, the United States exposed the workings of the underground network operated by Dr. Khan, which supplied nuclear technology not only to North Korea but also to **Iran** and **Libya**. In January 2004, President **Pervez Musharraf** pledged that the Khan network had been dismantled and that Pakistan had cut all cooperation on nuclear matters with North Korea. In February 2005, Pyongyang announced that it was in possession of nuclear weapons. This claim was taken seriously by the Western intelligence agencies who were of the view that the country had used plutonium extracted as spent fuel from a nuclear power reactor as the material for the weapons rather than enriched uranium that would have linked the North Korean program closely with that of Pakistan's.

**KOREA (SOUTH)–PAKISTAN RELATIONS.** The economic decision-makers in Pakistan were (and probably still are) only vaguely familiar with the circumstances that led to the economic success of South Korea. In fact, even in the late 1970s, they were much more enamored of the northern half of the country. It was only during the administration of Prime Minister **Mian Nawaz Sharif** that Pakistan began to take serious note of the Republic of (South) Korea. This interest was not directed at understanding the set of circumstances that had produced the Korean miracle, however. Instead, it was aimed at attracting Korean private capital for investment in Pakistan.

The Korean response to Prime Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif's overtures was encouraging. In February 1992, **Daewoo** of Korea signed an agreement with the government of Pakistan to construct a US\$2billion motorway connecting **Lahore** with **Islamabad**. During the same month, a high-powered delegation visited Pakistan to explore the possibility of setting up a Korean industrial estate on a site near **Karachi**. The Koreans requested that Pakistan set aside a site measuring 500 acres near Port Qasim for investment by industries from their country. This effort was stymied by the change in governments in July 1993 when Mian Nawaz Sharif resigned, first to be replaced by the caretaker administration of Prime Minister **Moeen Qureshi** and then by the administration headed by Prime Minister **Benazir Bhutto**.

Bhutto had no interest in continuing with the projects started by Sharif. She incurred the displeasure of the Koreans by putting the completion of the **Lahore-Islamabad Motorway** on the back burner. She made an effort in 1995 to improve relations with the Korean private sector by sending **Asif Ali Zardari**, her husband, to Korea to hold discussions with the large industrial houses, but was rebuffed. She paid a state visit to Korea in 1996, but it was only with the return of Mian Nawaz Sharif as prime minister in February of 1997 that Pakistan's relations began to warm with Korea. However, the East Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 and the stress it caused to the Korean private sector put on hold these plans for investment.

**KOT ADDU.** In 1994, the government of Prime Minister **Benazir Bhutto** began to implement a plan to privatize the **Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA)**, Pakistan's largest public-sector corporation. The first phase of the plan called for the transfer of two thermal power plants, the 1,600-MW plant at Kot Addu and the 880-MW plant at **Jamshoro**. The government's plan for the privatization of the Kot Addu plant envisaged a phased transfer of ownership to the private sector. In the first stage all financial obligations of the WAPDA, including an outstanding debt of US\$756 million, were to be taken over by the Kot Addu Power Company (KAP), an entity legally separate from the Authority. The second stage included the transfer of 26 percent of the company's assets, along with the responsibility for its operation, to a strategic investor selected on the basis of international competitive bidding. Four foreign companies entered the last phase of the bidding process. Britain's National Power was the successful bidder. It took over the management of the power station in 1996.

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**LAHORE.** In 1947, the year of Pakistan's birth, the city had a population of 500,000. In the **census of 1998**, its population was estimated at five million. Its boundaries now include a number of small towns that were once separated from it by farmland. It is now the second largest industrial city, accounting for one-fifth of industrial output.



By 2005, the city's boundaries had expanded and its population had increased to more than seven million. The first few decades of the 21st century may see the reemergence of Lahore as Pakistan's premier urban center. If the present trends continue, by 2015, Lahore may overtake **Karachi** in terms of both the size of its population and its contribution to the national economy. There is also the possibility that Lahore may evolve a cultural identity of its own, quite separate from that of Karachi. Finally, the political center of gravity may also shift toward Lahore. The last trend is already visible; it may gather momentum as some of the forces that have surfaced in urban Pakistan begin to move the city ahead of its competitors and take it toward greater prominence.

Lahore would have been Pakistan's most prominent city but for the way **Lord Radcliffe** drew the boundary between the Indian and Pakistani **Punjab**s. In 1947, the year Pakistan was born, Lahore would have been the most obvious choice to become the capital of the new country. However, Radcliffe drew the border too close to the city to justify locating the country's capital in what was then Pakistan's largest urban center. Apart from its size, Lahore, more than Karachi, had most of the infrastructure required for the capital of a country; it was well connected with the provinces in the western wing of what is now Pakistan, had a sound economic base on which the urban economy could be built, and possessed the bureaucratic skills around which the new administration could be structured. Lord Radcliffe's dispensation disabled Lahore; it could not become the seat of the Pakistani government for as long as India and Pakistan continued to view each other with suspicion and hostility.

**LAHORE FORT.** The Lahore Fort is the most elaborate structure to be built by the **Mughul emperors** of India. It was not conceived as one building erected for one purpose. It evolved instead over time as a mini-city on the outskirts of **Lahore**, the capital of Mughul **Punjab**. Four Mughul emperors were to contribute to the development of the fort. The site for the fort was selected by Akbar the Great in the mid-16th century. He chose the left bank of the Ravi River that flowed through Lahore to construct a series of buildings to be located within the walls of a fort. The fort was meant to provide residences for the emperor and the members of his court, places for holding audiences

to the emperor's courtiers and to the public, places of worship, palaces for the women in the harem, and quarters for the soldiers. Akbar laid the foundation stone of the fort, but it was his son, Jahangir, who had a special fondness for the city of Lahore and who undertook the first phase of the fort's construction.

Akbar's grandson and Jahangir's son, Emperor Shah Jehan, however, brought to the fort his genius for building and his flair for magnificence. Shah Jehan's most important contribution to the cluster of buildings located within the periphery of the fort is the Diwan-i-Khas, or the hall of private audience, and the Sheesh Mahal, or the Mirror Palace. The Mirror Palace has a marble dado, carved marble screens, and the mosaic is made of tiny convex mirrors of many colors set in arabesques. West of the Sheesh Mahal stands the Naulakha Pavilion, or the pavilion of 900,000, so named because its walls are studded with 900,000 precious stones. The main gate to the fort faces the Badshahi Mosque. Aurangzeb, the last great Mughul emperor of India, put the final touches to the fort as it now stands.

**LAHORE-ISLAMABAD MOTORWAY (M-2).** The idea of constructing a motorway linking **Lahore** with **Islamabad** along an entirely new alignment, numerous kilometers west of the existing highway, was first put forward by **Mian Nawaz Sharif** when he was the chief minister of **Punjab**. The feasibility report prepared for the project estimated its cost at Rs 8.2 billion, or about US\$250 million at the then prevailing exchange rate. The proposal did not advance very far, since the Islamabad administration under Prime Minister **Benazir Bhutto**, who was hostile to the provincial administration of Mian Nawaz Sharif, showed little interest in the project. The idea was revived, however, when Mian Nawaz Sharif replaced Benazir Bhutto as prime minister. The motorway was identified as one of several projects included in the multibillion-dollar highway construction program developed by the Nawaz Sharif government soon after it assumed office. The program—the motorway included—received the government's approval in a special meeting of the cabinet on 10 October 1991. Three months later, on 10 January 1992, Mian Nawaz Sharif performed the groundbreaking ceremony of the motorway.

The contract for the construction of the 340-kilometer motorway was given to **Daewoo** of **South Korea**. The project was to be com-

pleted over a period of three years. With the return of Benazir Bhutto as prime minister in October 1993, however, the project suffered a major setback. The new government stopped payments to Daewoo, while yet another investigation was carried out. Ultimately the government decided to proceed with the construction of the highway but on a schedule considerably longer than the original. It was only after the return of Sharif as prime minister in February 1997 that the project once again received the government's attention. The motorway was opened for public use in November 1997. It cost US\$2 billion to build. It is now a part of an ambitious program of a network of motorways that will crisscross the country by the year 2020. The Lahore-Islamabad Motorway (M2) is being extended toward **Peshawar** on the border with Afghanistan, with the construction of M1. Lahore will also be connected with **Faisalabad** and **Multan** in southern Punjab with the construction of M4 and M5, and ultimately linked with the port cities of **Karachi** and **Gwadar**.

**LAHORE RESOLUTION.** *See* PAKISTAN RESOLUTION.

**LAHORE UNIVERSITY OF MANAGEMENT SCIENCES (LUMS).** The Lahore University of Management Sciences was founded in 1986 by a group of industrialists headed by **Syed Babar Ali**. By the time the institution had been established, large industrial and commercial houses had begun to recruit professional managers for their enterprises. LUMS was designed to meet this burgeoning demand. It was fashioned after the Harvard Business School, borrowing the Harvard case method for teaching. Having started in rented buildings in Gulberg, **Lahore**, LUMS moved to a permanent, 100 acre campus—financed in part by a grant from the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID)—near the Defense Housing Society on the outskirts of Lahore.

Initially, LUMS focused on training students in managerial sciences, awarding the degrees of master of business administration after two years to students selected after they had finished three years of college. Later, in 1994, the institution established the School of Arts and Sciences which offered a four year program leading to a bachelor's degree. In 2005, LUMS announced a program of expansion aimed at establishing two new schools—the School of Law and the School of Science and Engineering. The aim was to provide multi-disciplinary

education in science, engineering, social sciences, humanities, and management at both the undergraduate (B.S.) and graduate levels (M.S. and Ph.D.). The board also announced that it had received a US\$2.5 million donation from the Dawood family for establishing a new Suleiman Dawood School for Management Sciences. In the 2004–2005 academic year, LUMS had a student body of 2,100, of whom more than a third were **women**. It also established an executive-training program, once again patterned after that of the Harvard Business School.

**LAND ALIENATION ACT OF 1901.** The Land Alienation Act of 1901 was promulgated by the British administrators of **Punjab** to protect the Muslim peasantry from Hindu moneylenders. The act prohibited the transfer of agricultural land from the group of people it defined as “agriculturalists” to those it identified as “non-agriculturalists.” Agriculturalists were mostly Muslims and non-agriculturalists were mostly non-Muslims. The act proved to be a significant piece of legislation. It restored social peace and harmony among the communities of rural Punjab. It also permanently bound the Muslim landed class of Punjab to the British. The fact that the Muslim community of Punjab never became restive under British rule and did not actively participate in the movement to create Pakistan, a separate homeland for the Muslims of British India, can be largely attributed to this piece of legislation and its successful application.

**LAND REFORMS OF 1959.** The Land Reforms of 1959, introduced by the military government of General **Muhammad Ayub Khan** in the form of a martial-law regulation (Martial Law Regulation [MLR] 64) prescribed two ceilings on land holdings: 500 acres for irrigated and 1,000 acres for non-irrigated (*barani*) land. The owners of confiscated land were to be compensated through the issue of long-term (20 years) interest-bearing (3 percent a year) bonds. The confiscated area was to be distributed to peasants against payment stretched over several years. MLR 64 departed from Ayub Khan’s original thinking on land reforms in two ways. These concerned *jagirs* (land grants), and the relationship between owners and cultivators. All jagirs were abolished without compensation to their owners. And all tenants were to be provided with legal protection against eviction. At the same

time, the owners were prohibited from levying any other charge, except rent, on the cultivators. *Begar* or forced labor extracted from cultivators by owners was made illegal.

Slightly more than one million hectares of land were confiscated under the Land Reforms of 1959. Of this land, 896,000 hectares were allotted to 183,266 persons. The beneficiaries, on average, received 4.9 hectares of confiscated land. A significant proportion of the land confiscated came from **Punjab**; the province provided 503,000 hectares or slightly more than one-half of the total. **Sindh** provided 9.3 percent; the **Northwest Frontier Province** 2.4 percent; and **Balochistan** 1.3 percent. The Land Reforms of 1959 affected only 5 percent of the total farm area in Pakistan.

**LAND REFORMS OF 1972.** The **Pakistan People's Party (PPP)** in its "Foundation Papers" and in the manifesto it issued for the **elections of 1970**, promised radical land reforms. The party indicated that its reforms would go far beyond those introduced by the administration of President **Muhammad Ayub Khan** in 1959. The PPP contended that Ayub Khan's reforms had been insignificant in scope, since they sidestepped the issue of inequality in the distribution of rural assets. The PPP promised to remedy that situation once it came to power.

On 1 March 1972, President **Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto**, acting as the chief martial-law administrator, promulgated Martial Law Regulation (MLR) 115 of 1972, which specified a new ceiling on land holding. In spite of the promise made in the Foundation Papers, the reforms proved not to be any more radical than those undertaken in 1959; they only advanced the process of structural change in land ownership that had begun with the earlier reforms. As in the case of the 1959 reforms, this effort also aimed to achieve greater equality but not a radical change in equity in land distribution. A new and lower ceiling was prescribed: 150 acres for irrigated land and 300 acres for non-irrigated land. The land owned in excess of these ceilings was to be confiscated by the state, without payment of compensation to the affected landlords. The confiscated land was to be provided to landless peasants and small landholders without charge. A total of 1.3 million acres was confiscated under the reforms, of which 900,000 acres were distributed to 76,000 small cultivators. *See also* LAND REFORMS OF 1959.

**LAND REFORMS OF 1977.** The third attempt to address persistent inequities in land distribution in West Pakistan was made in 1977. On 7 January 1977, acting on the advice of Prime Minister **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto**, President Fazal Elahi Chaudhry promulgated the Land Reform Ordinance of 1977 (Ordinance II of 1977). These reforms, like those attempted in 1959 and 1972, had a marginal effect on land distribution.

The 1977 land reforms had three significant features: they reduced the ceiling on land holdings to 100 acres of irrigated land; allowed compensation to the people who were required to surrender land in the form of long-maturity government bonds; and the land assumed by the government was offered without charge to landless peasants and small landholders. About 1.8 million acres of land were surrendered to the government under the reforms, of which 900,000 acres were distributed among 13,143 persons. *See also* LAND REFORMS OF 1959; LAND REFORMS OF 1972.

**LATIF OF BHIT, SHAH ABDUL (1609–1672).** Shah Abdul Latif of Bhit occupies a special place of honor among the “saints of **Sindh**,” a group of religious leaders who first brought Islam to the lower Indus valley. He was born in 1609 in Hela Haveli. His family had migrated to Sindh from the city of Heart in **Afghanistan**, a prominent center of **Sufist** learning. Shah Abdul Karim of Bulri, Latif’s great-grandfather, had been recognized in his own time both as a poet and a saint. Latif followed in the family tradition. Not much is known about Latif’s formal education, but the scope and sweep of his verse, composed mostly in his native Sindhi, suggests considerable familiarity not only with Persian and Arabic—languages that all reasonably literate Muslims were expected to know—but also with such vernacular dialects as Balochi, Punjabi, and Seraiki. Shah Abdul Latif’s *urs* (death anniversary) brings tens of thousands of devotees to the mausoleum that was built at Bhit Shah by Shulam Shah Kalhoro, the ruler of Sindh, in the middle of the eighteenth century. *See also* CHISTI.

**LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF 1958.** As president **Muhammad Ayub Khan** was to explain later in his political biography, the principal purpose of his coup d’etat (he called it “my revolution”) was to

bring Pakistan into the 20th century by modernizing its institutional structure. Although he had his own ideas about the changes he wanted to introduce, he nevertheless freely sought advice from people he considered more knowledgeable than himself. One way of receiving this advice was to appoint commissions of inquiry with clear terms of reference. A Law Reform Commission was among the dozens of commissions appointed in 1958-1959. It was convened in November 1958, with the injunction to study the entire legal infrastructure and to suggest how it could be modernized.

As instructed, the Commission reported back in one year, but its recommendations were less epoch-making than had been expected. It made 368 recommendations dealing with legal procedures, legal conduct, and the structure of the legal system. It also covered the area of family laws. Its suggestion that special family courts should be established influenced the content of the **Family Laws Ordinance of 1961**.

**LEGAL FRAMEWORK ORDER (LFO) OF 1970.** The Legal Framework Order was promulgated by the martial-law government of General **Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan** on 20 March 1970. Its main purpose was to fill the legal vacuum that was left by the abrogation of the **Constitution of 1962** by the martial-law government when it took office on 29 March 1969. The LFO was to serve as a quasi-constitution until a new constituent assembly came up with a new constitutional structure for the country.

The political structure prescribed by the LFO was entirely different from the one that supported the Constitution of 1962. The **principle of parity** was dispensed with. The LFO established a Constituent Assembly of 300 members with provincial representation determined on the basis of the shares of the provinces in total population. East Pakistan was allocated 162 seats, whereas West Pakistan was given 138 seats. Unlike the Constitution of 1962, the Legal Framework Order opted for direct elections of the president and the National and Provincial Assemblies. Under the LFO, general elections were to be held on 5 October 1970, and the National Assembly elected by the people was to be given 120 days to write a new constitution. This provision was put in the LFO in order not to repeat the experience of the **First Constituent Assembly** (1947–1954), which labored for more than seven years without agreeing on a constitution.

If the assembly failed to write a constitution within the stipulated period, it was to be dissolved by the president and another election was to be held to reconstitute it.

The **military** was not prepared to grant full constitution-making powers to the Constituent Assembly, however. It was fearful of two possible outcomes. One, it did not want the assembly to come up with a constitution that granted so much autonomy to the provinces that the unity of the state of Pakistan would be undermined. Two, it did not want provisions in the constitution that would put unacceptable constraints on the role of the army.

The elections promised by the LFO were held on 7 December 1970, two months after the time indicated in the order. The delay was caused by a cyclone that devastated the coastline of East Pakistan on 12 November 1970, leaving more than a million people dead and causing inestimable damage to property.

**LEGAL FRAMEWORK ORDER (LFO) OF 2002.** The LFO was promulgated by the administration of President **Pervez Musharraf** after the general had assumed the title of president, replacing **Abdul Rafiq Tarar** who had stayed in that position even after the military's removal of Prime Minister **Mian Nawaz Sharif**. Until this change in the country's leadership, General Musharraf was called the chief executive. This step by the general created some legal and constitutional problems, since President Tarar had provided legal continuity to the government even after the dismissal of the prime minister. The Supreme Court had already passed a judgment requiring that the military government hold a new set of elections no later than three years after its assumption of political control. This meant that elections to the dissolved National Assembly had to be held no later than October 2002. The military government, therefore, needed a quasi-constitutional framework not only to govern but also to hold elections to the National and Provincial Assemblies. There was precedent available to create a temporary legal structure pending the return to a constitutional form of government. This had done by the previous martial law administrations as well. The LFO was designed to address these issues. It laid down the legal boundaries within which the military could operate; prescribed a new set of rules for holding elections; and introduced a number of changes in the constitution, the most impor-



tant of which was to create once again a powerful presidency. The president, as was the case under the **Eighth Amendment** to the **Constitution of 1973**, was given the authority to dismiss the prime minister and dissolve the national legislature.

The LFO had to be made a part of the constitution once the elections were held, and a new National Assembly came into existence. The opposition led by the **Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA)** directed the fight against giving the LFO provisions permanent status by incorporating them into the constitution. A compromise was reached in the closing days of 2003, but only after General Musharraf gave his word that he would retire from the military a year later, on 31 December 2004. With this promise, the MMA supported the passage of the **Seventeenth Amendment** that incorporated most LFO provisions. However, President Musharraf failed to keep his promise and extended his period of service in the military. His reason for renegeing on his word was that the MMA had also not stuck to its part of the agreement by withholding its vote on a number of critical pieces of legislation that the government had moved in the national legislature.

**LEGHARI, SARDAR FAROOQ AHMAD KHAN (1941– )**. Farooq Ahmad Khan Leghari, Pakistan's eighth president, comes from **Baloch-Pathan** stock. His father, Muhammad Khan Leghari, was from **Balochistan**, whereas his mother belonged to the **Northwest Frontier Province**. He was born in Tank, a small town in the Northwest Frontier Province, but was brought up in **Lahore**, where his father lived most of his life. He was educated first at Lahore's renowned Aitcheson College, briefly attended Forman Christian College also in Lahore, and in 1961 went to St. Catherine's College, Oxford. He joined the **Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP)** in 1964 but did not stay in government service long. He resigned from the Service in 1970 to join the **Pakistan People's Party (PPP)** and won a seat from Dera Ghazi Khan, the seat of his family, in the **elections of 1970 and 1977**.

The 1977 victory brought him a seat in the cabinet headed by Prime Minister **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto**, but the cabinet was short lived. On 5 July 1977, Bhutto was removed from office by General **Zia ul-Haq**, who imposed martial law. Leghari, along with several members

of the PPP, decided to actively oppose the military rule. Following Bhutto's execution on 4 April 1979, his wife, **Nusrat Bhutto**, and his daughter, **Benazir Bhutto**, became the PPP's co-chairpersons. Leghari was given the important position of the party's secretary-general. He spent several months in prison when Zia came down hard on the movement that was launched by the PPP and a number of other parties to force the military president to hold elections and return democracy to Pakistan.

In the **elections of November 1988**, Leghari won seats in the National Assembly as well as in the Punjab Provincial Assembly. The PPP returned to power at the center in **Islamabad** but did not do well in **Punjab**, the country's largest province. Benazir Bhutto became prime minister but chose not to include Leghari in the federal cabinet; instead, he was asked to resign his National Assembly seat and go to Lahore and prevent **Mian Nawaz Sharif** from forming a government in Lahore, Punjab's capital. Leghari did not succeed in his efforts; Sharif managed to secure the support of a majority of Punjab's assembly members and became the chief minister of the province. Leghari returned to Islamabad and the National Assembly, and although he would have preferred the portfolio of finance, he was brought into the cabinet as minister in charge of water and power.

Bhutto's dismissal from office in August 1990 sent her and her associates into opposition once again, as the PPP lost to Mian Nawaz Sharif's **Islami Jamhuri Ittehad (IJI)** in the **elections** that were held in October. Bhutto and Leghari refused to accept the legitimacy of Sharif's elections. They accused the interim government of **Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi** of rigging the elections with the tacit approval of President **Ghulam Ishaq Khan** and the active involvement of the armed forces. While Sharif was prime minister, Leghari led noisy agitations against the government, including an effort in December 1991 to prevent Ishaq Khan from giving the annual state of the country address to the joint session of the Senate and the National Assembly.

The PPP did not win an outright majority in the **elections held in October 1993**, but emerged as the largest single party in the National Assembly. Benazir Bhutto was once again in the position to form a government in Islamabad, which she did with the help of a number of small parties. Leghari was given the portfolio of **foreign affairs**. In the effort to gain the presidency for her party, however, Bhutto

turned to Leghari and put him forward as the PPP candidate. Leghari won a comfortable victory with 274 votes, against Waseem Sajjad, who received 168 of 446 valid votes cast by the electoral college made up of the National and Provincial Assemblies. Leghari announced his resignation from the Pakistan People's Party after being sworn in as president. He wanted to be a nonparty president, responsible to the constitution and not to any particular political party. By the summer of 1996, Pakistan had slipped into serious economic difficulties, the government of Benazir Bhutto was accused of massive corruption and mismanagement, and the law-and-order situation had deteriorated remarkably. Leghari was clearly upset with these developments, as with the reluctance of the government to implement the judgment awarded by the Supreme Court in what had come to be called the “**judges' case**,” which ordered the prime minister to observe the law and the practice for making appointments to the Supreme Court.

Leghari dismissed the Bhutto administration on 5 November 1996, using **Article 58.2(b)** of the constitution. Although an interim government was appointed under Prime Minister **Meraj Khalid**, Leghari was effectively the ruler. Elections were held again in February 1997 in which Mian Nawaz Sharif and the **Pakistan Muslim League** won a decisive victory. Sharif became prime minister and used his vast majority in the National Assembly to amend the constitution twice. Article 58.2(b) was dropped. In the fall of 1997, Sharif and the **judiciary** clashed—the latter upset over some remarks made by the prime minister about the justices of the Supreme Court. To save Pakistan from plunging into a deep constitutional crisis, Leghari resigned as president on 2 December 1997.

After his resignation, Leghari moved to Lahore and began discussions with his supporters to chart out his political future. In a number of press interviews he criticized both Benazir Bhutto and Mian Nawaz Sharif for having failed to provide good leadership. He claimed that the two had plundered the country while in power and had amassed vast personal fortunes through corruption. It was clear that Leghari was hoping to present the people with another alternative to Sharif and Bhutto. On 14 August 1998—Pakistan's 51st birthday—Leghari launched a new party. Named the **Millat**, the party's foundation papers were aimed at the middle classes, who were by

then deeply concerned about the country's mounting political and economic problems. Leghari campaigned hard for his party in the **elections of October 2002**, winning a seat for himself in the National Assembly from his home district Dera Ghazi Khan. Several members of his family, including his son, Owais Khan Leghari, also won seats in the assembly. Owais Leghari was appointed minister of information technology first in the administration of Prime Minister **Zafarullah Khan Jamali** (2003–2004) and then in the government headed by **Shaukat Aziz**. In the summer of 2004, Leghari dissolved the Millat Party and merged it with the ruling Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid-e-Azam), the governing party.

**LIAQAT ALI KHAN (1896–1951)**. Liaqat Ali Khan was born in Karmal, **Punjab**, and was educated at Aligarh, Allahabad, and Oxford Universities. He took the bar examinations in 1922 and joined the **All-India Muslim League** soon after returning to India. He was a member of the United Provinces' Legislative council from 1926 to 1940, secretary of the All-India Muslim League from 1936 to 1947, and chairman of the Muslim League Central Parliamentary Board in 1945. He joined **Muhammad Ali Jinnah** in all of the important discussions that were held by the British to resolve India's constitutional dilemma. These included the **Simla Tripartite Conferences** held in 1945 and 1946.

In October 1946, Liaqat led the Muslim League group into the "interim government" formed by the British under Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of the **Indian National Congress** and was given the portfolio of finance. On 14 August 1947, Pakistan became a reality, and Liaqat Ali Khan was sworn in as the country's first prime minister. But even then, he remained in Jinnah's shadow. As governor-general, Jinnah wielded more power than had been given to him under the **Government of India Act of 1935** and the India Independence Act of 1947—two documents that together served as the new country's constitution. It was only after Jinnah's death on 11 September 1948 that Liaqat emerged as the principal leader of Pakistan and the de facto head of the Pakistan government. He invited Khawaja Nazimuddin to succeed Jinnah as governor-general and **Maulvi Tamizuddin**, another politician from Bengal, to become president of the first **Constituent Assembly**, a job also held by Jinnah.

Liaqat devoted considerable energy to **foreign affairs**. He concluded the first war in **Kashmir** by signing a cease-fire agreement with Jawaharlal Nehru, India's prime minister, in January 1949 but failed to get India to follow up on its terms. His effort to maintain neutrality in the U.S.–Soviet conflict, while claiming to be India's equal in the international arena, resulted in both superpowers giving Pakistan the cold shoulder. Liaqat moved out of this difficult situation by tilting toward the United States. In 1950, he visited Washington and met with President Harry S. Truman.

By the time of his death on 16 October 1951, Liaqat had begun to lose ground in domestic politics. **Punjab** and Bengal were restive under the control of the Muslim League, and several factions in **Sindh** were engaged in endless infighting within the Muslim League. It was only in the **Northwest Frontier Province** that **Abdul Qayyum Khan**, the Muslim League chief minister, had succeeded in cultivating support for himself and his party. Liaqat's approach to these developments was to bypass the provincial political bosses and go directly to the people. In 1950 and 1951, he began to build a constituency for himself by traveling all over the country, and using his great oratorical skills to address large audiences. It was while he was addressing a mammoth public meeting in **Rawalpindi's** Company Bagh that he was assassinated. His assailant, **Said Akbar**, was killed by the police soon after he had fired the fatal shot. In spite of an official inquiry into the assassination, the motives for Liaqat's murder remain unclear. Several historians suspect that the prime minister was killed on the orders of a group of politicians from Punjab who deeply resented the fact that they had been effectively sidelined since the founding of the state of Pakistan.

**LINE OF CONTROL (LOC).** The Line of Control became the border between the Indian and Pakistani administered parts of **Kashmir** after the signing of the **Simla Agreement** by President **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto** of Pakistan and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of **India** in June 1972. The LOC replaced the ceasefire line established in 1949 after the United Nations mandated cessation of hostilities between the two countries in their first war over Kashmir. According to the Simla agreement, “in Jammu and Kashmir, the line of control resulting from the cease-fire of December 17, 1971 shall be respected by

both sides without prejudice to the recognized position of either side. Neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally, irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretation. Both sides further undertake to refrain from threat or the use of force in violation of this line.”

The LOC did not bring about any major adjustments in the areas controlled by the two countries. Bhutto left the impression that he would work quickly to have the people of Pakistan accept the LOC as a permanent border. According to P. N. Dhar, who was part of the Indian delegation to Simla, “Bhutto agreed to change the ceasefire line into a line of control, for which he had earlier proposed the term ‘line of peace,’ but also agreed that the line would be gradually endowed with the characteristics of an international border.” In a speech to the National Assembly upon his return to Pakistan, Bhutto vehemently denied that he had reached a secret agreement on Kashmir. When a fresh series of negotiations began in 2004 between India and Pakistan, President **Pervez Musharraf** refused to consider the conversion of the LOC into a permanent international border as one of the options for resolving the issue of Kashmir.

**LOCAL BODIES ELECTIONS OF 1987.** The first local bodies elections under the system introduced in 1987 were held in November of the same year after President **Zia ul-Haq** had surrendered some power to an elected government and **Muhammad Khan Junejo** had become prime minister. The elections chose members of 4,467 local councils including 11 municipal corporations, 127 municipal committees, 186 town committees, 65 *zila* (district) councils, and 3,971 union councils. **Punjab** had 2,627 local councils of which 7 were municipal corporations (**Lahore, Faisalabad, Rawalpindi**, Multan, Gujranwala, Sargodah, and Sialkot), 67 municipal committees, 135 town committees, 29 *zila* councils, and 2,392 union councils. **Sindh**, Pakistan’s second-largest province, had 767 local councils of which there were only two municipal corporations (**Karachi** and **Hyderabad**), 33 municipal committees, 108 town committees, 13 *zila* councils, and 653 union councils. The **Northwest Frontier Province** had 706 local councils with one municipal corporation (**Peshawar**), 17 municipal committees, 23 town committees, 13 *zila* councils, and 653 union councils. Finally, **Balochistan**, Pakistan’s smallest province in terms of population but its largest in terms of geographical area, had one municipal corpo-

ration (**Quetta**), 10 municipal committees, 20 town committees, 19 zila councils, and 315 union councils, making a system of 365 local councils. In 1987, the entire system had 61,000 elected members.

**LOCAL BODIES ELECTIONS OF 1991.** The second local council elections were held in 1991 while **Mian Nawaz Sharif** was prime minister and his **Pakistan Muslim League** was the dominant player in the administration in **Islamabad**. This was the first time in Pakistan's history that political parties contested local council elections and put up candidates with clear party affiliations. The Muslim League did well in the elections, particularly in the provinces of **Punjab** and the **Northwest Frontier**; the **Pakistan People's Party** dominated the local councils in rural **Sindh**, while the **Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz (MQM)** triumphed in **Karachi** and had a strong presence in **Hyderabad**, Sindh's second largest city. Tribal *maliks* (chiefs) continued to hold rural **Balochistan** in their grip. The 1991 elections returned a member of the Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz as mayor of Karachi, whereas the mayors of **Lahore**, **Rawalpindi**, and **Faisalabad** were from the Muslim League.

The local councils elected in 1991 were dissolved in July 1993 by the caretaker government of **Moeen Qureshi**. In a landmark decision by the Lahore High Court in the spring of 1996, the dissolution of the local councils by Qureshi was declared unconstitutional. The Court instructed the government to restore the councils dissolved in 1993. A day after the decision was announced, however, the Punjab Provincial Assembly, acting under the direction of Prime Minister **Benazir Bhutto**, passed an act dissolving the resurrected local councils. She acted since the rural Muslim League had dominated the system in Punjab, the country's largest province.

**LOCAL COUNCILS.** In 1978 the government of President **Zia ul-Haq** adapted and simplified the system of **Basic Democracies (BDs)** introduced by the administration of President **Ayub Khan** in 1962. Unlike the BD structure that had interlocking councils at several levels, the system introduced by Zia had only two tiers in both the rural and urban areas. Union councils and town committees constituted the lowest rung of the system as they had in the BD structure. The *zila* (district) council in the rural areas, municipal committees in medium-sized towns,

and corporations in large cities constituted the second tier. All local council members were directly elected by the people; the chairpersons of the local bodies were not directly elected but were chosen by the members of the councils. Elections to the local councils were to be held every four years. Having created the system, Zia, however, was in no great hurry to hold elections. The first elections were held in 1987, nine years after the system was created.

**LONDON BOMBINGS OF 2005.** A coordinated attack on London's transport system by four young men, three of whom were of Pakistani origin, put the Pakistani immigrants settled in Britain under an intense spotlight. The suicide bombers exploded home-made devices in three subway trains in the heart of London and the fourth in a double-decker bus of the city's transport system. The attacks were carried out on the morning of Thursday, 7 July 2005, at the peak of the rush hour. Coordinated attacks by suicide bombers aimed to inflict great damage, killing a large number of people and carried out without any warning, bore the imprint of **al Qaeda**. They were reminiscent of the bombings of commuter trains in Madrid, Spain, on 11 March 2004, in which 191 people were killed and another 700 were injured. The London bombing killed 56 persons, including the four bombers, and injured another 700. Two weeks after the first series of attacks, an attempt was made to carry out a similar operation by another set of four young men. The bombs did not explode this time, and the bombers were arrested within days of the attempted attacks. The attackers in this attempted bombing were of African origin, but all of them were Muslims. On 18 September 2005, a videotape was released to the media that showed **Ayman Al-Zawahiri** taking responsibility for the attacks in London.

Hussain Habib, 18, Shahzad Tanweer, 22, and Mohammad Sadique Khan, 30, came from Leeds, and all were born to Pakistani parents who had immigrated to and settled in Britain several decades earlier. The fourth bomber, Jermaine Lindsay, 19, was born in Jamaica, lived in Aylesburg, a suburb of London, and had converted to Islam and changed his name to Abdullah Shaheed Jamal. In the investigations involving intelligence agencies in Pakistan, it was revealed that the three who were of Pakistani extraction had traveled to Pakistan in 2004 and may have received instruction in both religion and use of



chemicals to make bombs by attending some of the madrassas that dot the Pakistani landscape.

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**MADRASSAS.** *Madrasah*—the word derives from Arabic and means schools—have always played an important role in providing **education** in Muslim societies. Some of them have been operating in South Asia for decades and have educated hundreds of thousands of students. Soon after he took over the reins of government in Pakistan, in 1977, however, President **Zia ul-Haq** began an Islamization program that created a highly supportive environment for the growth of madrasah education. Not only did the state look with favor on the style of instruction the madrasahs provided, it was prepared to fund them by using a significant part of the accumulated resources of the *zakat* fund. The number of madrasahs operating in the country during Zia’s 11-year (1977–1988) rule increased significantly. The madrasahs filled an important gap in areas such as the tribal districts of **Balochistan** and the **Northwest Frontier Province** where the state had not set up its own schools.

Madrasahs in Balochistan and the Northwest Frontier Province acquired a new significance with the Soviet Union’s invasion of **Afghanistan**. Both the leadership in Pakistan that aided the Afghan mujahideen in their struggle against the Soviet Union and the mujahideen themselves gave a religious aspect to their efforts. In the minds of many Muslim communities all over the world, the struggle against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan was a *jihad* (holy war) against the infidel. As such, Afghanistan attracted a large number of Muslim fundamentalists who fought alongside the mujahideen. This form of international support also influenced the type of education that was provided to the Afghan refugees in the camps in the northwestern parts of Pakistan. A large number of madrasahs were set up to educate the refugees from Afghanistan.

The departure of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan did not end the involvement of the Pakistani madrasahs in Afghan affairs. The most vivid illustration of this was the appearance of *taliban*—an Arabic word meaning “students”—who were able to conquer most of the

Afghan territory within a few months. A large number of taliban, including their leader, Mullah Omar, were graduates of madrassas in the Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan. The taliban success in Afghanistan further increased the power, prestige, and importance of the madrassas in Pakistan. They were now significant not only as institutions that provided education but were of considerable political importance as well.

The 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States brought madrassas and the role they might have played in spreading deep animosity toward the United States to the world's attention. Washington put pressure on the government of **Pervez Musharraf** to reform the madrassas and bring them into the mainstream of the country's education system. In 2002, the International Crisis Group, a Brussels-based lobby group and think tank, published a report on the state of education in Pakistan. It estimated that the madrassas had spread widely in the country and now accounted for one-third of the students attending primary schools. In 2004, the 9/11 Commission also focused on the role played by the madrassas in the growth of Islamic extremism in the Muslim world. However, more careful and detailed analysis and surveys done by development institutions such as the **World Bank** estimated the proportion of students at a number considerably lower than previous estimates. In 2005, the World Bank published a report indicating that only 0.7 percent of the students going to primary school were attending madrassas on a full-time basis.

**MAHBUB UL HAQ HUMAN DEVELOPMENT CENTRE.** In 1995, **Mahbub ul Haq** returned to Pakistan to establish the Human Development Centre at **Islamabad**. The Centre, supported by grants from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the governments of Canada and Norway, was commissioned to prepare and publish reports on various aspects of human development in the South Asian region. The UNDP also provided support to regional centers in several other parts of the developing world. The Islamabad Centre's first report, *The Challenge of Human Development*, was launched by Mahbub ul Haq in the summer of 1997. The Centre was preparing its second report, *The Education Challenge*, when Mahbub ul Haq died in New York. The Centre's Board of Governors, which included **Shahid Javed Burki** and **Moeen Qureshi**, decided to re-

name the institution the Mahbub ul Haq Human Development Centre and appointed Khadija Haq, Mahbub ul Haq's widow, as its president. The Centre has continued to publish annual reports. In addition to the report on **education** published in 1998, the Centre published *The Crisis of Governance* in 1999, *The Gender Question* in 2002, *Globalization and Human Development* in 2001, *Agriculture and Rural Development* in 2002, *The Employment Challenge* in 2003, and *The Health Challenge* in 2004. Each report was launched at an international workshop held either in South Asia or in the capital city of one of the Centre's donor agencies.

Continuing Mahbub ul Haq's legacy, the Centre provides a unique perspective in three ways: first, by analyzing the process of human development, the analytical work of the Centre puts people at the center of economic, political, and social policies; second, the South Asia regional focus of the Centre enables an examination of issues of regional importance; and third, the Centre's comparative analysis provides a yardstick for the progress and setbacks of South Asia, vis-à-vis the rest of the world.

#### **MAMDOT, NAWAB IFTIKHAR HUSAIN KHAN OF (1905–1969).**

Iftikhar Husain Khan was born in Mamdot in the part of **Punjab** that served as the cultural and linguistic boundary between Punjab and the United Provinces (Uttar Pradesh) of British India. He migrated to Pakistan in 1947 and became the first chief minister of Pakistan's Punjab appointed to the position by **Muhammad Ali Jinnah** and **Liaquat Ali Khan**. He resigned in 1949, and in 1950 he left the **Muslim League** to form a party of his own, the Jinnah Muslim League. He came back to the Muslim League in 1953 and was rewarded by Governor-General **Ghulam Muhammad** who appointed him governor of **Sindh** province. Mamdot held this position for two years but left in 1955, after Ghulam Muhammad departed from the political scene. After Ghulam Muhammad's departure, Mamdot was once again back in the political wilderness. He reappeared later during the **Ayub Khan** period (1958–1969), when he joined a number of other veteran Muslim Leaguers to convene a meeting to express support for the military leader. The **Convention Muslim League** was the product of these efforts, and Mamdot became its deputy leader. He died in **Lahore**.

**MANDAL, JAGENDRA NATH (1892–1962).** Jagendra Nath Mandal was the only prominent non-Muslim politician to support the demand for the creation of a separate homeland for the Muslims of British India. He was a lawyer from Bengal and belonged to one of the “untouchable castes”—the “**scheduled castes**” now called the *Dalits* in India—as the British preferred to label them. He was inducted in the “interim cabinet” formed by **Lord Louis Mountbatten** in 1946 to prepare the transition to Indian independence. He joined the cabinet as one of the five members representing the Muslim League and was given the portfolio of law. **Muhammad Ali Jinnah**’s decision to include Mandal in the Cabinet scored an important tactical point, since the All-India Congress contingent included a prominent Muslim, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad.

Pakistan’s first **Constituent Assembly** came into being on 10 August 1947, four days before the country gained independence. Mandal was called on to chair the first session at which Jinnah was elected the president. In giving Mandal such a prominent role, Jinnah wished to emphasize that while Pakistan was a predominantly Muslim country, it would provide equal treatment to its minorities. For three years, from August 1947 to September 1950, Mandal served as minister in a series of cabinets that took office in **Karachi**, Pakistan’s first capital. In September 1950, **Muhammad Ali Bogra**, the second Bengali to become prime minister, dropped Mandal from the cabinet. Disappointed by this move, Mandal chose not to stay on in Karachi or go back to East Pakistan. Instead, he emigrated to India, where he died.

**MANGLA DAM.** The Mangla Dam on the Jhelum River was built as part of the **Indus Water Treaty** between India and Pakistan. It was constructed in the early 1960s by a consortium of American companies that worked under the supervision of the **Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA)**. The **dam** is 3,500 meters long and has an “above river” height of 119 meters. Including the power house and other ancillary works, it cost US\$540 million to build. It is built of rock and sand and has one giant spillway that operates during the flood season. The lake formed by the dam covers an area of 160 square kilometers and initially stored 4.75 million acre-feet of water. A canal from the left side of the river at

Mangla transfers water into Chenab to compensate the latter for the water it lost to India by way of a dam in its upper reaches. The Mangla dam also generates electricity with the capacity of 1,000 MW. The government of President **Pervez Musharraf**, worried about the impending shortage of water in Pakistan, decided to raise the height of the dam to compensate for the loss of capacity in the reservoir because of silting. The Mangla High Dam project was estimated to cost \$230 million to be completed by 2007. The contract for the project was won by CWE Joint Ventures, a consortium led by a Chinese firm.

**MARTIAL LAW, FIRST.** Pakistan's first general martial law was imposed on 7 October 1958 by Governor-General **Iskander Mirza**. The proclamation issued by the governor-general abrogated the **Constitution of 1956**, dissolved the National and Provincial Assemblies, and dismissed the government of Prime Minister **Feroze Khan Noon**. All political parties were banned. Twenty days later, **Ayub Khan** forced President Iskander Mirza out of office and assumed the position himself. The first martial law remained in force for 1,339 days. It was lifted on 8 June 1962 with the promulgation of the **Constitution of 1962**.

**MARTIAL LAW, SECOND.** Pakistan's second general martial law was imposed on 29 March 1969 when President **Muhammad Ayub Khan** was impelled to resign by the commander in chief of the army, General **Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan**. Yahya put the country under martial law and appointed himself president and chief martial-law administrator. The second martial law remained in force even after the resignation of President Yahya Khan on 20 December 1971. On the same day, **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto** became president and chief martial-law administrator. President Bhutto kept martial law in place for four more months. He lifted military rule on 21 April 1972 when an interim constitution was promulgated. The second martial law remained in place for 1,020 days.

**MARTIAL LAW, THIRD.** Pakistan's third—and longest lasting—general martial law was imposed by General **Zia ul-Haq**, on 5 July 1977. Although the National and Provincial Assemblies were dismissed, the

**Constitution of 1973** was not abrogated. It was merely suspended during the life of the martial law. General Zia ul-Haq retained Fazal Elahi Chaudhry as president, appointing himself the chief martial-law administrator. Return to civilian rule under the constitution of 1973 was promised within 90 days, after which the military was to have returned to the barracks. The chief justices of the four provincial high courts were appointed governors of the provinces. It was only in September 1978, 15 months after the country was brought under the rule of the **military**, that Zia's military shed its civilian clothes. Zia ul-Haq became president and replaced the provincial governors with army generals. Martial law lasted for 3,100 days. It was lifted on 30 December 1985 when **Muhammad Khan Junejo** was appointed prime minister. Zia ul-Haq stayed on as president, however, and retained the powerful position of COAS.

**MARTIAL LAW OF 1953.** In 1953, a number of religious leaders decided to take advantage of the political turmoil in Pakistan to press their campaign against the **Ahmadiya** community. Their aim was to persuade the government of Prime Minister Khawaja Nazimuddin to declare the Ahmadiyahs to be outside the pale of Islam. Nazimuddin's government had already been weakened by its inability to control the province of **Punjab**. The religious leaders—in particular, those active in the **Jamaat-e-Islami**—decided that the conflict between the central government and the government in Punjab provided them with a good opportunity to mount an agitation against the Ahmadiyahs. Once the agitation was started, however, it got out of hand, particularly in the large cities of Punjab, where the crowds turned violent. The mounting violence in the cities of Punjab persuaded Governor-General **Ghulam Muhammad** to call in the army to restore law and order. Punjab was put under martial law, with Lieutenant General **Azam Khan** as the martial-law administrator. The proclamation introducing martial law in Punjab was issued by the governor-general on 6 March 1953. Punjab was to stay under martial law for 69 days—until 14 May 1953.

**MASHRIQI, ALLAMA INYATULLAH KHAN (1888–1963).** Allama Inyatullah Khan Mashriqi was one of the more colorful and ec-

centric political figures of Muslim India. He graduated in mathematics from Cambridge University in England and upon returning to Pakistan he joined the Indian Educational Service and rose to become principal of Islamia College, **Peshawar**. Islam had a strong presence in both Peshawar and Islamia College, the city's most prominent educational institution. It was during his stay in Peshawar that Mashriqi decided to devote his life to improving the economic well-being of the Muslims of India.

Mashriqi resigned from the Indian Educational Service and joined the Khilifat movement—an effort by the Muslims of British India to provide assistance to the Ottoman Turks in their struggle against the British. After the Khilifat movement collapsed, Mashriqi founded his own party, the **Khaksars**, or the “humble ones.” The Khaksars was a paramilitary organization; as such, it was looked on with disfavor by the British administration in India. Like a number of other Muslims, Mashriqi also believed that the best way to help the Muslims of British India was not to create a separate homeland for them but to improve the economic and social conditions of Muslims the world over, including those living in all parts of British India. Accordingly, he did not support the idea of Pakistan and the establishment of a separate homeland for the Muslims of British India. Once Pakistan came into being, however, he brought his followers to the new country and began to work for the establishment of an Islamic order. He founded the Islamic League, but the party attracted little support and Mashriqi became politically irrelevant. He was largely ignored by the new leaders of Pakistan.

**MASIH, IQBAL (1979–1995)**. Pakistan's use of child-bonded labor in industries such as carpet weaving was brought to light in a vivid way in early 1995 by the murder near **Lahore** of Iqbal Masih, a spokesman for the **Bonded Labor Liberation Front (BLLF)**. Masih himself had worked in the carpet industry. He was sold into bonded labor by his mother when he was only 10 years old. Chained to the loom on which he worked, he came to the attention of the BLLF when its representatives visited the village in which he was working. Taken to Lahore, he received some education in a special school run by the organization and then went on to become

an untiring and eloquent spokesman for the organization. In 1994, he received the Reebok Foundation award for his long-time crusade against bonded labor. He was also awarded a fellowship by Brandeis University in the United States.

While preparing to leave for the United States, Iqbal Masih was murdered in his village near Mureedke, a town 25 kilometers north of Lahore and well known for its carpet industry. The murder was widely publicized in the West by the BLLF and led to the suspension of carpet imports from Pakistan by a number of Western countries, including Australia, Austria, and Sweden. An impression was created that Iqbal Masih had been killed by the representatives of the carpet industry, an accusation that was vehemently denied by carpet makers. After a detailed investigation carried out by its staff, the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan came to the conclusion that the carpet industry was not involved in Masih's murder; rather the killing was an act of random violence. At the same time, the government ordered a judicial inquiry into the murder; a commission was set up under the chairmanship of a judge of the Lahore High Court, to investigate the circumstances that led to the killing. But the murder and the coverage it received in the Western media achieved what Iqbal Masih had set out to do: to inform the world that a great deal of carpet weaving in Pakistan was done on hand looms that involved children working in inhumane circumstances.

**MATERNAL MORTALITY.** Pakistan for several decades had a very high rate of maternal mortality, estimated in 1980 by the **World Bank** at 600 for every 100,000 live births. Although the rate was considerably less than that of some of the African countries, Pakistan's performance is poor compared to that of several Asian countries. The rate for India was estimated at 500, for the Philippines at 80, and for China at only 44. The rate declined by a modest amount after 1980, mostly as a result of improvements in health care and some increase in the level of female education. It was estimated at 500 for the year 2000. Maternal deaths occur for a combination of reasons: frequent births, and births at a very early age or at a very late age. In countries with a high incidence of maternal deaths, the period between a **woman's** first pregnancy and her last may span more than



half her lifetime. Pakistan's failure to address this problem reflects the failure of policy in a number of areas. It has still to launch an effective family-planning program; the access to family-planning services is limited to a very small number of women. No attempt has been made to deal with the issue of poor female **health** in a comprehensive way. Finally, the social status of women remains very low.

**MAUDUDI, MAULANA ABUL ALA (1903–1979).** Maulana Abul Ala Maududi started his public career when he was only 24 years old. He published a collection of essays entitled *Al-Jihad fi al-Islam* (Jihad in Islam) that caused a stir among Islamic scholars. In 1933, he took over as editor of a monthly magazine, *Tarjuman al-Quran*. The magazine offered an interpretation of the Koran that emphasized that Islam as revealed to Muhammad, its prophet, did not make a distinction between the spiritual and the temporal worlds. In 1941, Maududi decided to enter politics by establishing the **Jamaat-e-Islami (JI)** (the Party of Islam). For six years, however, from 1941 to 1947, Maududi and the JI opposed **Muhammad Ali Jinnah**, his **All-India Muslim League**, and their demand for the creation of Pakistan, a homeland for the Muslim population of British India.

Maududi's opposition to the idea of Pakistan was based on the belief that nation states could not be reconciled with the concept of the Muslim *ummah* (community) that included all Muslims. The ummah could not be divided by borders that separated countries. Once Pakistan was born, Maududi decided to move to the new state and established himself and the JI in **Lahore**. Installed in Pakistan, he turned his attention to creating an Islamic state in the country established by Jinnah and the Muslim League. Maududi's program consisted of two parts. First, he wished to define strictly the meaning of being a Muslim, excluding all those who deviated even slightly from subscribing to what he defined as the basic tenets of Islam. Second, he wanted Pakistan to adopt an Islamic political system rather than a system borrowed from the West.

Maududi's first serious confrontation with the state of Pakistan came in 1953, when he led a movement against the **Ahmadiya** community. The movement turned violent, and **martial law** had to be imposed before law and order was restored in the country. A military court sentenced Maududi to death, but the sentence was later reduced. Maududi had to wait more than 20 years before the

Ahmadiyas were declared to be non-Muslims. This action was taken in 1974 by the administration of Prime Minister **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto**. It was during the early years of the regime of President **Zia ul-Haq** that Maududi's views had the greatest impact on Pakistan. Zia made several attempts to introduce Islam into the country's political and economic structures. Although Zia was not successful in the area of politics, he introduced a number of Islamic financial instruments. These included the imposition of taxes such as *zakat* and *ushr*.

**MEMON, JUSTICE BACHAL (1914–1978)**. Justice Bachal Memon was a member of the **Sindh** Chief Court (now the Sindh Court) bench that heard the case filed by **Maulvi Tamizuddin** in 1954 against the dismissal of the **Constituent Assembly** by Governor-General **Ghulam Muhammad**. The governor-general had taken the action in order to preempt the Constituent Assembly from limiting the powers that were given to him by the **India Independence Act of 1947**. The Sindh Chief Court not only admitted the case against the governor-general, it went on to declare the governor-general's dismissal of the assembly as unconstitutional. This was one of the rare occasions that Pakistan's **judiciary** was to act totally independent of the executive. The Sindh Court's judgment was written by Justice Memon, but was overturned when the government appealed the decision to the federal court presided over by Chief Justice **Muhammad Munir**.

**MIANDAD, JAVED (1957–)**. Javed Miandad—arguably the best batsman produced by Pakistan—made his debut in 1976 and scored a hundred in his very first test inning. He went on to play for Pakistan for a period of two decades, over which his test batting average remarkably never fell below the magic figure of 50. One of the finest moments of his career, and that of Pakistan **cricket**, happened when he hit a six off the last ball of the Austral-Asia Cup final against India in 1986, resulting in a memorable and unexpected win for Pakistan. He also played an important role with the bat in Pakistan's World Cup victory in 1992. He captained Pakistan in 34 test matches—with considerable success—and importantly served as **Imran Khan**'s vice-captain in the highly successful period for Pakistan cricket from the mid 1980s through to the early 1990s. He remained a consistent run scorer in the

1980s in both test and one-day cricket and was known for his ability to play gutsy innings under pressure. He became the first Pakistani to play a hundred test matches and holds the record as the highest run-scorer for Pakistan in test cricket. After retirement, he had three short stints as coach of the Pakistan team with mixed results.

**THE MILITARY.** Pakistan had to carve out its military from what remained of the British Indian Army after the end of World War II. In creating the British Indian Army, administrations in London and Delhi made the decision to recruit a number of ethnic battalions. There was a belief that ordinary soldiers were more comfortable when they were in company with men of the same social and religious backgrounds. This was the reason behind the formation of Sikh, Dogra, Maratha, and Gurkha regiments and battalions. However, because of the deep involvement of the Muslim community in the Indian **Mutiny** of 1857, the British thought it imprudent to form purely Muslim battalions. Instead, they created **Punjab** battalions, which had recruits from all three religious communities of the provinces—Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs. That notwithstanding, it was not an exceptionally difficult task to create a Pakistani army, since Muslim representation in the force was well beyond their share in the Indian population. Most of the serving Muslims opted to join the Pakistan army, navy, and air force. **Muhammad Ali Jinnah**, for want of physical space in **Karachi**, the capital of the new country, chose to locate the army headquarters in **Rawalpindi**, a British garrison town in northern Punjab. The air force found a place in **Peshawar**, and the headquarters of the navy were in Karachi. Although Pakistan was able to attract enough soldiers to serve the military, it was short of senior officers. Accordingly, the first generation of commanders of the three services was British. It was only in 1951 that a Pakistani—General **Muhammad Ayub Khan**—was appointed to head the army. Ayub Khan would not have been appointed to this job in 1951 had two senior officers not been killed in an air crash in 1950.

The military establishment was still in the process of settling down when Pakistan fought the **First Indo-Pakistan War in 1948-1949** over the state of **Kashmir**. The war was inconclusive, since Pakistan was not able to obtain by force what it had failed in getting by persuasion. The ruler of Kashmir, after hesitating for awhile, opted to take his state

into India, leaving behind a small sliver that Pakistan had occupied. The first war with **India** left a deep impression on Pakistan's military leadership. It realized that it had to quickly equip itself with modern weapons in order to deal with the Indian threat. This realization led to the development of a close relationship between the defense establishments of Pakistan and the United States. Prodded by Muhammad Ayub Khan, Pakistan signed a defense agreement with Washington that provided access to American weapons and technical assistance. By allowing Muhammad Ayub Khan a great deal of autonomy, the politicians laid the groundwork for the imposition of martial law in October 1958. Muhammad Ayub Khan appointed himself martial-law administrator and president, thus inaugurating military rule of the country that, with one brief interruption, lasted for four decades.

The interruption in military rule occurred in 1971 when General **Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan**, Pakistan's second military president, was forced out of office by his younger colleagues following the defeat of the army in East Pakistan in the **Second Indo-Pakistan War**. **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto** succeeded Yahya and governed for less than six years. He was removed from office in July 1977 by General **Zia ul-Haq**. Zia was Pakistan's third military president and ruled for a little over 11 years.

Even when the military establishment finally surrendered power to politicians in 1988, after Zia was killed in an air crash, it retained considerable influence over decision-making. This was exercised through an informal arrangement that was given the name of the "**troika**." This arrangement was put together in December 1988, when **Benazir Bhutto** was invited to become prime minister, provided she consulted President **Ghulam Ishaq Khan** and General **Aslam Beg** on all important matters. In January 1997, President **Farooq Leghari** formalized this arrangement by appointing a 10-member **Council for Defense and National Security (CDNS)**. The military was represented by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as by the chiefs of the three forces.

There was some diminution in the political influence of the military when the elections of 1997 resulted in a landslide in favor of **Mian Nawaz Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League**. Sharif became prime minister. Although he did not dissolve the CDNS, he did not summon it for consultation during the first 26 months of his second tenure as

prime minister. The political equation might have changed following the testing of **nuclear weapons** by India in May 1998 and the decision taken by Pakistan to test its own nuclear weapons a few days after the explosions set off by India if Prime Minister Sharif had established full civilian control over the nuclear arsenal. Instead, he disturbed the military's senior leaders by first pushing COAS General **Jehangir Karamat** to resign in October 1998 and then attempting to remove General **Pervez Musharraf** a year later. By that time, the military establishment's patience had run out and it decided to bring Pakistan once again under its control. Although General Musharraf did not declare martial law when he assumed power on 12 October 1999, he governed essentially as a military dictator. Even after elections were held in October 2002 and a civilian government was formed under an elected prime minister, Musharraf continued to wield real power. In December 2004, he reneged on his promise to retire from the military. He decided to govern as both president and COAS.

In 2005, Pakistan had some 540,000 persons in uniform and spent more than 6.5 percent of its gross domestic product on the military. *See also* MARTIAL LAW OF 1953; MARTIAL LAW, FIRST; MARTIAL LAW, SECOND; MILITARY AND THE ECONOMY.

**MILITARY AND THE ECONOMY.** A dozen or so military officers have made important contributions to Pakistan's **economy**. These officers belonged to three categories. The first group included the four commanders in chief of the Pakistan army—Generals **Muhammad Ayub Khan**, **Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan**, **Zia ul-Haq**, and **Pervez Musharraf**. All four became president after staging successful military coup d'états against civilian governments. As presidents, all four left a deep impression on the economy.

The second category was made up of the officers who were assigned important political positions by the country's soldier-presidents and from these positions made singular contributions to the development of the economy. This category included Lieutenant Generals **Wajid Ali Burki** and **Azam Khan**, Air Marshal Nur Khan, and Admiral Abul Ahsen. Burki and Azam were the members of the military Cabinet, which took office after Ayub Khan assumed political control in October 1958. Azam Khan went on to become the governor of East Pakistan, whereas Burki was appointed special assistant to the president

after the adoption of the **constitution of 1962**. Air Marshal Nur Khan and Admiral Abul Ahsen were the members of the martial-law government which assumed office after Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan's coup of March 1969. A few months later, Nur Khan was appointed governor of West Pakistan and Ahsen was sent to East Pakistan as the province's governor.

The third category was made up of officers who were assigned important administrative and economic positions because of their technical competence. Lieutenant Generals **Saeed Qadir** and Zahid Ali Akbar Khan, and Admiral Khalid Janjua belonged to this category. Saeed Qadir and Khalid Janjua were appointed cabinet ministers by President Zia ul-Haq and were made responsible for the portfolios of production and **agriculture**, respectively. After retiring from the army, Zahid Khan, an engineer, served as the chairman of the **Water and Power Development Authority** for five years.

In addition to the role played by individuals, the military also expanded its institutional economic interests by using a number of foundations and trusts. By 2005, the industrial, financial, and business assets owned and managed by the military included fertilizer and chemical plants, cement factories, and a commercial bank (Askari Bank). Most of the trusts and foundations were managed by retired military personnel. See also FAUJI FOUNDATION.

**MILLAT PARTY (MP).** The Millat Party was launched by **Farooq Ahmad Khan Leghari** on 14 August 1998, Pakistan's 51st birthday. Leghari, as president, had worked closely with the senior leaders of Pakistan's main parties—the **Pakistan Muslim League (PML)** and the **Pakistan People's Party (PPP)**. This experience persuaded him that neither party could be expected to provide good and honest government to the citizens of Pakistan. Before inaugurating the party, Leghari had criticized both **Benazir Bhutto** and **Mian Nawaz Sharif** and had claimed that as prime ministers they had used public resources for personal gains. He was convinced that people, in particular those living in the rapidly growing towns and those in the country, were now looking for a third political option. The Millat Party was designed to appeal to these people.

The inaugural session of the party was attended by more than 500 persons from all provinces of Pakistan. Leghari promised a new form

of federalism, in which the provinces would be granted a great deal of autonomy to manage their affairs. He also indicated that the party's leadership would be democratically elected, something that had not been done by the PML and the PPP. After launching the party, Leghari began touring the country on a campaign to win support for the new organization. The party did reasonably well in the national and provincial elections of October 2002. However, in May 2004, responding to an appeal by President **Pervez Musharraf**, Leghari dissolved the party and merged it with Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid-e-Azam).

**MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS (MDGs).** In September 2000, at the largest-ever gathering of heads of state and governments, world leaders from 189 countries adopted the Millennium Declaration. This was done at the United Nations Millennium Summit in New York. In their declaration, the world leaders pledged to make collective efforts to overcome poverty, promote equality and peace, and achieve sustainable development. Specific measurable targets—the Millennium Development Goals—were set, which would be achieved in a defined period. The MDGs are made up of eight goals, 18 targets, and 48 indicators. The goals included eradication of extreme poverty and hunger; achievement of universal primary **education**; promotion of gender equality and empowerment of **women**; reduction of child mortality; improvement of maternal health; combating HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases; ensuring **environmental** sustainability; and developing a global partnership for development.

Pakistan was among the many countries that were not expected to reach some of the more important Millennium Development Goals. In particular, it was not expected, between 1990 and 2015, to reduce by one-half the proportion of people whose income is less than one dollar a day; to ensure that boys and girls would be able to complete a full course of primary schooling; to eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education; to reduce by three-quarters the maternal mortality ratio; or to begin to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases. *See also* HEALTH.

**MINTO-MORLEY REFORMS.** *See* GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT OF 1909.

**MISSILE ABDALI.** Abdali is a short-range **missile** that Pakistan claims to have manufactured indigenously, using its own technological know-how. Some foreign experts maintain that the technology embedded in the missile was obtained from **North Korea**. With a range of 300 kilometers, it has a slightly longer reach than the Prithvi, **India's** short-range missile. Both countries tested their respective missiles on 26 March 2003. A spokesman for the Pakistan military announced that the "test validated all laid down technical parameters of the weapon system." A Foreign Office spokesman said that while Pakistan, under the understanding reached on 21 February 1991, had informed the Indian government of its intention to test the missile, Islamabad had not been told by the Indians of the Prithvi test. Both Abdali and Prithvi can carry both conventional and **nuclear weapons**.

**MISSILES.** In the 1990s, both **India** and Pakistan, having made advances in the field of nuclear development, began to concentrate their attention and resources on the development of missiles. India's efforts were largely indigenous, supported by its scientific establishment and local industry. Pakistan started work in the 1980s on the development of the Hatf series of missiles but also seems to have relied on a considerable transfer of technology from **China** and **North Korea**. There was a great deal of concern that China may have provided Pakistan with the wherewithal to manufacture the M11 missile. In 1996, India successfully test-fired the **Prithvi**, a surface-to-surface missile with a range of 150–250 kilometers. India also let it be known that work was proceeding on the development of the much longer range missile, Agni, which could travel 2,000 kilometers. In 1998, Pakistan announced the successful test of the Ghauri, a medium-range missile, with a range of 1,500 kilometers.

The missile race between the two countries took a serious turn when, on 11 May 1998, India announced the successful testing of three nuclear bombs at a site close to the Pakistani border. A few days later, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the Indian prime minister, announced that his country was working on the development of **nuclear weapons** that could be deployed on medium- and long-range missiles. Pakistan followed with its own tests on 28 and 31 May and also announced that it was preparing to arm its missiles with nuclear weapons.



**MOENJODARO.** Moenjodaro, or the “mound of the dead,” was excavated in 1922 by Sir John Marshall, a British archeologist. It is one of the 400 cities that are said to have flourished in the Indus plain some 4,000 years ago. The Indus civilization represented by Moenjodaro existed at the same time as the civilizations of Egypt and Mesopotamia. Moenjodaro has buildings that date back more than 4,000 years, to 2,500 BC. The **Indus River** was the main transportation highway that linked the cities of the empire, of which Moenjodaro was a part. The other main urban areas of the period were Harapa in **Punjab**, on the banks of the River Ravi, and an unexcavated city on the banks of the River Ghaggar, also in Punjab. The Indus cities traded actively with the cities in Egypt and Mesopotamia, exporting cotton (*sindu* in Mesopotamia, and *sinдон* in Greek) in exchange for some perishable commodities. The cities of the Indus plain practiced a simple religion before the arrival of Buddhism. Moenjodaro was abandoned in about 1,500 BC after being overrun by the Aryans who came into India from Europe and established their dominion over the subcontinent in second-century BC.

**MONEM KHAN, ABDUL (1899–1971).** Abdul Monem Khan came from the Mymensingh district of Bengal. He joined the **Muslim League** in 1935 and worked for the establishment of Pakistan. He became a member of the **Constituent Assembly** when it was reconstituted in 1954 and was elected to the National Assembly in 1962 as a member from East Pakistan. He was appointed minister of health, labor, and social welfare in 1962, succeeding Lieutenant General **Wajid Ali Burki**.

Later in 1962, President **Muhammad Ayub Khan** chose Abdul Monem Khan to succeed another general and close associate, Lieutenant General **Azam Khan**. He stayed on as governor of East Pakistan for seven years—the longest tenure in that job in the province’s history. He lost his job only with the change in government in March 1969 when President Muhammad Ayub Khan resigned and General **Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan** became president. His long and loyal service to Muhammad Ayub Khan had not endeared Monem Khan to the nationalist elements in East Pakistan. They took their revenge in 1971, shortly after the Pakistani army moved against the **Awami League**. He was assassinated by the

members of the **Mukti Bahini**, the Bengali freedom fighters. *See also* BANGLADESH.

**MOUNTBATTEN, LORD LOUIS (1900–1979).** Lord Louis Mountbatten was the last viceroy of British India and the first governor-general of independent India. He was appointed viceroy in 1946 by the Labour government of Prime Minister Clement Attlee, and given the mandate to guide India toward independence. Soon after arriving in India, he developed a close relationship with Jawaharlal Nehru, a prominent leader of the **Indian National Congress**. He was, however, rather cool toward **Muhammad Ali Jinnah** and was reluctant to agree to the partition of India. He told his biographers that had he known about Jinnah's illness, he would have avoided partitioning India by waiting for his death. Once having accepted the Muslim demand for an independent homeland, he let it be known that he wished to be appointed governor-general of both independent India and Pakistan. Jinnah refused to accommodate him and chose to become the first governor-general of Pakistan himself. The **Muslim League** leadership suspected Mountbatten's hand in drawing the line that separated Indian and Pakistani **Punjabs**, an impression later confirmed by historians when official and personal records for the period became available. The demarcation was unfavorable for Pakistan, since it provided India access, through the Muslim majority district of Gurdaspur, to the Muslim majority state of **Kashmir**. Mountbatten also persuaded **Lord Cyril Radcliffe**, who oversaw the drawing of a boundary between the Indian and Pakistani Punjabs, to have a major river headwork that controlled the flow of water to the districts that were to be part of India placed on the Indian side of the new border.

**MOVEMENT FOR THE RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY (MRD).** The Movement for the Restoration of Democracy was launched in February 1981 to put pressure on the military government of President **Zia ul-Haq** to hold elections and bring back democracy to the country. The movement was joined by 10 political parties: the Awami Tehrik, the **Jamiatul-Ulemai Islam**, the **National Awami Party** (NAP) (Pakhtunkhawa group), the National Democratic Party (NDP), the Pakistan Mazdoor Kisan Party, the **Pakistan Muslim League** (PML) (Khairuddin group), the Pakistan National

Party, the **Pakistan People's Party** (PPP), the Qaumi Mahaz-i-Azadi, and the **Tehrik-e-Istiqlal**. The MRD went to work immediately after it was launched. A campaign was started in February 1981 and seemed to be gaining momentum but suffered a serious setback when a group of terrorists led by **Murtaza Bhutto**, the son of **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto**, hijacked a **Pakistan International Airlines** plane. The hijackers belonged to a group called **Al-Zulfikar**. The plane was taken first to Kabul, Afghanistan, where the hijackers killed one passenger, an army officer from a well-known family from the **North-west Frontier Province** (NWFP). The hijackers then forced the plane to go to Damascus, Syria. They released the passengers who were being held hostage after President Zia ul-Haq agreed to set free scores of political prisoners. Although the PPP disassociated itself from Al-Zulfikar, the MRD was not able to recover from the incident.

The MRD launched another campaign in the summer of 1983, this time under the direction of **Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi**, an associate of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. The movement did not spread beyond **Sindh**; in Sindh, its supporters were involved in a number of bloody clashes with the police. The campaign was called off after the loss of hundreds of lives and after its organizers were convinced that the government of Zia ul-Haq was not prepared to yield ground. The MRD remained dormant for five years, unable to come up with an effective strategy for challenging the Zia administration. It was dissolved after the elections of October 1988, which saw the return of PPP to power under **Benazir Bhutto**.

**MUBASHIR HASAN, DR. (1920– )**. Mubashir Hasan, an engineer who had a flair for politics, was one of the founding fathers of the **Pakistan People's Party** (PPP). The first PPP convention was held in the front yard of his modest home in Gulberg, **Lahore**. He made significant contributions to the party's Foundation Papers, which firmly laid down the socialist road that the PPP was to take if it ever came to political power. Dr. Hasan won a National Assembly seat from Lahore in the **elections held in 1970** and was given the important portfolio of finance when **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto** was invited by the military in December 1971 to form a civilian government.

Dr. Hasan had a significant impact on economic policy-making. His influence was felt in the government's decision to nationalize

large-scale industries in January 1972, to extend nationalization to the commercial banking industry in January 1974, and to provide a generous compensation package to industrial workers under the Labor Policy of 1972. Most of these policies alienated powerful economic interests and led to an anti-Mubashir movement even within PPP circles. In order to placate these interests, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto removed Hasan from his cabinet in 1974 and asked him to devote his time to the affairs of the party. His departure brought a non-ideological slant to the policies of the Bhutto administration. Once he was out of office, Mubashir Hasan's influence steadily declined.

Hasan tried to get close to **Benazir Bhutto**, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's daughter, after she returned to Pakistan to renew her battle against President **Zia ul-Haq** and reclaim her political mantle. But Ms. Bhutto was not prepared to give much political space to her father's associates. She discarded the "uncles" in favor of the younger members of the party. Like most of the "uncles"—including **Mumtaz Bhutto**, **Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi**, and Abdul Hafeez Pirzada—Mubashir Hasan remained on the margins of politics even after the return of the PPP, the party he had helped found, to office in 1988 and again in 1993. In 2000, he published his political memoirs under the title, *The Mirage of Power: An Inquiry into the Bhutto Years, 1971–1977*, in which he downplayed his role in the nationalization policies of the Bhutto regime.

**MUDIE, SIR FRANCIS (1890–1976)**. Sir Francis Mudie was appointed governor of **Sindh** province in January 1946. He was one of several British officials with whom **Muhammad Ali Jinnah** had developed a comfortable relationship. Sir Francis had endeared himself to Jinnah when he interpreted the inconclusive results of the Sindh provincial elections of 1946 in favor of the **Muslim League**. Not taking heed of the advice he had received from the central government in New Delhi, he invited Hussain Hidayatullah of the Muslim League and a close associate of Jinnah to become the province's prime minister. When the Hidayatullah ministry seemed about to collapse after the defection of several members from the Muslim League, Mudie dissolved the Provincial Assembly and appointed a "caretaker" government headed by the League. Jinnah paid back the debt when, after Pakistan had been established, he appointed Sir Francis Mudie as

the first governor of **Punjab**. Sir Francis remained in this position for two years. He resigned in 1949 and returned to England.

**MUFTI MAHMUD, MAULANA (1909–1981)**. Mufti Mahmud was born in the **Northwest Frontier Province** of present-day Pakistan. He received his education in Islamic *madrassas* (religious schools) run by the Deobandi *ulema* (scholars). He joined the order himself and by virtue of his learning earned the right to use the title of Maulana. His interest in politics took him into the **Jamiatul-Ulemai-Islam (JUI)**, and he became the organization's president in the late 1960s. The JUI did well in the **elections of 1970**. In 1972, following the return of democracy, Maulana Mufti Mahmud was called to lead the coalition government formed in the Northwest Frontier Province by the JUI and the **National Awami Party (NAP)**. The government was allowed to remain in office for only a few months. It was dismissed by the central government headed by **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto**, on the ground of "anti-state activities." Following his death, his son, **Maulana Fazlur Rahman**, succeeded him as the president of the JUI.

**MUGHUL EMPIRE**. The Mughul Empire in India survived for more than three centuries, from 1526, when **Babar**, the first emperor, defeated Ibrahim Lodhi (the last **Pathan** ruler of Delhi) at the battle of Panipat, to 1857, when the British formally proclaimed their dominion over India. The Mughuls not only controlled most of modern **Bangladesh**, India, and Pakistan, their domain also included significant parts of **Afghanistan**. The first six Mughul rulers left a lasting impression on the entire history of South Asia. They included Babar, the founder, who ruled from 1526 to 1530, Humayun (1530–1540 and 1555–1556), Akbar (1556–1605), Jahangir (1605–1627), Shah Jehan (1627–1658), and Aurangzeb (1658–1707). The last emperor dissipated his energy in an effort to introduce Islam into Indian society, and to expand his control over the southern areas of India. After his death, a string of weak rulers presided over the empire as the British began to establish their control over India.

The long Mughul rule over India profoundly affected the lives of hundreds of millions of Muslims living in the subcontinent of South Asia. By far, the most important consequences were political. Centuries of Muslim domination over India created a rift between the

Muslim and Hindu communities that reverberates to this day. The demolition of the **mosque at Ayodhya** in 1991—the mosque called Babri was probably built by the first Mughul emperor—is one symptom of the resentment still felt by a large segment of the Hindu population. Also, the British treatment of the Mughul rulers and their court created a deep sense of frustration among the Muslims and laid the groundwork for the Muslim demand for the creation of Pakistan.

**MUHAJIR QAUMI MAHAZ (MQM).** The Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz was formed on 18 March 1984, with **Altaf Hussain** as its president. Hussain traces the origin of his organization to student politics when he and his fellow *muhajir* (refugee; in the context of politics in Pakistan means refugees who migrated to Pakistan from the Indian provinces of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and Delhi) students in Karachi University felt the need for a body to represent their interests. Accordingly, the **All Pakistan Muhajir Students Organization** (APMSO) was formed in 1978. The APMSO converted into a grassroots political organization in the early 1980s.

The MQM played an important part in the ethnic riots that paralyzed large parts of **Karachi** during the winter of 1986–1987. It was at that point that the leadership of the MQM decided to convert the MQM into a political party. The Karachi riots pitted the **Pathan** community in the city against the muhajirs, leaving hundreds of people dead and several Pathan and muhajir *muhallas* (neighborhoods) in ruins. The disturbances lent further strength to the MQM and moved the political spotlight from Karachi's old and established politicians to such political newcomers as Altaf Hussain.

The full political weight of the MQM was felt in the **general elections of November 1988** when its candidates won 11 out of Karachi's 13 National Assembly seats. The MQM also won two seats in **Hyderabad**, the second largest city in **Sindh**. With 13 seats in a chamber of 207, the MQM became the third largest group in the National Assembly, after the **Pakistan People's Party** (PPP) and **Islami Jamhuri Ittehad**. It was the decision by the MQM to lend its support to the PPP that made it possible for **Benazir Bhutto** to become prime minister on 2 December 1988. The MQM withdrew its support from the PPP a few months later, however. This break with the Bhutto government led to an open confrontation in Karachi between the MQM activists and law-

enforcement authorities. The MQM's relations with the authorities did not improve with the change in government in **Islamabad** following the dismissal of Bhutto as prime minister in August 1990. Another **election in 1990** reconfirmed MQM's authority in the urban areas of Sindh.

In late 1992, **Mian Nawaz Sharif**, the new prime minister, called the army to assist the civil authorities in restoring law and order in Karachi, in which it was partly successful. Bhutto was back in power in 1993, after yet another election in which the MQM retained its hold over Karachi and maintained some presence in Hyderabad. This time around, Bhutto increased the pressure on the MQM by giving extraordinary powers to the police and paramilitary forces to hunt down its activists. The result was the arrest of a very large number of MQM functionaries and the deaths of hundreds of them in encounters with the authorities. There was a high political cost to this approach, but it brought peace to Karachi—1996 turned out to be the most tranquil year for the city in some time.

Bhutto's dismissal in November 1996 and another **general election in 1997** resulted in the formation of a coalition between the MQM and the **Muslim League**. As a result, the MQM entered both the federal government and the Sindh provincial government. In an effort to enter the mainstream of Pakistani politics, the party changed its name to Muttahida Qaumi Movement (United National Movement). However, in 1998, MQM left the coalition government and went into opposition against Mian Nawaz Sharif.

After the restoration of military rule in October 1999, under General **Pervez Musharraf**, the MQM regained some influence in the new corridors of power. Having done well once again in the national and Sindh provincial elections, it joined coalition governments in Islamabad and Karachi. The Musharraf government also gave the position of Sindh governor to an MQM leader who was a close associate of **Altaf Hussain**.

**MUHAJIR QAUMI MAHAZ (HAQIQI (MQM))**. On 19 June 1992, the **Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz** splintered into two groups, the original led by **Altaf Hussain**, the other by **Afaq Ahmed**. It was widely believed that this division was engineered by the army intelligence agencies among the MQM members. The authorities, having convinced themselves that the MQM could not be destroyed by the use

of force, decided to try and control it from within. But the split in the MQM did not diminish Altaf Hussain's popularity. If the aim was to bring peace to the troubled city of **Karachi** by creating a political force that could lead the city's people away from violence, this purpose was not achieved either. In fact, the creation of the MQM (Haqiqi) made Altaf Hussain even more popular among his followers. And the arrival of a rival organization persuaded the original MQM to direct its wrath against its own dissidents. What followed was a bloodbath of the type Karachi had not seen before. The new organization battled not only with its parent body but with the police and other "law and order" forces. This three-way conflict led to the deaths of 1,800 persons in Karachi in 1995—the bloodiest year in the city's history.

When the government in **Islamabad** finally sat down to negotiate with the MQM, in early 1995 it invited Altaf Hussain's group to the table. The Haqiqis were excluded. The negotiations did not bridge the gap between the government of **Benazir Bhutto** and the MQM led by Altaf Hussain, but they certainly alienated the Haqiqis. In 1997, the tension between the two branches of MQM flared up again, and Karachi once again reverted to turbulence.

**MUHAMMAD ALI, CHAUDHRI (1905-1980).** Muhammad Ali was born in Jullundhur, a city in the northern part of what is now the Indian state of **Punjab**. After gaining a master's degree in chemistry from Punjab University, **Lahore**, Ali joined the Indian Audit and Accounts Service in 1928. In 1931, he was deputized by the government of India to serve as accountant general in the state of Bahawalpur. In 1935, after serving in Bahawalpur for four years, Muhammad Ali went to the central government in New Delhi and rose quickly in the department of finance. It was while serving as additional finance secretary that he came to the attention of **Muhammad Ali Jinnah**.

Chaudhry Muhammad Ali was appointed to advise Finance Minister **Liaqat Ali Khan** in the interim government formed in New Delhi in 1946. The British decision to accelerate their departure from India put an enormous administrative burden on the two designated successor governments of Pakistan and India. For Pakistan, a large portion of this burden fell on Muhammad Ali, who as a member of the two-man steering committee of the Partition Council, was responsi-



ble for building Pakistan's administrative structure. After partition, Muhammad Ali moved to **Karachi**, Pakistan's first capital, and was appointed secretary-general (the highest ranking official in the government) in the new administration. In October 1951, following the assassination of Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan, Muhammad Ali became Pakistan's second finance minister, succeeding **Ghulam Muhammad**. In August 1955, he was called on by Governor-General Ghulam Muhammad to become Pakistan's fourth prime minister.

Muhammad Ali's main achievement as prime minister was to give Pakistan its first constitution—the **Constitution of 1956**. Pakistan, now declared a republic, chose **Iskander Mirza** as its first president; he, in turn, decided to strengthen his political base by overseeing the formation of a new political party, the Republic Party. Muhammad Ali refused to abandon the **Muslim League**, and Iskander Mirza chose a more trusted associate to succeed him. After leaving the government, Muhammad Ali also came to the conclusion that not much political life was left in the Muslim League. In 1957, he launched a new movement under the banner of *Tehrik Istikham-i-Pakistan* (Movement for the Preservation of Pakistan), which in 1958 merged with the Nizam-i-Islam Party. Muhammad Ali was elected the party's president.

In 1959, President **Muhammad Ayub Khan** appointed a Constitution Commission to advise him on a new political structure for the country. Muhammad Ali wrote a long memorandum for the commission on the subject of democracy and its relevance for Pakistan. The memorandum was given wide circulation by the press and, consequently, won Muhammad Ali Ayub Khan's displeasure. In 1964, when the first presidential election was held under the **Constitution of 1962**, Muhammad Ali was active in organizing the **Combined Opposition Party** (COP) and in persuading **Fatima Jinnah** to challenge Ayub Khan at the polls. Later, in 1967, at the height of the political agitation that ultimately resulted in the resignation of Muhammad Ayub Khan, Chaudhry Muhammad Ali played a central role in attempting to find a constitutional way out of the impasse that had developed between the president and the opposition.

Muhammad Ali did not expect that his efforts to restore democracy in the country would result in Pakistan's second military administration, civil war between East and West Pakistan, the breakup of Pakistan, and the emergence of East Pakistan as independent

Bangladesh. He died in Lahore. In 1965, Chaudhry Muhammad Ali was invited by Columbia University to reflect on his experiences during the period of partition of British India. The result was a book, *The Emergence of Pakistan* which remains the most authoritative account extant, giving the Muslim point of view about the events during that fateful period.

**THE MUHAMMAD FAMILY.** The famous cricketing family of Karachi consisting of brothers Hanif, Sadiq, Mushtaq, Wazir, and Raees played important roles in Pakistan's **cricket** history, the first four as test cricketers for Pakistan, while the fifth brother, Raees, played first-class cricket in Pakistan. Hanif, the most prolific of the brothers and famous for his ability to bat for long periods of time, holds the record for the highest test score by a Pakistani—a match-saving 337 against the West Indies, in 1958—as well as the second highest first-class score ever made. Hanif's record was bettered by Brian Lara from the West Indies. Mushtaq remains one of Pakistan's most successful batsmen and also captained Pakistan to eight test victories, while Sadiq formed a successful opening pair with Majid Khan. Hanif's son, Shoaib, also an opener, went on to play test cricket for Pakistan.

**MUJAHIDEEN.** Mujahideen, or “freedom fighters,” led the resistance to the occupation of Afghanistan by the troops of the Soviet Union. The Soviet occupation lasted for 10 years, from 1979 to 1989. The mujahideen, helped by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United States, were able to force the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan in early 1989. The Soviet defeat in Afghanistan contributed to its collapse two years later. The mujahideen did not fight as a unified force, however. They were divided into seven factions, each led by a powerful warlord. The failure of the mujahideen leaders to work together after the withdrawal of the Soviet Union prolonged the war in Afghanistan for another 10 years and provided the opportunity for another group, the **Taliban**, to conquer most of the country in the early 1990s.

**MUJIBUR RAHMAN, SHEIKH (1920-1975).** Sheikh Mujibur Rahman began to take an active interest in Muslim politics at an early age. At the age of 20 in 1940, he joined the Muslim Student's Feder-

ation, an arm of the **All India Muslim League**. Soon after the establishment of Pakistan on 14 August 1947 he joined **Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardhy** in founding the **Awami League**. He opposed the imposition of martial law by General **Muhammad Ayub Khan** and was imprisoned by the military government. After the death in 1963 of Suhrawardhy, his political mentor, Mujib was elected president of the Awami League. In 1964, he joined the opposition leaders from West Pakistan to form the **Combined Opposition Party (COP)**. The COP's main objective was to challenge Ayub Khan at the polls. **Fatima Jinnah**, the COP's candidate, lost the election, however.

Mujibur Rahman offered his **Six Point Program** in 1966 in a meeting of the opposition parties held in **Lahore**, West Pakistan. This was too large a dose of provincial autonomy for Ayub Khan to swallow. Even the leaders of West Pakistan, who otherwise opposed Ayub Khan, were troubled by the direction the East Pakistani leadership was taking under the guiding hand of Mujibur Rahman. Mujib was arrested and charged with undermining the integrity of the state of Pakistan. The result was the Agartala Conspiracy Case, which dragged on for several months and was eventually overtaken by political developments, including the launching of a campaign against the government of Ayub Khan. The president decided to negotiate with the opposition, and as gesture of good will the Agartala Conspiracy charge against Mujibur Rahman was withdrawn.

In the **elections of 1970**—the first to be held in Pakistan, to directly elect the National Assembly—Mujib's Awami League won a decisive victory in East Pakistan. The party captured all but two seats from the eastern wing. The leaders of West Pakistan refused to hand over power to Mujib, and the result was a brutal civil war between the **Mukti Bahini**, Bengal's freedom fighters, and the Pakistan army. On 16 December 1971, the Pakistani army surrendered to a joint Indian and Mukti Bahini force, and East Pakistan became the independent state of **Bangladesh**. At that time Mujibur Rahman was still in a West Pakistani prison. He was released in January 1972 and returned to Dacca (Dhaka), the capital of Bangladesh and was appointed prime minister—later president—of the new state. He was assassinated by a group of disgruntled army officers on 15 August 1975 along with his wife and several other members of his family. His daughter, Hoseina Wajid, survived and took over as president of the Awami League. She

twice served as prime minister of her country. Four years later, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was to meet a similar fate at the hands of the army in Pakistan. *See also* INDO-PAKISTAN WAR OF 1971.

**MUKHTARAN BIBI (1972– )**. In June 2002, Mukhtaran Bibi was ordered by a *panchayat*—a five member council of men—to be raped by four men. The tribal elders represented a powerful group, the Masto tribe, in Meerwala village in Pakistan’s southern **Punjab** province. Her guilt was by association. Her 14 year old brother, Abdul Shakoor, was seen in the company of women from the tribe. In remote areas of Pakistan, tribal codes often take precedence over both Islamic and secular law. The *panchayat*’s sentence was carried out in the presence of a cheering crowd. In rural Pakistan, this type of punishment is not unknown; it is part of a system of traditional custom known as *karo-kari*. According to the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working with **women** in Pakistan, 150 women were raped in Pakistan under *karo-kari* in 2004.

After recovering from her injuries and giving up the thought of suicide, Bibi decided to fight back. The local media gave her support and began to refer to her as Mukhtar Mai, the respected sister. It was by this name she came to be known, not only in Pakistan but also abroad. The local *imam* (religious leader) also took up her cause and used the mosque to speak out against the injustice that was done. He also persuaded her to file a complaint with the police. The local anti-terrorism court took up the case, and sentenced six men, two tribal elders and four volunteer rapists, to death by hanging. She was also offered the equivalent of US\$8,000 in compensation, a princely amount in a poor village in Pakistan. Rejecting the government’s offer to be relocated in **Islamabad**, Bibi chose to spend her compensation money on starting a school for girls in her village. “I hope to make **education** more readily available to girls, to teach them that no woman should ever go through what happened to me,” she wrote for her website, which was created by a group of volunteers to help her in her campaign.

Her story was carried by the Western media, including *The New York Times*. The *Times* account, written by Nicholas D. Kristof, on 5 March 2005, drew a response from its readers that resulted in donations amounting to \$130,000. These funds were used by Bibi and her NGO associates to expand the facility she had created in her native

village. At the same time, Bibi decided to educate herself and enrolled in her own school as a student.

In the meantime, the case against the men took an unexpected turn, when on appeal, the Multan bench of **Lahore** High Court acquitted all but one accused, whose sentence was reduced from death to life imprisonment. The High Court's judgment, in turn, was vacated by the Federal Shariat Court. On 14 March 2005, the Supreme Court decided to step in and take over the case. In a two page order, Chief Justice **Nazim Hussain Shah** declared that the action by the Federal Shariat Court was not visualized by the constitution and the law. "Clearly judgment of the high court can be challenged before this court (Supreme Court), under Article 185 of the Constitution." The Supreme Court later upheld the conviction of the accused in the case, and Mukhtaran Bibi's assaulters found themselves back in jail.

The Mukhtaran Bibi drama took another turn in the summer of 2005 when it was revealed that the Pakistani government had prevented her from traveling to the United States to speak at a convention organized by the people of South Asian origin who were working to draw the world's attention—including that of their own countries—to the low social status assigned to a large number of women in that part of the world. There was a great hue and cry against the action by the government of Pakistan; this became even more intense when it was discovered that President **Pervez Musharraf** himself had ordered that Bibi should be prevented from traveling abroad. At a press conference in New Zealand, President Musharraf said that he had taken that step in order to save Pakistan from public humiliation. This action by the government produced a set of scathing articles by *The New York Times*'s Nicholas Kristof, who also revealed that Islamabad had refused to give him a visa to visit Pakistan so that he could personally interview Mukhtaran Bibi.

The way the Bibi case was handled by the Pakistani government produced exactly the opposite results from those intended. Instead of saving the country from gaining a bad reputation in the area of human rights, particularly with respect to the treatment of women, the publicity associated with the case put Pakistan in an extremely difficult position. The government withdrew the constraints on Mukhtaran Bibi's travel, and in September 2005, while on a visit to the United Nations in New York, President Pervez Musharraf took

time to speak to a conference of women, at which he openly acknowledged that his country had to go a great deal further in protecting the rights of its women.

**MUKTI BAHINI.** The Mukti Bahini—meaning “freedom fighters” in Bengali—was a paramilitary force organized to oppose the Pakistan army in East Pakistan. It took shape following an action launched, somewhat unexpectedly, by the units of the Pakistani army stationed in East Bengal, then called East Pakistan. The Pakistan army began its operation on 25 March 1971 and arrested a large number of supporters of **Mujibur Rahman** and members of the **Awami League**. Hundreds of people were killed in the military operation. The Bengali members of the Pakistan army who managed to escape to India formed the core of the Bengali force. India took the Mukti Bahini under its wing when it decided to aid the Bengalis in their struggle against West Pakistan. The Bengali militia entered East Pakistan along with the Indian forces and participated in the ceremony in which the commander of the Pakistani force surrendered to the Indians. Some members of the Mukti Bahini were later incorporated into the armed forces of independent **Bangladesh**, whereas others joined the civil service of the new state. *See also* INDO-PAKISTAN WAR OF 1971.

**MUNIR, CHIEF JUSTICE MUHAMMAD (1916–1995).** Muhammad Munir was a lawyer from **Punjab** who gained prominence by publishing *Principles and Digest of the Law of Evidence*. The book appeared in 1936 and established Munir’s reputation not only as a lawyer but as a profound thinker on legal matters. He was appointed to the federal Court of Pakistan soon after Pakistan became independent. After a few months on the bench, he was appointed to head the Court as the chief justice. When the Court was reconstituted as the Supreme Court of Pakistan, following the adoption of the **Constitution of 1962**, Muhammad Munir was appointed chief justice.

A number of landmark decisions were issued by the Supreme Court under the guidance of Chief Justice Muhammad Munir. These included the **Usif Patel** and **Maulvi Tamizuddin** cases, both of which had a profound impact on Pakistan’s political development. In the Tamizuddin case, the court used the “**doctrine of necessity**” to

endorse the dissolution of the **Constituent Assembly** by Governor-General **Ghulam Muhammad**. Chief Justice Munir headed several inquiry commissions, including the commission appointed by the governor-general to investigate the circumstances that led to the anti-Ahmadiya riots in 1953, on which he issued the **Munir Report**.

Justice Muhammad Munir retired from the Supreme Court in 1960 and was succeeded by Chief Justice **A. R. Cornelius**. Munir wrote extensively after his retirement; one of his books, *From Jinnah to Zia*, had several printings. When the book was first published, his main argument ran counter to the one that was being espoused by President **Zia ul-Haq**. Munir maintained that Pakistan was not created to become an Islamic state. Its purpose, according to **Muhammad Ali Jinnah**, the country's founder, was to establish a country for the Muslim community of British India and was to be run as a modern democracy in which followers of all religions would have equal rights as citizens. *See also* AHMADIYAS.

**MUNIR REPORT.** *The Report of the Court of Inquiry into the Punjab Disturbances of 1953* was published in 1954 and has come to be called the "Munir Report." The report is so named because the two-man Court of Inquiry appointed by the governor-general to investigate the government's handling of the anti-Ahmadiya riots was headed by Chief Justice **Muhammad Munir** of the Supreme Court. Justice **Muhammad Rustan Kayani** was the Court's other member. The report issued by the Court of Inquiry is important for two reasons. First, it offered an opinion on the role of religion in state and politics. Second, it advised the government on an appropriate role for the elitist **Civil Service of Pakistan** (CSP) in the country's economic and political development. *See also* AHMADIYAS.

**MUSA, GENERAL (RETIRED) MUHAMMAD (1915–1993).**

Muhammad Musa was born in the province of **Balochistan** and joined the British Indian Army while still in his teens. He took part in the operations carried out by the British Indian Army from 1936 to 1939 in Waziristan, in the northwest of India. Musa saw action in Africa during World War II. He rose quickly in the ranks of the new Pakistani army and became a two-star general in 1950, succeeding General **Muhammad Ayub Khan** as the general commanding officer of the

army garrison in East Pakistan. When in 1951 Muhammad Ayub Khan was appointed as the first Pakistani to command the Pakistani Army, General Musa was summoned back to **Rawalpindi**, and appointed deputy chief of staff. In 1955, he became chief of staff of the army (COAS), and when Muhammad Ayub Khan placed Pakistan under martial law, Musa was appointed commander in chief. He was the fourth person, but only the second Pakistani, to command the Pakistani Army.

It was under General Musa's command that Pakistan fought its second war with India in September 1965. He retired from the army in October 1966 after having served for eight years as commander in chief. President Muhammad Ayub Khan rewarded him for his loyal service by appointing him governor of West Pakistan. He held this position until March 1969. In January 1986, General Musa was recalled from retirement and was appointed governor of Balochistan by Prime Minister **Muhammad Khan Junejo**. Musa was retained in this position when **Benazir Bhutto** became prime minister in December 1988, a position he held until the prime minister's dismissal in August 1990. *See also* INDO-PAKISTAN WAR OF 1965.

**MUSHARRAF, PERVEZ (1943– )**. Pervez Musharraf was born in New Delhi on 11 August 1943, the second of three brothers. His father, Syed Musharrafuddin, was a graduate of Aligarh University; his mother majored in English Literature. Syed Musharrafuddin moved his family from Delhi to **Karachi** after the partition of British India in 1947 and the birth of Pakistan. In Karachi, he joined the External Affairs Ministry and quickly rose in the ranks. He retired from government in 1986 as Joint Secretary. During his nearly 40 years in service, Syed Musharrafuddin was posted in Ankara, Turkey (1949–1956) as a middle ranking diplomat in Pakistan's embassy. Pervez Musharraf, a young boy at that time, went to Turkish schools, learned the Turkish language, and was deeply influenced by the Turkish attempt to define for itself a new basis of nationality. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of modern Turkey, became young Musharraf's political hero.

Back in Pakistan, Musharraf attended St. Patrick's High School in Karachi and graduated from there in 1956. He then went to **Lahore** and enrolled as an undergraduate in Forman Christian College, a mis-



sionary institution founded and managed by an American Christian order. He left the college to enroll in the army.

Musharraf joined the **Pakistan Military Academy** at Kakul in 1961 and was commissioned two years later. He opted for service in an artillery regiment which he joined in 1964. He fought as a young subaltern in the **Indo-Pakistan war of 1965** and was awarded *Imtiaz-i Sanad* for gallantry. Following his war experience, he was trained as a commando, and on the eve of Pakistan's 1971 war with India, he was appointed company commander in a commando battalion. His performance in the war won him two awards, *Nishan-e-Imtiaz* and *Tamgha-e-Basalat*. In September 1987, as the head of a newly formed SSG Mountain warfare unit, he attempted to capture the Indian held posts of Bilafond La pass in the **Siachen Glacier**. He was, however, beaten back.

Musharraf was promoted to the rank of major-general on 15 January 1991 and was placed in command of an infantry division. Four and a half years later, on 21 October 1995, he received his third star and was promoted to lieutenant general. He held several staff and command positions in the four year period between October 1995 and October 1999. He was commanding the Mangla Corps when, on 7 October 1998, he was summoned to **Islamabad** by Prime Minister **Mian Nawaz Sharif** to replace General **Jahangir Karamat**, who had agreed to cut short his three year tenure and take early retirement. He was awarded the fourth star and was sworn in as the chief of army staff (COAS) on the same day. He was the eighth person to occupy that position since its creation by President **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto** in December 1971.

Now in command of the army, General Musharraf returned to indulge in what had, by then, become a passion—using the military to wrest Kashmir from Indian control. In the winter and early months of 1999 when Prime Minister **Mian Nawaz Sharif** was actively engaged in easing tensions with India, the army, under Musharraf's command, dusted from the shelves an old plan of attack to capture the **Kargil** post in the northern parts of the area under India's occupation. By launching this assault, Musharraf and his men were violating a gentlemen's agreement that had worked for many years between the commanders on both sides of the border. When snow and ice in the deep winter months made it difficult and expensive for India to man

these posts, it pulled back its forces with the understanding that the better-positioned Pakistani forces would not take advantage of the Indian withdrawal. General Musharraf saw an opportunity to avenge the setback he had suffered as a young commander several years earlier when he attempted a similar operation in Siachen, further east of Kargil. Therefore, in the winter of 1999, as the Indians vacated their posts, Musharraf ordered the men of a light infantry division to occupy the vacant heights. The military men also took along a few Islamic mujahideen as a cover for their assault. The Kargil operation, when it was discovered by India and the West, was said to have been part of the insurgency that had gone on in Kashmir for a decade.

The Indian reaction could have been predicted. It launched a massive air and artillery attack on the posts occupied by Pakistan; the Indians also threatened to cross the international border and invade Pakistan if Islamabad did not immediately withdraw its troops unconditionally from the Kargil heights. This the Pakistani government agreed to do following intervention by President Bill Clinton in a meeting in Washington on 4 July 1999. This incident totally alienated the military commander from his prime minister.

When the prime minister launched a bizarre plan to remove General Musharraf from his post, the senior commanders of the military were prepared to act. The change in command was ordered while General Musharraf was on a plane returning to Karachi from Colombo, Sri Lanka. Islamabad tried to force the plane out of the Pakistani territory; the **military**, by taking control of the landing strip at Karachi, managed to land the plane with only seven minutes of fuel left in the tanks. This was late on 12 October 1999. The military annulled the order that appointed Lieutenant General Khwaja Ziauddin to succeed Musharraf. The prime minister, several of his senior ministers, and General Ziauddin were placed under arrest. General Musharraf flew to Islamabad and took over the administration of the country as the chief executive.

Two days later, General Musharraf announced a seven-point plan to rescue Pakistan from the serious economic difficulties it faced. He also promised to return the country to civilian control after some of these problems had been resolved. The Supreme Court, moved by the former prime minister to challenge the legality of the military takeover, ruled that the circumstances that prevailed at the time of the

army action justified its move. However, it ordered the chief executive to hold fresh elections no later than October 2002 and to return power to an elected National Assembly.

In June 2001, after receiving an affirmative vote from the people in a widely criticized referendum, Musharraf was sworn in as Pakistan's eleventh president. A month later he traveled to India to meet with Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee at a summit held at Agra. The summit failed, and the Pakistani president flew home without even a joint declaration by the two governments. Musharraf blamed the failure on **Lal Krishna Advani**, a powerful minister in the cabinet and a close ally of the Indian prime minister.

Musharraf's next foray into international politics came three months after the failure of the Agra summit. On 11 September 2001, the United States was attacked by terrorists who were soon identified as working for al Qaeda and its leader **Osama bin Laden**. Within hours of the attack, Pakistan was approached by Washington and asked to give up its support of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan that had provided sanctuary to bin Laden and his associates. Islamabad agreed, and when, on 8 October 2001, the United States launched a military campaign against Afghanistan, Pakistan permitted the use of its air space for American bombers and missiles. Musharraf had decided to place Pakistan on the front line of the American-led war against Islamic terrorism. He was immediately rewarded for this move; the United States, after having shunned him as a military usurper, welcomed him several times to Washington. During the summer of 2003, while on a visit to Camp David, the U.S. presidential retreat, President George W. Bush announced a package of economic and military support to Pakistan valued at US\$3 billion to be made available over a period of five years. In March 2005, the U.S. president also permitted Pakistan to obtain **F-16 aircraft** from the United States. This purchase, previously ordered and paid for by Pakistan, had been blocked by Washington after Islamabad tested nuclear bombs in May 1998.

On 13 December 2001, a group of Muslim terrorists attacked the Indian parliament compound in Delhi. About a dozen people died during the assault, which was blamed by India on the **Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)**, an agency operated by the Pakistan army. The Indian response was to mass its troops on the long border with Pakistan—a

move that was countered by Islamabad. For more than a year some one million troops from the two countries faced one another across the border and there was widespread fear across the globe that this confrontation could lead to a nuclear war. At one point President Musharraf hinted that he would be prepared to use all the means at his disposal if his country's integrity was threatened. Following intense pressure by the Western powers, especially the United States, the two countries agreed to pull back their troops. Pakistan gave the assurance that it will not permit the crossing of the Indian border by Muslim militants including the **Line of Control** that separated the Indian and Pakistani occupied parts of Kashmir. In April 2003, while on a visit to Srinagar, the capital of Indian Kashmir, Prime Minister Vajpayee extended his hand of friendship to Pakistan. Musharraf warmly responded to the move; nine months later, on the sidelines of the twelfth summit of the nations of the **South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)** held in Islamabad, Musharraf and Vajpayee issued a declaration pledging that the two countries would seek to resolve their differences through dialogue and negotiations. The Islamabad declaration led to considerable easing of tensions between India and Pakistan.

Pakistan made some progress in the area of political development under Musharraf but not enough to assuage his critics who were concerned with the slow pace the military leader had adopted to bring democracy back to the country. While elections were held for the national and provincial assemblies in October 2002 and a civilian prime minister was inducted into office in January 2003, it was clear that President Musharraf retained most executive powers. Some of these were enshrined in the **seventeenth amendment to the constitution** approved by the National Assembly in January 2003. Some of the power wielded by the president was due to his decision not to retire from the army and simultaneously to continue to function as the COAS and head of state. He announced that he would remain in the two positions until 2007 when he would offer himself for reelection as president.

Musharraf's close association with the United States and his campaign, albeit a halting one, to curb the power of militant Islamic groups won him the animosity of the latter. Twice in December 2003, attempts were made to assassinate him in **Rawalpindi**, the seat of the

Pakistani army. The second attempt was made by suicide bombers belonging to a well-known group of Islamic radicals. These attempts led Musharraf to proclaim a new political philosophy labeled “enlightened moderation.” Under the umbrella of this strategy, Musharraf promised to reform the *madrassas* system of education; several seminaries belonging to the system were engaged in recruiting and training Islamic militants to carry out jihadist activities inside and outside the country.

Under Musharraf and with the help of the United States and several donor agencies, Pakistan pulled back from the economic abyss it faced when the military intervened in October 1999. In 2004–2005, the GDP increased by 8.4 percent following an increase of 6.1 percent in the previous year. The country was also able to build up foreign exchange reserves of US\$12 billion, equivalent to nine months of expenditure on imports. External **trade** also expanded rapidly, bringing the trade-to-GDP ratio to 30 percent. The government predicts that it will be able to sustain a rate of growth of 7–8 percent a year for several years into the future. At that rate of growth, the Pakistan economy would be one of the most rapidly growing economies in the world.

**MUSLIM LEAGUE (1906–1958).** The formation of the All-India Muslim League in 1906 established a political tradition in Muslim India which survives to this day in Pakistan. The tradition is to set up a political organization for the pursuit of narrowly defined political objectives. Once the objectives are achieved, the sponsoring organization tends to wither away. This was to be the fate of the Muslim League. The organization was transformed several times to pursue the issue of the day. It also fragmented into factions that remained active for as long as the sponsoring person or group remained on the scene. The present-day **Pakistan Muslim League** has little resemblance to the party that was created in 1906.

Founded in Dhaka (then Dacca), Bengal, in December 1906, by Nawab Viqar ul-Mulk, the League’s main objective was to get the British to accept that the political interests of the Muslim community did not always coincide with those of the majority Hindu community. The Hindu leadership was anxious to get the British to leave India; the League, on the other hand, wanted the British to prolong their stay, if

only to protect the minorities. The Muslim League remained a weak organization during that time, in that it failed to define a broad set of objectives that would win it the support of the diverse Indian Muslim community, particularly those who lived in the Muslim-majority provinces. It also needed a leader who could get the provincial Muslim leaders to accept the discipline of a national party. These two objectives were realized when **Muhammad Ali Jinnah** took over as president of the League in 1934. With Jinnah as its leader, the League found a good organizer; Jinnah was also respected for the selfless way in which he had served the interests of the Muslim community, even when he was associated with the **Indian National Congress**. Despite Jinnah's activism, however, the League did poorly in the provincial elections of 1937, especially in the Muslim-majority provinces in the northwest.

The Muslim League's 1940 annual session, held in **Lahore** on 23 March 1940, turned its fortunes around. The assembled delegates approved the "**Pakistan Resolution**," demanding the creation of a separate homeland for the Muslims of British India. The resolution gave the League a tangible objective to pursue, which it did with remarkable tenacity, unfamiliar to those who had observed the course of Indian Muslim politics. Within a few years of the passage of the Pakistan Resolution, the League was converted from a party of a few notables to one with a large and growing following. By 1944, the League had a membership of some three million people. It had begun to penetrate even the Muslim-majority provinces. In Bengal, the League claimed a membership of 500,000; **Punjab** and **Sindh** had 200,000 members each. These successes were translated into electoral victories in 1946. The results of 1946 surprised even the leaders of the League. Muhammad Ali Jinnah was now in a position to challenge the provincial leaders, who had resisted his attempts to bring them and their provinces under the umbrella of the party that he led. The provincial leaders read the tea leaves, and several joined the party, whereas those who continued to resist—such as **Khizar Hayat Tiwana** of Punjab—were crushed by the League's steamroller. After the elections, the League and Muhammad Ali Jinnah were able to proclaim, with some justification, that they alone represented the interests of the Muslims of British India. First the British and later the Indian National Congress accepted this position, and both agreed to the creation of Pakistan, an independent state for the Muslims of British India.

The question of the League's future arose, as soon as the British announced the decision to leave their Indian domain in the hands of two successor states. Should the All-India Muslim League transform itself into the All-Pakistan Muslim League, or should it be divided also into two parts, one for India and the other for Pakistan? Recognizing that independent India would continue to have a large Muslim minority, Jinnah and his associates decided in favor of the two-League option. The one for Pakistan was to function under Jinnah's leadership, whereas Nawaz Ismail was to head the League in India.

With Pakistan achieved and Jinnah dead within a year of Pakistan coming into existence, the Muslim League lost its mission and its sense of direction. **Liaqat Ali Khan's** death in October 1951 dealt a further blow. In the provincial elections in East Bengal, the Muslim League suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of the **United Front**. In 1956, soon after Pakistan adopted its first constitution, President **Iskander Mirza** formed the Republican Party, attracting a large number of Muslim Leaguers into the fold of the new organization. In September 1957, another tradition was broken. **Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy**, who had been long gone from the Muslim League, was invited to form a government in **Karachi**. He thus became the first non-Muslim Leaguer to become Pakistan's prime minister. The military takeover of October 1958 and the decision by President **Muhammad Ayub Khan** to ban all political parties finally killed the Muslim League in its original form. It was to be reconstituted several times under different names; quite a few times it split into factions that professed allegiance to a leader who had walked away from the main party. *See also* CONVENTION MUSLIM LEAGUE; COUNCIL MUSLIM LEAGUE; PAKISTAN MUSLIM LEAGUE (NAWAZ SHARIF GROUP); PAKISTAN MUSLIM LEAGUE (QUAID-E-AZAM).

**MUTINY, GREAT INDIAN.** According to a celebrated phrase, much of the British Indian empire was acquired "in a fit of absence of mind." The British first came to India as traders, in the early years of the 17th century, but through purchases, bribery, conquest, treaties with land owners and princes, and sheer intimidation, their dominion over India through the **East India Company** kept expanding rapidly. By the middle of the nineteenth century, Great Britain controlled almost all of In-

dia either directly or as a result of having persuaded sometimes willing and at times reluctant princes to sign treaties of protection, which effectively made them the subjects of India's new rulers.

A reaction came in 1857, in the form of a *sepo*y (enlisted man) mutiny. It was provoked by the introduction of a new kind of Enfield rifle (provided by the East India Company), which used ammunition in the form of cartridges that had to be greased not with vegetable oil, as was the case before this unfortunate innovation, but with animal fat. It was rumored that the fat provided to the *sepoys* came either from cows or from pigs. This offended both the Muslims, who considered pigs dirty and therefore forbidden as food, and the Hindus, for whom the cow was a sacred animal. When 85 *sepoys* were thrown in jail for refusing to use the new cartridges, their enraged colleagues stormed the jail and launched the Great Indian Mutiny. A good deal of blood, both Indian and British, was to flow before the mutiny was brought under control. The British had to import troops from the northern areas of India—from **Punjab** and the **Northwest Frontier**—to bring order to the areas that had been affected by the uprising. Once law and order had been restored, the East India Company was dissolved and the government of Great Britain assumed responsibility for administering the company's territories in India. Thanks to the Great Indian Mutiny, India formally and from the perspective of the British became legally and constitutionally a colony of Britain.

**MUTTAHIDA MAJLIS-E-AMAL (MMA)**. In preparation for the elections promised by the military government, headed by General **Pervez Musharraf**, for October 2002, six religious parties agreed to form an alliance. This resulted in the creation of the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal, with the **Jamaat-e-Islami** at its core. The alliance also included both factions of the **Jamiat Ulemai-e-Islam** headed, respectively, by Maulana Fazlur Rehman and Maulana Samiul Haq, **Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan**, and the Shiite group named Tehrik-e-Islamia. The last group was formerly called the Tehrik-e-Nafaz-e-Fiqah-e-Jafaria, which had been banned earlier by the government of General Musharraf for inciting sectarian violence. The MMA's formation was encouraged by the military's **Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)**, which was looking for a political entity to rival the popularity of the two mainstream political parties, the **Pakistan**



**People's Party** and the **Pakistan Muslim League**. This calculation paid off since the MMA came up with a stronger performance in the **elections of 2002** than was generally expected. By winning 51 of the 272 contested seats, it became the third largest party in the National Assembly, after the **Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid-i-Azam) (PML[Q])** and **Pakistan People's Party Parliamentary (PPPP)**. Since no party won anywhere near the majority in the new assembly, General Musharraf had to work hard before a coalition could be put together that would support him and the changes in the **constitution** that he wished to make.

The MMA withheld its support for **Sardar Zafarullah Khan Jamali**, picked by President Musharraf to head the new government as prime minister and to draft the **Seventeenth Amendment** to the constitution. Given the hostility of the PPP and PML(N) toward Musharraf, the stance taken by the MMA proved to be awkward for the president. It was only after he had pledged that he would retire from the military by 31 December 2004 that the MMA agreed to support Jamali and agreed to the proposed amendment to the constitution, with some changes. The most significant of these changes concerned the establishment of the **National Security Council (NSC)**. The MMA indicated that its support for the amendment was contingent upon the NSC's establishment not as mandated by the constitution, but after approval by the National Assembly. Giving the NSC constitutional sanctity would have made it difficult to undo it at a later stage.

With the MMA on board, Jamali won the assembly's vote of confidence, and the Seventeenth Amendment was approved by the parliament's two chambers on 1 January 2004. The MMA also formed a government in the **Northwest Frontier Province**, headed by its nominee, Akram Durrani, as chief minister. It entered the coalition administration in Balochistan, partnering with PML(Q).

The honeymoon between President Pervez Musharraf and the MMA did not last long. The religious groups became increasingly troubled by the president's close relationship with the United States, his pursuit of the remnants of the **Taliban** in the remote areas of the country on the border with **Afghanistan**, and his advocacy of "enlightened moderation" as the country's political ideology. Following two attempts on the president's life in December 2003, orchestrated

by Islamic extremists, the rift between Musharraf and the MMA widened. While the general began attempts to reconcile with the PPP and with the progressive forces in the country, the MMA's position hardened. It condemned the president for not keeping his promise to retire from the military and for becoming even more vocal in his criticism of **Islamic** extremism. By the spring of 2005, the party wanted Musharraf to be removed from the military as well as the presidency. It said that Musharraf and Pakistan could not coexist, alleging that "he had reduced the country to the status of an American colony, that he ridicules Islamic tenets, and that his government encourages obscenity." In the fall of 2005, there were reports that the Musharraf government was seriously contemplating banning the Jamaat-e-Islami, and Jamiat Ulemai Islam of Fazalur Rahman for their alleged ties with the al Qaeda network.

**MUTTAHIDA QAUMI MOVEMENT.** *See* MUHAJIR QAUMI MAHAZ (MQM).

**MUTTAHIDA SHARIAT MAHAZ (MSM).** The Muttahida Shariat Mahaz, or the Joint Shariat Front, was formed in 1986 to work for the passage of the Shariat bill by the National Assembly. The MSM's main support for the movement came from the **Jamaat-i-Islami** and the religious leaders of the **Northwest Frontier Province**. It did not include the two Jamiats—the Jamiatul-Ulemai-Islam and the Jamiatul-Ulemai-Pakistan. In a public rally held in **Peshawar** on 6 February 1987, the Mahaz issued an ultimatum to the government, threatening direct action if it did not succeed in getting the National Assembly to pass the Shariat Bill. The Mahaz set 27 Ramzan 1407 A. H., as the deadline for the government, choosing a date on the Islamic calendar to signify the fortieth anniversary of Pakistan. The Peshawar meeting was described as the first large gathering of the *ulemai Islam* (Islamic scholars) in 66 years, since the Allahabad meeting of 1920, called by the All-India Khilifat Conference. The Allahabad conference had endorsed the movement against the British and had decided to create a force of volunteers to help Turkey in its struggle against Great Britain.

The Mahaz's threat to launch a massive street campaign against the government of Prime Minister **Muhammad Khan Junejo** was not

carried out even though the Shariat Bill was not enacted into law. The bill passed the Senate but remained under discussion in the National Assembly until its dismissal by President **Zia ul-Haq** in May 1988. The bill was finally approved by the National Assembly in 1991 when **Mian Nawaz Sharif** became prime minister. Its purpose secured, the MSM went out of business.

**MUTUAL DEFENSE AGREEMENT (MDA).** The Mutual Defense Agreement was signed between Pakistan and the United States in 1954. General **Muhammad Ayub Khan**, at that time commander in chief of the Pakistan army, was the principal exponent in Pakistan for entering into this alliance with the United States. Pakistan entered into the agreement in order to help secure U.S. assistance in building its defenses against India. The United States was interested in obtaining the support of Pakistan in its effort to contain the spread of communism in Asia. The agreement led to the massive flow of military assistance from the United States, including the construction of two military bases (cantonments) in Kharian and **Multan**. However, given the fact that the two countries had entirely different interests in entering into the MDA, it did not survive the war between India and Pakistan in September 1965. Pakistan believed that it was entitled to receive support from the United States during this difficult period; the United States, on the other hand, imposed an embargo on the export of military equipment to Pakistan, arguing that the MDA was aimed only at containing the spread of communism to Asia. *See also* CENTRAL TREATY ORGANIZATION (CENTO); SOUTH-EAST ASIA TREATY ORGANIZATION.

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**NADWAT AL-ULEMA (NU).** Nadwat al-Ulema (the Council of Islamic Scholars) established in Lucknow, India, in 1893, had a profound influence on the religious organizations working in the sector of education in Pakistan. NU continued to flourish even after the partition of British India and the loss of millions of Muslims to Pakistan from Uttar Pradesh, the home state of the organization. The organizations in

Pakistan maintained strong links with NU. In the 1990s, NU oversaw 60 affiliated schools, managed mostly by the graduates of its seminary in Lucknow. More than 13,000 students received education in these schools, with a teaching body of some 3,300. The seminary in Lucknow had 2,000 students, of which 1,500 lived on campus.

**NASIM WALI KHAN.** Nasim Wali Khan, the wife of **Abdul Wali Khan**, became politically active in the early 1990s following the withdrawal of her husband from the political scene because of illness. She was appointed chairperson of the provincial branch of the **Awami National Party** (ANP), in which capacity she was active in the deliberations with Prime Minister **Mian Nawaz Sharif's Muslim League** on the issue of renaming the **Northwest Frontier Province** as Pakhtunkhawa.

**NASRULLAH KHAN, NAWABZADA (1918–2003).** Born in Muzaffargarh in south **Punjab**, Nawabzada Nasrullah was one of the few politicians from Punjab who did not join any one of the major political parties that were to dominate the Pakistani political scene. He stayed away from the **Unionist Party**, which launched many political careers before Pakistan was born. He opted instead to work for the Ahrar party and supported its campaign against British rule. A number of Unionist politicians abandoned their party in favor of the **Muslim League** when they realized that **Muhammad Ali Jinnah's** demand for Pakistan would become a reality. Nasrullah Khan remained with the Ahrars, and after Pakistan was born he joined the **Awami League** and became a close associate of **Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardhy**, the party's founder and leader. The Awami League was the only large political organization Nasrullah Khan was associated with; he left the party when **Mujibur Rahman**, the party's new head, put forward a "**Six Point Program**" for gaining autonomy for East Pakistan.

Nasrullah Khan was resolute in his opposition to the "militarization" of Pakistani politics, first under General **Muhammad Ayub Khan** and later under Generals **Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan**, **Zia ul-Haq**, and **Pervez Musharraf**. He was one of the principal architects of the **Combined Opposition Party**, which was cobbled together in 1964 to fight Muhammad Ayub Khan in the presidential

election of 1964; he actively opposed Muhammad Ayub Khan once again in 1967 when he, along with several other prominent leaders, launched a campaign to democratize the **Constitution of 1962**. He cooperated with **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto** in giving Pakistan its most democratic Constitution in 1973 but turned against the prime minister when he and several other opposition politicians believed that the prime minister had stolen the **elections of 1977**, by gross misuse of administrative power. Nasrullah Khan remained in opposition throughout President Zia ul-Haq's 11 years in power. He was one of the prominent figures associated with the **Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD)**. It was only toward the close of his political career that he chose to work for the government in power rather than against it. He supported the return of **Benazir Bhutto** to power in 1993 and was rewarded with the chairmanship of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Assembly. He died in **Islamabad** on 26 September 2003.

**NATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY BUREAU (NAB).** The National Accountability Bureau was established by the government of General **Pervez Musharraf** under the National Accountability Bureau Ordinance of 1999. The bureau so created was to be headed by a serving lieutenant general. Lieutenant General Amjad Hussain was appointed to this position. It was clear that the government headed by General Musharraf attached considerable importance to the issue of corruption and had concluded that stern action in this regard would win it some legitimacy. Its intention was to directly involve the **military** in this operation, thus winning both the new administration and the armed forces some credibility in an area—public and political corruption—that had created great resentment in the country. The ordinance contained a number of draconian provisions relating to detention, bail, and evidence.

The NAB initially concentrated its efforts on the **banking** sector in response to the widespread belief that commercial banks had been raided by the administrations of **Benazir Bhutto** and **Mian Nawaz Sharif** to help their respective families, friends, and political supporters. Accordingly, one of the first acts of the NAB was to set 16 November 1999 as the deadline for the payment of all overdue loans to the banks. The response was less than anticipated. While a number of well

known industrialists and businessmen were taken into custody, the NAB discovered that even armed with new law-enforcement instruments, both the recovery of long overdue loans and the prosecution of alleged perpetrators was going to be a difficult task.

The NAB also pursued a number of politicians who had served a series of administrations that were in office in the 1980s and 1990s. Among those brought into the NAB net were Faisal Saleh Hayat, Aftab Khan Sherpao, and Liaquat Jatoi. Later, as the military government began the difficult task of creating a political base for itself, an impression was created that the NAB was being used to harass the government's opponents and provide succor to its supporters. This impression was reinforced when a number of politicians who had cases pending before NAB courts were invited to join the cabinet headed by **Zafarullah Khan Jamali**, the first prime minister under General Musharraf. Hayat, Sherpao, and Jatoi were brought into the cabinet and were assigned important portfolios. Also, by not bringing military officials into its net, the NAB created the impression that the new government was being highly selective in pursuing the problem of corruption. The only exception to the hands-off policy followed with respect to military personnel was the long incarceration of Admiral Mansur ul Haq, who was head of the navy in the late 1990s and was accused of having benefited personally from the purchase of nuclear submarines from France.

**NATIONAL AWAMI PARTY (NAP).** The National Awami Party was founded by **Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani** in the early 1950s. The left-of-center politics of the party attracted leaders and people from both East and West Pakistan. It was one of the few political parties that gained a sizable following in both parts of Pakistan. Over the years, the NAP grew in influence in the smaller provinces of the western wing, particularly in the **Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP)**. In the NWFP, **Abdul Wali Khan** led the provincial wing of the party for several years and saw it win enough seats in the **elections of 1970** to be able to form a government in the province in 1972. In 1973 Prime Minister **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto** dismissed the NAP-led provincial governments in the NWFP and **Balochistan** and banned the party. The NAP was revived by Wali Khan and his associates in 1986 under the name of **Awami National**

**Party.** This decision was taken after President **Zia ul-Haq** agreed to restore political activity in the country.

**NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITY (NCA).** The National Command Authority was established in 2000 under the chairmanship of General **Pervez Musharraf**. It was an apex body, authorized to oversee the country's nuclear program and the nuclear arsenal. It was also authorized to order the use of **nuclear weapons**. The decision was to be taken on the basis of unanimity among the members, which, in addition to the president, included the prime minister, the foreign minister, and the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff. On 6 January 2003, General Musharraf convened the NCA and inducted **Zafarullah Khan Jamali**, the newly sworn in prime minister, as a member of the authority. Following Jamali's resignation, **Shaukat Aziz**, his successor as prime minister, was invited to join the NCA as a member. The Command's secretariat was manned by a serving three-star general. While it may have been the intention to induct some civilian control into the management of the country's nuclear arsenal, it was clear that the dominant voice in these deliberations would be that of the military.

**NATIONAL COMMISSION ON AGRICULTURE (NCA).** The National Commission on Agriculture was appointed by Prime Minister **Muhammad Khan Junejo** in 1986 under the chairmanship of **Sar-taj Aziz**, minister of **agriculture**. The tradition of appointing commissions to make recommendations to the governments on agricultural policy goes back more than a century to the time of the British rule in India. The NCA presented its report to the government in March 1988. Its reach and recommendations were comprehensive in that they argued for the radical transformation of the agricultural sector. It was of the view that the way the sector was organized, it would not be able to realize its full economic potential. That potential was large but could only be achieved if the government was prepared to undertake some major changes in the way land was owned, water supplied, inputs marketed, surpluses sold, and taxes collected. The commission's report was made public only a few months before the government of Muhammad Khan Junejo was dismissed by President **Zia ul-Haq**. In the political uncertainty in which Pakistan functioned in the 1990s, no government had the time or the inclination to think

through the recommendations made by the Commission. It was only under the government headed by General **Pervez Musharraf** that Pakistan began to seriously address the question of structural reform of the agricultural sector.

**NATIONAL DEFENSE COLLEGE (NDC).** The National Defense College was established at **Rawalpindi** in 1972 to provide instruction to middle-level officials of the armed forces in military and social sciences. The college was housed in the premises once occupied by the National Assembly. In 2000, it moved to a new campus built for it in **Islamabad**. The college offers two courses every year. A “War Course” is attended by officers from all branches of the military and focuses principally on military matters. A “National Defense Course” also brings in middle-level officials from the federal secretariat who sit with military officers to be instructed in **defense** strategy. Giving a broader interpretation to “strategy,” the course teaches economics and political science, along with military strategy. At the end of each Defense Course, the students are required to present a “national strategy” to the college on a subject considered to be of vital interest to the country at that point in time. This paper is known to be read by the senior echelons of the military and is said to have influenced their policies on several occasions. For an officer in the armed forces to receive the “second star”—to move from brigadier general to major general in the army, for instance—he must have attended the NDC.

**NATIONAL FINANCE COMMISSION AWARD (1991), FOURTH.**

The **Constitution of 1973** showed some sensitivity to the need for an institutional arrangement for the distribution of financial and other resources among the provinces. It required the formation of two bodies for this purpose: a Council of Common Interests (CCI) to resolve all disputes among the provinces, and a National Finance Commission (NFC) to distribute financial resources from the center to the provinces and to allocate them among the provinces on the basis of an agreed formula. Although the CCI was to be a “standing body” to be called into session by the prime minister whenever the need was felt for deliberations among the provinces, the NFC was to be convened every five years.



The first NFC under the 1973 constitution was set up soon after the promulgation of the constitution and went on to announce its award in 1975. Two more commissions were formed, one in 1979 and another in 1985, but neither was able to reach an agreement over the distribution of resources among the provinces. The Fourth National Finance Commission was appointed by President **Ghulam Ishaq Khan**, during the first administration of Prime Minister **Benazir Bhutto** (December 1988–August 1990). The Commission was not able to complete its work during Benazir Bhutto's tenure, however. It was reconstituted with the change in government and the appointment of **Mian Nawaz Sharif** as prime minister. The reconstituted commission announced its award on 20 April 1991.

The award took effect on 1 July 1991, the first day of the 1991–1992 financial year. It made a number of changes in the country's fiscal system. For instance, it discontinued the practice of meeting the budgetary deficits of the provinces, or requiring them to surrender their budgetary surpluses. All strategic projects executed in the provinces or any development activity undertaken on the directives of the president or prime minister were to be fully funded by the federal government. The award of the National Finance Commission, by making the provinces virtually autonomous in the fiscal field, was expected to have a profound developmental effect. For the first time in the country's history, it provided incentives to the provinces to use the tax authority available to them under the constitution to generate resources for their development. Also, by establishing the principle of payment of rent for the exploitation of natural resources, the award also set the stage for the construction of large hydroelectric projects in the upper reaches of the Indus. *See also* INDUS WATERS TREATY.

**NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COOPERATIVE FINANCE CORPORATION (NICFC).** The National Industrial Cooperative Finance Corporation was established in 1964 in **Lahore** and was registered under the Punjab Cooperative Act of 1925. Its aim was to help its members, mostly the province's rural elite, to diversify into activities other than **agriculture**. The institution grew rapidly in the latter part of the 1960s when the "**green revolution**" in **Punjab** resulted in consider-

able prosperity in the province's countryside. It lay dormant in the 1970s when the government of **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto** banned private commercial banking but revived in the 1980s, particularly after the induction into office of **Benazir Bhutto** as prime minister and **Mian Nawaz Sharif** as chief minister of Punjab. A serious political conflict between the two deprived Nawaz Sharif and the Iteffaq Group of Industries, owned by his family, access to the commercial and investment banks controlled by the central government. Sharif and his associates turned to the Punjab's cooperatives for the funds they required. By the time of its collapse due to a large number of nonperforming loans, the NICFC had grown into Punjab's largest cooperative bank. In August 1991, the government withdrew the operating license of the NICFC and closed down its operations. The government of Benazir Bhutto launched an investigation, accusing the Sharif family and their associates of plundering the bank. The investigation did not result in a court trial, and the responsibility for what came to be called the "Punjab cooperatives scandal" was not determined.

**NATIONAL LANGUAGE AUTHORITY.** The **Constitution of 1973** adopted Urdu as Pakistan's national language and provided for the establishment of a National Language Authority to promote the use of Urdu in the country. The framers of the constitution believed that with the departure of Bengali-speaking East Pakistan from the fold of Pakistan, they were no longer dealing with an explosive issue. They also believed that as Urdu was the mother tongue of a small proportion of the population, its use had to be promoted by special state effort—thus the need for a Language Authority.

It soon became obvious that the framers of the constitution had misread public sentiment. They had not fully realized that language remained a burning issue in at least one part of Pakistan—the major cities of **Sindh** province in which millions of Urdu speakers had settled in the late 1940s and the early 1950s after migrating from India. The native Sindhis were becoming increasingly apprehensive that their ancient culture and equally ancient language—Sindhi—were being threatened by Urdu and the *muhajir* (refugees from India) community. They were disappointed that Prime Minister **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto**, himself a Sindhi, would forsake their language by giving such prominence to Urdu in the constitution that he piloted through

the National Assembly. The language riots of 1974 in **Karachi** were the result of Sindhi resentment against the government's language policy in general and what was considered to be the growing influence of the muhajir community in particular. Scores of people were killed in the riots, as angry demonstrators clashed with the police in several parts of Karachi.

Prime Minister Bhutto heard the message delivered by the riots in Karachi and did not appoint the National Language Authority as stipulated in the constitution. That constitutional hole was plugged by the **martial-law** government of President **Zia ul-Haq**, when in October 1979 it set up the Language Authority under the chairmanship of Ish-tiaq Hussain Qureshi. Qureshi was a highly respected figure: He was a well-known historian who had served his country in several important positions, including as vice chancellor of Karachi University. In November 1987, Jameel Jalibi, a noted scholar and former vice chancellor of Karachi University, became the third chairman of the Language Authority, under Prime Minister **Muhammad Khan Junejo**.

**NATIONAL LOGISTICS CELL (NLC).** The National Logistics Cell was established in 1984 as a transport unit within Pakistan Army's Electrical and Mechanical Corps (EME). Its initial mandate was to organize the transport of a million and a half tons of wheat, which Pakistan had to import and distribute because of the massive failure of the wheat crop of 1983–1984. This task was entrusted by the government of President **Zia ul-Haq** to General **Saeed Qadir**. After the successful completion of the task, Qadir decided to keep the cell in business. In time, the NLC became the largest public-sector transport company in Pakistan.

**NATIONAL PEOPLE'S PARTY (NPP).** The National People's Party (NPP) was founded in 1986 by **Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi**, an old associate of **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto**, and one of the founding fathers of Bhutto's **Pakistan People's Party** (PPP). Jatoi's decision to launch a new organization was provoked by the treatment meted out to the first generation of PPP leaders by **Benazir Bhutto**, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's daughter and his successor as the chairperson of the party. Benazir Bhutto's treatment of Jatoi reflected her intention to turn to a younger generation of leaders in redefining the party.

The NPP was launched with great hope, and there was considerable expectation that Jatoi would succeed in attracting not only Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's political associates but also the landed community of **Sindh**. This did not happen, and the party fared poorly in the **elections of 1988**, the first to be held after the revival of democracy in Pakistan. Jatoi did not even succeed in winning his ancestral seat in Nawabshah.

**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL (NSC).** The National Security Council was established in 2004 by the National Security Council Act of April 2004. President **Pervez Musharraf** had originally intended to make the NSC a permanent part of the political and governance structure by giving it a status in the **Constitution of 1973**. However, that attempt did not succeed, largely as result of the stiff opposition of the religious parties represented in the **Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal** coalition. They were only prepared to sanction its creation through an act of the parliament.

The Council, as created by the parliament, had 13 members. Besides the president, it included the prime minister, the chairman of the Senate, the speaker of the National Assembly, the leader of the opposition in the National Assembly, the four Provincial chief ministers, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the chiefs of staff of the army, navy, and air force. The NSC served as an advisory group for the president and his cabinet on matters of national security, including the sovereignty, integrity, **defense**, and security of the state. It did not have the authority to take decisions on any of the issues but was allowed to formulate recommendations to the president.

The Council was convened a few times, but its meetings were boycotted by Maulana Fazlur Rahman of the MMA, who had been elected by the National Assembly as the leader of the opposition, and also by the MMA chief minister of the **Northwest Frontier Province**.

**NATIONAL VOLUNTEER MOVEMENT (NVM).** The National Volunteer Movement was launched by President **Pervez Musharraf** on 22 November 2005 at a site located in the area devastated by the **earthquake of 8 October 2005**. He inducted the first batch of volunteers into the movement. The first group of 1,700 were adminis-

tered the oath by the president. It included boy scouts, girl guides, and students. NVM was organized to allow young people who wish to volunteer their time for helping to improve social conditions in the country and to provide relief in the aftermath of natural disasters. By setting up NVM, the government attempted to deflect young people from being recruited as volunteers by various Islamic organizations that became active following the October earthquake. The president will be the convener of NVM; its work will be overseen by a cabinet committee, called the National Council, headed by the prime minister. Mohammad Ali Durrani, an official working in the prime minister's secretariat, was appointed the first chairman of the movement.

**NIKAI, ARIF (1941– )**. Arif Nikai, a little-known politician from a small town near **Lahore**, achieved sudden prominence when, on 13 September 1995, the provincial Assembly of **Punjab** elected him as the province's chief minister. He secured 152 votes in the 248-member Provincial Assembly. Nikai's election was the outcome of intense politicking on the part of both the **Pakistan People's Party (PPP)** and the **Pakistan Muslim League**, following the dismissal of Chief Minister **Manzoor Wattoo** by President **Farooq Leghari**. The PPP's efforts to get the coveted position for itself did not succeed because the splinter **Pakistan Muslim League (Junejo group) (PML(JJ))** threatened to walk out of the coalition government at the center in **Islamabad** if the PPP denied it the chief ministership. The PML(J) won the support of the mainstream Muslim League, which was also anxious to keep the chief minister's job from going to the PPP.

Nikai's election was not well received by the people of Punjab, as they felt the province, given its size and importance, deserved a more experienced chief executive. With Nikai's elevation to chief minister, the conflict between the PPP and the PML took a heavy toll in terms of the quality of governance in the province. While Nikai was in office, effective power passed into the hands of **Major General (retired) Saroop**, governor of the province.

**NISAR ALI KHAN, CHAUDHARY (1950– )**. Chaudhary Nisar Ali Khan belongs to **Punjab**'s Campbellpur district. He gained prominence as one of the "young Turks" in the first administration of Prime

Minister **Mian Nawaz Sharif** (November 1990–April 1993). He was not only a close confidante of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif but also wielded considerable power in the **Muslim League**. He was in charge of the powerful petroleum ministry in the first Sharif administration, a position from which he was able to influence economic policy-making during the period. As a “young Turk” he was consulted on all important matters by the prime minister and was instrumental in persuading the latter to begin to hew a course independent of President **Ghulam Ishaq Khan** in the spring of 1993. This advice led to the confrontation between the president and the prime minister and ultimately to the resignation of both. Elections held in October 1993 brought **Benazir Bhutto** back to power as prime minister. Nisar won back his seat in the National Assembly and played an active role from the opposition benches. After winning a seat in the National Assembly in the **elections of 1997**, he returned as a minister in the second Sharif administration, which took office in February 1997. He continued to play an important role in the new government. He stayed loyal to Sharif after the military assumed power under General **Pervez Musharraf**.

**NISHTAR, SARDAR ABDUR RAB (1899–1958)**. Abdur Rab was born in **Peshawar**. He acquired the pen name of Nishtar, probably while he was a graduate student at Aligarh. He practiced law for a few years, but took up serious politics when he joined the **All India Congress** in 1929. He resigned from the Congress in 1931 to join the **Muslim League** and was elected to the legislative assembly of the **Northwest Frontier Province** in 1937. In 1943, he joined the cabinet of Aurangzeb Khan and was given the portfolio of finance. He left the provincial cabinet in 1945 when, with the defection of Sardar Bahadur Sadullah Khan, the Aurangzeb government fell.

**Muhammad Ali Jinnah** included Nishtar in the four-person Muslim League delegation that attended the **Simla Tripartite Conference** of 5–12 May 1946. He was also one of the five ministers to join the interim government under Jawaharlal Nehru later that year. In the interim government, Nishtar held the portfolios of posts and air communications. Even more significant was Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s invitation to Nishtar to join himself and **Liaqat Ali Khan** as the Muslim League representatives in the decisive meetings held on 2 and 3

June 1946 by **Lord Louis Mountbatten** to apply final touches to the plan to partition India. A four-member Partition Committee was set up to prepare for India's division, with Vallabhbhai Patel and Rajendra Prasad representing the Congress and Liaquat Ali Khan and Abdur Rab Nishtar representing the Muslim League.

Nishtar joined Liaquat Ali Khan's first post-independence cabinet as the minister of communications but left in August 1949 to become the governor of the politically troubled province of **Punjab**. Once Pakistan was born, the Punjab Muslim League disintegrated into a number of feuding factions competing for power in the province. Liaquat Ali Khan needed a strong presence in **Lahore**, Punjab's capital, to get the faction leaders to work together. He chose Nishtar for the job. He was called back in October 1951 to the central cabinet by Khawaja Nazimuddin, Pakistan's second prime minister, as a part of a complicated political maneuver that left much political power in the hands of such bureaucrats-turned-politicians as **Ghulam Muhammad**, **Chaudhri Muhammad Ali**, and **Iskander Mirza**. Khawaja Nazimuddin was dismissed from office by Governor-General Ghulam Muhammad in April 1953, an action that for all practical purposes also ended Abdur Rab Nishtar's political career. For another two years, Nishtar remained on the sidelines but was unable to come to terms with the new generation of politicians or to reestablish himself in the **Northwest Frontier Province**, his province of origin. In 1956, he agreed to assume the presidency of the Muslim League but the party had lost most of its luster and Nishtar could do little to revive it.

**NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT (NAM).** The Non-Aligned Movement was launched in 1955 following a meeting in the Indonesian city of Bandung sponsored by President Sukarno of Indonesia, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of **India**, and Presidents Gamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt and Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana. Attended by 29 countries from mostly Asia and Africa, the leaders vowed to pursue policies that would be aimed at improving the welfare of their citizens. They were of the view that the Cold War, which had entrenched the West, under the leadership of the United States, and the Communist countries led by the Soviet Union, on the opposite sides of an ideological divide, was deflecting attention from the real problems faced by the world—economic backwardness of hundreds of millions of people who lived

in Africa and Asia, in countries that had recently gained independence from colonial rule. The Bandung meeting was also attended by Prime Minister Zhou Enlai of **China** who signaled that his country was not involved in the Cold War but was a developing nation that shared the same aspirations as the rest of the underdeveloped world.

Pakistan, although invited to the Bandung meeting, was not included in the NAM, since the country was considered openly aligned with the United States. In 1954, having signed the **Mutual Defense Agreement** with Washington, Pakistan was considered to be an active participant in Cold War politics. Prime Minister **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto** sought entry into the NAM by actively campaigning for membership but was thwarted by India. Delhi was successful in arguing its case against Pakistan: Pakistan's continuing membership in the **Central Treaty Organization (CENTO)** meant that it could not be regarded as non-aligned. After Pakistan left CENTO, it was officially accepted into the NAM, at the group's 1979 summit held in Havana, Cuba. By that time, the NAM had expanded its membership to include most countries of the developing world. *See also* ASIAN-AFRICAN STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP.

**NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION (NGO).** Although the NGO type of activity has always existed in the countries of the Third World, the work of local NGOs began to gain greater prominence and importance in the 1980s. Sometimes this happened because of the encouragement by the developed-country NGOs. However, commonly it was the product of the frustration of the people with the government's inability to provide such basic services as primary **education** and **health** care. With the government becoming increasingly dysfunctional in Pakistan, a number of NGOs began to provide services normally reserved for the government. Among the NGOs most active in Pakistan are the **Edhi Foundation**, the **Agha Khan Foundation**, **Shaukat Khanum Foundation**, and several associations working to promote women's welfare. *See also* EDHI, ABDUL SATTAR.

**NOON, SIR FEROUZE KHAN (1893–1970).** Born in **Punjab**, Feroze Khan Noon held a number of important positions in the government of that province before the partition of India and the birth of Pakistan. In 1936, he was appointed high commissioner to London, a position



he held for five years. This position did not carry much authority, since relations between the British government in London and the British Indian Administration in New Delhi were conducted through official and not diplomatic channels. Upon returning to India in 1941, Noon was appointed to the Viceroy's Council. Under the **Government of India Act of 1935**, the Council worked as a cabinet. He became a member of the **First Constituent Assembly** of Pakistan, and went on to serve as governor of East Pakistan (1950–1953), chief minister of Punjab (1953–1955), and foreign minister (1956–1957) in the cabinet headed by Prime Minister **H. S. Suhrawardhy**. President **Iskander Mirza** invited him to become prime minister in 1957, a position he held until the declaration of **martial law** by General **Muhammad Ayub Khan** on 7 October 1958.

**NOORIABAD.** The Nooriabad Industrial Estate, located midway between **Karachi** and **Hyderabad**, was established to stem the departure of industries from Karachi to the areas around **Lahore**. Industries had begun to leave Karachi because of the law-and-order problem in the city during the late 1970s and the 1980s. The Nooriabad Estate was established in 1983 on 1,450 hectares of land. It was planned to accommodate 1,000 industrial units and could take in another 2,500 enterprises by expanding into Dadu district. Fully developed, the estate could stretch over an area of 6,600 hectares. By 1992, it had managed to attract only 66 industrial units with a total investment of Rs 6 billion.

**NORTHWEST FRONTIER PROVINCE (NWFP).** The Northwest Frontier Province is an area of 75,000 square kilometers, a population of 22 million, and a population density of 293 persons/square kilometer. Of Pakistan's four provinces, the Northwest Frontier Province is the only one without a historical name. **Punjab**, **Sindh**, and **Balochistan** have been so named for hundreds of years. The NWFP acquired its name only in 1901 when Lord Curzon, the viceroy of India, persuaded the British government to separate the **Pathan** districts of Punjab to form a separate province. The British could have called the new province Pathanistan or **Pukhtunistan**, but instead they chose the name "Northwest Frontier Province." Most often the province was just called the "Frontier." The British reluctance to call the new

province by the name of the majority of its population was dictated in part, by the uneasy relations they had had with **Afghanistan** and the Pathan tribes that lived on their side of the border. Had the NWFP been given the name Pukhtunistan, it would have saved Pakistan a great deal of trouble when the leaders of the new country had to contend with Pathan (or Pukhtun) nationalism.

The establishment of the NWFP did not entirely endear the British to the Pathans. The Pathans continued to resent the British presence in their midst, and this resentment gave birth to a movement—the **Khudai Khidmatgar** (KK)—that combined Pathan nationalism and socialism. The Khudai Khidmatgar’s political program was closer to that of the **Indian National Congress** than to that of the **Muslim League**. The KK entered into an electoral alliance with the Congress, which resulted in the Congress gaining a strong presence in the NWFP. It took a referendum conducted on 17 July 1947, in which almost 99 percent of those who voted cast their vote for Pakistan, to dislodge the Congress from the Frontier Province. Less than a month later, on 14 August 1947, the NWFP joined other Muslim majority provinces and areas of British India to form the state of Pakistan. Eight days later, on 22 August, Governor-General **Muhammad Ali Jinnah** dismissed the Congress–Khudai Khidmatgar provincial ministry and installed a Muslim League administration with **Abdul Qayyum Khan** as chief minister.

Qayyum Khan remained the province’s chief minister for six years, from 1947 to 1953, a period during which the NWFP made impressive economic strides. He launched and completed a number of large public-sector projects, including the Warsak dam on the Kabul River, and encouraged private entrepreneurs to invest in **agriculture** and set up industry. Qayyum Khan was succeeded first by Sardar Abdur Rashid, a policeman turned politician, and then by Sardar Bahadur Khan. The latter was the younger brother of General **Muhammad Ayub Khan**; he led the NWFP into the **One Unit of West Pakistan**. Most residents of the province considered the creation of the One Unit a serious infringement of their political rights. There was reason for their unhappiness. The province suffered economically during the One Unit period. The One Unit was dissolved by the military government of General **Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan** on 1 July 1970, and the NWFP reemerged as a province.

The national **elections of December 1970** saw the emergence of the **Jamiatul-Ulemai-Islam (JUI)** of **Maulana Mufti Mahmud**, the Qayyum Muslim League, and the **National Awami Party** (Wali Khan Group) as the main political parties. The JUI and the NAP together won 10 seats to the National Assembly out of the 25 allotted to the province and secured 34 percent of the total votes cast. In 1972, **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto** invited the JUI-NAP coalition to form a government. The coalition appointed Arbab Sikander Khalil of the NAP as governor and Maulana Mufti Mahmud as chief minister. The JUI-NAP government resigned a year later to protest the dismissal of a similar coalition in Balochistan. Political turmoil ensued, and Bhutto was not able to fully establish his political control over the province.

In 1978, General **Zia ul-Haq**'s **martial law** government appointed Lieutenant General **Fazle Haq** governor of the NWFP. Fazle Haq stayed in the job for seven years and adopted Qayyum Khan's approach toward economic development and political management. Under him, the province once again went through a period of rapid economic growth, in spite of the fact that it had also to accommodate more than two million refugees who poured in after the arrival of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan. After martial law was lifted in 1985, Arbab Jehangir Khan of the Muslim League was appointed chief minister.

In the **elections of November 1988**, the Muslim League and other political parties that had been associated with Zia ul-Haq performed poorly. The **Pakistan People's Party (PPP)** was able to control the provincial legislature with the help of a number of minor parties for two years. In the **elections of 1990**, however, power passed into the hands of the **Islami Jamhuri Itthead (IJI)**. The PPP was back in power following the **elections of 1993** but lost to the Muslim League in the **1997 elections**.

A major political change occurred in the province after General **Pervez Musharraf** brought the military back to power. Following the approach adopted by the administrations in **Islamabad** since the mid-1990s, the new military government continued to support the consolidation of power by the **Taliban** regime in Afghanistan. The Taliban were trained in the various seminaries (*madrassas*) strung along NWFP's border with Afghanistan. As such, the new regime had a strong base of support for the Afghan Taliban. With the terror-

ist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001 and the Bush administration's pressure on General Musharraf, Pakistan terminated its support for the Taliban. This was a traumatic event for the Pukhtun population of the province, which, further aggravated by the American invasion of Afghanistan, overwhelmingly voted for a coalition of religious parties in the elections of October 2002. The electoral triumph of the **Muttahida-Majlis-e-Amal** (MMA) brought Islamic radicals to power in the province. Ever since then, relations between the province and Islamabad have remained strained. *See also* UNITED STATES–PAKISTAN RELATIONS; WANA.

**NOWSHERA.** At Nowshera, a middle-sized city of about 200,000 people in the **Northwest Frontier Province**, the **Indus River** briefly enters a narrow gorge that runs as far as Kalabagh, in **Punjab**. If a **dam** is built at Kalabagh, the impounded water would submerge a good part of Nowshera. This is unacceptable to the people of the Frontier Province, who are not prepared to lose a city of significant size nor to accommodate the people who would be displaced. Their opposition to the construction of the dam put the project on hold. In the meantime, Nowshera continues to grow in size.

**NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT).** The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was negotiated in 1970, originally for a period of 25 years, and was renewed in 1995. It has been signed by 188 states; only India, **Israel**, and Pakistan still remain opposed to the treaty. It divided the world into two parts: the countries that possessed nuclear weapons (Great Britain, **China**, France, the **Soviet Union**, and the **United States**) and those that did not. The five recognized nuclear powers promised to work toward nuclear disarmament as part of an effort toward general and complete disarmament. The non-nuclear states agreed not to acquire nuclear weapons on their own but were promised help with their civilian nuclear industry. India decided against joining the NPT on the grounds that it discriminated among countries. It wanted all states, nuclear and non-nuclear, to give up **nuclear weapons**. Pakistan did not sign because of India's refusal to do so.

The International Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) was given the responsibility of enforcing the provisions of the treaty, in partic-

ular keeping an inventory of the fissionable material stockpiled by non-nuclear states. The ability of some countries, in particular Iraq and North Korea, to acquire weapons-grade material in spite of the inspections carried out by the IAEC resulted in the strengthening of the powers of the agency. The new protocol to the NPT incorporating the additional powers given to IAEC came into force in 1997. That the treaty failed to stop the spread of nuclear weapons was demonstrated vividly by the nuclear tests carried out by India and Pakistan in May 1998. By testing their weapons, neither country broke any international law, but they seriously undermined the principal objective of the NPT.

In 2003, North Korea opted out of the treaty, thus further weakening the non-proliferation regime. In early 2005, the country announced that it had already manufactured nuclear bombs based on plutonium, a technology on which it had been working for several years. Iran was the other state that seemed to be engaged in a cat and mouse game with the West—in particular, the United States—to develop nuclear weapons. In March 2005, on the eve of the 35th anniversary of the signing of the NPT, the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush indicated that it wished the content of the NPT to be redefined so as (in the words of Stephen J. Hadley, the White House National Security Advisor) not to “allow rogue states that violate their commitments and defy the international community to undermine the NPT’s fundamental role in strengthening international security. We must therefore close the loopholes that allow the states to produce nuclear materials that can be used to build bombs, under the cover of civilian nuclear progress.” At the heart of U.S. concern was what it regarded as a fundamental flaw in the treaty. There was nothing in it to prevent a country, once it had learned how to enrich uranium or reprocess spent plutonium rods, from withdrawing from the treaty and developing nuclear bombs. That course was adopted by North Korea. Washington could have called for renegotiating the treaty, but it believed that this would be a time-consuming process since it would involve developing a consensus among the NPT’s 188 signatories. The latest five-yearly review of the treaty was held in New York, in May 2005, at which the signatories did not agree to strengthening its provisions. See also ABDUL QADEER KHAN.

**NUCLEAR WEAPONS.** **India** carried out an underground nuclear test in 1974. This alerted Pakistan to the danger of being exposed to a country with which it had already fought three wars and that now seemed poised to arm itself with nuclear weapons. Pakistan's response came from Prime Minister **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto**, who launched his country on an effort to close the nuclear gap. Much of Pakistan's endeavors were highly secret, led by **Abdul Qadeer Khan**, a metallurgist trained in Germany and The Netherlands. Pakistan concentrated on developing the capacity to produce nuclear-weapons-grade material. India, protesting all the time that the 1974 explosion was not aimed at developing weapons but was intended to give the country the technology it needed to produce nuclear energy, went about achieving nuclear self-sufficiency. By the late 1990s, India had built 10 commercial nuclear power stations with seven others under construction and 10 more in the planning stages. India also had four research reactors and was building a nuclear-powered submarine. The country also had an advanced missile development program.

Although the Congress Party-led governments—and also the government led by the United Front that held office in 1996–1998—had kept the nuclear weapons program under wraps, the **Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)**, which came to power on 17 March 1998, indicated its intention of developing the capability to produce and deliver nuclear weapons. The Pakistani response to this intention came immediately: It announced that it, too, would develop weapons if India took that route. The nuclear arms race between the two countries heated up when, on 11 May 1998, India exploded three nuclear bombs at a testing site in Rajasthan, close to the Pakistan border. The tests took the world by surprise and were condemned by most Western countries as well as **China** and **Russia**. The **United States** imposed economic sanctions on India, but India was not deterred. It carried out two more tests on 13 May. The world's attention then shifted to Pakistan, and there was hope that it could be prevented from testing its nuclear devices by the promise of generous economic assistance. The leaders of Pakistan, however, were not satisfied with the quality of the Western response to the Indian tests. There was also a great deal of domestic pressure on Prime Minister **Mian Nawaz Sharif** to follow India and claim the status of a nuclear power for Pakistan. Accordingly, Pakistan carried out six tests of its own on 28 May and 30 May in the

**Balochistan** desert. The United States and Japan responded by imposing sanctions similar to those imposed on India.

A joint Western response to these developments came on 12 June 1998 when the foreign ministers representing the G8 countries (Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Russia, and the United States) decided to oppose loans to both India and Pakistan by the **International Monetary Fund**, the **World Bank**, and the **Asian Development Bank**. *See also* MISSILES.

**NUR KHAN, AIR MARSHAL (RETIRED) (1927– )**. Nur Khan was the second Pakistani to command the air force of Pakistan. (Air Marshal **Asghar Khan** was the first.) At the time of his appointment, he had already distinguished himself as the chairman of Pakistan International Airlines, the public-sector air carrier that had built an impressive performance and service record. Nur Khan took over the air force shortly before the **Indo-Pakistan war of 1965**, and is credited with the exceptional performance of the air force against India. In March 1969, following the imposition of martial law by General **Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan**, Nur Khan was inducted into the military cabinet and was assigned the portfolio of health, education, and social welfare. In the summer of 1970, he left the cabinet and was appointed governor of West Pakistan. Assisted by his principal economic advisors, including Vaseem Jaffrey and **Shahid Javed Burki**, Nur Khan developed an ambitious program of economic reform for West Pakistan. However, by that time, serious differences had developed between him and the Yahya government in **Islamabad**, which led to his resignation in June 1971. He was elected to the National Assembly in 1977 but was unable to establish a political role for himself. He resurfaced briefly in 1993 when he was appointed to chair the prime minister's Commission on Education by the caretaker administration of **Moeen Qureshi**, but he effectively retired from public life after completing the commission's work.

**NUSRAT FATEH ALI KHAN (1949–1997)**. Nusrat Fateh Ali Khan belonged to a famous family of *qawals*—singers of religious Sufi music. Originally from Jullundhur, **Punjab**, the family migrated to **Faisalabad** following the partition of India. Nusrat's father and grandfather had practiced the art of *qawali* in India, and gained a

considerable reputation as *qawals*. Nusrat learned the art from his father and became the head of the group after his father's death. He was introduced to Western audiences by **Imran Khan**, who invited him to participate in fundraising concerts in Great Britain and North America for the Shaukat Khanum Foundation, a **non-governmental organization** that Imran had organized in honor of his late mother. Nusrat's talent as a singer of exceptional quality was recognized in the West and contributed to his fame in his native country. He died in London while preparing for a concert.

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**OJHRI CAMP.** The Ojhri Camp was an ammunition depot built by the British in the vicinity of **Rawalpindi**. The depot became an active storage and supply station for the arming of the Afghan *mujahideen* during their war with the Soviet Union that started in 1979. The depot was managed by the **Inter-Services Intelligence** (ISI) of the armed forces. On 10 April 1988, a major explosion in the depot destroyed thousands of tons of ammunition and killed hundreds of people in the depot and in the neighboring cities of Rawalpindi and **Islamabad**. The government of Prime Minister **Muhammad Khan Junejo** ordered an inquiry into the incident. The inquiry reportedly placed the responsibility on some senior army officers. Had the report been made public, it would have caused a great deal of embarrassment to the senior officers of the armed forces. President **Zia ul-Haq** decided to act before the report could be presented to the National Assembly. He dismissed Prime Minister Junejo and dissolved the National Assembly. In the meantime, the United States launched a massive airlift to replenish the stock of weapons in order not to give any satisfaction to the Soviet Union.

**ONE UNIT OF WEST PAKISTAN.** West Pakistan in the early 1950s was still not a "wing." It was made up of three provinces (the **North-west Frontier**, **Punjab**, and **Sindh**), a number of princely states (**Bahawalpur**, Kalat, and Khairpur being the largest among them), and the large, centrally administered territory of **Balochistan**. The as-



sembly of all these diverse administrative parts into “One Unit,” or one wing of the country, was therefore a precondition for the acceptance of the principle of **parity**, the basis of the **Constitution of 1956**. According to this principle, seats in the National Assembly were divided not on the basis of population but equally between East and West Pakistan. To apply this principle neatly, it was important to create one administrative unit in the western wing. This was done on 30 September 1955 with the establishment of the One Unit of West Pakistan. **Lahore** was designated the capital of the new province, and Dr. **Khan Sahib** was appointed chief minister of the new provincial government.

The creation of the One Unit of Pakistan was not popular with the smaller provinces. They resented the loss of autonomy implied by its creation. From the day the One Unit came into being, the smaller provinces started a campaign to undo it. Their demand was finally accepted by the military government of President **Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan**, which took office in March 1969. On 28 November 1969, the new military president accepted Bengal’s demand for representation on the basis of population and the demand of the smaller West Pakistan provinces for the dissolution of the “One Unit.” Because the principle of parity was not to be the basis of the new constitution promised by Yahya Khan, retention of the One Unit of West Pakistan was no longer necessary. The military government accepted this logic; the One Unit (Reorganization) Committee was set up on 10 December 1969, under the chairmanship of Mian Muzaffar Ahmad, deputy chairman of the Planning Commission, to reorganize West Pakistan into the four provinces of Balochistan, Northwest Frontier, Punjab, and Sindh. The committee concluded its work in June 1970, and on 1 July the One Unit of West Pakistan disbanded.

**OPERATION FAIRPLAY.** Operation Fairplay was the code name given to the move made by the armed forces on the night between 4 and 5 July 1977 to arrest Prime Minister **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto** and place Pakistan under **martial law**. The decision to move against Bhutto was taken after a number of senior officers refused to fire on the crowds that kept coming out on the streets of Pakistan’s major cities—in particular, **Lahore**—despite the government’s orders of “shoot to kill.” It was later claimed by those who put the operation in

place that had they not acted, some officers involved in restoring law and order in the cities might have mutinied against their commanders.

**OPERATION GIBRALTAR.** Military planners in Pakistan used the code name “Operation Gibraltar” for infiltrating commandos across the border into the Indian-occupied state of **Kashmir**. The operation began in the summer of 1965 and was launched in the belief—mistaken though it turned out to be—that the commandos would be able to incite rebellion by the Muslim population of the state against the occupying forces of India. That did not happen. Instead, the operation led to a full-scale war between India and Pakistan, a development that had not been foreseen by the government of President **Muhammad Ayub Khan**. *See also* INDO-PAKISTAN WAR OF 1965.

**OPPOSITION ALLIANCES.** Pakistan’s political history is punctuated with the appearance and dissolution of numerous political alliances. Most of these alliances addressed particular situations—the need to mount an effective opposition to an unpopular leader who was prepared to use the instruments of state to curb those not in his favor, the need to challenge the ruling party in the general elections, or the need to educate the people about some particular issue. Most of these alliances were short-lived; they disappeared once their immediate objective had been achieved. Some of them appeared briefly, and left little impression on political developments.

Among those that had some impact on history was the **United Front** (UF), organized by a number of political groups to challenge the **Muslim League** in the elections held in 1954 in East Bengal. The UF defeated the Muslim League and laid the foundation for the ultimate secession of East Pakistan as the independent state of **Bangladesh**. The **Combined Opposition Party** (COP) of 1964 was formed to challenge President **Muhammad Ayub Khan** in the presidential elections of 1965 and contributed to his fall three years later. The **Pakistan National Alliance** (PNA) was put together to fight the elections of 1977, called by Prime Minister **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto**. The PNA’s refusal to accept the results of the elections led to the military takeover in July 1977. The **Movement for the Restoration of Democracy** sought to challenge the military government of President **Zia ul-Haq** and campaigned for the restoration of the **Constitution**

of 1973. The **Islami Jamhuri Itihad** was an effort mounted by the right-of-center parties to block the reemergence of the **Pakistan People's Party** as a dominant political force. The **Pakistan Awami Itihad**, with the PPP as its main component, was assembled in 1998 to check the authoritarian tendencies displayed by Prime Minister **Mian Nawaz Sharif** when he returned to power in February 1997. The **Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy** (ARD) was constituted to challenge the military government, headed by General **Pervez Musharraf**, that took office in October 1999. The ARD had the **Pakistan Muslim League** (Nawaz Sharif Group) and the Pakistan People's Party at its core. The alliance also pledged to repeal the amendments made by the military governments of Zia ul-Haq and Pervez Musharraf in the Constitution of 1974 and restore it to its original shape and form. *See also* POLITICAL PARTIES.

**ORANGI.** Orangi is one of **Karachi's** several squatter settlements. It was settled by *muhajirs* (refugees)—who came from India, after Pakistan became independent—in the 1950s. It has received public attention for two reasons: First, it was the scene of a major ethnic disturbance in Karachi when thousands of **Pathans** from the neighboring ghetto of **Sohrab Goth** attacked the muhajir population of the settlement. Second, Akhtar Hamed Khan, a well-known Pakistani social worker, made the township the center of his urban-revival project (known as Orangi Pilot Project), which emphasized the importance of community participation.

**OVERSEAS PAKISTANIS INSTITUTE (OPI).** The Overseas Pakistanis Institute, founded in September 1994, is the brainchild of some Pakistani expatriates working in **Saudi Arabia**. More than 5,000 associations of overseas Pakistanis as well as thousands of individuals from Pakistan living and working abroad were contacted by the sponsors of the institute before it was launched. Its purpose was to introduce Pakistan—its history, language, culture, and traditions—to the rapidly growing community of younger expatriates, and conversely, to introduce them to Pakistan, the country of their origin. The organization held its first annual meeting in **Islamabad** in August 1995. The OPI launched a number of programs, including the acquisition of land in Islamabad, to help overseas Pakistanis

build retirement homes in the capital city of their home country. It also hoped to hold a census of overseas Pakistanis to develop a better statistical profile of the numerous expatriate communities that have developed in the Middle East, Europe, and North America. Its themes have included the contribution that the community of overseas Pakistanis could make to the economic, cultural, and political development of their homeland and the issue of political instability in Pakistan, which has become a subject of major concern for Pakistanis living abroad. *See also* DIASPORAS.

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**PAKISTAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (PAEC).** The history of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission can be traced back to 1956 when the Atomic Energy Research Council was formed. After reorganizations in 1964, 1965, and 1973, the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission was incorporated under an act. Dr. Ishrat Usmani, a member of the powerful **Civil Service** of Pakistan, was appointed director of the PAEC in 1960, and under him many important projects were started, such as the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant, the Pakistan Institute of Science and Technology, and the Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Sciences and Technology. Perhaps the most important legacy of Dr. Usmani was the training abroad, mostly in Great Britain, of scores of Pakistani scientists in nuclear physics and nuclear technology.

In 1972, Dr. Usmani was replaced by Munir Ahmad Khan. A year later, in 1973, oversight of the commission was transferred from the Science and Technology Research Division of the federal government, and placed under the direct command of the president's secretariat. This decision was taken after Prime Minister **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto** gave the commission the mandate to develop a nuclear arsenal for Pakistan. Now the projects that had begun under Usmani received even greater attention. They were to play a part in Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. Abdul Qadeer Khan also initially worked for the PAEC in 1976.

The basic functions of the PAEC are to research and develop nuclear power and fuel-cycle facilities as well as to promote the use of radiation and radioisotopes in medicine, agriculture, and industry.

The PAEC is now the largest science and technology organization in the country. Several organizations that are part of the PAEC are involved in nuclear medicine, agriculture, and biotechnology.

**PAKISTAN AWAMI ITEHAD (PAI).** The Pakistan Awami Itihad was formed in the spring of 1998 when **Benazir Bhutto**, chairperson of the **Pakistan People's Party (PPP)**, decided that she needed to align herself with a religious grouping to mount an effective challenge to Prime Minister **Mian Nawaz Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League**. The League's decisive victory in the **elections of 1997** had reduced the PPP to the status of a minor party in **Punjab**, Pakistan's largest province. The PPP chose Tahir-ul-Qadri and his Awami Tehrik Party to be the principal partner in this new alliance. However, to broaden the appeal of the new grouping, the organizers invited 11 other minor parties to come under the umbrella of the new alliance. Among the parties attracted was **Mirza Aslam Beg's** Qiadat Party. The PAI organized its first "mass contact" event in Gujranwala, Punjab. The Gujranwala meeting, held on 20 March 1998, attracted a large number of people. In the speeches at the meeting, Bhutto promised to abandon the program of privatization that was being followed at the time by the Sharif government. Tahir-ul-Qadri indicated that he was in favor of introducing a pragmatic form of Islam in Pakistan, while Beg stressed the importance of a strategic alliance among the Muslim countries of West and Central Asia to meet the challenge posed by the West to Islam. The alliance did not survive the return of the military to politics in October 1999.

**PAKISTAN DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE (PDA).** The Pakistan Democratic Alliance was formed in 1990 in anticipation of the elections scheduled for that November. The parties that came together under the umbrella of the alliance included the **Pakistan People's Party (PPP)**, the **Tehrik-e-Istiqlal**, and the **Pakistan Muslim League (Junejo group)**. The PDA fared poorly, winning only 45 seats in the National Assembly compared with 105 secured by the Islami Jamhuri Itihad. Differences soon emerged between the Tehrik and the PPP, and the former left the alliance in 1991. The PDA was dissolved in 1993 when the PPP decided to contest the elections held later in the year under its own banner.

**PAKISTAN DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT (PDM).** The Pakistan Democratic Movement was formed on 1 May 1967 by the **Awami League**, the **Council Muslim League**, the **Jamaat-e-Islami**, and the Nizam-i-Islami Party. The movement's program included the reintroduction of a parliamentary system of government, direct elections to the National and Provincial Assemblies, and creation of a federal structure. By agreeing that the federal government's jurisdiction should be limited only to defense, foreign affairs, currency, and communications between Pakistan's two provinces, the PDM sought to accommodate Bengal's growing apprehension about West Pakistan's political and economic domination. The PDM parties agreed to transfer the headquarters of the Pakistan navy to Dacca (now Dhaka), to seek equal representation for East and West Pakistan in all government services, and to maintain separate accounts of foreign exchange earnings of exports from the two provinces. This avowedly pro-East Pakistan sentiment in the PDM program won it a great deal of sympathy in Bengal but gained it little support in the western wing. In December 1968, at the height of the movement against **Muhammad Ayub Khan**, the PDM parties joined with a number of other political organizations to form the **Democratic Action Committee**. The PDM participated in the inconclusive "roundtable" discussions convened by Muhammad Ayub Khan in March 1969. It was dissolved following the army takeover later in the same month.

**PAKISTAN DEVELOPMENT FORUM (PDF).** In the late 1990s, the **World Bank** decided to replace the aid consortia and consultative committees it had chaired for decades with development fora for at least some of its major borrowing countries. These fora were held in the countries, while the consortia were held mostly at the World Bank's Paris office. The fora were hosted and chaired by the borrower. This change in policy led to the creation of the Pakistan Development Forum. The PDF met every year in **Islamabad**, was organized by the Economic Affairs Division of the Ministry of Finance, and was chaired by the minister of finance.

The PDF meeting for 2005 was held in Islamabad from 24–26 April, and was chaired by Prime Minister **Shaukat Aziz**, who concurrently held the portfolio of finance. "Sustaining growth and improving quality of life" was the forum's theme. It was attended by

nearly 300 delegates, not counting the large delegation representing Pakistan; 27 bilateral donors and 11 development agencies attended the meeting. The head of the Pakistani delegation said that the administration headed by President **Pervez Musharraf** had succeeded in reviving growth, reducing the burden of domestic and external **debt**, reducing inflation and interest rates, and creating a comfortable level of foreign exchange reserves. With these achievements in place, the government's objectives as spelled out in the Medium Term Development Framework (MTDF) were to bring about a major reduction in poverty, improve the level of human development, and move toward attaining the **Millennium Development Goals**.

**PAKISTAN INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (PIDC)**. The Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation was established in 1950 as a public-sector enterprise. Its mandate was to build large projects, preferably outside **Karachi**, and if possible, in the more underdeveloped parts of the country. Preference was to be given to the projects that faced long gestation periods between conception and completion, required more investment than could be mustered by individual entrepreneurs, and needed the types of management skills that were not readily available to the new industrial families. This mandate constrained the scope of the corporation's activities. Accordingly, it was some three years after its establishment that the PIDC undertook its first substantial investment. It was only in 1956–1957, six years after it commenced operations, that the investments undertaken by the PIDC exceeded 10 percent of total industrial assets.

In the latter half of the 1960s, the corporation's role as an investor of last resort meant that it had to concentrate its energies on the industrial development of East Pakistan. In the western part of the country, industrial entrepreneurship had developed to the extent that private investors, with the help of by then fairly well-developed capital markets, could undertake projects requiring large investments and complex technologies. The situation was different in East Pakistan, where the original role of the PIDC still remained relevant. It was logical for the PIDC to be split into two corporations, one for each wing of the country. The original PIDC, therefore, spawned two public-sector corporations, the East and West Pakistan Industrial Development Corporations.

With the nationalization of large industries by the government of **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto** in January 1972, and the setting up of a number of sectoral corporations, the PIDC lost its *raison d'être*. It stayed in business a while longer and was liquidated in 1985.

**PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES (PIA)**. Soon after independence in 1947, the government of Pakistan decided that the country needed a state-owned airline. Consequently, in 1951, Pakistan International Airlines was established. In June 1954, PIA flew its first domestic service from Karachi to Dacca (Dhaka), then the capital of East Pakistan, and in February 1955 its first international service from Karachi to London via Cairo. In March of the same year, it took over the assets of the privately owned Pakistani operator, Orient Airways, as it consolidated its domestic network.

Zafar-ul-Ahsan, a member of the powerful Civil Service of Pakistan, was appointed the first managing director of the airline, and the PIA head office building was established at the Karachi Airport (now called Quaid-e-Azam International Airport). The building still houses the major departments of the airline. The second managing director, Air Commodore Nur Khan, served from 1959 through 1965—termed the “golden years” of PIA. In 1960, PIA became the first Asian airline to operate a jet service when its Boeing 707 began operating on the London-Karachi route. The following year, PIA started a trans-Atlantic service from Karachi to New York. During this time the airline also updated and expanded its fleet.

The current PIA fleet totals 48, including 6 Airbus A300, 12 Airbus A310, 10 Boeing 747, 7 Boeing 737, 8 Fokker F-27, 2 Twin-Otter, and 3 Boeing 777 aircraft. In 2002, PIA ordered eight of the latest Boeing 777 aircraft in the biggest deal of its history in order to update and strengthen its fleet. Three 777 aircraft have already been added, while the other five will be delivered in 2006. The airline network spreads over 37 domestic and 38 international destinations, including North America, the Middle East, Europe, and the Asia-Pacific regions. Its share-capital value was US\$277 million for 2004. The airline has shown profits over the past couple of years, with the 2004 (after-tax) profit totaling US\$38 million. It employs over 19,000 personnel (2003), giving it one of the highest employee-aircraft ratios in the world.



**PAKISTAN MADRASSA EDUCATION BOARD (PMEB).** Having come under pressure, particularly from the United States, to regulate the *dini madrassas* (religious schools) in the country, the government of President **Pervez Musharraf** established the Pakistan Madrassa Education Board in August 2001. The board was given the authority to register madrassas, reform their curricula by incorporating modern subjects, and to provide financial assistance to deserving institutions. This move was not popular with most madrassa operators. Most religious institutions, including four *Wafaqul Madaris* (Madrassa Foundations) representing various schools of thought rejected the board and refused to be affiliated with it. The PMEGB was provided a grant of Rs 30 million (US\$0.5 million) with which to begin its operations. In 2002, the board issued its first annual report indicating that it had received 600 applications for registration out of an estimated 10,000 madrassas operating in the sector. The board appeared to have become dormant and did not issue any report after 2002. In April 2005, Hafiz Abdur Rahman Abbasi, the head of *Jamia Masab bin Umari Phagwart* a madrassa located in Murree, a hill station near Islamabad, filed a petition with the federal ombudsman to take note of the lack of activity on the part of PMEGB and order its management to provide a report on its performance since 2002.

**PAKISTAN MILITARY ACADEMY (PMA).** The Pakistan Military Academy was established in 1947 at Kakul, a small military station outside Abbotabad in **Northwest Frontier Province**. The academy was modeled after the Indian Military Academy (IMA) at Dera Dun. The class of Muslim students already enrolled at the IMA was the first group to be trained at the PMA. The academy admitted its first class of cadets in September 1948, graduating it two years later in September 1950. By the spring of 2005, the PMA had received 113 cadet classes and had graduated more than 22,000 men (but no women) into the Pakistan army as commissioned officers. In addition to its regular class, the PMA also began training men who had received college education. These cadets were commissioned into the army after spending only one year at the academy. General **Mirza Aslam Beg** was the first PMA-trained officer to command the Pakistan army.

**PAKISTAN MUSLIM LEAGUE (PML).** The Pakistan Muslim League of recent times shares only its name with the **All-India Muslim League** that successfully campaigned for the creation of Pakistan, or the **Convention Muslim League** that was founded by the supporters of President **Muhammad Ayub Khan** in 1963, or the rival **Council Muslim League** that was formed by the opposition to Ayub Khan. The PML of the late 1980s and 1990s owes its existence to President **Zia ul-Haq**, who encouraged those who supported him to form a **political party**. The party was founded and given the name of the Pakistan Muslim League. Zia ul-Haq, however, chose not to join the new organization himself.

When President Zia allowed elections to be held in 1985, he decided to conduct them on a “party-less” basis. This decision was motivated by the president’s wish not to give an opportunity to the **Pakistan People’s Party (PPP)** to win power in the National Assembly. By boycotting the elections, the PPP fell into the trap laid by Zia. The majority of the people elected to the National Assembly were affiliated with the PML. This allowed President Zia to call on **Muhammad Khan Junejo**, the PML president, to take over as prime minister.

Zia’s death on 17 August 1988 opened the political field to political parties once again, and in the **elections of 1988**, in which political parties were allowed to contest, the PPP emerged as the single largest party in the National Assembly. The PML, not confident that it would do well in a direct contest with the PPP, encouraged the formation of an alliance of conservative and religious parties under the banner of **Islami Jamhuri Ittehad (IJI)**. Although Junejo remained as president of the PML, the IJI coalition was headed by **Mian Nawaz Sharif**. Following the elections of 1988, the PPP, headed by **Benazir Bhutto**, took office in **Islamabad**, whereas the IJI, under the leadership of Sharif, was called on to form the government of **Punjab**.

The **elections of 1990** brought the IJI to power in Islamabad, and Mian Nawaz Sharif became prime minister as the head of the alliance. However, Junejo’s death in January 1993 prompted Nawaz Sharif to claim the PML leadership for himself. This attempt was interpreted by President **Ghulam Ishaq Khan** as an effort by the prime minister to concentrate power in his hands. The president worked behind the scenes to split the PML. The split did occur, and a faction headed by Hamid Nasir Chatta was formed and named PML (Junejo)

(PML[J]). This maneuvering by the president brought the military into the fray, which forced both the president and the prime minister to resign. A caretaker administration was inducted into office and was charged to hold another election. Following the **elections of 1993**, the PML(J) joined with the PPP to form the government at Islamabad. The PPP-PML(J) coalition government was headed by Benazir Bhutto, who was also able to keep Sharif and the PML out of power, even in Punjab, by getting **Manzoor Wattoo** elected the chief minister of the province.

Bhutto's poor performance during her second administration (October 1993–November 1996) resulted in another general election in which the PML, under Nawaz Sharif, won a massive victory, wiping out both the PPP and PML(J) from Punjab and reducing the presence of the former in the provinces of **Balochistan** and the **Northwest Frontier**. By February 1997, when Sharif became prime minister for the second time, the PML had emerged as the largest political party in the country. *See also* MUSLIM LEAGUE.

**PAKISTAN MUSLIM LEAGUE (CHATTA) (PML[C]).** The **Pakistan Muslim League (Junejo) (PML[J])** was renamed the Pakistan Muslim League (Chatta) in March 1998, following a split in the former faction of the **Pakistan Muslim League**. The split was the result of a decision by a number of Sindhi politicians affiliated with the PML(J), including the son and daughter of **Muhammad Khan Junejo**, not to agree to the move by **Hamid Nasir Chatta** to align the PML(J) with the **Pakistan People's Party (PPP)** and several other parties in the opposition in a new grouping called the **Pakistan Awami Ittehad**. The split was also the consequence of active wooing by **Mian Nawaz Sharif** to win back some of the prominent PML(J) leaders to Nawaz Sharif's mainstream Pakistan Muslim League. This particular grouping was dissolved after the military takeover of October 1999. *See also* POLITICAL PARTIES.

**PAKISTAN MUSLIM LEAGUE (JUNEJO) (PML[J]).** The emergence of the Pakistan Muslim League (Junejo) in the spring of 1993 was in keeping with a time-honored tradition in Pakistani politics. As had happened before on numerous occasions, disagreement between

two prominent politicians within a **political party** led to the creation of factions that remained politically active for as long as differences remained or for as long as the leader of the splinter group remained in active politics. This process of constant splintering affected parties with weak ideologies. The **Pakistan Muslim League** was particularly prone to it, since the party had failed to redefine itself after the emergence of Pakistan.

The formation of the PML(J) was the consequence of the struggle between **Mian Nawaz Sharif** and **Hamid Nasir Chatta**, two young politicians from **Punjab**, who were brought to prominence by President **Zia ul-Haq**. Zia was interested in breaking the hold of the **Pakistan People's Party** (PPP) on the politics of Punjab and was looking for people who could mount an effective challenge to **Benazir Bhutto's** party. Sharif and Chatta filled the bill very well. The two came from very different backgrounds, and between them they covered a wide spectrum of Punjabi politics. Chatta was from a prominent landed family. His father had been active in Punjab politics for a number of years following independence, representing the interests of the landed community. Nawaz was a relative newcomer to politics. He belonged to an industrial family with vast holdings in and around **Lahore**. His main concern was the promotion and protection of the interests of the urban classes.

Uneasy peace was maintained between the two protagonists from Punjab for as long as Zia was in power. After Zia's death, Sharif and Chatta began to drift apart but were persuaded to work together by **Muhammad Khan Junejo**, who feared that an open rift between the two would provide an opening for the PPP in Punjab. A compromise was reached following the **elections of 1990**, with Nawaz becoming prime minister, and Junejo taking over the presidency of the Pakistan Muslim League. Nawaz included Chatta and his associates in the federal cabinet. Junejo's death in early 1993, however, introduced a new complication into the equation. Nawaz attempted to consolidate his power by putting himself forward as successor to Junejo. This move was not acceptable to the Chatta group, which wanted to retain the PML's presidency. In these endeavors, Chatta and his associates had the support of President **Ghulam Ishaq Khan**, who was also unwilling to see Sharif consolidate his power. When Sharif refused to relent, Chatta and his colleagues resigned from the cabinet and

formed the Pakistan Muslim League (Junejo). Their departure provided the president with the pretext for the dismissal of Sharif and his cabinet.

The PML(J) fielded separate candidates in the **elections of 1993** and won enough seats in the National and Punjab Provincial Assemblies to deny a majority to Nawaz Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League in both houses. The PML(J) joined Benazir Bhutto's PPP in a political alliance called the **Pakistan Democratic Alliance (PDA)**. The PDA was able to muster majorities in both the National Assembly and in the Punjab Provincial Assembly. It was thus able to form the government in both **Islamabad** and **Lahore**. The PPP-PML(J) alliance was maintained for the **elections of February 1997**, but this time around the PML(J) was of no help whatsoever to Bhutto and her party, since it did not secure a single seat. The PML(J) dropped the suffix "Junejo" and became the **Pakistan Muslim League (Chatta)** in March 1998 when Muhammad Khan Junejo's son and daughter left the party and joined the mainstream Pakistan Muslim League, headed by Prime Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif.

**PAKISTAN MUSLIM LEAGUE (NAWAZ) (PML[N])**. Keeping with an old tradition, the Pakistan Muslim League splintered again into two groups following the overthrow of Prime Minister **Nawaz Sharif** by the **military** in October 1999. The split was encouraged by the military, which, operating through the **Inter-Services Intelligence**, encouraged the creation of a new party, the **Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid)**. While most of the leadership of the party transferred its allegiance to the new faction, Sharif's die-hard supporters created their own faction, the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz). Raja Zafar ul Haq was among the few prominent leaders of the party who stayed behind and gave some political substance to the new group. The PML(Q) contested as a separate political party in the **elections of 2002** but, not surprisingly, did not do well. In 2003, the faction elected Mian Shabaaz Sharif as its president. *See also* POLITICAL PARTIES.

**PAKISTAN MUSLIM LEAGUE (QUAID) (PML[Q])**. Encouraged by General **Pervez Musharraf** and his associates, the **Pakistan Muslim League** splintered into two groups following the military

takeover on 12 October 1999. The military turned to **Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain**, once a close associate of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and a minister in his cabinet, to lead the new group. Hussain brought with him a number prominent leaders from the old party, including **Khurshid Kasuri**, **Humayun Akhtar Khan**, and Ijaz ul Haq from **Punjab**, **Zafarullah Khan Jamali** from **Balochistan**, and a number of second-ranking leaders from **Sindh** and **Northwest Frontier Province**. The party contested the **elections of 2002** and emerged as the largest party in the new National Assembly. In early 2003, it was able to form a government at the national level with the help of some smaller parties including the **Muttahida Qaumi Movement** of urban Sindh and a splinter group from the **Pakistan People's Party**. Since executive authority did not reside with the prime minister but with the president, Shujaat Hussain decided that it would be politically prudent for him to stay outside the government. He engineered the election of Jamali as prime minister and continued to function as chairman of PML(Q).

Jamali proved to be an ineffective leader. In August 2004, he was replaced first by Shujaat Hussain who was able to get **Shaukat Aziz**, a technocrat, elected from two constituencies on the PML(Q) ticket. Aziz became prime minister after Hussain had served in that position for a few weeks. In late 2005, there was an attempt by a number of PML(Q) members of the National Assembly, who constituted themselves in a "forward bloc," to replace Shujaat Hussain as the party's chairman. However, the attempt was abandoned after Musharraf threw his support behind Hussain. In the local bodies elections of 2005, the PML(Q) did very well not only in Punjab but also in the country's smaller provinces. There was a widespread suspicion that the government had helped the party by rigging the polls in several parts of the country. *See also* POLITICAL PARTIES.

**PAKISTAN NATIONAL ALLIANCE (PNA).** The Pakistan National Alliance was formed in January 1977 to face the **Pakistan People's Party (PPP)** in the elections that were called by Prime Minister **Zul-fikar Ali Bhutto**. The alliance included a number of religious parties and political groupings that had bitterly opposed Bhutto's economic and social policies. Air Marshal **Asghar Khan** of the **Tehrik-e-Is-tiqlal** was among the more prominent members of the alliance. The

alliance parties had done poorly in the **elections of 1970**, thus Bhutto was initially not inclined to treat them seriously. However, their ability to attract large crowds to their meetings surprised the administration and persuaded it to put a somewhat greater effort into the campaign leading up to the elections. According to the PNA, this effort included the mobilization of the civil bureaucracy to aid the candidates fielded by the PPP.

The results of the elections shocked the PNA leadership. It had expected a much better showing by its candidates. Not satisfied with the results announced by the Election Commission, the PNA launched a countrywide campaign against the government, demanding that it hold a new poll. The campaign resulted in a great deal of violence, and the **military** had to be called in to restore law and order in a number of cities. Bhutto, after receiving a strong message from the high command of the army that it was not prepared to fire on its own citizens, decided to call the leaders of the opposition to the negotiating table. Bhutto concluded an agreement with the PNA, on 3 July 1977. By that time, however, the army high command, under General **Zia ul-Haq**, had already decided to act and place the country under **martial law**. In this, they had been encouraged by Air Marshal Asghar Khan, who had openly invited the armed forces to intervene once again in Pakistani politics.

The PNA survived the imposition of martial law, and some of its members joined the first of several civilian administrations that Zia was to put into office during his 11-year rule. The decision by some PNA parties to work with Zia split the alliance, however. Some of its constituents later joined the PPP to organize the **Movement for the Restoration of Democracy**. *See also* POLITICAL PARTIES.

**PAKISTAN PEOPLE'S PARTY (PPP).** The inaugural convention of the Pakistan People's Party was held in **Lahore**, on 30 November 1967, at the residence of **Mubashir Hasan**, a left-wing intellectual. The party was created to provide **Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto** with a political vehicle to use to return to politics. The convention adopted the party's ethos as "Islam is our faith; democracy is our policy; socialism is our economic creed; all power to the people." This proved to be a heady brew for the underprivileged segments of the Pakistani population. Unlike scores of parties that had appeared on Pakistan's political

scene before the advent of the PPP, Bhutto's organization was remarkably successful in gaining the electoral support of many groups of people. It triumphed in the **elections of 1970**, winning 81 out of 138 seats allocated to West Pakistan. It was because of the strong support received by the PPP in the elections that Bhutto was able to take the position that his organization should not be treated merely as a **political party** that would occupy the opposition benches in the newly elected National Assembly. Instead, the PPP demanded that it should be considered equal to **Mujibur Rahman's Awami League**, which had won an even more impressive victory in Bengal, Pakistan's eastern wing. This stance of the PPP ultimately contributed to the breakup of Pakistan in December 1971 and the emergence of **Bangladesh** as an independent state.

Once in power in December 1971, the PPP leaders carried out their promise of bringing most large-scale **industry**, commerce, and finance under the direct control of the government. The nationalization of privately owned economic assets carried out by the PPP government in 1972–1974 led to a fundamental restructuring of the **economy**. It also produced a sharp decline in the rate of growth of the gross domestic product, which contributed to the fall of Bhutto in July 1977.

The PPP remained a potent political force throughout the 1980s despite its unpopularity with the **military**. It was at the center of the **Movement for the Restoration of Democracy**, launched by the opposition against the military government of President **Zia ul-Haq**. Zia's death in a plane crash in August 1988 resulted in the return of the PPP to political power in December of the same year, under the leadership of **Benazir Bhutto**, who had become the party's chairperson following her father's execution in April 1979. The party survived another attempt by the military to send it into the wilderness when Benazir Bhutto was dismissed by President **Ghulam Ishaq Khan**, on charges of corruption and mismanagement. Although the PPP performed poorly in the **elections of 1990**, which brought **Mian Nawaz Sharif** and the **Islami Jamhuri Itihad (IJI)** to power in **Islamabad**, the party improved its performance in the **elections of 1993**. In October 1993, with Benazir Bhutto once again sworn in as prime minister, the party was back in power to rule Pakistan for the third time in 20 years.



It was during the second tenure of Benazir Bhutto as prime minister, however, from October 1993 to November 1996, that the PPP eventually lost support of the people. It suffered a massive defeat at the hands of the **Pakistan Muslim League** in the **elections of 1997**. There were many reasons for the precipitous decline of the PPP. Scores of stories published in the **press** about the corrupt practices of the senior functionaries of the second Bhutto administration, as well as members of her family, contributed to the party's loss of favor with the public. These stories featured, in particular, the activities of the prime minister's husband, **Asif Ali Zardari**. Bhutto's authoritarian style of management, along with the lack of party discipline, also contributed to its decline. The PPP was not helped by the poor performance of the economy during Benazir Bhutto's second term.

All these setbacks notwithstanding, the PPP emerged as a potent political force during the early years of the military rule under President **Pervez Musharraf**. A series of corruption charges filed against Benazir Bhutto by the Musharraf government could have resulted in her arrest had she not left the country. Choosing exile over incarceration, she continued to lead the party from Dubai and managed to win the second largest group of seats in the National Assembly with an affiliate—called the **Pakistan People's Party Parliamentarians**—contesting the elections and the majority of seats in the **Sindh** Provincial Assembly. The military, however, was determined to keep both Bhutto and Mian Nawaz Sharif out of power, and to achieve this goal they encouraged the formation of yet another Muslim League, this time with the suffix, Quaid-e-Azam attached to it. The **Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid) (PML[Q])** was able to govern only with the support—sometimes explicit and sometimes implicit—of the *Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal*. The MMA's support pushed the Musharraf regime toward the acceptance of political Islam as an active force in the country. This was an uncomfortable position to occupy particularly in view of the suspicion with which radical Islamic groups were viewed by the West, in particular by the United States. By the fall of 2004, President Musharraf and his associates were persuaded to reach accommodation with the PPP. A dialogue was started, which led to the release from jail of Asif Zardari in August 2004. Zardari was also allowed to join his wife in Dubai. However, upon his return to Lahore

on 16 April 2005, the government intervened and did not permit the PPP workers to hold a large reception for him at the airport.

**PAKISTAN PEOPLE'S PARTY (BHUTTO SHAHEED) (PPP[B-S]).** The only serious threat to the political authority of the **Pakistan People's Party (PPP)** and its unity came in 1995, when **Mir Murtaza Ali Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's** only surviving son, returned to Pakistan and founded the Pakistan People's Party (Bhutto Shaheed). He added the suffix "Bhutto Shaheed" ("Bhutto the martyr") to underscore the point that he, and not his sister, had inherited his father's political mantle. In this effort, Murtaza had the full support of his mother, **Begum Nusrat Bhutto**, who was also of the view that her husband's political legacy should be inherited by his son and not his daughter. For all these reasons, Murtaza was bitterly opposed by his sister, **Benazir Bhutto**, and her husband, **Asif Ali Zardari**.

The dispute between the Bhutto siblings heated up in September 1996 when the government arrested one of Murtaza's staunch supporters. Murtaza reacted by sending a well-armed team of his followers to obtain the release of his associate. The police were ordered to confront Murtaza and to force him and his followers to surrender their arms. This confrontation led to Murtaza Bhutto's death at the hands of police gunmen on the evening of 20 September 1996. Murtaza's wife, **Ghinwa Bhutto**, took over as the party's chairperson. She took part in the **elections of 1997** but failed to win a seat in the National Assembly.

**PAKISTAN PEOPLE'S PARTY PARLIAMENTARIANS (PPPP).**

The Pakistan Peoples Party Parliamentarians group was formed in the summer of 2002 after the **Pakistan People's Party (PPP)** decided not to boycott the **elections of 2002**. However, **Benazir Bhutto**, not allowed to participate in the elections, was not willing to transfer the leadership to another person. The formation of the PPPP was a device to overcome this problem. It contested in the polls under the leadership of Makdoom Amin Fahim, a loyal follower of Bhutto. The PPPP secured the second largest number of seats in the National Assembly. *See also* POLITICAL PARTIES.

**PAKISTAN RESOLUTION.** On 23 March 1940, the **All-India Muslim League (AIML)** met in the city of **Lahore** for its annual session.

The session began in a charged political atmosphere. The **All-India Congress** had refused to support the British war effort against the Germans; however, the AIML's decision to help the British effort did not result in any tangible reward for them from the rulers of India. The AIML was clearly disappointed at the failure of the British government to specify how, once the war was over, it proposed to deal with the Muslim community's demand for the protection of their economic and political rights in an independent India. **Muhammad Ali Jinnah**, the president of the Muslim League, had, up until then resisted the pressure exerted by the more radical elements of the party to demand the creation of an independent Muslim state in British India. All along, Jinnah had been a strong advocate of a united India.

In 1940, as the Lahore session began, it was clear to him that he could no longer avoid this pressure. Always a consummate tactician, he also felt that such a demand would give the British government a very strong signal that the Muslim community was not likely to be appeased by anything short of iron-clad guarantees aimed at protecting the rights of the Muslims in India. Accordingly, he authorized the movement of the resolution demanding the creation of "independent Muslim states" in the areas of British India in which the Muslims were a majority. The resolution was moved on 23 March 1940, by **A. K. Fazlul Haq**, a veteran Bengali politician, and received the overwhelming support of the delegates. Thus was laid the foundation of the state of Pakistan. The Pakistan resolution is also referred to as the Lahore resolution.

**PAKISTAN STEEL MILLS (PSM).** Pakistan Steel Mills, a public sector enterprise established with financial assistance from the Soviet Union, and using Russian technology, began operations at a location near Karachi in 1975. PSM had an installed capacity of one million tons, enough to meet the country's total consumption for various products. The project was initiated by the government of President **Ayub Khan**, who, having failed to secure help from the World Bank and Western bilateral donors, turned to the Soviet Union for assistance. It was under Prime Minister **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto** (1971–1977), who was of the view that Pakistan needed steel manufacturing capacity to industrialize, that the project was finally completed with Moscow's help. However, from the start of operations, PSM could not sell its products at market prices without incurring a

heavy loss. For 30 years the government continued to subsidize its operations. PSM had a number of problems: outdated technology; long distances over which raw materials, both iron and coal, had to travel, since Pakistan did not have any resources of its own; and labor problems, because the militant Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz penetrated the workforce. In spite of these problems, various administrations had plans to expand PSM's capacity from 1.1 million to 1.5 million tons. Discussions to this effect were held with potential investors from Austria, China, Russia, and Ukraine. However, in April 2005, Industry Minister Jahangir Khan Tareen announced that the **Pervez Musharraf** government had decided to privatize PSM.

**PAKISTAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS LIMITED (PTCL).** Pakistan Telecommunications Limited, as the sole owner of the telecommunications network in the country and provider of all services in the sector, emerged after a number of organizational changes that took place over several decades. Initially, telecommunications were controlled by a government department—the Ministry of Communications—but in the 1980s, after the decision was taken to bring corporate governance into the enterprises owned by the public sector, the PTCL was set up as a semiautonomous state enterprise.

The decision to privatize the PTCL was made during the administration of Prime Minister **Nawaz Sharif** in the early 1990s and was endorsed by the successor government of Prime Minister **Benazir Bhutto**. This was one of the few areas of economic management on which there was agreement between the **Pakistan Muslim League** and the **Pakistan People's Party**. However, while the **privatization** of the assets held by the government in some other sectors—commercial **banking** was one example—proceeded according to the program endorsed by the two political parties, no action was taken in the vital field of telecommunications. The main reason for the delay was the inability of various administrations to decide on the most appropriate structure of the sector before the PTCL was offered for sale. Two approaches were discussed in considerable detail, especially after the military came to power in October 1999. According to one approach, the PTCL should be split into various components before privatization; the other was that the company should be offered for sale without being broken up. The latter strategy was adopted. However, before the company could be

sold, the military's strategic interests had to be protected. It was only after the government decided to create an alternative network for the military's use that the company was formally offered for sale. There was considerable expression of interest in acquiring the company on the part of telecommunications operators in East Asia and the Middle East. However, before the final decision could be made, another problem had to be dealt with: resistance by the workers employed in the company.

The workers' resistance resulted in country-wide strikes in May and June 2005, which disrupted telecommunications in the country. On 12 June, the government decided to use force to prevent the workers from delaying the process. Security forces took control of the company's major and vital installations in all major cities, including **Karachi, Lahore, Islamabad, and Rawalpindi**. At the same time, a generous package of Rs 4.2 billion (US\$70 million) was announced, including severance payments, educational grants for workers' children, and sale of shares at a discounted price to the workers. Along with the government's action against the workers came the announcement that the selection of the successful bidder for 26 percent share of the company would be announced on 18 June 2005. The Emirates Telecommunications Corporation (Etisalat), with a bid of US\$2.57 billion for 26 percent of the company's stock, emerged as the winner, beating China Telecommunications and Singapore Telecom. The bid was accepted by the Privatization Commission.

**PAKSAT-1.** Pakistan's first communications satellite, PAKSAT-1, began operations on 24 January 2003. It occupies the 38 East slot allotted to Pakistan, but was due to expire on 19 April 2003; it was saved by the decision by **Islamabad** to acquire the satellite. The satellite that carried Pakistan's signal was made and put into orbit by Russia. Pakistan acquired the satellite from the Russians. Its operation was facilitated by the Organization of Islamic Conference Standing Committee on Scientific and Technical Cooperation (COMSTECH). Pakistan received both financial assistance and technical advice from COMSTECH.

**PANO ADIL.** *See* CHHOR.

**PARITY.** The principle of parity—that is, political equality between East and West Pakistan—was the basis of the **Constitutions of 1956**

**and 1962.** Given East Pakistan's larger population, one man—one vote would have meant providing it with a permanent majority in the national legislature. The powerful political elite of West Pakistan was not prepared to accept this, and it was one reason why it took the **First Constituent Assembly** so long to reach an agreement on the Constitution of 1956. Politicians from West Pakistan found a solution to this problem; they came up with the principle of parity, according to which seats in the National Assembly were to be divided equally between the two wings of the country, East and West Pakistan. The Bengalis gave the principle the name of “fifty-fifty,” claiming that this formula had to be applied not only to the apportionment of seats in the National Assembly but also to jobs in government, recruitment in the army, division of government resources, and investment by the private sector. This wider application of the formula was not acceptable to West Pakistan. Instead of solving what came to be known as the “East Pakistan problem,” therefore, the principle of parity made it more complex and ultimately led to the creation of **Bangladesh** as an independent state. The principle itself was abandoned in 1969.

**PARVEZ, ARSHAD Z. (c. 1954– ).** A Canadian citizen of Pakistani origin, Arshad Z. Parvez was arrested in the United States in mid-July 1987 on charges of seeking to illegally provide Pakistan with sensitive materials used in making **nuclear weapons**. He was accused of applying for a license to export to Pakistan maraging 350 steel, a rare alloy used almost exclusively in uranium processing. The export of the alloy is tightly controlled by the U.S. government. The Parvez case complicated Pakistan's relations with the United States because of the “Solarz amendment,” passed by the U.S. Congress in 1985 which mandated a cutoff of U.S. aid to any country that illegally imports nuclear-weapon materials from the United States. The case surfaced at the time Pakistan had successfully negotiated a six-year aid package with the United States, valued at US\$4.02 billion. On 17 December 1987, a Philadelphia jury found Parvez guilty of the charge, but the jury's verdict did not affect the U.S. aid program to Pakistan for the year 1987–1988. It was much later, and by a different law—the **Pressler amendment**—that the flow of economic and military aid to Pakistan was to be affected by the United States concern over Pakistan's nuclear program.

**PATEL, DURAB (1920–1997).** Durab Patel was a prominent lawyer practicing law in **Karachi** And a well-known jurist who served for several years as a judge of Pakistan’s Supreme Court. He displayed a remarkable sense of independence while sitting on the Supreme Court bench. He refused to confirm the death sentence given to **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto** by the **Lahore** High Court when the sentence was appealed to the Supreme Court. He also refused to take the oath under the Provisional Constitutional Order promulgated by President **Zia ul-Haq**. Those judges who agreed to take the oath “were violating the oath they had taken under the **Constitution of 1973**,” he told an interviewer, while discussing the implications of the tension between the Supreme Court and the government of Benazir Bhutto over the appointment of judges to the provincial high courts and the Supreme Court. The position taken by him in the Bhutto murder case cost him his seat in the Supreme Court; he also gave up the opportunity to become the chief justice of Pakistan.

Durab Patel also took a clear position on the question of the appointment of judges to the courts when this issue became the source of a major disagreement between the judiciary and the executive. He maintained that it was correct for the Supreme Court to insist on consultation, albeit not to claim that the chief justices of the Supreme Court and provincial high courts had the constitutional right to approve these appointments. He was also of the view that the practice of letting chief justices serve in acting capacities, although allowed by the constitution, was against the intent of those who had included that provision and had been misused by a number of administrations, including those headed by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Zia ul-Haq, and **Benazir Bhutto**. *See also* THE JUDGES’ CASE; THE JUDICIARY.

**PATHAN.** (Also called Pashtun, Pushtun, Pakhtun) This ethno-linguistic group lives primarily in eastern and southern Afghanistan and in **Northwest Frontier Province** of Pakistan and in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and Balochistan provinces of Pakistan. They form a significant proportion of population of the city of **Karachi**. They are typically characterized by their language, their pre-Islamic indigenous code of honor and culture Pashtunwali, and adherence to Islam.

The Pashtuns are the world's largest segmentary lineage (patriarchal) tribal group in existence. The total population of the group is estimated to be over 40 million, but an accurate count remains elusive since there has not been an official census in Afghanistan since the 1970s, while in Pakistan, due to the migratory nature of many Pashtun tribes as well as the practice of secluding women, exact figures are too hard to attain. See also PUKHTUNKHAWA.

**PATTALA.** Pattala, a city on the banks of the **Indus River**, was an important port at the time that Alexander the Great invaded India. The city, now called **Thatta**, was destroyed by floods and rebuilt in later centuries.

**PATWARI.** Pakistan and many parts of India inherited the office of *patwari*—land registration clerk—from the **Mughuls**, who ruled India for three centuries. Although the *patwari* was the central figure in the land-administration system developed by the Mughuls, he was in fact, part of an elaborate hierarchical system. He was accountable to the *kanungoh*, literally the “law giver,” who was responsible for adjudicating between the *patwari* and the people with some claim on land. The *tehsildar*, the official next in line, was in charge of land and civil administration in *tehsils*, a jurisdiction that includes several hundred villages. *Ziladar* was the next in line, and so forth.

The *patwari* was responsible for maintaining up-to-date records on land ownership in the area for which he was in charge, usually a large village, or a cluster of small villages. In order to be recognized by the state, all land transfers had to have taken place legitimately and had to be entered in the *patwari* records. The *patwari* also recorded births and deaths in his areas so as to deal with issues of inheritance. He was also responsible for maintaining a record of the crops grown and animals kept on the land in his areas. Furthermore, he estimated the level of output of various crops and other agricultural produce. Most of this information was needed by the Mughuls to collect “revenue” or tax from the countryside. The *patwari* maintained a map of his areas, showing the division of property among different owners on a piece of cloth. The record of ownership was kept in a book called *khotani*, and transfer of land either because of inheritance or sale was called *intiqal*.



The land administration system introduced by the British after they established their control over India continued to rely on the same hierarchy of officials, and the patwari remained the key official. The British instituted the system of fixing the amount of revenue to be collected by the state by undertaking “settlements” at regular intervals every 10 to 20 years. This system was kept in place by Pakistan. The patwaris were also called on to perform other functions for the state, when a large number of trained officials were needed. For instance, they were critical in the enumeration effort undertaken by Pakistan, as a part of the **population census held in 1998**.

It was inevitable that the considerable authority wielded by the patwari would tempt him to corruption. In fact, corruption became so much associated with patwaris—as it did with the *thanadar*, the officer in charge of the local police station—that exactions by them were not resented by those who needed their services.

In 2005, the governor of **Punjab**, Pakistan’s largest province, began a program to introduce electronic filing of land records. If the program is successful, it will significantly reduce the power of the patwari.

**PESHAWAR.** Of Pakistan’s dozen large cities, Peshawar was the only one that did not immediately benefit from independence. Its population declined after 1947, the result of a large outflow of non-Muslims that was not compensated for by the arrival of migrants from India. In 1941, Peshawar’s population was estimated at 173,000, and in 1951, according to the **first census** taken after Pakistan was established, the city had only 151,000 people. The 1955 merger of West Pakistan’s four provinces in the “**One Unit**” of **West Pakistan** dealt Peshawar another blow, as its status was reduced from that of provincial headquarters to that of the residence of a divisional commissioner. The decision in 1970 to dissolve West Pakistan’s “one unit” and recreate the old provinces was a welcome one for Peshawar, but the city had to wait until the late 1970s to see its fortunes really change. In 1978, the Soviet move into **Afghanistan** brought millions of refugees pouring into Pakistan; a large number of them settled in and around Peshawar. Also in 1978, General **Zia ul-Haq** appointed Lieutenant General **Fazle Haq** governor of the **Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP)**. The new governor proved to be a dynamic leader, and under his leadership Peshawar began to develop rapidly

as the center of commerce and industry in Pakistan's northwest. Not counting the refugees from Afghanistan, it is now a city of over one million people.

**POLITICAL PARTIES.** As is the case with almost all of the other countries of the Muslim world, Pakistan's political landscape has not encouraged the development of broad-based political organizations. Some political scientists maintain that the growth of political parties was inhibited by the frequent incursions of the **military** into politics. While the weight of the army's presence in the political arena certainly stunted the growth of parties, that is not the sole reason. Perhaps even more significant was the failure of the political system to accommodate **Islam** while not hindering the development of parties. The fact that most Muslim countries, Pakistan included, had strong tribal traditions meant that loyalty toward the tribe and its leader(s) stood in the way of the development of political parties.

There are three cases of reasonably successful political organizations in the history of the Muslims in British India after the departure of the British and upon the birth of Pakistan. The parties that developed a reasonably strong presence on the political stage include the **Muslim League**, the **Pakistan People's Party (PPP)**, and the **Jamaat-e-Islami**. All three pursued different objectives and different organizational forms. Two of these parties—the Muslim League and the PPP—splintered, came together, and splintered again several times because their organizational structure and policymaking processes were not strong enough to contain individual ambition. The Jamaat, on the other hand, followed democratic processes to accommodate different viewpoints as long as they did not depart significantly from its core ideology.

The longevity of the Muslim League and the PPP was the consequence of their adherence to programs backed by their broad based membership. The original Muslim League—the **All India Muslim League (AIML)**—gained strength within the Muslim community of British India once it clearly articulated a program for protecting the rights of the socioreligious class that it represented. Although **Muhammad Ali Jinnah**, the party's president, was a powerful presence in the party for more than a decade, he allowed democratic processes to work

within the organization. Jinnah led, but he permitted his politics to be influenced by his colleagues, whose voices were heard according to the clearly defined processes for policymaking. Once Pakistan was created, the League lost its *raison d'être*, and with Jinnah's death, the party lost the leader who could keep the organization together.

The party morphed and splintered several times. During the period of **Ayub Khan**, it was divided essentially into two factions, one—the Pakistan Muslim League (PML)—that supported the military leader; and the other—the Council Muslim League—that campaigned for the restoration of democracy. Both Leagues were overtaken by the birth of a new political party—the PPP—which had a well-formulated social and economic program and for a while was the main government party. Founded by the charismatic **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto** in 1969 and led by him until his execution in 1979, the party remained broad-based. Its supporters, in spite of all the shenanigans of Bhutto and later his daughter, **Benazir Bhutto**, continued to strongly believe in the egalitarian and socialist politics and programs on which the elder Bhutto based his support. The party was in power for a total of 11 years, from 1971–1977 when Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was first the president and then the prime minister, and then twice later, 1988–1990 and 1993–1996, both times when Benazir Bhutto was prime minister.

It was in the late 1980s and all of the 1990s that the **Pakistan Muslim League (PML)** acquired some of the features of a genuine political party. Its leadership was elected by the members, its economic program was based on the promotion of private entrepreneurship, and its **foreign policy** was focused on finding a solution to the problem of **Kashmir**. The new PML initially had the backing of the **military** and the intelligence services. This was especially the case during the latter part of the period of President **Zia ul-Haq** (1977–1988) when the military leader sought to strengthen a political organization that could challenge the PPP. Once Zia was dead—in a plane crash in August 1988—the military's support became episodic. Prime Minister **Mian Nawaz Sharif**, the president of the PML, was removed twice from the prime ministership by the president who had the support of the military establishment. Toward the end of the 1990s, the PML had weaned itself away from the military and was seeking to develop on its own. The PPP suffered the same fate; its administration was also

dismissed by the president of the day on grounds of corruption and incompetence.

In October 1999, when the military reentered politics for the third time in Pakistan's history, the country had two large political parties, each led by strong leaders, and each with well-articulated economic and social programs. The PPP then was a left-of-center party favoring a role for the government in delivering services to the poorer segments of the population. The PML, on the other hand, had much greater confidence in the role and dynamism of the private sector. It also favored a more prominent role for **religion** in governance than did the PPP. Both parties vigorously opposed the presence of the military in politics. They were sidelined by the administration of President **Pervez Musharraf**, who followed in the footsteps of his military predecessors and created a party that was prepared to provide him political cover. The leadership of this party, the **Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid)**, came from the ranks of the PML.

There were other players in the political system. The Jamaat had continued to work for the Islamization of the political and economic system, with some success, during the periods of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Zia ul-Haq. At one point, the PML had moved sufficiently to the right to briefly form a governing coalition with the Jamaat, under the banner of the **Islami Jamhuri Itihad** (Coalition for the Promotion of Islamic Democracy). But the IJI did not survive once the government was dismissed. In addition to the Jamaat, a number of smaller religious groups and parties served segments of the population, which interpreted the dictates of **Islam** differently from the majority.

However, unlike **India**, Pakistan did not develop strong regional or ethnic political parties. This would have happened had the political process been allowed to run its course. This did not happen, largely because of the periodic intervention by the military. Nonetheless, some of the communities did manage to create organizations to represent them in the political arena. The **Muttahida Qaumi Mahaz** (Joint National Front) that began its political life as the Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz (National Refugee Front) is now a powerful regional and ethnic group. It is a force in the large cities of **Sindh**, where millions of Muslim refugees from India settled after independence.

Stunted political development created space within which Islamic parties developed and grew deep roots. However, even in their case

they were behind the curve, compared to other organizations in the Muslim world. For most Muslim countries, political parties, in the words of the French scholar Olivier Roy, “had abandoned transnational militant solidarity and [become] centered on national politics.” Even the various branches of the Muslim Brotherhood developed their own nationalist agendas; the one in Kuwait bitterly opposed the 1990 invasion of their country by Iraq, while the one in Jordan tacitly supported it. Although the Islamic parties in Pakistan developed an agenda similar to the one endorsed by the organizations in the Middle East—a call to replace corrupt ruling elites, a conservative sociocultural agenda, and robust nationalism—they did not give up their transnationalism. It was because of this belief—the hope of developing a transnational movement to reform the entire Muslim community—that the Islamic groups in the country retained a strong and passionate interest in Islamic causes around the globe. It was also because of this line of thinking that the Islamic political parties in Pakistan became progressively anti-American, in particular, after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. *See also* OPPOSITION ALLIANCES; RELIGIOUS PARTIES.

**POPULATION.** In 1947, the year Pakistan gained independence, the country had a population of 32 million; in 1985, it crossed the 100-million mark. In 1997, when the country celebrated its 50th anniversary, its population was estimated to be 127 million. Between 1947 and 1997, the average rate of growth was 2.2 percent per year. The population **census of 1998**, conducted in March of that year, estimated the population at 130.5 million. In the last decade (1980–1990) the population increased by 2.7 percent per annum. In 2005, it was estimated to have reached 152 million. At 5.5, Pakistan’s total fertility rate (TFR) (the number of children born per woman) was considerably higher than the rates for **India** (4.2), Sri Lanka (2.5), and **China** (2.3). The TFR in Pakistan is not declining as rapidly as it is in the other countries of Asia. There is, therefore, a built-in demographic dynamism in Pakistan that will contribute to further rapid growth in population over the next two to three decades. *See also* CENSUSES; HEALTH.

**PRESS AND NEWS MEDIA.** The press played an active role in mobilizing political support for the **Muslim League** and its demand for

the establishment of Pakistan, a separate homeland for the Muslims of British India. Four newspapers, two in English—*Dawn*, published from Delhi, and the *Pakistan Times*, published from **Lahore**—were aimed at the well-educated, Muslim middle and upper classes. Two Urdu-language newspapers—*Jang*, published from Delhi, and *Nawa-i-Waqt*, published from Lahore—were read mostly by the people who had sought to maintain their Muslim identity. Neither the All-India Muslim League nor its rival, the Hindu-dominated All-India Congress, had access to electronic media, which were controlled by the government. The first news bulletin by the All-Pakistan Radio was made at midnight, on 14 August 1947, a few hours before **Muhammad Ali Jinnah** was sworn in as Pakistan's governor general.

Following the partition of India and the birth of Pakistan, *Dawn* and *Jang* moved their operations to **Karachi**, the country's first capital. Both papers continued to support Jinnah and the Muslim League. The *Pakistan Times*, under the direction of its owner, **Mian Iftikharuddin**, and its editor, **Faiz Ahmad Faiz**, tilted to the left and began to espouse socialist causes, whereas the *Nawa-i-Waqt* moved to the right of the political spectrum and began to work for the Islamization of the institutions of government. Recognizing that without an Urdu-language newspaper, it would be difficult to reach a mass audience, Iftikharuddin founded the *Imroze*, which began to appear from Lahore in 1949.

**Muhammad Ayub Khan**, Pakistan's first military president (1958–1969), did not believe in a free press. He was of the view that it was only with the help of a government-controlled news and opinion media that he would be able to introduce some order in Pakistan's chaotic political life. His government nationalized Progressive Papers Ltd., the publishing house responsible for the *Pakistan Times* and *Imroze*, and promulgated the Pakistan Press Ordinance to curb the freedom of expression of all print media. Television came to the country in the mid-1960s, and along with the state-controlled radio continued to voice the views of the government. This situation did not change for 30 years. It was only after the death of President **Zia ul-Haq** in August 1988 and the assumption of power by Prime Minister **Benazir Bhutto** in December 1988 that the print media obtained the freedom for which it had campaigned for three decades.

Over the past decade and a half, several news magazines have become important independent voices. Two news monthlies, *Herald*,

published from Karachi by the Dawn Group, and *Newsline*, also published from Karachi, have done serious investigative exposes, concerned particularly with government corruption. *The Friday Times*, a weekly, published from Lahore and read with great interest by the **Islamabad** establishment, has become an influential voice in recent years. Several new newspapers have also begun to appear in both English and Urdu. These include the *Muslim*, published from Islamabad; *The Nation*, published by the Nawa-i-Waqt group from Lahore and Islamabad; *The News*, published by the Jang group from Karachi, Lahore, and Islamabad; and *Daily Times*, published from Lahore and Karachi. An independent English-language newspaper, *Business Recorder*, represents the interest of the business community. *Khabrain*, an Urdu-language newspaper, published simultaneously from several urban centers, has developed a large readership since its appearance.

Although the government of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto loosened the government's grip over the print media, it kept radio and television under its firm control. The opposition was prevented from accessing the electronic media. This tradition was maintained by all of the governments that succeeded the Bhutto administration. It was only in November 1996, under the caretaker administration headed by Prime Minister **Meraj Khalid**, that points of view other than those of the government were voiced on the air. Under the military government headed by General **Pervez Musharraf**, the news media continued to be free. A number of privately owned cable channels have begun to attract viewers. Two of them, *Geo* and *ARY*, have popular news programs and talk shows.

**PRESSLER AMENDMENT.** In 1986, U.S. Senator Larry Pressler (R-South Dakota) successfully attached an amendment to a foreign-aid bill in which all assistance from the United States to Pakistan had to be stopped if there was reason to believe that the country was developing a nuclear bomb. The Pressler amendment was signed into law after a provision was included that gave the U.S. president the authority to waive the penalty against Pakistan based on the United States' strategic interests. Such waivers were granted for as long as Pakistan was engaged in the Afghan effort; President George H. W. Bush refused to use this provision in 1992, thus all U.S. aid to Pakistan was

blocked. It took Pakistan nine years of intensive lobbying in Washington to obtain some relief under the provision of the **Brown amendment**. The Brown amendment was a one-time deal, however; it did not repeal the Pressler amendment. The sanctions imposed by the Pressler amendment and other U.S. laws were withdrawn after Pakistan, under President **Pervez Musharraf**, agreed in September 2001 to give full support to Washington's war against international terrorism. With the withdrawal of sanctions, Pakistan became one of the largest recipients of U.S. aid.

**PRINCELY STATES.** It took the British almost 100 years before they were able to establish their dominion over India. Their advance was made in fits and starts, sometimes by conquest, sometimes by agreements reached with the ruling princes. What ultimately emerged was a patchwork that included provinces directly administered by the British, and 562 princely states that retained some degree of autonomy from British rule. The political future of the princely states had become an issue when the Indian politicians began to campaign actively for independence. The British administration had set up a Chamber of Princes to involve the states in government. If the princes had hoped that they would receive some protection by the British as they abandoned their rule in India, these hopes were dashed on 25 July 1947. In a conference of princes convened by **Lord Louis Mountbatten**, the last viceroy of India, it was indicated that by 15 August, when British paramountcy would cease, the princes should have acceded either to India or Pakistan, as geographic proximity dictated.

As India marched toward independence, it was clear that the **Indian National Congress** had no interest in preserving the princely states in any autonomous form. They were to be treated as any other part of British India. The position of **Muhammad Ali Jinnah** and his **Muslim League** was somewhat more ambiguous. This may have encouraged some of the states to toy with the idea of some form of autonomy or even independence. Even the ruler of **Bahawalpur** flirted with the idea of acceding to India, before he was persuaded that such a move would be imprudent. Some other states gave Pakistan more problems. It was only after military action that the Khan of Kalat agreed to surrender sovereignty to Pakistan. The problem of **Kashmir**, unresolved to this day, was one serious and unanticipated con-



sequence of the British policy that left the question of accession to India or Pakistan to the discretion of the princes.

**PRITHVI MISSILE.** The Prithvi, a medium-range **missile**, was inducted into service by India in January 1996. The missile has a range of 150 to 250 kilometers, and can carry a payload of one ton of conventional or nuclear warhead. Prithvi's deployment met with criticism from both the United States and Pakistan.

Prithvi (a Hindi word meaning "earth") is an important part of an ambitious missile-development program that was launched by India in 1983. The program includes the development and deployment of five types of missiles, including the Agni (fire), a ballistic missile that has a range of 2,500 kilometers and carries a small nuclear warhead. India is said to have spent more than a billion dollars on its missile-development program.

The Indian program for the development of medium- and long-range missiles evoked the expected response from Pakistan, including the launching of an alleged program to develop local capability for manufacturing the Chinese M11 missile. The allegation that Pakistan had embarked on that course was made off and on by U.S. intelligence agencies. In April 1998 and again in April 1999, Pakistan tested the Ghauri, its own medium-range missile. These tests were continued, and missiles of various ranges were inducted into the Pakistani arsenal on a regular basis.

**PRIVATIZATION.** Pakistan initially encouraged the private sector in leading the effort to develop the economy. This was particularly the case during the time President **Ayub Khan** was in power. However, the size of the public sector increased significantly in the early 1970s with a series of nationalizations carried out by the administration of **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto**. Bhutto nationalized banks, insurance companies, large industries, and commercial enterprises. After his removal from office by the **military** in July 1977, an attempt was made to return these assets to the private sector. Privatization only became public policy in 1991 during the first administration of Prime Minister **Mian Nawaz Sharif**.

The Privatization Commission was tasked with returning the assets acquired by the government as well as those created by the public

sector to private entrepreneurs. During the first administration of Prime Minister Sharif, the commission was headed by an individual who was also given a seat in the cabinet. In this way, the process of privatization could be reviewed by the cabinet. During Sharif's first tenure (1991–1993), a number of industries and commercial banks were handed back to the private sector. Privatization was done on the basis of open bidding in the market.

The pace of privatization picked up considerably under President **Pervez Musharraf**. During his period, two large public sector banks, the **Habib Bank** and the **United Bank**, were privatized, as was **Pakistan Telecommunications Limited**, one of the largest enterprises in the public sector. PTCL was purchased by a company from the United Arab Emirates, and United Bank Limited was acquired by a partnership that also included Arab investors. Privatization, therefore, led to the arrival of large Arab companies into the country.

**PROXIMITY TALKS.** The “proximity talks” between the governments of **Afghanistan** and Pakistan began in Geneva in 1982 under the auspices of the United Nations. The government of Pakistan, not having recognized any of the many regimes that had been established in Kabul following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, refused to sit with the Afghans at the same conference table. To overcome this problem, a formula was devised by Diego Cordovez, undersecretary for political affairs at the United Nations, for holding talks without the two delegations coming face to face. Cordovez shuttled between the two delegations, which sat in different but proximate rooms in Geneva; therefore, these negotiations became known as “proximity talks.”

Between the summer of 1982 and February 1988, 10 rounds of discussions were held. Agreement was arrived at fairly quickly on three basic principles: the need for the Soviets to withdraw their troops from Afghanistan; the need to stop the flow of arms to the **mujahideen** once fighting had stopped; and the need for all refugees to return to their homes in Afghanistan. The only point that required considerable negotiation concerned the period of time over which the **Soviet Union** would complete the process of withdrawal. After a great deal of diplomatic activity in the spring of 1988, even this issue was resolved.

The talks lasted six years in all. An agreement signed in Geneva on 14 April 1988 brought an end to the involvement of the Soviet Union in the affairs of Afghanistan. Pakistan, Afghanistan, the Soviet Union,

and the **United States** signed the final document. The Soviet Union agreed to withdraw its troops by the end of the year, whereas the United States promised to stop supporting the Afghan mujahideen once the Soviet troops were out of Afghanistan. *See also* AL QAEDA; MUJAHIDEEN; OSAMA BIN LADEN; TERRORISM.

**PUKHTUNISTAN.** Pakistan's birth on 14 August 1947 posed a difficult political dilemma for a number of **Pathan** leaders. They had little affinity for the new country, or liking for **Muhammad Ali Jinnah**, the man who was responsible for its creation. Immediately after the birth of Pakistan, a number of them, most notably **Abdul Ghaffar Khan**, began to espouse the cause of autonomy for the Pathan population. This campaign was often couched in a language that suggested to their detractors that this group was working for the creation of an independent state for the Pathans who lived on both sides of the Afghanistan–Pakistan border. That notwithstanding, the campaign for the establishment of Pukhtunistan—a homeland for the Pukhtuns or Pathans—attracted support from large sections of the Pathan community, in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. For several decades the idea of Pukhtunistan had the official support of the government of Afghanistan and was the cause of the uneasy relationship that Pakistan had with its neighbor for more than 30 years, from 1947 to 1979. By endorsing the idea of Pukhtunistan, Ghaffar Khan and his associates could not join the mainstream of Pakistani politics. Some of them endured long periods of incarceration at the hands of several regimes in Pakistan, which accused them of working against the integrity of the country. In 1979, the Soviet Union, by invading Afghanistan and alienating the Pathan population, effectively killed the idea of Pukhtunistan.

**PUKHTUNKHAWA.** Pukhtunkhawa means the home of the Pukhtuns or Pathans. It is the name the **Awami National Party (ANP)** wanted to give to the **Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP)**. The ANP leaders claimed that an agreement had been reached between them and **Mian Nawaz Sharif** before the **elections of 1997** that this change in the name of the NWFP would occur if Sharif's party, the **Pakistan Muslim League (PML)**, returned to power in **Islamabad**. It was because of this understanding that the ANP had joined the Muslim League and formed a coalition with Sharif's party in the NWFP. The

support of the ANP was critical for the PML in the province. Sharif became prime minister in February 1997 but, fearful that a change in the province's name would not be popular with the non-Pathan residents, failed to act. The ANP, disappointed by the breach in promise, left the PML-dominated government in **Peshawar**, the capital of the NWFP, in 1998.

**PUNJAB.** With a population in 2005 of some 87.6 million people—or 55.6 percent of the total—Punjab is Pakistan's largest province. Its area of 205,344 square kilometers is equivalent to 25.8 percent of the total. It has a population density of 427 persons per square kilometer. The province produces two-thirds of Pakistan's gross domestic product. Until recently, **agriculture** was the most important sector of the provincial economy. Since the mid-1980s, Punjab has been industrializing rapidly.

*Punj* is a Punjabi/Sanskrit word for “five,” and *aab* means “water” in Persian. *Punjab* therefore means “five waters,” or the “land of five rivers.” The etymology of the word *Punjab* reflects the rich cultural heritage of the area that lies between the **Indus River** in the north and the Jumna River in the south. This land of five rivers, watered by the Jhelum, the Chenab, the Sutlej, the Ravi, and the Beas, is agriculturally rich.

Punjab afforded easy access to the riches of India for invaders who came in from the northwest, either by land, by sea, or through the passes in the mountains that shield the area from west Asia and Europe. It was invaded by the Greeks under Alexander the Great, the Arabs under Muhammad bin Qasim, the Mongols under Timurlane, the Afghans under Mahmud of Ghazni and Mohammad Ghauri, the Central Asians under Babar, and the Persians under Nadir Shah. Some of these invaders plundered the cities of the river plains of Punjab and then went back home; some of them went deep into India, taking the Punjabis with them; and some of the conquerors simply stayed. These invaders brought different religions into the area; Punjab was successively Hindu, Buddhist, and Muslim. It also produced a religion of its own—Sikhism. Only the British entered the province from the south, and only the Sikhs were able to establish a kingdom in this area that Punjab could truly call its own.

In 1947, Punjab was divided into two parts: one became the Indian state of Punjab, and the other became the Pakistani province of Punjab.

The demise of the **Unionist Party** in 1946–1947, left Punjab in Pakistan with a discredited political elite that could not match the popularity and power of the **Karachi**-based urban *muhajir* (refugees from India) community. The militarization of politics in Pakistan took power away from the *muhajir* community but did not immediately give it to Punjab. In 1955, Punjab was merged with other provinces and **princely states** of the country's western wing to form the **One Unit of West Pakistan**. **Lahore** became the capital of the new province. The creation of One Unit was not a popular step, and the military government headed by President **Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan** decided to disband it. West Pakistan was divided in 1969 into four provinces: **Balochistan**, the **Northwest Frontier Province**, Punjab, and **Sindh**.

The rise of **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto** in the early 1970s moved Pakistan's political center to Sindh. Bhutto's removal by the military, under the command of General **Zia ul-Haq**, a Punjabi military officer, did not benefit Punjab, however. Zia was originally from the part of the province that had gone to India. After migrating from India, his family settled in **Peshawar**, the capital of the Northwest Frontier Province, rather than in Punjab. It was only with the ascendancy of **Mian Nawaz Sharif**, who was prime minister of Pakistan twice (1990–1993 and 1997–1999), that Punjab gained political authority. In fact, in 1998 Punjabis held the four most important positions in the country with **Muhammad Rafiq Tarar** as president, Mian Nawaz Sharif as prime minister, General **Jehangir Karamat** as COAS, and Waseem Sajjad as the chairman of the Senate.

Punjab retained its political prominence under the military rule of President **Pervez Musharraf**, who chose the Chaudhrys of Gujarat, a political family headed by **Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain**, as his political mentors. Chaudhry Pervez Ilahi, Shujaat Hussain's brother-in-law, became Punjab's chief minister after the elections of October 2002.

**PUSHTOON ULASI QAUMI JIRGA (PUQJ)**. Perhaps because of the absence of an institutional base that can help people to redress their grievances, people in Pakistan have a tradition of creating “one issue” organizations that come into being to deal with a specific problem and disappear once the problem has been resolved. The Pushtoon Ulasi Qaumi Jirga arrived on the national scene at the time Pakistan began work on the population **census of 1998**. The organization was

opposed to the census in the belief that the **population** count would indicate a much smaller proportion of the **Pathan** population in the province of **Balochistan** than was claimed by the organizations and political parties that represented the Pathans in the province. The PUQJ had the support of the Pushtoonkhwa Milli Awami Party, which claimed to represent Balochistan's Pathan population. Working together, the two organizations were able to stop work in the province from 21 to 22 March 1998, while the census was being conducted.

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**QADEER KHAN, ABDUL (1935– )**. Abdul Qadeer Khan, generally credited with having led Pakistan's effort to develop **nuclear weapons**, was trained in metallurgy in the Netherlands. Summoned back to Pakistan in the early 1970s by Prime Minister **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto** to head the effort to equal the advances made by India in the nuclear field, Khan organized and led a team of scores of nuclear scientists in makeshift laboratories in Kahuta, a small town near **Islamabad**. Khan and his team of experts concentrated their attention on producing weapons-grade nuclear material by using the "centrifuge technology" for enriching uranium. By the early 1990s, Pakistan had stockpiled enough enriched uranium to make at least a dozen nuclear bombs. With the help of a series of well-managed news leaks, Islamabad let it be known that it had developed the capacity to build nuclear bombs. This revelation was meant to deter India from taking military action against Pakistan as the Kashmiris launched a campaign to free their state of Indian occupation.

Pakistan's advances in the nuclear field caused sanctions to be imposed on the country by the United States under the **Pressler amendment** passed in 1986. From 1990 on, Pakistan stopped receiving assistance from the **United States**. In the early 1990s, Khan and his associates began work on developing **missiles** for delivering nuclear weapons. Most of the work was undertaken at Kahuta in research facilities now named A. Q. Khan Laboratories. The scientists announced their success by launching the Ghauri, a medium-range missile, in 1997. In May 1998, India tested five nuclear bombs, and Pakistan fol-

lowed with its own tests a few days later. In December 2003, the United States disclosed that it had knowledge of an underground network of nuclear proliferators who worked under Dr. Khan's leadership and had provided technology and equipment to Iran, Libya, and **North Korea** to enrich uranium. In January 2004, Khan went on Pakistan TV and confessed that he had indeed participated in these activities but had done so without official government involvement. Following this confession, President **Pervez Musharraf** pardoned Dr. Khan but put him under virtual house arrest in **Islamabad**.

### **QADIR, LIEUTENANT GENERAL (RETIRED) SAEED (1930–).**

Saeed Qadir was trained as an engineer and joined the Electrical and Mechanical (EME) Corps of the Pakistan army. He rose rapidly in the army and was the first EME officer to attain the rank of lieutenant general. He left active service in 1977 and joined the first martial-law government of **Zia ul-Haq** as minister in charge of production. The Ministry of Production was created by Prime Minister **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto** to oversee the industries that his government had nationalized in three phases in the four-year period between 1972 and 1976. The ministry was also made responsible for new industrial investments by the public sector. Accordingly, when Saeed Qadir became minister, he was by far the biggest industrial manager in the country.

In 1983–1984 Pakistan suffered a catastrophic decline in wheat production as the result of a fungus (“wheat rust”) that spread quickly and destroyed a large acreage of wheat waiting to be harvested. The news of the loss came late to the government; it moved quickly once it was recognized that a million and a half tons of wheat would have to be imported in order to prevent famine in the country. General Qadir was entrusted with the task of organizing the transport of this quantity of wheat from **Karachi** to the major consumption centers inland. He responded by turning to the EME Corps of the army and entrusted it with the task of organizing the logistics for this operation. The EME established a logistics transport cell by importing thousands of large haulage trucks from abroad. Once these trucks were deployed, the EME, under Lieutenant General Qadir's supervision, moved a million and a half tons of imported wheat within a few months. Even when the crisis was over, the Logistics Cell remained in operation and went on to become the largest goods-transport company in Pakistan.

General Qadir's next important assignment came from the administration of Prime Minister **Mian Nawaz Sharif** when in early 1991 he was appointed chairman of the Privatization Commission to sell the economic assets acquired by the government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. The commission was asked to implement the **privatization** program in less than a year. It did not succeed, and some of its decisions—such as the privatization of the Muslim Commercial Bank—led to considerable controversy. That notwithstanding, the commission's performance was commendable in the sense that privatization in Pakistan was undertaken with greater dispatch and efficiency than in most other countries where similar attempts were made.

**Benazir Bhutto** returned to power as prime minister in October 1993 and moved quickly against a number of initiatives taken by her predecessor. She was determined to demonstrate to the people that the government of Nawaz Sharif had indulged in corrupt practices. Sharif's privatization program was singled out as one area in which her administration thought that it had solid evidence of wrongdoing by Sharif and his associates. As part of this campaign, Lieutenant General Saeed Qadir was arrested and imprisoned. Because the courts refused to grant bail to Qadir, he spent several months in prison.

**QADIR, SHEIKH MANZUR (1913–1974).** Manzur Qadir was born in **Lahore**, and educated at Lahore's Government College and Cambridge University in England. He was called to the bar in 1935 in Lincoln's Inn. He gained national prominence by defending General **Akbar Khan** and his associates in the **Rawalpindi Conspiracy** case. He became foreign minister in the first cabinet appointed by General **Muhammad Ayub Khan**, following the imposition of martial law in October 1958. He also served Muhammad Ayub Khan as chairman of the cabinet subcommittee that wrote the draft of the **Constitution of 1962**. Qadir left the administration following the promulgation of the constitution on 23 March 1962 and was appointed chief justice of the West Pakistan High Court. He resigned from the court in 1963 and returned to private practice. He was called back to public service to represent Pakistan in its case against India at the International Court of Justice at The Hague concerning the demarcation of the boundary in the Rann of Kutch. The case was decided in Pakistan's favor in 1967. Qadir's last high-profile legal assignment was in 1968–1969 when he



argued the government's case against **Sheikh Mujibur Rahman** in what came to be called the Agartala Conspiracy. Rahman was accused by the government of conspiring with India to break up Pakistan. The case was withdrawn after the resignation of Ayub Khan and the imposition of martial law by General **Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan**.

**QAMAR, SYED NAVEED (1952– )**. Syed Naveed Qamar, a member of the National Assembly, belongs to the **Pakistan People's Party** (PPP). He was appointed finance minister in the cabinet of Prime Minister **Benazir Bhutto** on 28 October 1996, two days after a team from the **International Monetary Fund** (IMF) began discussions in **Islamabad** on reviving the standby agreement that was on hold. The IMF, not satisfied with Pakistan's program to bring about a major reduction in its fiscal deficit, had refused to disburse funds from the US\$600 million standby agreement that the Bhutto government had negotiated earlier. The Fund, along with its sister organization, the **World Bank**, had asked Bhutto to assign the portfolio of finance to a full-time minister. Bhutto had kept the portfolio for herself in her first administration (December 1988–August 1990) as well as for the first three years of her second administration (October 1993–November 1996). Naveed Qamar's appointment was viewed as a major concession by Bhutto to international financial institutions. He was still a member of the Bhutto Cabinet when it was dismissed on 5 November 1996. He won a seat in the National Assembly in the elections of October 2002 and is active in PPP politics.

**QAYYUM KHAN, ABDUL (1901–1981)**. Qayyum Khan was born in **Peshawar** and educated at Aligarh and London. He returned to Peshawar in 1927 to practice law. He joined the **Indian National Congress** and was elected to the assembly of the **Northwest Frontier Province** (NWFP) in the elections of 1937. He switched to the **Muslim League** in 1945 and was elected as a League representative to the Provincial Assembly in the elections of 1946 where he played an active role in turning out the vote in favor of Pakistan in the plebiscite held in July 1947. On 22 August, following the dismissal of the provincial government led by the Congress Party's Dr. **Khan Sahib**, he became the NWFP chief minister. Qayyum held this position for six years and was responsible for the economic turnaround of the province. He

left the province in 1953 and briefly served as a minister in the cabinet headed by **Muhammad Ali Bogra**. He was elected president of the Muslim League in 1957 and began to campaign actively on behalf of the party for the elections scheduled for early 1959 under the **Constitution of 1956**. The campaign was suspended after General **Muhammad Ayub Khan** imposed martial law in October 1958.

Qayyum adopted a low profile while the country was under martial law, from October 1958 to March 1962. When political parties were revived in 1962, however, he decided against joining the **Convention Muslim League** headed by Ayub Khan or the **Council Muslim League** sponsored by those who opposed military rule. Instead, he created his own party and called it the **Qayyum Muslim League** (QML). The QML proved to be the most popular party in the NWFP in the **elections of 1970**, winning 7 of the 25 National Assembly seats allocated to the province. In 1972, when **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto** took over as president, the QML opted to work with the **Pakistan People's Party** (PPP). He served as a minister in the cabinet headed by Prime Minister Bhutto but retired from politics following his defeat in the **elections of 1977**.

**QUAID-E-AZAM.** The title of Quaid-e-Azam (the “Great Leader”) was formally bestowed on **Muhammad Ali Jinnah** by the **Constituent Assembly** of Pakistan at its first session held on 12 August 1947, two days before the country became independent and Jinnah was sworn in as its first governor-general. The tradition of giving titles to prominent leaders was maintained; **Liaqat Ali Khan** was called *Quaid-e-Millat* (nation’s leader), and **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto** *Quaid-e-Awan* (people’s leader).

**QUETTA.** Quetta is the capital of **Balochistan** province and the largest city in the northwestern part of Pakistan. The **census of 1998** estimated the city’s population at 560,000, which increased to an estimated 745,000 by 2005. The city houses a corps of the Pakistan army and a number of military institutions including the Army Staff College. The present city was built on the ruins of the one completely destroyed by the earthquake of 1935, which left 50,000 people dead. Although the Quetta of today is a new city with no building more than 65 years old, its history goes back a thousand years, at least to

the times of Mahmud of Ghazni, an Afghan general who raided India several times in the early 11th century and occupied the city for a while. Quetta was an outpost of the **Mughul Empire** (1526–1756). It was occupied by the British in 1876. It was only after the birth of Pakistan that Balochistan acquired the status of a province and Quetta became a provincial capital. The war in **Afghanistan** (1979–1989) brought a large number of Afghan refugees into Balochistan. Many of them became active in the economic life of Quetta. The Afghan incursion turned Quetta into a Baloch-**Pathan** city. The advent of the **Taliban** rule in Afghanistan in 1996 brought extremist Islam to the city since Kandhar, the seat of the Taliban, was close to the city. Even after the fall of the Islamic regime in Afghanistan in December 2001, Quetta remained under the influence of Islamists. Following the elections of October 2002, the coalition government that took office in Balochistan included the **Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal**, the coalition of religious parties that opposed military rule and also opposed the pro-American stance of President **Pervez Musharraf**.

**QURESHI, MOEENUDDIN AHMAD (1931– )**. Moeenuddin Ahmad Qureshi—more commonly known as Moeen Qureshi—was born in **Lahore**. He belonged to a distinguished family from Kasur, a small town southeast of Lahore. Qureshi was educated at Government College, Lahore, where he studied economics. After being awarded a Fulbright Fellowship, he went to the United States for postgraduate work. On receiving a Ph.D. in economics from Indiana University, he returned to Pakistan in 1955 and joined the Planning Commission. He left the Planning Commission a year later to join the **International Monetary Fund (IMF)**.

Qureshi rose rapidly in the ranks of the IMF. His tenure at the IMF included a stint as economic advisor to Ghana. In the 1960s, he was persuaded to move to the International Finance Corporation (IFC), a **World Bank** affiliate. In the early 1970s, he was appointed to head the IFC and later was invited by Robert McNamara, the World Bank president, to become the senior vice president of finance. In 1987, after a major reorganization at the World Bank, Qureshi was appointed senior vice president of operations. He retired from the World Bank in November 1991 and founded Emerging Markets Associates, his own investment company.

While visiting Singapore in July 1993 to raise funds for his company, he received a call from **Ghulam Ishaq Khan**, Pakistan's president, asking him to come to **Islamabad** and form a government of technocrats with himself as the caretaker prime minister. The offer came as a part of the solution that had been proposed by General **Abdul Waheed Khan Kakar**, COAS, to solve the constitutional crisis into which the country had been thrown as a result of the increasing antipathy between the president and Prime Minister **Mian Nawaz Sharif**. Qureshi accepted the offer with some reluctance. He stayed in Islamabad for three months during which he began the implementation of a program of economic reform aimed at introducing a number of long-postponed structural changes. He also made some efforts to improve governance in the country: his main focus was to introduce a "culture of payment" by making public the names of the people who had defaulted in paying back loans obtained from public-sector banks. He also published a list of taxpayers in the country that showed clearly not only the small tax base but also the very small amounts paid into the country's exchequer by the rich. The main task of the Qureshi administration, however, was to hold another round of national and provincial elections. These were held in the first half of **October 1993**, and resulted in the return of **Benazir Bhutto** as prime minister, and a few weeks later, in the election of **Farooq Ahmad Khan Leghari** as president. Leghari belonged to Bhutto's **Pakistan People's Party** (PPP) and had been a close political associate of hers ever since the execution of her father on 4 April 1979. With the PPP controlling the offices of the heads of state and government, political tranquility was expected to return to Pakistan. Qureshi was widely credited for bringing this about as well as for his success in introducing a semblance of order in the management of the economy. He returned to Washington and to his business in late October 1993.

**QURESHI, SHAH MAHMOOD.** *See* THE QURESHIS.

**THE QURESHIS.** The Qureshis of Multan trace their ancestry to the 12th century **Sufi** saint named **Bahauddin**. They gained great wealth first as the guardians of the shrine of Bahauddin and later as owners of land granted to them by various rulers of the area. However, the family suffered a great deal at the hands of the Sikh

rulers who occupied Multan in 1818. In 1857, Makhдум Shah Mahmood, the *sajadanashin* (keeper) of the shrine of Bahauddin at that time, supported the British rulers of India during the **Great Mutiny**. Shah Mahmood was awarded a *jagir* (estate) as reward for his services. In 1860, on the occasion of the visit by the British viceroy to **Lahore**, the Makhдум received a personal grant of a garden, the **Banwhiwala Bagh**. The Makhдум's descendants continued this tradition of loyal service to the British until the British departure from the subcontinent. Later, in Pakistan, they developed close ties with the succession of military rulers who governed the country. In the politically turbulent years following the death of President **Zia ul-Haq**, the Makhdums first served the **Muslim League** governments both in Lahore, the capital of **Punjab**, and **Islamabad**, the federal capital. Later, however, Shah Mahmood Qureshi, the current sa-jadanashin, left the Muslim League and joined the **Pakistan People's Party** government headed by Prime Minister **Benazir Bhutto**. He was elected to the National Assembly on a PPP ticket in the elections of October 2002 and became actively involved as a prominent leader in the opposition to President **Pervez Musharraf**.

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**RAANA LIAQAT ALI KHAN, BEGUM (c. 1905–1991)**. Raana Liaqat Ali Khan was the second wife of Prime Minister **Liaqat Ali Khan**. She played an active role in the movement that led to the creation of Pakistan. She worked with **Fatima Jinnah**, the sister of **Muhammad Ali Jinnah**, in getting the upper-class Muslim women to give up their secluded lives and participate actively in politics. After the birth of Pakistan, she carved out a niche for herself as a strong advocate for women's rights. It was for this reason that she joined with a number of women—mostly the wives of senior officials—to organize the **All-Pakistan Women's Association (APWA)**.

Raana Liaqat Ali Khan went into virtual seclusion after the assassination of her husband on 16 October 1951 at **Rawalpindi**. It was more than two decades after her husband's death that she was persuaded to accept public office. In 1973, **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto** appointed her governor of **Sindh**. Bhutto was in search of a person who would command

the respect of the *muhajir* (refugees from India) community in the province of Sindh. Raana filled that description very well. She stayed as governor for three years. She resigned in 1976.

**RADCLIFFE, SIR CYRIL (1899–1977).** Sir Cyril Radcliffe, a British lawyer, was appointed in 1947 to head the Punjab Boundary Commission and was entrusted with the task of drawing a line to separate the Indian and Pakistani Punjabs. The demand for Pakistan as a separate homeland for the Muslims of British India sought to include the entire province of **Punjab** within Pakistan. In finally accepting the demand for Pakistan, the **Indian National Congress** applied the same logic to Punjab that **Muhammad Ali Jinnah** and the **Muslim League** had used for partitioning India. The Congress maintained that since the Hindus and Sikhs constituted a significant minority in Punjab, the province should be partitioned into Muslim and non-Muslim parts. Jinnah accepted the Congress demand and also agreed to refer the task of partitioning the province to Radcliffe and his commission.

Radcliffe knew very little about India and even less about Punjab. He used the population data from the **census of 1941** to draw the line that became the boundary between India and Pakistan. The line drawn by him became controversial the moment it was announced. The Muslim community claimed that Radcliffe had awarded the district of Gurdaspur to India in order to provide India access to the state of **Kashmir** and had included the district of Jullundhur in order to give Amritsar, the holy city of the Sikhs, to India. The people in Pakistan continue to lay the responsibility for the unresolved Kashmir dispute at Radcliffe's doorstep.

**RAHIM, J. A. (1900–1982).** J. A. Rahim was born in Calcutta and was educated at Cambridge University and the University of Munich. He joined the **Indian Civil Service** in 1926, and in 1947 he opted for service in Pakistan. There, he transferred to the Pakistan Foreign Service and held numerous ambassadorships and other diplomatic posts. He came to know **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto** when the latter was appointed foreign minister in 1963 by President **Muhammad Ayub Khan**. Bhutto resigned from the government of Ayub Khan in 1966, and Rahim retired from service in July 1967. In November 1967, the two became the founding members of the **Pakistan People's Party (PPP)**.

Rahim was the author of several of the PPP's foundation papers, in which he advocated the introduction of a socialist economy in Pakistan, to be brought about by the government's occupation of the economy's commanding heights. It was as the party's secretary-general that he was able to attract a number of influential socialists to join the new movement. After the government's acquisition of large-scale industries in January 1972, President (later Prime Minister) Zulfikar Ali Bhutto appointed Rahim to be in charge of the new ministry of production. His mandate was to organize and develop the expanded public sector. Rahim and Bhutto started to drift apart in 1974 when the prime minister, in an effort to accommodate Pakistan's political elites, in particular the landed interests, began to move the government and the party to the right. Rahim objected to these moves and was dismissed in December 1974 both from the cabinet and from his position as the PPP's secretary-general. Bhutto was unforgiving toward those who deserted him. While Rahim was still in the cabinet, he was picked up by the police from a dinner party in **Islamabad**—at which the prime minister was the chief guest—was beaten up, and released a day later.

**RAHMAN, MAULANA FAZLUR (1953– )**. Fazlur Rahman succeeded his father, Maulana **Mufti Mahmud**, to the leadership of the **Jamiatul-Ulemai-Islam (JUI)**. In 1986, he was appointed the convener of the multiparty **Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD)**. In appointing the Maulana (an honorary title) to this position, the MRD, an alliance of mostly leftist **political parties**, took an unusual step in turning to a leader of the right. As the MRD convener, Maulana Fazlur Rahman toured the country extensively, emphasizing that the alliance's aim was "the realization of a limited objective, namely, the solution of the constitutional and political issue." Even after stepping down as the convener of the MRD, the Maulana remained active in opposition politics. After the collapse of the MRD in 1988, he retained some political influence. In the **elections of November 1988, October 1990, and October 1993**, he won a seat for himself in the National Assembly from a constituency in the **Northwest Frontier Province**. When **Benazir Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party** was unable to win a majority in the elections of 1993, Fazlur Rahman joined with a number of parliamentarians from the smaller parties to provide her with enough

votes to be elected prime minister. She rewarded the Maulana by appointing him chairman of the National Assembly's Foreign Affairs Committee. His party did not do well in the **elections of 1997**.

In 2002, the Maulana was one of the founding leaders of the six-party **Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal**, a coalition of religious parties. He was elected leader of the opposition in the National Assembly.

**RAHMAT ALI, CHOUDHARY (1897–1951)**. Choudhary Rahmat Ali was born in Hoshairpur, **Punjab** and was educated at Jullundur, **Lahore**, and Cambridge University in England. He was a prolific pamphleteer; in one of his pamphlets, written while he was a student at Cambridge, he proposed the creation of a Muslim state to be carved out of the Muslim-majority provinces in the northwest of British India. He called the state "Pakistan" and explained that in choosing the name he had drawn letters from the names of the provinces that would ideally constitute such a state. Thus, "P" in Pakistan stood for Punjab, "A" for Afghan (**Pathan** areas) of British India, "K" for **Kashmir**, "S" for **Sindh**, and "Tan" for **Balochistan**. Even though **Muhammad Ali Jinnah** and his **Muslim League** put forward the demand for the creation of a separate Muslim state in the League's annual meeting of 1940, the resolution that was endorsed by the party membership did not give the name of Pakistan to the state being demanded. Some modern historians believe that the Muslim League did not immediately adopt the name "Pakistan," in order not to give credit to Rahmat Ali for having first proposed the establishment of a Muslim country in British India.

Rahmat Ali returned to Pakistan in 1948, a year after the country was founded, but was not given the warm reception he considered his due. He returned to England and died in Cambridge, a bitter and disappointed man.

**RAHU, FAZIL (c. 1950–1987)**. Fazil Rahu was assassinated in his hometown of Golrachi in **Sindh**, 120 kilometers south of **Hyderabad**. At the time of his death, he was the central vice president of the **Awami National Party** and a close associate of Rasul Bakhsh Paleejo. Rahu and Paleejo belonged to a long-established tradition of socialist politics in Sindh that sought to challenge the powerful landed interests in the province. Rahu emerged on the national political scene in 1983, when he helped to organize the agitation launched



by the **Movement for the Restoration of Democracy** against the military government of President **Zia ul-Haq**. He was arrested for his participation in the agitation and sentenced to a three-year jail term by a military court. He was released from prison in July 1986.

**RAIWIND.** Raiwind, in **Lahore**'s suburbs, was chosen by the **Tablighi Jamaat** as its headquarters after Pakistan became independent. The Jamaat's success in attracting millions of followers turned Raiwind into an important center of religious activity in the country. In 1996, the Sharif family relocated to Raiwind, and built a large estate in the city. After becoming prime minister in 1997, **Mian Nawaz Sharif** began the practice of holding important meetings in Raiwind about once a week.

**RAWALPINDI.** Rawalpindi is now a bustling, crowded, somewhat unkempt city of 1.7 million people, which is in the process of being eclipsed by **Islamabad**, the capital of Pakistan. Islamabad's "zero point" is only 20 kilometers from the heart of Rawalpindi. Pindi, as the city is commonly called, was probably built some 400 to 500 years ago by the Ghakkar tribe of north **Punjab**. It came into some prominence when Emperor Sher Shah Suri built a highway in the 1500s to connect **Peshawar** with **Lahore**, Delhi, and Bengal. Rawalpindi was a convenient watering point for the caravans that plied the **Grand Trunk Road**, situated as it is between the Margalla pass to the northwest and the Salt range to the south. The Ghakkars lost the city to the Sikhs in 1763, and the Sikhs lost it to the British in 1849; it remained a British possession for 98 years.

The British turned Rawalpindi into a major cantonment, or military base, by stationing their northern command in the city's vicinity. For them, Rawalpindi was strategically located, barely 80 kilometers from **Kashmir** in the east and 250 kilometers from the **Khyber Pass** in the northwest. One of the largest British cantonments in all of British India was constructed next to the city to house the British soldiers and their families and to provide offices for the northern command. It was the availability of this infrastructure that persuaded **Muhammad Ali Jinnah** to locate the army's general headquarters in Rawalpindi rather than in **Karachi**, which became Pakistan's capital in 1947.

It was in Rawalpindi that a conspiracy was hatched by a leftist clique of middle-ranking army officers to overthrow the government of Prime

Minister **Liaqat Ali Khan**. It was also in Rawalpindi that the following incidents took place: Liaqat Ali Khan was assassinated on 16 October 1951; General **Muhammad Ayub Khan** launched his coup d'état in October 1958; the first person was killed at the start of an agitation that resulted in the resignation of General Ayub Khan, and the promulgation of Pakistan's second martial law; and **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto** was hanged on 4 April 1979 after having been condemned to death for the murder of a political opponent. In spite of this history, Rawalpindi has remained an apolitical city, following the political trends set in places such as Karachi, Lahore, and Peshawar. It has not been able to develop a political life of its own. In 2004, the government of President **Pervez Musharraf** decided to relocate the army's headquarters to Islamabad, a move that will further diminish Rawalpindi's importance. In the meantime, new housing developments in Islamabad have begun to encroach on the land around Rawalpindi, bringing the city under the capital's rapidly expanding contours. In 2005, the twin cities of Islamabad and Rawalpindi had a combined population of 3 million, making them Pakistan's third largest urban center. *See also* RAWALPINDI CONSPIRACY; URBANIZATION.

**RAWALPINDI CONSPIRACY.** In 1951, a conspiracy involving a number of senior officers was brought to light by the government of Prime Minister **Liaqat Ali Khan**. The event, which became known as the Rawalpindi Conspiracy, was planned on 23 February 1951 at the Rawalpindi residence of Major General **Akbar Khan**. A number of prominent civilians with leftist leanings were also involved. These included the poet **Faiz Ahmad Faiz** and Sajad Zaheer, a member of the Communist Party. General Akbar Khan, in an article published in 1972, when he was serving the government of **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto** as minister of state for national security, revealed that the conspiracy's objective was to overthrow the government of Liaqat Ali Khan and establish in its place a military council consisting of senior generals. Once installed in power, the military government was to reconstitute the **Constituent Assembly** after holding elections on the basis of adult franchise.

There were a number of reasons for discontent among the senior ranks of the army, which persuaded some of them to conspire with General Akbar Khan. Rapid promotions following independence had raised unreasonable expectations of quick advance on the part of most

young officers. This could not be realized once the army had reached what was then considered to be its stable size. Akbar Khan, who had been active in the **Kashmir** campaign, was also dissatisfied with the way the government of Liaqat Ali Khan had conducted itself in its attempts to resolve the Kashmir dispute with India. Akbar Khan believed—and his fellow conspirators no doubt agreed with him—that it was possible to dislodge India from Kashmir by force. Finally, the officers were disillusioned with the lack of progress made by the politicians in giving the country a viable set of political institutions. The rapid progress made by India in this respect did not go unnoticed by the army officers. A special tribunal was constituted to try the conspirators. The conspirators were given long sentences, with the longest awarded to General Akbar Khan. Most of them were released in 1955.

**REFUGEES FROM AFGHANISTAN.** Refugees from **Afghanistan** began pouring into the frontier regions of Pakistan after the movement of the Soviet troops into their country in the winter of 1979. Camps to provide temporary shelter to the refugees were set up in Pakistan's northern areas. By the winter of 1980–1981, some 3.5 million people, a majority of whom were women and children, were living in these camps. Pakistan received external assistance to provide for the basic needs of the refugee population. The presence of such a large number of refugees had a profound political impact on Pakistan, however. Their presence also affected the economic situation in the areas around the camps in which they were housed. Growing urban violence in Pakistan was attributed to the easy availability of automatic weapons, which were supplied to the Afghan **mujahideen** by their Western supporters but found their way into Pakistan's crowded cities via the refugee camps. Several ethnic riots in Pakistan's largest city, **Karachi**, in the winter of 1986–1987, were also blamed in part on the presence of the refugees.

By early 1988, the patience of the population that hosted the refugees began to be exhausted. "When the Afghans first came, they were welcomed. People even gave them land for their homes. That has changed now," according to one report prepared by a foreign visitor. This change in the attitude of the host population toward the refugee population, combined with the unease created by repeated "car bombings" in Pakistan's cities, also convinced the Pakistani leadership to become more willing to accommodate Soviet interests

in the **Geneva Proximity Talks** on the Afghan issue. The end of the conflict with the Soviet Union in 1989 did not bring peace to Afghanistan, and Pakistan's expectation that the majority of the refugees would return to their country after the withdrawal of the Soviet troops was not realized. Millions of Afghans continued to live in Pakistan. It was only after the collapse of the **Taliban** regime in December 2001 and the gradual consolidation of power by President Hamid Karzai that Afghanistan returned to some stability, and the refugees began to go home. Even then, some 1.5 million Afghans were estimated to be living in Pakistan in 2005.

**REFUGEES FROM INDIA.** *See* MUHAJIR QAUMI MAHAZ (MQM).

**REGIONAL COOPERATION FOR DEVELOPMENT (RCD).** *See* IRAN–PAKISTAN RELATIONS.

**RELIGION.** In 2005, Pakistan's population was estimated at 152 million, 95 percent of it Muslim. The remaining 5 percent was made up of a number of minorities that include **Christians**, Hindus, and Parsees (Zoroastrians). Orthodox Muslims have always regarded the **Ahmadiya** community as a non-Muslim minority, a position accepted by the government of **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto** in 1976 when it moved legislation through the National Assembly declaring the Ahmadiyas to be non-Muslims. This act increased the proportion of non-Muslims in the population to 9 percent.

The vast preponderance of Islam in today's Pakistan is the consequence of "religious cleansing," which occurred soon after the British announced their intention to leave their domain in India to two successor states: India with a Hindu majority and Pakistan with a Muslim majority. In 1947, before the mass transfer of population that followed the partition of India, today's Pakistan had a population of 30 million, seven million of whom were non-Muslim. Of the non-Muslim population, some six million people moved across the border to India, whereas Pakistan received eight million Muslims from India. This exchange left Pakistan with a population of 32 million, of whom one million were non-Muslims. Within a few months, the proportion of Muslims in the areas that now constitute Pakistan increased from 67

percent to slightly below 97 percent. The proportion of non-Muslims has increased as a result of the higher rate of fertility among these people, most of who are among the poorest people in the country.

**Muhammad Ali Jinnah**, Pakistan's founder, and his associates fought for the creation of Pakistan, not to establish an Islamic state in the Indian subcontinent, but to create a state in which the Muslims of British India would be able to practice their religion without fear of the Hindu majority. This position was accepted by most citizens of the new country, but a small minority wished to formally introduce Islam into the state. This minority had more influence in West Pakistan—today's Pakistan—than in East Pakistan—today's **Bangladesh**. Therefore, as long as the two wings of Pakistan remained together, it was possible to keep the pressure of the “Islamists” in check. The breakup of Pakistan in December 1971, and the imposition of martial law in July 1977 by General **Zia ul-Haq**, an orthodox Muslim, created an environment in which those who favored the Islamization of Pakistani society gained a great deal of influence.

This influence was exercised in a number of ways. President Zia encouraged the Islamization of the **economy**, the judicial system, and the political structure. He was partially successful in the first two areas, but failed in the third. In the late 1970s the government introduced such Islamic taxes as the *zakat* and *ushr*. It also issued injunctions against *riba* (usury), and encouraged commercial and investment **banks** to respect Islamic principles. Zia established the **Shariat Court**, and empowered it to rule on the conformity of all legislation passed by the National and Provincial Assemblies to Islamic principles. Finally, Zia sought to replace elected assemblies with appointed *Shura*, assemblies of people nominated by a ruler, with the selection of the individuals based on their dedication to Islam. A Shura was convened in 1979, but Zia had to abandon the idea in the face of considerable opposition.

The next impetus for the Islamization of Pakistan came from two different sources. The invasion of **Afghanistan** in December 1979 brought Islamic resistance to communist rule to the surface. The *jihād* (holy war) in Afghanistan was supported by both the United States and Saudi Arabia. The Afghan **mujahideen** fought gallantly and with great enthusiasm against the occupation by the Soviet Union. Their triumph resulted not only in the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from

their country, it also brought respectability to militant Islam. The mujahideen themselves, as well as their supporters, gained considerable influence in Pakistan. They also expanded their reach into other areas with similar conflicts such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Algeria, Egypt, and **Kashmir**.

The second reason for the increasing influence of Islam in Pakistan concerned the collapse of the state in the 1990s; in particular, its inability to provide such basic services as education, health, and security to the people. The increasing importance of the *madrassas* in providing basic education to the people was the outcome of the failure of the state to provide this important function. The madrassas had one profound development, the **Taliban** movement of Afghanistan, whose senior leaders received education in the madrassas, strung along the Afghan–Pakistan border.

Another development of great concern to Pakistan was the increase in sectarian violence involving the Sunni and Shia organizations, supported by **Saudi Arabia** and **Iran**, respectively. Hundreds of people were killed in the 1990s as a result of this conflict. Sectarian conflict has added yet another element of volatility to Pakistan.

In September 2001, following the **terrorist** attacks on the United States by a group of Islamic suicide bombers, President **Pervez Musharraf** began the process of weaning Pakistan away from Islamic extremism. In 2003, he advocated the adoption by his country of an ideology he termed “enlightened moderation.” There was pressure on Musharraf to move in this direction by the West, in particular the United States. However, he had to tread cautiously because of the backing that a coalition of **religious parties**, the **Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal**, had managed to acquire, especially after the US invasion of Afghanistan in October–December 2001.

**RELIGIOUS PARTIES.** All three religious parties most active in Pakistani politics in the early years of the 21st century were formed in the 1940s—the **Jamaat-e-Islami (JI)** in 1941, the **Jamiatul-Ulemai-Islam** in 1945, and the **Jamiatul-Ulemai-Pakistan** in 1948. When the **Muslim League**’s campaign for the establishment of an independent homeland for the Muslims of British India picked up momentum in the mid-1940s, the Muslim leadership was forced to define its position with respect to the role of **Islam** in politics, and the position of

the Muslim community when India would become free of British control. The religious leadership (*ulema*) responded in three different ways. The result was the establishment of three religious parties founded on three different political philosophies. Once Pakistan came into being, these three religious groups carved out three different political niches for themselves.

The ulema of the Deobandi School put forward a theory in which the spheres of religion and government did not overlap. Maulana Hasan Ahmad Madani was the most articulate spokesman of this school. He was also very influential because Deoband had considerable support among the Muslim middle classes. Madani argued that religion was a personal domain, in which the state need not—in fact, should not—interfere. As such, the Muslims could live in a society in which the majority was not made up of their co-religionists, as was the case with India under the British, and would be the case after the departure of the British from the subcontinent. This view was not shared by **Muhammad Ali Jinnah's** Muslim League. Because the League needed the support of the ulema (clerics) in order to reach the Muslim masses, Jinnah worked hard to win some of them over to his side. He succeeded in 1945 when, under the leadership of Maulana **Shabbir Ahmad Usmani**, some ulema broke from the mainstream of Deoband thought, and founded the Jamiatul-Ulemai-Islam (JUI). The JUI in Pakistan retained its Deobandi coloring, and did not campaign for the Islamization of the Pakistani society through state action. It did not initially sympathize with the program launched by General **Zia ul-Haq** to Islamize Pakistan. In 1981 the JUI joined the **Movement for the Restoration of Democracy**, the main purpose of which was to pressure General Zia to move toward a more representative form of government.

The second response to the question of Muslim nationalism raised by the Muslim League's campaign came from the Barelvi ulema, so called because of the writings of Maulana Ahmad Raza Khan Barelvi. For the Barelvis the domain of religion is not confined to the individual. The individual needs a guiding hand. But the hand that guides is provided not by the state, but by the people who had demonstrated their piety. This view of Islam sat very comfortably with the people in the countryside, particularly in the northwestern provinces of British India, where the veneration of saints and *pirs* (living saints) was commonplace. The Barelvis, by accepting non-divine intercession, were

comfortable with **Sufism**, which the Deobandis found particularly abhorrent. It was largely because of the intense rivalry between the Deobandi and Bareilvi schools, that the latter founded the Jamiatul-Ulemai-Pakistan. The JUP was established to counter the influence of Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani and his JUI. In independent Pakistan, JUP's political influence was confined to **Karachi**, which attracted a large number of Muslims who left India and migrated to the new country. The JUP, however, lost a good deal of its political authority with the rise of the **Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz (MQM)** in Karachi. The MQM drew its political base from the community that had given political support to the JUP.

Although an intense rivalry existed between the Deobandi and the Bareilvis, and clashes between the followers of the two schools were not uncommon in **Punjab** and **Sindh**, the two groups of ulema did agree on one fundamental issue: the immutability of Islamic doctrine. These ulema did not accept *ijtihad*, or the effort to arrive at a consensus on the reinterpretation of religious issues. For the traditionalist ulema, the Islamic doctrine was fixed for eternity. However, there were some scholars who believed that there was a need to reinterpret the Islamic doctrine in view of the changes that had occurred in the environment in which the Muslim communities lived. The concept of *ijtihad* was the cornerstone in the doctrine espoused by Pakistan's third religious party, the Jamaat-e-Islami, the brainchild of **Maulana Maududi**, an Islamic scholar of great repute. The Jamaat's political doctrine did not recognize any separation between state and religion. Islam was an all-encompassing religion that provided guidance not only in the spiritual field, but also in economics and statecraft. But to keep the Islamic doctrine current, these ulema accepted the concept of *ijtihad*. To achieve *ijtihad*, however, the ulema had first to gain control over the state. Maulana Maududi moved to Pakistan after the country gained independence. He established his party in a suburb of **Lahore**. The party gained a large and committed following in Karachi, and the large cities in Punjab, and the **Northwest Frontier Province**. Like the JUP, however, it lost its political support to the MQM, but continued to retain influence in Punjab and the NWFP.

In 2002, these three parties along with some of their factions formed an alliance called the **Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal**, which performed well in the **elections of October 2002**. The formation of



MMA resulted in diluting some of the ideological differences among the religious groups. They were now focused on expanding their political base with the expectation of eventually gaining power in the country. The MMA was partially successful in this goal; it captured power in the Northwest Frontier Province, and entered a coalition in **Balochistan**. Fazalur Rahman Khan, one of the more prominent leaders of MMA, was elected as the leader of opposition in the National Assembly elected in 2002. With the emergence of the Islamic coalition, a clash between the forces of radical Islam and those representing moderation began to define Pakistan's political life.

**REVIVAL OF THE CONSTITUTION 1973 ORDER (RCO).** The Revival of the Constitution 1973 Order was promulgated by President **Zia ul-Haq** on 2 March 1985. The RCO, by amending 67 out of 280 articles in the Constitution of 1973, introduced a number of significant changes in the political structure that had been erected by **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto**. Two changes were especially important. First, the RCO strengthened the Islamic provisions of the 1973 Constitution by including the preamble relating to the sovereignty of Allah, in the body of the amended constitution. A new article—Article 2A—was added, which effectively gave the **Shariat Court** the authority to veto legislation that was not found to be in conformity with the basic tenets of Islam.

The other change concerned presidential powers and prerogatives. The original constitution had made the president the head of the republic but had given all executive functions to the prime minister. The RCO gave the president the authority to appoint and remove the prime minister, chiefs of the armed services, provincial governors, and judges of the Supreme and high courts. The president could dissolve the National Assembly, without consulting the prime minister. The RCO also incorporated the referendum of December 1984 in the constitution, thus providing legitimacy to the continuation of Zia's presidency from 1985 to 1990, which he would have availed himself of had he lived. The RCO also provided constitutional protection to all presidential orders, **martial-law** regulations, and the actions undertaken by the martial-law authorities as of 5 July 1977. Finally, the RCO stipulated that the president had the sole authority to interpret the scope of his discretionary powers.

**RIBA.** Although agreeing that Islam bans *riba* (usury), Islamic scholars continue to differ on the meaning of the term. Does *riba* mean simple or compound interest; are there indications in the sayings of the Prophet that could be interpreted to mean that the lenders of money are allowed to receive back from the borrower at least the “real” value of the amount lent; does Islam allow capital to be lent and borrowed, or is this concept of movement of capital totally alien to Islamic *fiqh* (law)? These and other questions became important not only for the scholars of **Islam**, but also for all citizens of Pakistan, since on 14 November 1991, the Federal **Shariat Court** gave a historic verdict declaring 20 federal laws to be against the principles of Islam. The laws found by the court to be contrary to the teachings of Islam as contained in the Koran, and interpreted from the Hadith, include the State Bank of Pakistan Act, the Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan Rules of 1961, the Banking Companies Rules of 1963, the Banks Nationalization Act of 1974, the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) ordinance of 1979, and the General Financial Rules of the Federal Government. The Shariat Court judgment, therefore, threatened to twist out of shape the financial system as it operated in Pakistan. If the judgment had remained in place, it would have completely changed the shape of the financial structure in the country. One immediate impact of the court’s pronouncement was to create a situation that would have made it impossible for the country’s commercial and investment **banks** to recover loans.

Although the financial bureaucracy in Pakistan may have been taken aback by the Shariat Court’s ruling, it did not come as a surprise to the Islamic scholars in Pakistan. The government was now faced with two serious questions: One, how to meet the deadline of 30 June 1992 set by the Shariat Court for making the laws identified by it conform to the teachings of Islam. Two, to save the banking system from suffering serious losses in case the debtors decided not to meet their obligations, because they were not seen to be sanctioned by Islam.

For a while the government did not have a clear strategy of how to deal with the issue. It was now up to the government and the Parliament to carry out its injunction. In January 1992, the Muslim Commercial Bank, probably at the government’s encouragement, appealed to the Supreme Court to extend beyond 30 June 1992 the

period allowed by the Shariat Court for its judgment to take effect. A number of other references were also made to the Supreme Court, where the case has remained unsolved.

**RICE.** Rice has been cultivated in the Indus plains since the dawn of history, but it never became the staple diet of the people of the region. Wheat was and remains the preferred crop for most people living in Pakistan. That notwithstanding, rice has always been grown in large quantities, mostly for export. One indigenous variety, the basmati—a fragrant, thin-grained rice highly valued in the Middle East—is grown by the farmers in **Punjab**. For a time, exports of basmati rice won handsome rewards in terms of foreign exchange for the country.

The advent of the first **green revolution** in the late 1960s, heralded by the arrival of the high-yielding rice varieties from the Philippines, made the crop commercially attractive, and the Pakistani farmers took full advantage of the economic benefit provided by it. The new varieties were particularly suited to the hot and humid climate of upper and middle **Sindh**, which quickly became a major rice-producing area. In 2003–2004, rice was grown on 2.5 million hectares of land, equivalent to nearly 20 percent of the total cropped area. Total output of the crop was estimated at 4.9 million tons, of which 2.5 million tons were exported. Rice exports earned the country US\$515 million of foreign exchange.

**RUSHDIE, SALMAN (1947– )**. In February 1989, the Indian-born novelist Salman Rushdie published *The Satanic Verses*, a novel peopled with several characters that closely resembled Prophet Muhammad, his wives, and associates. A few weeks after its publication, an Indian Muslim politician condemned the novel, declared that it blasphemed Islam, and called for it to be banned. A few days later, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini issued a fatwa, or religious edict, against the novelist, and offered a US\$1.6 million award for the author's assassination. The fatwa forced Rushdie into hiding, and contributed to further souring relations between Iran and the West. In spite of the intense pressure brought by the Western countries on Iran, and even after the death of the Ayatollah, Iran refused to lift the death sentence

imposed on Rushdie. It was more than six years before Rushdie was able to make a public appearance.

*The Moor's Last Sigh*, the first novel written by Rushdie since the publication of *The Satanic Verses*, also led to controversy. Some Hindu fundamentalists from Mumbai (Bombay), the city of Rushdie's birth, were incensed by the description of a character they said was based on Bal Thackeray, a powerful local politician who, it was generally believed, had inspired the Hindu-Muslim riots that had rocked the Indian city in 1992. The Hindu-fundamentalist reaction to the latest Rushdie novel persuaded his publisher not to release the book for distribution in Mumbai.

Although born in Mumbai, Rushdie had strong links with Pakistan. One of his maternal uncles, General Shahid Hamid, had served as an aide to Lord Louis Mountbatten, India's last viceroy, and had become very familiar with the story of British India's partition. After India was partitioned, General Hamid and most members of the family to which Rushdie belonged migrated to Pakistan. In Pakistan, General Hamid became a close associate of General Muhammad Ayub Khan. Some of the family's experiences were dutifully recorded by Rushdie in *Midnight's Children*, the novel that won its author the coveted Booker prize, and international fame. General Hamid appeared as a major character in the novel. Rushdie went on to write *Shame*, a novel that chronicled President Zia ul-Haq's rise to power and his conflict with the Bhutto family. This interest in Pakistan notwithstanding, Rushdie retained considerable antipathy toward it. Because of his strong belief in racial harmony—a subject that received a great deal of attention in both *The Satanic Verses* and *The Moor's Last Sigh*—the novelist viewed the creation of Pakistan as a step in the wrong direction.

**RUSSIA.** See SOVIET UNION.

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**SAAD SUBMARINE.** Pakistan successfully tested its first locally manufactured submarine, PNS/M *Saad*, on 19 January 2003 at **Karachi**. The submarine is an Agosta 90-B class and was manufac-

tured at the Pakistan navy dockyard at Karachi and was activated in the fleet in the summer of 2003.

**SABAKZAI DAM.** In August 2005, Prime Minister **Shaukat Aziz** officiated at the ground-breaking ceremony for the Sabakzai Dam in Zhob, some 320 kilometers northwest of **Quetta**, capital of **Balochistan** province. The **dam** is one of the “mega projects” initiated by the government of President **Pervez Musharraf**. The dam, 35 meters high and 400 meters long, will cost Rs 1.1 billion (US\$18.5 million) to build and its construction will be completed in about two years, or some time in late 2007. Three canals with a total length of 40 kilometers will bring water from the dam’s reservoir which will have a storage capacity of 3,500 cubic meters of water. It is estimated that the canals will bring 6,680 hectares of land under cultivation.

**SADIQ ALI, JAM (1937–1991).** Jam Sadiq Ali was born in rural **Sindh** and was educated in **Karachi**. He belonged to a well-to-do, landed family that took an active interest in politics. He associated himself with **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto** when the latter left the government of President **Muhammad Ayub Khan** and started out on his own. Bhutto’s removal by the military in 1977 and his execution two years later convinced Sadiq Ali that it was prudent to leave Pakistan. Accordingly, he spent several years in exile in London. His stay in London coincided with that of **Benazir Bhutto**, who had also left Pakistan for much the same reason. Differences developed between the two, and when they returned to Pakistan in the late 1980s, they found themselves on opposite sides of the political divide. Jam’s antipathy toward Benazir Bhutto was sufficient reason for President **Ghulam Ishaq Khan** to turn to him for his support when he dismissed Bhutto as prime minister in August 1990. Sadiq Ali served as the chief minister of Sindh during this critical period.

**SALAM, ABDUS (1926–1996).** Born in Jhang, a small town in central Punjab, Abdus Salam belonged to the small community of **Ah-madiya** Muslims, regarded by some of the mainstream followers of **Islam** as renegades. Since this community came to be discriminated against in the country of his birth, Professor Salam, even after winning the Nobel Prize in physics in 1979—the only Pakistani to have

this distinction—found it difficult to spend much time in his home country.

After attending a public school near his place of birth, Salam received a masters in Physics from Punjab University and from there matriculated to St. John's College, Cambridge, and then to Cavendish Laboratory in the same city from where he received a Ph.D. in theoretical physics. He returned to Pakistan in 1952 and taught physics as a lecturer at Government College Lahore. However, not happy with the environment in which he had to work, he went back to England in 1957 and was appointed professor of theoretical physics at Imperial College, London.

It was his work in electroweak theory, a mathematical synthesis of electromagnetic and weak interactions, that resulted in the award of Nobel Prize in 1979. He shared the prize with two American scientists, Steven Weinberg and Sheldon Glashow. He left Imperial College in 1964 to establish the International Center for Theoretical Physics at Trieste, Italy, and served as its director until 1993, when, afflicted with Parkinson disease, he went to Oxford University where he died at Oxford on 21 November 1996. His body was flown back to Pakistan for burial at Jhang, the place of his birth. There was an attempt by the Pakistani Cabinet to award official reception to the body at Islamabad but it was vetoed by President **Farooq Leghari** and Prime Minister **Meraj Khalid** on the grounds that such an action would provoke the Islamic groups. Professor Salam was buried quietly in a small Ahmadiya cemetery in Jhang.

**SALINITY CONTROL AND RECLAMATION PROGRAM (SCARP).** In developing the vast **Indus** irrigation network, the British administration in India emphasized bringing water to the fields, but no provision was made for draining it. The Pakistani engineers and administrators continued with this tradition. Consequently, vast areas of central **Punjab** began to show signs of salinity and of being waterlogged. The situation was perceived to be serious enough for President **Muhammad Ayub Khan** to raise it with President John F. Kennedy during a state visit to Washington in 1961. Kennedy responded by sending a team of experts to Pakistan under the leadership of John Revelle, a Harvard University geologist. Revelle submitted a report to the White House in which he sug-

gested that the government of Pakistan should extend its successful Salinity Control and Reclamation Project to other affected areas of the country. The first SCARP was completed in 1961 and covered an area of 500,000 hectares. By the end of 1990, when the SCARP program in its original form was discontinued, it had covered 3.7 million hectares with 22,000 deep-water tube wells installed in both saline and fresh-water areas.

**SAQI, JAM (1939– )**. Jam Saqi of **Sindh**, born in a village near Chachchro in the Tharparkar district, exposed a number of social problems faced by the poor and the underprivileged segments of the population in his province. However, his campaign to bring some relief to these people was not appreciated by the authorities. He was repeatedly incarcerated by the governments of **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto** and General **Zia ul-Haq**. His detention lasted for more than eight years. On being released from prison in 1986, he announced that he would reorganize the Hari Committee and tour the country to meet like-minded people, and after that determine his future strategy. *See also* HARIS.

**SATTAR, FAROOQ (1961– )**. Farooq Sattar was born in **Karachi** and graduated in medicine from a medical school in that city. He joined the **Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz (MQM)** as student activist and played an important role in helping the organization expand its base of support among the *muhajirs* (refugees from India) of Karachi. On 9 January 1988, Sattar was elected unopposed by the Karachi Municipal Corporation as the mayor of Karachi. The general **elections of November 1988** brought **Benazir Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (PPP)** to power with the support of the MQM; Sattar, as the mayor of Karachi, had the full support of the federal government. The PPP-MQM alliance proved to be short lived, however. As the MQM drifted away from the ruling party, its emphasis shifted to "street politics," and Karachi plunged into ethnic violence. A number of MQM activists went underground or were imprisoned by the authorities. Farooq Sattar was one of the few leaders of the organization who remained present on the political scene.

The MQM decided to boycott the national **elections of October 1993** but reversed itself and took part in the provincial elections held

a few days later. Farooq Sattar won a seat for the MQM in the Provincial Assembly and was elected the leader of the opposition in the **Sindh** legislature. Sattar again won a seat in the Provincial Assembly in the **elections of 1997** and was included as a senior minister in the provincial cabinet headed by **Pakistan Muslim League's** chief minister, Liaquat Jatoi.

**SAUDI ARABIA–PAKISTAN RELATIONS.** Pakistan's warm relations with Saudi Arabia go back to the time of the country's birth in 1947. Given that Pakistan is the only country in the world that was created to provide a homeland for a segment of the Muslim population—those who lived in British **India**—and given that Saudi Arabia is the birth place of **Islam** and home to Mecca and Medina, Islam's holiest sites, it was inevitable that the two countries would develop warm relations. These relations became even closer when, after the sharp increases in the price of oil, Saudi Arabia became awash with “petrodollars.” It used some of this windfall income to assist Muslim countries, in particular Pakistan, and advance the cause of Islam. In promoting Islam, the Saudis favored **Wahabism**, their own interpretation of the religion.

There are no firm estimates available but it appears that the Saudis—the government as well as the country's philanthropists—invested hundreds of millions of dollars building mosques and schools in Pakistan and paying stipends to *imams* (preachers) and teachers working in *madrassas* and places of worship. The Saudi activities in the country had a profound political impact since they helped to aid the rise of various religious groups in the country. Some of them, by becoming participants in the multi-party coalition, the **Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA)**, entered the mainstream of politics, while several others favored the more extremist approach by turning to violence as a way of influencing the society and the political system.

Included in the assistance provided by Saudi Arabia was an oil facility that allowed Pakistan to defer payment of US\$1.3 billion the country spent on oil imports from the Kingdom. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were the major oil suppliers to Pakistan, meeting 90 percent of the country's oil requirements.

It had become a tradition for Pakistan's leaders, presidents, and prime ministers to visit Saudi Arabia upon assuming office. They went



to the kingdom to perform the *Umrah* (prayers at the Mecca Mosque) and establish relations with the leaders in Riyadh. This tradition was observed by President **Pervez Musharraf** and Prime Ministers **Zafarullah Khan Jamali** and **Shaukat Aziz**. *See also* DIASPORAS.

**SCHEDULED CASTES.** Untouchable castes in India came to be called scheduled castes, because their names were included in a schedule to a law passed by the British administration to give them some protection against abuse by the superior castes. Gandhi chose to call them the *harijans*. Later, in independent India, they adopted the name of *dalits*. **Jagendra Nath Mandal**, a prominent scheduled-caste lawyer from Bengal, joined the **All-India Muslim League** and supported the demand for the creation of Pakistan; he was awarded a seat in the interim cabinet formed in 1946 under the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru.

There is no particular name given to people of a similar social situation in Pakistan. They make up about 2 percent of Pakistan's population. Most of them are **Christians** and work either in agriculture or in the service sector.

**SHAH, SAJJAD ALI (1933–).** Sajjad Ali Shah was born in **Sindh**. His father served for several years as the registrar of the Sindh High Court. In 1954, Shah senior made judicial history by accepting the petition filed by President of the Assembly **Tamizuddin Khan**, challenging the dismissal of the **First Constituent Assembly** by Governor-General **Ghulam Muhammad**. The petition was registered despite the executive branch's pressure on the high court not to entertain it.

After working as a judge in the Sindh High Court, Sajjad Ali Shah was elevated to the Supreme Court and continued in the tradition established by his father of ignoring political pressures. He refused to side with the majority in 1990 when **Benazir Bhutto** brought a case to the Supreme Court against the presidential order for her dismissal. When Bhutto returned as prime minister in 1993, she appointed Shah as the chief justice of the Supreme Court, bypassing several senior judges. It was widely believed that his appointment was her reward for the position he had taken three years earlier. It did not take long for Justice Shah to demonstrate that he was not beholden to the prime minister, however.

The question of the qualification of judges and their appointment was reviewed by the Supreme Court in early 1996 following a petition filed by Wahabul Khairi, a lawyer from **Islamabad**. On 20 March, the Supreme Court bench, headed by Shah, issued its opinion, holding that the prime minister could not ignore the principle of seniority in making her recommendation to the president for the appointment of judges. The Court's opinion was based on the tradition that had been established in British India and was followed in the successor states of India and Pakistan. The Supreme Court held that the appointment of scores of judges had to be regularized in light of its finding.

The prime minister was not happy with the decision and chose to ignore it. The Court's insistence that its decision had to be implemented contributed to the prime minister's dismissal by President **Farooq Leghari** on 5 November 1996. In the summer of 1997, Chief Justice Shah once again locked horns with the serving prime minister, this time with **Mian Nawaz Sharif**, who had succeeded Benazir Bhutto. The issue, once again, was the appointment of a fresh batch of judges. The new prime minister was not willing to abide by the seniority rule either, since that would have meant elevating at least one judge to the Supreme Court who was not considered sympathetic to him and his program. The ensuing conflict between the prime minister and the chief justice brought Pakistan to the brink of a major constitutional crisis. It was only resolved with the resignation of President Farooq Leghari on 2 December 1997. The president had supported the chief justice; his departure led to the move by 10 judges of the Supreme Court to rule that under the seniority rule Sajjad Ali Shah's own appointment as the chief justice of the Supreme Court had to be vacated. Shah was removed from the Court and Justice Ajmal Mian, the senior-most judge of the Supreme Court, was appointed chief justice.

**SHALIMAR GARDENS.** Shalimar Gardens were built in 1642 by Emperor Shah Jehan (1627–1658), the fifth great Mughul emperor of India, who also built the Taj Mahal at Agra, India. The gardens were laid in the outskirts of **Lahore** as a recreational place for the royal family. They were prepared by the emperor's chief architect, Ali Mardan, following the Persian style. They have a triple-terraced garden

with marble pavilions, three lakes, and a marble waterfall. The lakes and the waterfall are surrounded by 400 water fountains. During the time of the **Mughul empire**, the principal access to the Gardens ran outside the city wall of Lahore. A road was built to connect the Gardens with the **Lahore Fort**, where the emperors lived and held court. The Shalimar Gardens are now open to the public and are also used for state functions by the government of Pakistan.

**SHARIAT COURT.** Pakistan's Federal Shariat Court is the highest Islamic law-making body in the country. It was established in 1980 by President **Zia ul-Haq**, who amended the constitution to allow for the Islamization of the legal structure. The Shariat Court was empowered to entertain requests for the review of existing laws to see whether they were "repugnant to Islam." Zia, after causing the court to be set up, constrained its authority; he excluded the laws relating to fiscal, procedural, or family matters from its jurisdiction until 1990.

In 1980–2000 the Federal Shariat court reviewed 1,511 laws and declared 267 to be wholly or partly "repugnant to Islam." In June 1990, while **Benazir Bhutto** was prime minister, the court's "period of exclusion" expired and it acquired the right to examine fiscal matters. A number of requests were made to the court to examine financial laws, and on 14 November 1991 it gave an opinion concerning 20 laws dealing with a variety of institutions and issues. The government was told to amend these laws by 30 June 1992, failing which "the various provisions of the laws discussed in judgment and held repugnant to the injunctions of Islam will cease to have effect." In January 1992, the Muslim Commercial Bank appealed to the Supreme Court to extend beyond 30 June 1992 the period allowed by the Shariat Court before its judgment came into effect. The bank's request was accepted and, as a result, Pakistan continues to live in a legal cul-de-sac, with little clarity as to which legal system is paramount, particularly in the areas of economics and finance. *See also* JUDICIARY.

**SHARIF, MIAN NAWAZ (1950– ).** In March 1986, President **Zia ul-Haq** chose Mian Nawaz Sharif, a young industrialist turned politician, to become **Punjab's** chief minister. What distinguished Sharif was not only his youth—he was in his late thirties when he became

chief minister and was the youngest of Pakistan's four provincial chief executives appointed by Zia ul-Haq—but also the fact that he belonged to an entirely new breed of politicians. The local bodies **elections of November 1987**, by returning a large number of supporters of Nawaz Sharif to the municipal committees all over Punjab, strengthened the chief minister's political position and also gave the signal that urban Pakistan had finally produced a political force of its own.

In the **elections of November 1988** held after the death of Zia ul-Haq, Mian Nawaz Sharif emerged as the most powerful politician outside the ranks of the **Pakistan People's Party (PPP)**. He was the only political figure of any consequence from the time of Zia ul-Haq to survive the reemergence of the PPP. In December 1988, while the PPP formed a government in **Islamabad** under the leadership of Prime Minister **Benazir Bhutto**, Nawaz Sharif was invited to lead the administration in **Lahore** formed by the **Islami Jamhuri Ittehad (IJI)**, a coalition of right of center and religious parties of which he was the chairman. What ensued was a bitter political dispute between Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, operating out of Islamabad, and Chief Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif, working out of Lahore. Each tried to unseat the other and both failed in their attempts. Finally, on 6 August 1990, President **Ghulam Ishaq Khan** dismissed all administrations—those at the center as well as those in the four provinces. In the **elections held in October 1990**, the IJI won the most seats in the National Assembly, and Mian Nawaz Sharif became Pakistan's twelfth prime minister.

The new prime minister decided to free himself from the control still exercised on him by the “**troika**,” a power-sharing arrangement among three actors—the president, the COAS, and the prime minister. This arrangement was put together prior to the induction of Benazir Bhutto as prime minister in December 1988. Ghulam Ishaq Khan struck back in April 1993 by dismissing Mian Nawaz Sharif, his cabinet, and the national and provincial legislatures. Mian Nawaz Sharif responded by going to the Supreme Court and challenging the president's move as unconstitutional. The Court, to the great surprise of the president, agreed with Sharif, who was reinstated as prime minister. The president refused to surrender, however. He persuaded a faction of the **Pakistan Muslim League (PML)** led by **Hamid**

**Nasir Chatta**, to leave the PML. All these maneuverings brought political paralysis to the country, and the army, under the command of General Abdul Waheed Kakar, intervened. The military forced both the president and the prime minister to resign. **Elections were held in October 1993** under the supervision of an interim administration, and Benazir Bhutto and her Pakistan People's Party were back in power in Islamabad. With the help of Chatta and his group, Bhutto was able to keep Mian Nawaz Sharif out of power in Punjab as well. This ushered in a period of considerable political instability as the opposition, led by Sharif, refused to work with the government.

The dismissal of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's government by President **Farooq Leghari** on 5 November 1996, followed by another general election on **3 February 1997**, dramatically changed the political fortunes of the Sharif family. Mian Nawaz Sharif led the Pakistan Muslim League to a massive electoral victory, capturing most of the seats in the National Assembly and in the Provincial Assembly of Punjab. For the first time in decades, the PML had a credible presence in **Sindh** province.

Taking over as prime minister on 17 February 1997, Sharif acted quickly to consolidate his position. He took advantage of the very comfortable majority in the National Assembly to move two constitutional amendments. The **Thirteenth Amendment** took away from the president the power to dissolve the assembly without being advised to do so by the prime minister. The **Fourteenth Amendment** made it unlawful for legislators to cross the floor in the National and Provincial Assemblies. Now politically secure, Sharif moved against the **judiciary**. Defying the Supreme Court's order, delivered in the "**judges' case**" of March 1996, that it had the authority to recommend for appointment judges to the superior courts, the prime minister refused to allow five men identified by the chief justice of the Supreme Court to be inducted into the Court. What followed was a constitutional crisis that was resolved only after the resignation of the president on 2 December 1997 and the removal from office of **Sajjad Ali Shah**, the chief justice. On 31 December, **Muhammad Rafiq Tarar**, a close associate of the Sharif family, was elected president.

Preoccupied with politics, the prime minister had little time for economics. The economic difficulties inherited from the Bhutto period continued to take their toll. Although the government adopted a

program of structural reforms that had been initially introduced by the caretaker administration of **Meraj Khalid** and was supported by the **International Monetary Fund**, the **economy** did not respond. The situation became more serious after the imposition of economic sanctions by the Western nations following the explosion of six nuclear devices by Pakistan in late May 1998. The country came close to bankruptcy in July of that year.

The military took cognizance of the deteriorating economic situation. In a speech in Lahore before the staff and students of the Naval War College, General **Jahangir Karamat**, COAS, advised the government to pay attention to the economy and to improve its style of management. Irritated by this advice, the prime minister asked for the general's resignation. Much to the surprise of his senior army colleagues, the general complied, and was replaced by Lieutenant General **Pervez Musharraf** in October 1998. The new army commander developed his own difficulties with the prime minister, particularly over the issue of **Kashmir**. It was not clear how deeply involved the prime minister was in the decision by the military to take over the **Kargil heights** in the north of Kashmir that were controlled by India. The Kargil incident would have led to another war between India and Pakistan had the prime minister not requested U.S. President Bill Clinton to intervene. The **United States** was prepared to help only on the condition that Pakistan withdraw the occupying troops unilaterally and unconditionally. The prime minister gave that undertaking which was announced in a joint Pakistan-U.S. statement issued on 4 July 1998. The "Kargil surrender" led to a deep rift between the prime minister and COAS.

The prime minister endorsed a bizarre plan to remove the army chief by hijacking the plane in which he was traveling. The plan backfired; the plane landed safely in Karachi after the military had taken over the airport and also placed Islamabad and **Rawalpindi** under its control. General Musharraf, after landing in Karachi, immediately flew to Islamabad, dismissed the prime minister, arrested him and a number of his close associates, and installed himself as the country's chief executive at the head of a **military** regime. Mian Nawaz Sharif was tried on a number of charges including plane hijacking and was sentenced to long prison terms by the Lahore High Court. In 2000, a deal was brokered by **Saudi Arabia** which allowed

Sharif to go to Jeddah in exile provided he did not return to Pakistan or take part in political activities in the country for a period of 10 years, 2000–2010.

**SHERPAO, HAYAT MUHAMMAD KHAN (1935–1975).** Hayat Muhammad Khan Sherpao of the **Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP)** was one of several young politicians whom **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto** attracted to the **Pakistan People’s Party** as its “founding members.” Sherpao came to the party with no political background and baggage and was fully committed to implementing the new party’s socialist program. In that respect he was more in line with the politics of the **Khudai Khidmatgars (KK)**, although he had very little affection for **Wali Khan**, who had inherited the KK mantle from **Abdul Ghaffar Khan**. When Bhutto came to power in December 1971, he appointed Sherpao governor of the NWFP. Sherpao moved to **Islamabad** as a minister in the central Cabinet when a **National Awami Party/Jamiatul-Ulemai-Islam (NAP-JUI)** government took office in **Peshawar** in 1972. On 8 February 1975, Sherpao was assassinated while addressing a public meeting in the university town of Peshawar. The government reacted by arresting a number of opposition leaders, including Wali Khan, and declaring the NAP an illegal organization.

**SHOAIB, MUHAMMAD (1906–1974).** Muhammad Shoaib was one of the many civil servants to have occupied important economic positions in Pakistan. Shoaib was a member of the Pakistan Accounts Service and was serving as an executive director at the **World Bank** when General **Muhammad Ayub Khan** staged his military coup d’état in Pakistan. He was summoned back to Pakistan and appointed minister of finance, a position he held for six years (1961–1967). It was during his tenure as finance minister that Pakistan’s **economy** performed exceptionally well. He went back to the World Bank in 1967 and was appointed vice president in charge of administration. He died in Washington in 1974.

**SHUJAAT HUSSAIN, CHAUDHRY (1946–).** Shujaat Hussain was a close associate of **Mian Nawaz Sharif** while the latter was twice prime minister of Pakistan in 1993 and from 1997–1999. He served

as interior minister in both administrations headed by Sharif. After the prime minister's overthrow by the **military** in October 1999 and the Sharif family's decision to go into exile in **Saudi Arabia**, Hussain and a group of prominent members of the **Pakistan Muslim League** separated to form their own faction, the **Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid-e-Azam)**. The PML(Q) followed a long line of political groups formed to provide support to the men in power. Its predecessors included the "Leagues" that supported military presidents Muhammad Ayub Khan and Zia ul-Haq. As was the case with the previous incarnations, the new PML group under Chaudhry Hussain's leadership was promptly dubbed the "King's Party."

Hussain had earned this reward for having cobbled together a new political grouping, the Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid-e-Azam), out of the party headed by Mian Nawaz Sharif, the deposed prime minister. The PML(Q) was the mainstay of the political support President Musharraf had in the National Assembly that came into being following the **elections of 2002**. Hussain belonged to a group that came to be called the Chaudhris of Gujarat, an industrial family that dominated this medium-sized industrial city in north-central Punjab. The family owed its remarkable wealth and political influence to Chaudhry Zahoor Ilahi, its patriarch. In the go-go days of the period immediately following the partition of India and the movement of millions of people—Muslims into Pakistan and Indians and Sikhs into India—the senior Ilahi had used his presence in the police force to amass a small fortune based on the acquisition of "evacuee properties," the assets left by the departing Sikhs and Muslims from Pakistan. Ilahi, after entering politics during the period of President Ayub Khan, established a political dynasty whose most prominent member was Shujaat Hussain. **Chaudhry Pervez Ilahi**, a cousin of Shujaat Hussain, became Punjab's chief minister in 2003. On 7 January 2003, Shujaat Hussain was elected unopposed as president of the PML(Q), replacing Mian Muhammad Azhar, while Salim Saifullah Khan was elected the party's secretary general. It was the first time in the country's political history that the top leadership of the ruling party did not hold positions in the government.

A complicated maneuver orchestrated by President **Pervez Musharraf** resulted in the election by the National Assembly of Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain as Pakistan's 22nd prime minister on 30



June 2004. He received 190 votes in the assembly against 76 cast in favor of Makhdoom Amin Fahim, the leader of the **Pakistan People's Party Parliamentarians (PPPP)** and the head of the **Association for the Restoration of Democracy (ARD)**. Hussain was appointed to fill in the position following the resignation of Sardar **Zafarullah Khan Jamali**, the 21st prime minister, and the completion of formalities before **Shaukat Aziz** could assume that position.

Even after relinquishing the post of prime minister to Shaukat Aziz, Shujaat Hussain continued to play an important role as a policymaker. In early 2005, along with Senator Mushahid Hussain, secretary general of PML(Q), he negotiated an agreement with Sardar Akbar Bugti, the Balochistan tribal leader, to bring peace to the troubled province. Later, he took a delegation to Delhi to prepare for President Musharraf's summit with Manmohan Singh, the Indian prime minister, on 19 April. In June, he traveled to Muzaffarabad, the capital of Pakistani-controlled Azad Kashmir, to receive a delegation of Kashmiri Muslims from the Indian part of Kashmir. These incursions into both domestic political and **foreign affairs** had the effect of reducing the power of Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz.

**SIACHEN GLACIER.** The Siachen Glacier, located east of Pakistan's district of Baltistan, measures 75 kilometers in length and is about 5 to 8 kilometers wide. It is the second-largest glacier in the world and, through Bilfond La (pass) and Sia La, offers access to the peaks of the Karakoram range. The control of the glacier remains disputed between India and Pakistan; the two countries failed to reach agreement on the precise location of the line of control in the glaciated area in 1949 when the first ceasefire line was drawn in **Kashmir**, and in 1973 when the line was re-demarcated. In 1984 India occupied the glacier but was not able to dislodge the Pakistanis from the two passes. Both India and Pakistan took positions attempting to prevent the other from gaining control of an undelineated area beyond NJ9842, the last defined point on the **Line of Control** established in 1972. Once the LOC reached that point in the Karakoram Mountains, cartographers specified that it continued "thence north to the glaciers." Pakistan interpreted the line to proceed northeast to the Karakoram Pass on the Chinese border, while India took it to mean a line that ran along the Saltoro Range and Siachen Glacier northwest to the Chinese border.

In 1985 and again in 1986 and 1987, the glacier saw a lot of military activity on both sides. According to the government of India, an exceptionally bitter but inconclusive battle that left hundreds of soldiers dead on both sides was fought in September-October 1987 over the control of some parts of the glacier. The dispute remains unresolved. The financial cost of the conflict is prohibitive. According to one estimate, India spends US\$1 to \$2 million a day maintaining its presence in the area. Since 1984, it has spent \$10 billion, much higher than is the case with Pakistan, which has a better access to the glacier. In their summit meeting on 19 April 2005, President **Pervez Musharraf** of Pakistan and India's Prime Minister Manmohan Singh resolved to find a solution to the conflict as a part of their effort to bring the two countries together. Singh visited Siachen on 12 June 2005, the first Indian prime minister to travel to the area. While reiterating that there could be no "redrawing of boundaries," he nevertheless indicated that "the time has come to make effort that this battlefield is converted into a mountain of peace."

**SIKANDER HAYAT KHAN, SIR (1892–1942).** Sikander Hayat Khan was born in a family from Wah, a small town in north **Punjab**. His father is said to have helped the British in the 1857 Indian Mutiny, and is also said to have assisted in bringing back the body of General John Nicholson, who was killed in action during the uprising. The grateful British helped the Hayat family and contributed to Sikander's success in Punjab politics. British aid notwithstanding, Sikander was an able politician who played an important role in producing an unusual degree of communal harmony among three religious groups in Punjab: the Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs. He empathized with the Punjab elite's desire to chart a political course that would have kept Punjab united. He believed that only such an approach would avoid a political upheaval and help to escape the communal tensions that were building up in other Indian provinces. At the same time, he was shrewd enough to realize the impracticality of such a course because it would not be possible for Punjab to become independent once the British left India. Therefore, he walked a thin line between the multi-religious orientation of Punjab's politics and **Muhammad Ali Jinnah's** ambitions to carve a separate homeland for the Muslims of India. He succeeded **Fazli Hussain** as the leader

of the **Punjab Unionist Party**, and arrived at an arrangement with Jinnah that allowed him membership of the **Muslim League** while preserving the separate identity of the Unionist Party. He led the Unionists to victory in the elections of 1937 and was appointed Punjab's first prime minister the same year. He held this position until his death five years later.

**SIMLA ACCORD.** The Simla Accord was signed on 3 July 1972 between Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of India and President **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto** of Pakistan. The accord settled a number of outstanding matters between the two countries following the third **Indo-Pakistan war** fought in November-December 1971. India agreed in principle to release and send back to Pakistan more than 90,000 prisoners it was holding after the fall of Dhaka in December 1971. It also agreed to vacate 12,950 square kilometers of territory it had captured in what was left of Pakistan. Although no agreement was reached over the future of **Kashmir**, Pakistan accepted India's demand not to raise the matter in international fora. This last provision in the accord was interpreted by the Indian side as Pakistan's agreement not to ask for the implementation of the Security Council resolution passed in 1949, which required the two countries to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir to ascertain whether the people of the state wished to join Pakistan or India.

**SIMLA TRIPARTITE CONFERENCE, 1946.** Viceroy Lord Wavell and the British government's cabinet mission to India invited eight Indian leaders, four each from the All-India Congress (Maulana Azad, Jawaharlal Nehru, Sardar Vallabhai Patel, and **Abdul Ghafar Khan**) and the All-India Muslim League (**Muhammad Ali Jinnah**, **Liaquat Ali Khan**, **Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar**, and Nawab Ismail Khan) to meet with them to find a solution to the Indian constitutional crisis. The tripartite conference opened at Simla on 5 May 1946 and collapsed seven days later on 12 May. After seven days of proposals and counterproposals, the conference broke down over the issue of "group powers," which according to Jinnah was "the whole guts" of the problem. *See also* CABINET MISSION PLAN 1946.

**SINDH.** With a population of 30 million in 2005, Sindh is Pakistan's second largest province. Its total area is 141,000 square kilometers,

which means a moderate population density of 213 persons per square kilometer. **Karachi**, with nearly 13 million people, is the province's largest city, its capital, and one of its two ports. The province derives its name, and a great deal of its economic wealth from the **Indus River**. The river is called Sindhu in Sindh; it enters the province from the northeast of Kashmore and leaves it via an extensive delta in the southwest from where it flows into the Arabian Sea. An extensive network of irrigation canals brings the water of the Indus to the fields of Sindh. The British constructed a barrage on the river at Sukkur in 1933, and Pakistan built another barrage downstream at Kotri in the 1950s. Of the total cultivated area of 5.34 million hectares, 3.26 million hectares are irrigated, 2.63 million hectares by the canals of the Indus system.

Of Pakistan's four provinces, Sindh has the richest history. Its recorded history goes back to the Indus civilization (2300 BC to 1750 BC), manifestations of which exist at the archeological sites of **Mohenjodaro**, Amri, and Kot Diji. From the third to the seventh centuries AD Sindh was under the dominion of Persia, which yielded the province to the Arabs in AD 712. With the Arab conquest of Sindh, the province's Islamic period began. Sindh passed under the control of the **Mughuls** in the 16th century. The British conquered Sindh in 1843 and made it a part of the Bombay Presidency. In 1934, the British created the province of Sindh and made Karachi its capital.

The powerful political families of Sindh did not clearly articulate their position with respect to the province's future once the British announced their decision to leave India in the hands of the Indians. The result was an exceptionally turbulent period in which the politically influential groups allowed themselves to be pulled in different directions by **Muhammad Ali Jinnah's Muslim League**, the **Indian National Congress**, and the British administration.

After the establishment of Pakistan, Sindh remained politically restive. Seven governments were formed and collapsed in the eight-year period between 1947 and 1955—three of them under one individual, Muhammad Ayub Khuhro. In 1955 Sindh was merged into the **One Unit of West Pakistan** and was governed for 15 years from **Lahore**. The province was reestablished on 1 July 1970. For five years it was under the control of the **Pakistan People's Party**, whose chairman, **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto**, was from one of the most prominent

landed families of the province and whose cousin, **Mumtaz Ali Bhutto**, served as the province's chief minister for three years.

In the 1980s, the Sindh's *muhajir* community—millions of **refugees** who arrived in the province from India in 1947 and settled in its large cities, in particular Karachi and **Hyderabad**—began to assert themselves and formed a coalition with the indigenous Sindhis to work against the **Pathans** and the Punjabis who migrated to the province after the mid-1960s. This four-way ethnic distribution of Sindh's population—the indigenous Sindhis, the Muhajirs, the Pathans, and the Punjabis—brought things to a boil in the winter of 1986–1987, when ethnic riots in Karachi claimed hundreds of lives. The Pakistan People's Party, dominated by rural Sindh and, therefore, by the original inhabitants of the province, came to political power after the **elections of 1988**. It was initially supported by the **Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz (MQM)**, which had won decisively in Karachi and parts of Hyderabad. But the two parties drifted apart. The political conflict between the PPP and the MQM resulted in a great deal of violence as the supporters of the muhajir party fought the law-enforcement agencies controlled by the PPP-led government.

The demise of the PPP government in August 1990 did not bring peace to the province, however. The government of Prime Minister **Mian Nawaz Sharif** brought in the army to fight the MQM. The army stayed for three years. It was withdrawn from the province in late 1994 by the government of **Benazir Bhutto** a year after she returned as prime minister. The army's withdrawal resulted in the bloodiest year in the history of Karachi in 1995, when nearly 2,000 persons were killed in street battles fought by the MQM activists and the forces of government. A concerted effort by the Bhutto government that involved the use of considerable (according to the muhajir leadership, ruthless) force brought peace to Karachi but at some political price. Bhutto's PPP performed poorly in the province's urban areas in the elections of February 1997 when the MQM once again captured most of the seats from Karachi in the National and Sindh assemblies. The MQM joined the governments formed by Mian Nawaz Sharif's **Pakistan Muslim League** in both Karachi and **Islamabad**, but left the coalition in 1998. The MQM was back in power after winning a large numbers of seats in Karachi and Hyderabad in the elections of 2002. Ishrat-ul-Ebad Khan, an MQM leader, was appointed

the province's governor in 2003 by the administration of President **Pervez Musharraf**.

**SINDH PUNJAB ABADGAR WELFARE ASSOCIATION (SPAWA).** The Sindh Punjab Abadgar Welfare Association was formed by the small Punjabi landowners who had settled in the province of **Sindh**. Punjabi *abadgar* (settlers) in rural Sindh became the target of Sindhi nationalists as well as the *dacoits* (highway robbers) of Sindh. Most of them came to Sindh looking for virgin land or for holdings larger in size than those they had farmed in the crowded villages of their own province. Although precise statistics are not available, it appears that most of the land the Punjabi settlers cultivate was purchased from the “allottees”—the people who were given land by the government either in return for the holdings they had abandoned in India at the time of partition or in recognition of meritorious military service. The SPAWA decided to involve itself in issues beyond the immediate welfare of its members after the success of the **Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz** (MQM) in mobilizing political support against the new migrants to Sindh. In March 1987, Chaudhri Niaz Ahmad, the president of the SPAWA, was ambushed and killed by a group of dacoits. The SPAWA responded by holding a well-attended condolence meeting in Roshanabad, a town on the national highway, thereby signaling the arrival of yet another political organization on the crowded political arena of Sindh province.

**SINDHUDESH.** The name Sindhudesh was used by **G. M. Syed**, a Sindhi politician, to give meaning to his campaign for greater autonomy for the province of **Sindh** within the Pakistani federation. The use of this name evoked unhappy memories in the minds of those who suspected Syed of working for Sindh's independence. This was so because the Bengali nationalists called their country **Bangladesh** once East Pakistan gained independence.

**SIRHOEY AFFAIR.** In 1989, Prime Minister **Benazir Bhutto** made an effort to extract herself from the controls that had been placed on her by President **Ghulam Ishaq Khan** and General **Aslam Beg**, COAS. She was obliged to discharge her duties as a member of an informal arrangement that came to be called the “**troika**” and included

the president, the COAS, and herself. Her plan to dismantle this arrangement involved the appointment of Aslam Beg as chairman of the three Joint Chiefs of Staff, a post that did not carry much weight. Once Beg had been moved out, she planned to bring in an officer of her choice to become the army chief. The position of Joint Chiefs was occupied at that time by the Pakistani navy's Admiral Sirhoey. Bhutto asked the president to make these changes; the president, claiming that the constitution gave him the right to make these appointments, refused. What followed was a bitter dispute between the president and the prime minister that ultimately led to the latter's dismissal in August 1990. This episode came to be known as the Sirhoey Affair.

**SIX POINT PROGRAM.** Sheikh **Mujibur Rahman** unveiled his "Six Point Program" for autonomy for the province of East Pakistan in a meeting held in **Lahore** on 12 February 1966. The adoption of the program was to have a dramatic effect on Pakistan's future as a nation state. Its announcement holds the same significance in Pakistan's history as the **All-India Muslim League's** resolution, passed on 23 March 1940, demanding the creation of Pakistan. That resolution was also proposed and passed in Lahore.

**SOCIAL ACTION PROGRAM (SAP).** In the early 1990s, several members of the **Aid to Pakistan Consortium** conditioned their economic support on greater emphasis by the government to social development. These efforts by the donors resulted in the formulation of the Social Action Program in association with the **World Bank**. The SAP was a comprehensive program for improving the quality of life in the country's poorer areas.

The SAP had a number of unique features. Built into it were provisions to ensure that the government would continue to provide support to the program. Initially, the government agreed to implement the program for three years, from the 1993–1994 to 1995–1996 financial years, at an expenditure of US\$4,020 million, of which US\$3,050 million, or 76 percent, was to be provided by Pakistan from its own resources. The World Bank agreed to lend US\$200 million for the program, another US\$100 million came from the **Asian Development Bank**, and the Netherlands provided US\$13 million. Because the program was implemented in a reasonably satisfactory way, the World

Bank agreed to seek the remaining US\$105 million from external sources. In 1996, the program was extended for a period of two years to the 1997–1998 financial year. The total expenditure over the five-year period was estimated at US\$7,731 million. In 1998, Pakistan and the donor community agreed to launch SAP II at a cost of US\$10 billion to cover the 1998–2002 period. However, the program was discontinued after an internal evaluation by the Bank concluded that a significant amount of funds released through the program were used for recruiting unqualified teachers, nurses, and midwives. Thousands of these workers were “ghosts” since they did not work but collected their monthly paychecks. *See also* EDUCATION.

**SOHRAB GOTH.** In 1978, a **Pathan** entrepreneur set up a store in Sohrab Goth, a village on the outskirts of **Karachi**, selling imported merchandise smuggled into the country through illegal channels. Soon after, Sohrab Goth became the site of a “*bara*” market, so called because of a similar bazaar in a village of that name that operated near **Peshawar** selling smuggled imported goods. In 1981, thousands of **refugees** from **Afghanistan** moved to Karachi and settled in the vicinity of Sohrab Goth. With the refugees came arms and drugs into the “*bara*” market of Sohrab Goth. With the emergence of Pakistan as a source of heroin for Europe and America, Sohrab Goth became an important link in the drug-supply chain. This troubled the U.S. administration, and with the use of heroin spreading quickly among Pakistan’s working as well as affluent classes, the government of General **Zia ul-Haq** also became concerned. Pressure mounted on the government to move against the drug merchants of Sohrab Goth.

On 12 December 1986, the Sindh administration launched “Operation Cleanup.” Bulldozers moved into the village and leveled shops and houses. Reaction to the operation came quickly; on 14 December 1986, the residents of Sohrab Goth descended on the neighboring Orangi Colony and unleashed “acts of reprisal” against the *muhajir* (refugee) community. The “Black Sunday” left dozens of people dead. What ensued was ethnic violence of the type Pakistan had not known in its history. It left 170 dead and thousands injured. For several days, the government seemed to have lost control over Karachi’s outskirts. Peace was restored by army action, and on 22 December 1986, the displaced Pashtun



population was moved into three camps south of Sohrab Goth on the national highway.

**SOLARZ AMENDMENT.** *See* PARVEZ, ARSHAD Z.

**SOUTH ASIA FREE TRADE AREA (SAFTA).** The seven members of the **South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)** decided at their thirteenth summit held at **Islamabad** in January 2004 to launch a free trade area in their region. They gave themselves two years to do preparatory work for the launch and agreed to inaugurate SAFTA on 1 January 2006. All tariffs on trade among the nations represented in SAARC were to be removed within a period of 10 years. The less developed countries that included **Bangladesh**, Bhutan, Maldives, and Nepal were allowed more time to make the adjustment to a tariff-free regime. The fastest pace was to be assumed by **India** and Pakistan while Sri Lanka was given a timetable that lay between that followed by the other two groups of countries. A committee of experts consisting of trade officials was set up to undertake the work leading up to the launch of the free trade area.

The experts met a number of times but were unable to complete their work in the stipulated time. They dealt with four issues: sensitive lists developed by each country to protect some of its products, the rules of origin for the products that were to be allowed duty-free access to the member countries, the amount of compensation to be provided to the less developed countries for loss of revenue by the governments as a result of the removal of tariffs, and technical assistance to be provided to the region's poorer members for moving toward a tariff free regime. The SAARC nations met for their fourteenth summit in November 2005 at Dacca (Dhaka) after twice postponing their meeting. They noted that more time would be needed for the launch of the free trade area but did not set a new timetable. However, they agreed to admit **Afghanistan** into SAARC with the expectation that it will also join SAFTA.

**SOUTH ASIAN ASSOCIATION FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION (SAARC).** The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation was the brainchild of President Ziaur Rahman of **Bangladesh**. Formally launched in December 1985 in Dacca

(Dhaka), at the summit of leaders from Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, its purpose was to improve relations among the countries of South Asia and to provide a forum for the discussion of regional issues. All decisions were to be taken on the basis of consensus, a provision that made progress difficult in light of a number of bilateral agreements between the countries of the region. The long-enduring problem between India and Pakistan made it difficult for the organization to hold summit meetings on schedule.

The 2002 summit, held in Katmandu after a long delay, brought the leaders of Pakistan and India face to face while their armies were massed along their borders. In fact, President **Pervez Musharraf** had to travel through China in order to get to Katmandu since India did not allow Pakistani aircraft to fly over its territory. SAARC's twelfth summit was held in **Islamabad** on 4–6 January 2004 at which the member countries agreed to launch the **South Asia Free Trade Area (SAFTA)** on 1 January 2006. The thirteenth summit was held in Dacca (Dhaka) on 12–13 November 2005, at which the association decided to admit **Afghanistan** as the eighth member. The SAARC has a small secretariat that operates out of Katmandu, the capital of Nepal.

**SOUTH ASIAN PREFERENTIAL TRADING ARRANGEMENT (SAPTA)**. After ratification by Pakistan, the South Asian Preferential Trading Arrangement came into being on 8 December 1995. It was expected that the formation of the SAPTA would provide some impetus for growth of regional trade in South Asia. Trade between the countries of the region amounted to only 3 percent of the total in the first half of the 1990s. The items covered by the SAPTA agreement were a small fraction of even this modest exchange, however.

The government of Pakistan decided to move with extreme caution in implementing SAPTA. It allowed duty relief on only 38 items (spices, fibers, medicinal herbs, leather, chemicals, etc.), whereas India gave concessions to 106 items to be imported from Pakistan. Also, the duty on imports of specified items from the members of the **South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)** other than India, was to be equivalent to 85 percent of the prevailing rate, compared to 90 percent for imports from India. At the tenth an-

nual meeting of SAARC foreign ministers held in New Delhi on 19 December 1995, it was decided to create a free trade area after the turn of the century but no later than 2005. This was delayed until January 1, 2006, when the South Asia Free Trade Area (SAFTA) was formally inaugurated.

#### **SOUTHEAST ASIA TREATY ORGANIZATION (SEATO).**

SEATO, established in 1956, was the brainchild of John Foster Dulles, the Secretary of State in the administration of the U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953–1961). It was a defense alliance that included the **United States** and a number of countries from Southeast Asia, all of whom were apprehensive about the encroachment of communism. Pakistan, having signed the **Mutual Defense Agreement** with the United States in 1954, joined SEATO; Pakistan and the United States were the only non-regional members of the alliance. Pakistan's membership in the alliance was important because the country was already a participant in the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and thereby provided the link between the two alliances. Turkey, as a member of both CENTO and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), was another link in the chain of buffer states formed by Washington to contain the spread of communism in Europe and Asia.

**SOVIET UNION–PAKISTAN RELATIONS.** Pakistan's emergence as an independent state in August 1947 was not greeted with enthusiasm by any major political power, least of all the Soviet Union. Each country had its reason for not according the new country a warm welcome: in the case of the Soviet Union, it was particularly distasteful to see a “religious nationality” break away from a state to establish a separate political entity of its own. The Muslim republics in central Asia were never happy at being included in the Russian empire—either in Czarist Russia or in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). By granting the Muslims of British India the right to secede from the motherland, London had accommodated the forces of separation that Moscow had resisted in its own domain for so long. Besides, Pakistan was not very far from the USSR's southern border, and some of the ethnic groups in the new country had historical ties with the Muslims in the Central Asian Soviet republics.

An unqualified and warm reception to Pakistan's birth would have meant giving a form of recognition to the problem of Soviet nationalities. For understandable reasons, the Soviets were not prepared to do this.

This set the stage for two foreign-policy decisions taken by the Pakistani leadership in the early 1950s: first, to stay out of the non-aligned movement; second, to side unequivocally with the Western countries in the Cold War with the Soviet bloc. Both decisions dismayed the Soviets, who, with the assumption of power by Nikita Khrushchev, began to openly side with India on a number of disputes between India and Pakistan. This pronounced Soviet tilt toward India was corrected somewhat when **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto** became foreign minister in the government of **Muhammad Ayub Khan**. In the early 1960s, Pakistan signed an oil-exploration agreement with the Soviets; in 1966, at the invitation of Soviet Prime Minister Aleksei Kosygin, India and Pakistan signed the **Tashkent Declaration**; and in the second half of the 1960s, Pakistan invited Soviet assistance in setting up a **steel mill** in **Karachi**. This thaw in the relationship lasted until 1971 when the Soviets once again supported India in the third **Indo-Pakistan War** fought over **Bangladesh**.

The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan in December 1979 placed Pakistan and the Soviet Union on opposite sides of the Afghan conflict. The 1980s saw a sharp deterioration in relations between the two countries as Pakistan permitted the use of its territory not only to accommodate 3.5 million refugees from **Afghanistan** but also to channel military and economic assistance to the Afghan **mujahideen**, who successfully battled the Soviet troops in their country. In January 1988, Mikhail Gorbachev announced that the Soviet troops would withdraw from Afghanistan if Pakistan and the communist regime of Afghanistan could sign an agreement at Geneva before 15 March 1988. Pakistan and Afghanistan signed an agreement that met this deadline, and the Soviet Union pulled its troops out of Afghanistan.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and its replacement by the Russian Republic brought a significant change in Moscow's attitude toward South Asia, including India and Pakistan. Preoccupied with its own economic problems, Russia was now only marginally interested in South Asia. It was now more interested in carving out a

role for itself as a member of the community of industrial and developed nations. Its ambition was rewarded when in June 1998 the G7 group of industrial nations became the G8, with Russia included. In the very first G8 meeting held in Birmingham, England, Russia joined with other industrial countries to agree to a freeze in lending by international financial institutions to sanction both India and Pakistan after the two countries carried out nuclear bomb tests in May. A few days after agreeing with the G8 position, Russia announced its intention to supply two heavy-water reactors to India, a development that drew instant criticism from the Western countries and seemed to suggest that the country was not playing entirely by the rules it was now expected to follow.

**STOCK MARKETS.** Pakistan has three stock markets operating in **Karachi, Lahore, and Islamabad**. At one point in the country's history—in the 1960s, during the presidency of **Muhammad Ayub Khan**—the evolution of capital markets in Pakistan was much more advanced compared with countries at the same level of development. **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's** reforms introduced in the early 1970s, including the nationalization of large-scale industries and financial institutions working in the private sector, dealt a severe blow to capital-market development.

The stock markets showed some life in the early 1990s when **Mian Nawaz Sharif** was in office as prime minister for the first time. In 1992, the KSE-100 index crossed the 2000 mark for the first time in the history of the Karachi Stock Exchange. The economic downturn during the second tenure of **Benazir Bhutto** as prime minister depressed the markets, however. When she was dismissed in November 1996, the KSE-100 index had dipped to below 1300. The index recovered somewhat with Nawaz Sharif's assumption of office in February 1997; it crossed the 2000 mark once again. In May 1998, however, following the testing of nuclear bombs by India and the prospect that Pakistan might follow suit, the index showed a sharp decline. The index registered another record low at 1157. There was near panic in the market following the announcement by Pakistan that it had carried out nuclear tests on 28 May; the KSE-100 index closed at 1032, and the government, using the emergency powers it had acquired, shut down the market for one day. When the markets

opened on 30 May, the index dropped below 1000. It declined to 850 in August 1998.

On 15 March 2005, the **Karachi** Stock Exchange-100 index reached the 10,000 mark after starting the year at 6218. The strategists agreed that the market's rise was fueled by two developments: the program of **privatization** that was now being aggressively pursued by the government of President **Pervez Musharraf** and the reentry of foreigners into the market.

The market's slide began again on 17 March 2005 when the KSE-100 index declined by 225 points but still closed at above 10,000. There was major selling in two scrips—both public sector companies that were being gradually privatized—Oil and Gas Development Corporation (OGDC) and Pakistan Telecommunications Limited (PTCL). Strategists described the decline as a technical correction, which they saw as benefiting the market since it would discourage speculators from becoming very active. However, the market's plunge continued. By 25 March, the index had dipped to 7965, and it was clear that the market faced a crisis. However, the government, while under pressure to intervene, decided to stay on the sidelines. The index steadied around 7500, 25 percent lower than its peak earlier in the year. And by early 2006, it crossed the 10,000 mark again. It then had a market capitalization of US\$40 billion.

**SUFISM.** As a system of beliefs within the teaching of Islam, development of Sufism was a reaction against the orthodox views of the early Umayyad period. The proponents of the Sufistic point of view gained rapid acceptance in the non-Arab world, in particular Central Asia and Turkey. The Arabic term *sufi* (mystic) derives from *suf* (wool) probably in reference to the woolen garments worn by the ascetics who yearned for a personal union with God. These ascetics pleaded *tarifa* (path) and *haqiqa* (goal) different from the impersonal *sharia* (traditional Islamic law). This notwithstanding, the Sufis strove to remain within the mainstream of Islamic thinking.

Sufism appealed to many segments of the Indian society that had a strong disposition toward mysticism. It was largely as a result of the travels and teachings of several influential Sufis, **Muinuddin Chisti**, **al Suhrawarndi**, and Nizamuddin Auliya among them, that Islam penetrated into India. Several Sufi shrines in India, including those at

Ajmer and Delhi, and in what is now Pakistan, including those at **Lahore** and Pakpattan, attracted not only Muslim disciples but also Hindus. Even today the shrines in India are visited by non-Muslims.

It was inevitable that the system of thought inspired by the Sufi saints would come into conflict with puritanical Islam, in particular **Wahabism** that was to become the state religion of **Saudi Arabia** in the 20th century. Two developments—the migration of millions of Muslims from Delhi and what is now the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh to Pakistan brought puritanical Islam to **Karachi** and the **Northwest Frontier Province**, and the deep involvement of Saudi Arabia in the fight against the Soviet Union’s occupation of **Afghanistan** (1979–1989)—made Pakistan the central battleground for the conflict between these two interpretations of Islam. With the rise of the **Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal** (MMA) to political power in the early years of the rule of General **Pervez Musharraf**, this conflict sharpened to the point that the liberal interpretation of Islam as represented by Sufistic teaching went into retreat. In 2004, after proclaiming that “moderate enlightenment” should be his country’s ideology and after a well advertised visit to the shrine of Muinnuddin Chisti at Ajmer, India in April 2005, Musharraf began a campaign to control the further penetration of fundamentalist Islam as represented by Wahabism in the country. This brought him and his government into direct conflict with the MMA and put further pressure on the followers of Sufism in the country.

**SUHRAWARDHY, HUSSAIN SHAHEED (1893–1963).** Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardhy was born in Midnapur, Bengal and was educated at Calcutta and Oxford. He entered politics in the mid-1920s, and was a member of the Bengal Legislative Council from 1924 to 1945. The launching of the Khilafat movement by the Indian Muslim leadership introduced Suhrawardhy to mass politics. In 1936, Suhrawardhy was appointed to the powerful position of secretary of the Bengal Muslim League. He used his position to advance his political career beyond Bengal. In 1940, at the historic meeting of the **All-India Muslim League** held in **Lahore**, he seconded the “**Pakistan Resolution**” demanding the establishment of independent states for the Muslims of India.

Suhrawardhy took an active part in the Pakistan movement, and after having been elected as the parliamentary leader of the Muslim

League Party in Bengal's Legislative Assembly, he was invited to become the province's chief minister in 1946. He held back his support for the British plan of 3 June 1947 to partition the provinces of Bengal and **Punjab**, and for a few weeks he actively canvassed the idea of a united but independent Bengal. It appears that Suhrawardhy's campaign for the creation of an independent Bengal may have had the blessing of **Muhammad Ali Jinnah**, but it did not endear him to other leaders of the Muslim League. His growing influence in Muslim politics was resented in particular by **Liaqat Ali Khan**, who teamed up with Khawaja Nazimuddin to deny Suhrawardhy the chairmanship of the East Bengal Muslim League, formed after the partition of Bengal and the establishment of Pakistan.

But Suhrawardhy was too active a politician to be sidelined for very long; he reasserted his role in Bengal in 1949 by founding the **Awami Muslim League** (AML). The AML joined with **Fazlul Haq's** Krishak Sramik Party in 1954 to defeat the Muslim League in the first election held in Bengal after partition. In September 1955 Suhrawardhy was elected the leader of the opposition in the **Second Constituent Assembly**. He used this position to seek constitutional protection for East Pakistan in any political arrangement to be devised by the Constituent Assembly. After declaring that the **Constitution of 1956** had secured "95 percent autonomy for East Pakistan," he accepted President **Iskander Mirza's** call to become Pakistan's prime minister, a position he held for just over a year, from September 1956 to October 1957. He opposed the martial-law government of General **Muhammad Ayub Khan** and campaigned openly and actively against the military government's plan to introduce a new constitutional arrangement. This led to his incarceration in 1962 for about six months. He died in Beirut on 5 December 1963.

**"SURREYGATE."** The story that the Zardaris—**Asif Ali Zardari** and his wife, **Benazir Bhutto**, the prime minister of Pakistan—may have purchased an estate in Surrey, near London, was first carried by the *Sunday Express* in late May 1996. The news was instantly communicated to the people in Pakistan, and a question pertaining to the alleged deal was raised in the National Assembly by **Mian Nawaz Sharif**, the leader of the opposition, and vehemently denied by the



prime minister. The opposition's accusations and the prime minister's angry denial earned the developing story the name of "Surreygate."

Ms. Bhutto tried to get out of the situation created by the opposition's charges by first denying them angrily. The story, however, refused to go away. On 21 August 1996 Nawaz Sharif took the floor of the National Assembly once again, this time armed with a long list of damaging facts that seemed to lend credence to the accusation that a private firm, Roomina Property, registered in the Isle of Man, in October 1995, had purchased the Rockwood estate in Surrey. The Surrey house was being furnished with tons of freight carried by **Pakistan International Airlines** at no charge. The purchase of the house by the Zardaris in Surrey was one of the charges leveled against the prime minister in the dismissal order issued by President **Farooq Leghari** on 5 November 1996.

**SYED, G. M. (1903–1995).** G. M. Syed was born in the Dadu district in **Sindh**, and remained active in politics for more than four decades, often at odds with the government in power. He was among several prominent leaders of the Muslim community of British India who initially resisted **Muhammad Ali Jinnah's** attempt to create a strong political organization for the entire Indian Muslim population. Like **Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana** and Sir **Sikander Hayat Khan in Punjab**, **Abdul Ghaffar Khan** in the **Northwest Frontier**, and **Fazlul Haq** in Bengal, he believed that Muslim interests in the Muslim-majority provinces could be best served by a loose confederation of Indian provinces. Although he joined the **All-India Muslim League** in the 1940s, became a cosponsor of the "**Pakistan Resolution**" in 1940, and for a brief period (1942–1946), was a member of the Central Working Party of the All-India Muslim League (1942), he never won the full trust of Muhammad Ali Jinnah.

After independence, Syed moved into the opposition and began to mobilize support for his efforts to gain greater autonomy for Sindh within the state of Pakistan. It was for this reason that he opposed the incorporation of Sindh in the **One Unit of West Pakistan**, and suffered long periods of incarceration for launching an anti-One Unit campaign in the province. His disillusionment with the course of political development grew and resulted in the launching of the **Jiye Sindh** (Long live Sindh) and **Sindhudesh** (Land of the Sindhis) movements, which were

seen by his detractors as secessionist in nature. The governments of **Zia ul-Haq** and **Muhammad Khan Junejo** were more tolerant toward Syed and allowed him greater freedom of movement and expression. He was allowed to travel to India and speak openly in public. Newspapers carried extensive coverage of Syed's activities, leading to speculation that the government may have been using him to create another force in Sindh besides **Benazir Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party**.

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**TABLIGHI JAMAAT.** The Tablighi Jamaat (Organization for the Spread of God's Word) was established in Delhi in 1880. The organization operated out of an office located near the shrine of **Sufi** saint Nazimuddin Aulia in a suburb of Delhi. In the 1940, Muhammad Ilyas, a Muslim reformist scholar, gave the movement its present day structure. After the establishment of Pakistan, the Jamaat set itself up in the new country, using **Raiwind** near **Lahore** as its headquarters. The Tablighi Jamaat is different from other major religious organizations in Pakistan in that it neither has regular membership nor any identified leadership. All Muslims can participate in its activities as long as they fulfill certain requirements. Those wishing to join the Jamaat's traveling missions must demonstrate that they have made arrangements to have their dependents looked after during their absence.

The Jamaat's main purpose is to establish contact with both Muslims and non-Muslims and teach them what it considers as correct Islamic practices. The task of proselytizing involves members of the Jamaat, both male and female, leaving home in small groups for varying periods of time, ranging from 3 to 40 days. All expenses for these trips must be borne by the members themselves. Only those who have already performed a four-month-long domestic mission and two 40-day local tours are allowed to embark on foreign trips. After the resurgence of Islam in Pakistan in the 1970s and 1980s, the Tablighi Jamaat's attractions increased enormously. Now hundreds of thousands of people attend its annual meeting held in **Karachi's** Madani mosque. According to some estimates, 2 million people are currently associated with the Jamaat in Pakistan. The organization remains active in India and has established itself in the United States, Europe, and Africa.

**TALIBAN.** The emergence of the Taliban—the Arabic word for “students”—as a major political and military force in **Afghanistan** caught most observers, in particular those from the West, by surprise. In November 1994, the Taliban marched out of their camps in the northwestern areas of Pakistan, organized themselves into a potent military force, and in a short span of a few weeks conquered one-third of Afghanistan. The size of the force increased as it got closer to Kabul; en route, the Taliban also picked up sophisticated weapons and acquired an air force. In March 1995, they arrived on the doorstep of Kabul.

Few guerrilla leaders chose to stand up and fight the Taliban; some joined them while others, like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, just melted away into the hills, leaving the territory they controlled and the arms they had collected in the hands of the advancing forces. By attacking the city of Kabul, the Taliban lost their moral authority, however. Their rapid advance toward Kabul without shedding much blood had distinguished them from other guerrilla forces that had ravaged the country in their hunger for power and territory. The Taliban assault on Kabul was as vicious and destructive as the relentless campaign conducted for years by various warlords, most notably Hekmatyar. In the end, the Taliban failed to capture the city, which was protected by Ahmad Shah Masoud, the most successful guerrilla chief in the days when the Afghans were fighting the Russians rather than each other.

In September 1995, the Taliban changed their tactics and returned to doing what they had done so effectively before their advance on Kabul. They brought more territory under their control, including the city of Herat in the western part of the country, largely by bribing or cajoling faction leaders to join them. Although they now controlled nearly one-half of the Afghan territory, by bringing Herat into their domain they picked a new enemy, Iran. Herat was located in the Shi'ite part of Afghanistan, and Iran was not prepared to let its co-religionists be subjected to rule by the **Pathan** Sunnis. The Taliban's entry into Herat also soured Pakistan's relations with Iran.

The entry of the Taliban into the Afghan picture complicated Pakistan's relations with the country it had helped for so long and at a great cost to itself. On 6 September 1995, a mob burned down Pakistan's embassy in Kabul. An embassy official was killed and others in the building, including the ambassador, were injured. The mob was protesting Pakistan's support of the Taliban.

The final assault by the Taliban came in 1996 when they were able to buy their way into Meraj Sharif, the last stronghold of the forces that had sought to slow down their conquest of Afghanistan. With Meraj Sharif under their control, the Taliban were able to claim that they were the legitimate rulers of Afghanistan. This claim was accepted by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, who recognized the Taliban government. Soon after this recognition, however, the Taliban forces were driven out of Meraj Sharif and confined once again to about two-thirds of the country.

While continuing to do battle in the northeast of the country, the Taliban government in Kabul introduced an exceptionally rigid style of government in the areas they occupied. Girls were prohibited from attending school, women were barred from employment outside their homes, music was banned, men were ordered to grow beards, and women were instructed to cover themselves from head to toe whenever they left home. These dictates were first ignored by the Western world, but in late 1997 a number of countries, most notably the United States, began to openly express concern to Pakistan about the way the Taliban were governing Afghanistan. During a brief visit to **Islamabad**, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright told her Pakistani hosts that the **United States** expected Pakistan to exercise its influence over the Taliban to get them to relax their rule over their country.

By August 1998, following the conquest of Mazar Sharif, the last stronghold of the opposition, the Taliban could claim to have taken all of Afghanistan. They might have gained international recognition but for the attack on the United States embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, for which the Americans held **Osama bin Laden**, based in **Khowst**, Afghanistan, to be responsible. The United States launched missile attacks on Khowst to punish al Qaeda for having sponsored the attacks on the embassies.

In 1996, Osama bin Laden, forced to leave Sudan where he had been active for several years, had decided to relocate in Afghanistan. In its report, the United States Commission on 9/11 stated that “it is unlikely that bin Laden could have returned to Afghanistan had Pakistan disapproved. The Pakistani military intelligence service probably had advance knowledge of his coming, and its officers may have facilitated his travel.” Having in the meantime founded his organiza-

tion **al Qaeda**, bin Laden turned Afghanistan into a vast camp for recruiting and training **terrorists** (he called them jihadists) to wage war against the West, in particular the United States. Following the terrorist attacks on the United States, carried out by the activists trained mostly in Afghanistan, Washington declared war on the Taliban regime. Military operations led by the United States began on 8 October 2001, and Kabul fell on 13 December to a joint force of the Afghan Northern Alliance and a coalition led by the United States. As of 2006, in spite of their defeat, remnants of the Taliban continue to operate against the government of Hamid Karzai and the United States. Some of the Taliban operate out of the sanctuaries offered to them by the tribal chiefs of northwestern Pakistan who remain sympathetic to the movement.

**TAMIZUDDIN KHAN, MAULVI (1889–1963).** Born in Bengal, Tamizuddin Khan became active in Muslim politics of the province at an early age. He was elected to the Bengali Provincial Assembly in 1937 from a Muslim seat and in 1938 joined the Krishak Praja—the **Muslim League** coalition administration led by **Fazlul Haq**. After the partition of British India in 1947 and the establishment of Pakistan, Tamizuddin left Bengal and moved to **Karachi**, the capital of the new country. The Muslim League elected him deputy president of the **Constituent Assembly**. **Muhammad Ali Jinnah** was the assembly president. After Jinnah’s death in September 1948, Tamizuddin became the president of the Constituent Assembly. Under his leadership, the assembly spent a great deal of its time debating the “**basic principles**” that should govern constitution-making but failed to write a constitution for the country. The assembly was unable to agree on such issues as the sharing of power between the federation and the provinces and the role of Islam in politics. In 1954, after having been in existence seven years, it was able to agree on one important issue, however: that the governor-general wielded too much power under the existing legal structure. A bill was passed to curtail the chief executive’s power, but Governor-General **Ghulam Muhammad** moved before the bill could become law. He dissolved the Constituent Assembly.

As the president of the assembly, Tamizuddin filed a suit in Sindh High Court questioning the legality of the governor-general’s move. The court accepted the argument, but on appeal by the government,

its decision was overturned by the Supreme Court. Chief Justice **Muhammad Munir**, in writing the majority opinion, argued in favor of the government on the basis of the “**doctrine of necessity**,” or the judicial need to legitimize an act, even if it is a priori unlawful, once a new government has come into being following the act. *Tamizuddin vs. the Government of Pakistan* remains a landmark case in the legal and political history of Pakistan. The “doctrine of necessity” was to be invoked a number of times by the courts to give legal cover to coup d’etats and other unconstitutional moves.

Tamizuddin Khan returned to politics after General **Muhammad Ayub Khan** had consolidated his hold over Pakistan. In 1962, he joined Ayub Khan’s **Pakistan Muslim League** and was unanimously elected speaker of the National Assembly constituted under the **Constitution of 1962**. By accepting the political order that was put into place by the military coup led by Ayub Khan in 1958, Tamizuddin Khan implicitly accepted the “doctrine of necessity.”

**TANZIM NIFAZ SHARIAT-I-MUHAMMADI (TNSM)**. Tanzim Nifaz Shariat-i-Muhammadi, or the organization for the promulgation of the legal system endorsed by Prophet Muhammad, scored its first success in the spring of 1994 when the government agreed to the enforcement of *Sharia* (Islamic law) in Malakand, a remote, mountainous district in the northwest of Pakistan. The TNSM, responding to a call for action by Maulana Sufi Muhammad, a highly respected Islamic scholar from the area, had launched a violent campaign directly challenging the authority of the state. It blocked the Malakand Pass on the Mardan-Bunnu highway, a busy road that connected this remote area with the rest of Pakistan. A dozen people were killed when the government’s law-enforcement agencies tried to open the highway. On 17 May 1994, the administration of **Benazir Bhutto** accepted the TNSM’s demand and agreed to establish a new system of *kazi* (magistrates with knowledge of Islam and therefore able to apply the Islamic legal system) courts.

A number of TNSM activists were not satisfied with the slow pace at which the government was implementing the agreement it had signed with their organization, however. Accordingly, in November 1994, another demonstration was organized that resulted in the loss

of 21 lives, this time in the adjoining district of Swat. This was the second time that the TNSM's armed followers had confronted the government during the course of the year. Among those killed was Badiuzzaman, a **Pakistan People's Party** member of the **Northwest Frontier Province** Provincial Assembly. The government now took a more aggressive position and arrested Maulana Sufi Muhammad. It also declared that it had no intention of moving faster than it had planned in bringing the new legal structure to the area.

**TARAR, MUHAMMAD RAFIQ (1929–)**. Muhammad Rafiq Tarar entered politics after a long career in the **judiciary**. He was born in the **Punjab** city of Gujranwala and studied law at Lahore Law College. After serving as a civil judge for a number of years, he was elevated to the Punjab High Court and from there went to the Supreme Court of Pakistan. He retired from the Supreme Court in 1994 and three years later received a ticket from Prime Minister **Mian Nawaz Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League (PML)** to contest for a seat in the Senate. He won the seat. In December 1997 he was chosen by the Pakistan Muslim League to be the party's candidate for the presidency.

Tarar was sworn in as Pakistan's ninth president on 1 January 1998 after having been elected the day before by a joint sitting of the National Assembly, the Senate, and the four provincial assemblies. Representing the PML, Tarar received 374 votes compared to 58 votes cast for Aftab Shahban Mirani, the candidate of the **Pakistan People's Party (PPP)**. **Jamiatul-Ulemai-Islam's Maulana Fazlur Rahman** received 26 votes. Tarar stayed on as president even after the military assumed power on 12 October 1999 and General **Pervez Musharraf** chose the title of Chief Executive. However, in June 2001, shortly before General Musharraf went to Agra, India, for a summit meeting with Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Tarar was forced to resign his position. On 12 June, Musharraf became president.

**TARBELA DAM.** The Tarbela Dam is one of the largest earth-filled **dams** in the world, and the largest dam in Pakistan. It was constructed at a site some 80 kilometers north of **Islamabad**, Pakistan's capital. The dam rises to a height of 150 meters above the river bed

and is 2,800 meters long. The reservoir area is 132 square kilometers; the Tarbela lake formed by the dam is 80 kilometers long. The initial size of the reservoir was over 1.2 MCM (million cubic meters), although this capacity was rapidly eroded by the heavy silting of the lake. Like the **Mangla Dam** on the Jhelum River, Tarbela is a multi-purpose project. It provides electric power as well as water for irrigation. Once the Tarbela powerhouse was completed, it had the capacity to generate 4,000 MW electricity.

After some questioning and hesitation, the international community of donors agreed to finance the project out of the financial resources that had been mobilized to implement the **Indus Water Treaty** between India and Pakistan. By the middle of 1966, the **World Bank**, which managed the Indus Basin Development Fund on behalf of the donor community, was persuaded that the dam on the **Indus** at Tarbela made economic sense, although the economic rate of return from the project was not very high. The dam's construction started in 1968, four years later than originally planned; it took six years to build and was commissioned in 1974. It was constructed by a consortium of European companies, led by an Italian firm, which worked under the name of Tarbela Joint Ventures (TJV). The TJV outbid the consortium that had constructed the Mangla Dam.

In retrospect, the dam contributed significantly to Pakistan's economic development. The low rate of return originally estimated by the World Bank was no longer valid after OPEC increased the price of oil in the 1970s. Pakistan, an oil-importing country, needed its own sources of power supply. The power generated by Tarbela became much more critical for the country than had been originally envisaged.

**TASHKENT DECLARATION.** Immediately after India and Pakistan accepted the United Nations resolution calling for a ceasefire in the **Indo-Pakistan War of 1965**, Aleksei Kosygin, the Soviet prime minister, invited **Muhammad Ayub Khan**, president of Pakistan and Lal Bahadur Shastri, the prime minister of India, to Tashkent to begin the process of reconciliation between the two countries. The choice of Tashkent, the capital of what was then the southern republic of Uzbekistan in the Asian part of the Soviet Union, underscored the Soviet interest in the area in which both India and Pakistan were located. The



Tashkent Declaration was signed after a week of intense negotiations between the two delegations. Kosygin and his associates took an active part in the discussions. Prodded and encouraged by the Soviet leadership, the two South Asian leaders affirmed “their obligation under the [United Nations] Charter not to have recourse to force and to settle their disputes through peaceful means.” Pakistan and India agreed to withdraw their troops to the positions they had occupied on 5 August 1965 when Pakistan had launched its **Operation Gibraltar** to encourage an uprising in the Indian part of **Kashmir**. Prime Minister Shastri’s death of a heart attack soon after the signing of the Tashkent Declaration added a dramatic touch to the entire episode.

Although the Tashkent Declaration did little to improve relations between India and Pakistan it had a profound impact on political developments in Pakistan. It proved to be the turning point for the administration of Ayub Khan. It quickly became known that Foreign Minister **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto**, who had accompanied Ayub Khan to Tashkent, had not supported the declaration. He resigned his post soon after returning to Pakistan, alleging that Ayub Khan had given up at Tashkent what had been gained on the battlefield. Bhutto’s position on Tashkent, which he never spelled out in detail, won him many admirers in **Punjab**, Pakistan’s largest province. “Tashkent” proved to be a potent political slogan. It attracted the powerful anti-India lobby to the fold of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s **Pakistan People’s Party** and contributed to the party’s triumph in the **elections of December 1970**.

**TAXILA.** Taxila is one of the most important archeological sites in Pakistan. It is about 30 kilometers northwest of the twin cities of **Rawalpindi** and **Islamabad**, a couple of kilometers beyond the Margalla Pass. The cluster of three cities now called Taxila was built over a period of more than a thousand years, from 600 BC to AD 600. These cities together constituted a highly developed cultural, religious, and economic center situated at the confluence of the trade routes that linked China, India, Central Asia, and Europe. Buddhism evolved in these cities and spread to other parts of Asia. Asoka, the grandson of Chandragupta of the Mauryan empire, embraced Buddhism while serving his grandfather as the viceroy of Taxila. It is probable that the large stupa of Dharmarajika at Taxila was erected by Asoka to house a portion of Buddha’s ashes.

The first of Taxila's three cities is now called Bhir Mound. It was built in the sixth century BC and lasted for 400 years, to the second century BC. Alexander the Great visited the city in 326 BC and with the help of three interpreters held a prolonged philosophical discourse with the intellectuals of the area. Sirkap, the second city, was founded by the Bactrian Greeks who were descendants of Alexander's army. The city lasted for 260 years, from 180 BC to AD 80. In about AD 60, the Kushans invaded Taxila and began work on a new city, Sirsukh, which lasted for about 600 years. It was sacked and buried by the White Huns in AD 455, but was rebuilt, although not to its previous grandeur.

Most of the archeological work at Taxila was done by Sir John Marshall around 1912. The three cities yielded a rich harvest of stone sculptures, coins, implements, household utensils, and ornaments that are now to be found in museums all over the world. The best Pakistani collections are in the museums at Taxila, **Peshawar**, and **Lahore**.

**TECHNICAL COMMITTEE ON WATER RESOURCES (TCWR)**. Increasingly concerned with the impending shortage of **water**, the government of President **Pervez Musharraf** sought to develop a consensus around the construction of a number of high-level **dams**, mostly on the **Indus River**. Some of these projects—in particular the construction of the dams at **Kalabagh** and **Bhasha** on the Indus—were delayed for years because of intense opposition by a number of political and environmental groups. On 15 November 2003, President Musharraf appointed a technical committee, the TCWR, to address the issues that had delayed the construction of water storage projects. The committee was also instructed to examine the problem created by the rapid silting of the **Mangla** and **Tarbela** reservoirs. A highly respected engineer from **Sindh**, A. W. G. Abbasi, was appointed committee chairman. The committee was initially expected to complete its work in six months. However, its life was extended several times. The committee worked in collaboration with the **Indus River System Authority (IRSA)**.

**TEHRIK-E-INSAF**. **Imran Khan**, the famous cricketeer, launched a movement on 25 April 1996 to fight corruption and injustice, which he said were rampant in the country. He called the movement *Tehrik-*

*e-Insaf*, or the Justice Movement. That Imran Khan would start a political movement had been the subject of speculation for some time. The actual announcement of the launching came 10 days after a big bomb extensively damaged the hospital he had built in memory of his mother, Shaukat Khanum.

Imran Khan provided few details of his program other than to say that he planned to set up committees to advise him on improvement in areas that included justice and legal affairs, human rights, health, education, economy, youth employment, women's affairs, and the environment. The Tehrik was still struggling to organize itself when, in November 1996, President **Farooq Leghari** dismissed the government of Prime Minister **Benazir Bhutto** and ordered general elections to be held in February 1997. Khan and the Tehrik launched an active campaign and fielded some 300 candidates for the National and Provincial Assemblies. Imran Khan contested from half a dozen seats himself, including **Lahore**, his native city, Mianwali, the native city of his father, and from the cities where he thought he had a firm base of support. The Tehrik's failure to win a single seat surprised most political observers. The elections were a major setback for the Tehrik and for Imran Khan's ambition to establish a solid political base for himself. He continued his efforts to develop grass roots support once **Mian Nawaz Sharif** and his **Pakistan Muslim League** assumed power. The Tehrik participated in the elections of October 2002 and won only one seat, that by Imran Khan from Mianwali.

**TEHRIK-E-ISTIQLAL.** The Tehrik-e-Istiqlal was founded in 1969 by Air Marshal (retired) **Asghar Khan**, with the aim of providing Pakistan's rapidly growing middle classes with an organizational vehicle for articulating their political, economic, and social aspirations. He believed that the established parties were either too far to the right of the political spectrum or too far to the left to be attractive to the constituency that he cultivated. The **Pakistan Muslim League** of that time was dominated by the landed aristocracy, the **Jamaat-e-Islami** by Islamic fundamentalists, and the **Pakistan People's Party (PPP)**, under the influence of urban intellectuals who espoused various leftist causes. According to this analysis, therefore, there was a lot of space in the center of the political spectrum for a party such as the Tehrik to occupy.

The Tehrik's program attracted a sizable following from the urban professional classes: a number of lawyers, doctors, and engineers joined the party. The party's senior office holders were mostly retired government officials or influential lawyers from **Lahore**, **Karachi**, and **Rawalpindi**. The Tehrik failed to develop a strong grass roots following, however. None of the candidates that it fielded in the national elections of 1970 and 1977 were elected to the National Assembly. Asghar Khan, the party chairman, was defeated in 1970 by a relatively unknown PPP politician from Rawalpindi.

In order to improve its political standing and gain a wider basis of support for itself, the Tehrik joined other opposition parties in 1981 to launch the **Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD)**. Because the MRD was dominated by the PPP, a party with which the Tehrik had had a difficult relationship all along, its stay in the movement was not a comfortable one. The Tehrik quit the MRD in 1986 and launched on its own once again. This decision and the visit by Air Marshal Asghar Khan to Kabul in the summer of 1987—an effort aimed at bringing peace to Afghanistan by negotiating with Najibullah, the Afghan president whose government Pakistan had refused to recognize—caused him to lose support among the members of his constituency. It resulted in a number of defections from the party, particularly from the province of **Balochistan** and the **North-west Frontier Province**.

The Tehrik surprised political observers by joining the PPP to form the **Pakistan Democratic Alliance (PDA)** to compete in the **elections of 1990**. The alliance with the PPP did not produce tangible results for the Tehrik and was terminated after the elections. The **elections of October 1993** did not improve Tehrik's standing, since none of its members were elected either to the National Assembly or to any of the four Provincial Assemblies. In the spring of 1996, Asghar Khan resigned from the leadership of the party but was persuaded to stay on. The party fielded very few candidates in the **elections of 1997**. Once again it failed to win any seat at the National and Provincial Assembly and was dissolved.

**TEHRIK ITTEHAD-E-QABAIL.** The Tehrik Itehad-e-Qabail (Movement for Tribal Cooperation) was founded by a number of

tribal leaders from the **Northwest Frontier Province**. Its main objective was to reconcile the differences between the **Pashtun** tribes supporting the Afghan **mujahideen** and those that favored the Kabul government. The Tehrik's central leaders were arrested by the provincial government on 17 February 1987, when they declared their intention of traveling by road from **Peshawar** to Kabul on a "peace mission." The tribal leaders said that this mission was intended to set the stage for the Geneva "**proximity talks**" of February 1987 by showing that the tribal people of Pakistan and **Afghanistan** could reach an understanding on the differences that continued to fuel the rebellion in Afghanistan. These efforts did not produce any tangible results, and the tribal leaders continued to battle one another, even after Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan.

**TERRORISM.** One consequence of the 10-year Afghan struggle against the occupation of their country by the **Soviet Union** was to turn Pakistan into both a target of terrorism and a base for the training of terrorists. The ground for these developments was laid in the mid-1980s when the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) worked with Pakistan's **Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)** to establish training bases for the Afghan **mujahideen** on both sides of the Afghanistan–Pakistan border. The most important of these bases was in **Khowst**, a small town south of Kabul, near the Pakistan border. The CIA built an elaborate network of training camps at Khowst. Some of these facilities were lodged deep in the mountains to protect them against air attacks by the Soviet Union.

Following the departure of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan in 1989 and the withdrawal of CIA operatives from Pakistan, the mujahideen training camps were taken over by a number of different groups that continued to fight in the prolonged civil war in Afghanistan. The camps on the Pakistani side helped train young graduates from the *madrassas* (religious schools) who were to form the backbone of the **Taliban** movement that gradually extended its sway over Afghanistan. The Khowst facilities were acquired by **Osama bin Laden**, a Saudi millionaire, to train and equip hundreds of people to participate in various conflicts that pitted the forces of radical **Islam** against a variety of opponents. People trained in the camps run by bin

Laden were said to have taken part in the conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Chechnya, Kosovo, **Kashmir**, the Philippines, Somalia, and Sudan.

On 7 August 1998, terrorist bombs outside the **United States** embassies in Kenya and Tanzania killed nearly 300 persons, including 12 Americans. On the same day, Pakistan arrested Muhammad Siddique Odeh, a young Palestinian, at the airport in **Karachi** on his way from Nairobi to **Peshawar**. During interrogation, Odeh linked the bombings to Osama bin Laden. On 20 August, the United States launched missile attacks on the bin Laden camps in Afghanistan and on a factory in Khartoum, the capital of Sudan, which was said to be producing chemicals that could be used in weapons of mass destruction. In explaining the attacks, President Bill Clinton linked bin Laden to a number of terrorist attacks including those on U.S. and Pakistani troops in Somalia in October 1993; plans to bomb six American 747 passenger aircraft in flight over the Pacific; the plot to assassinate President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt in Ethiopia in June 1995; the bombing of the Egyptian embassy in Islamabad in November 1995; and the gunning down of German tourists in Luxor, Egypt in November 1997.

Osama bin Laden's support of the insurgency in Kashmir with the possible help of Pakistan's ISI brought Pakistan very close to being declared a terrorist state by the United States in 1996 and 1997. It was only after Pakistan gave a firm assurance to the United States that it would sever all contacts with Harakat ul Ansar, a shadowy group deeply involved in the conflict in Kashmir, that the United States agreed to take Pakistan off the list of countries suspected of harboring terrorists. It was the need to establish a clean record for itself in the field of terrorism that persuaded Pakistan to arrest and extradite **Ramzi Youssef**, accused of masterminding the February 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York, and **Mir Ajmal Kansi**, accused of killing two CIA employees outside the agency's headquarters in Langley, Virginia. The arrest and extradition of Odeh in August 1998 was also part of this effort.

The authorities in Pakistan believe that Osama bin Laden, a fundamentalist Sunni Muslim, might also have contributed to the escalation of the Sunni-Shia strife that claimed hundreds of lives in the country in the 1990s. Terrorist activities in Pakistan were not con-

fined to the work of Muslim fundamentalists in Pakistan, however. Several attacks in which scores of people died were attributed by the authorities to the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW)—the intelligence agency of the Indian government. The operations by the RAW in Pakistan were said to have been in retaliation for the alleged involvement of the Pakistani intelligence agencies in the Indian state of **Punjab** in the 1980s and in the Indian-occupied areas of Kashmir in the 1990s.

Osama bin Laden, his organization, **al Qaeda**, and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan were all implicated in the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001. After 9/11 the war on international terrorism was formally launched with Washington in the lead. The war was fought on several fronts. The United States led an international coalition to invade Afghanistan on 8 October 2001. Kabul fell on 13 December, and a few months later, a regime friendly to the United States was installed in the Afghan capital.

The collapse of the Taliban regime and the destruction of the elaborate training infrastructure created in Afghanistan by al Qaeda did not bring an end to international terrorism. The U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003 and its failure to end insurgency against its occupation of that country provided another cause for those committed to pursue various *jihadi* causes by using terrorism as an instrument. In April 2005, the United States' annual report on international terrorism prepared by the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) documented a dramatic increase in terrorist attacks in 2005, a sharp surge from 175 incidents that killed 625 in 2003, to 651 such attacks that killed 1,907. The report's strongest words were reserved for Iran, which was dubbed the "most active state sponsor of terrorism in 2004."

**THATTA.** Today's Thatta is a small town of less than 100,000 people, located on the right bank of the **Indus River** some 80 kilometers northeast of **Karachi**. But Thatta has seen better times. According to legend, it was the city of Pattala where Alexander the Great rested his army before he crossed the Mekran desert on his way back to Greece. In the 14th century Thatta was the capital of the Muslim dynasties that governed **Sindh**. For 400 years, from the 14th to the 18th centuries, Thatta was an important administrative and commercial center

for lower Sindh. Its location on the Indus turned it into a busy port not only for the ships that moved up and down the river but also for small seafaring vessels. These ships and vessels connected the city with the centers of commerce on the Arabian side of the Arabian Sea. They not only brought goods and commodities to Thatta from the Arab world but brought Islamic culture to the city through easy communication between Arabia and lower Sindh.

As has happened to many cities in the lower reaches of the world's great rivers, Thatta lost its significance when the Indus changed its course. The population of the city declined precipitously from the high point of 200,000 reached in the middle of the 18th century to only 20,000 a century later. The region's fertile **cotton** and **wheat** fields were reduced to wasteland. Thatta's second revival commenced under Prime Minister **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto** when his administration began to restore the city's many monuments and brought sugar and cotton-ginning industries to the town. Bhutto, a Sindhi and proud of his heritage, was anxious to restore his province to its past glory. Thatta benefited a great deal from his efforts.

**TIKKA KHAN, GENERAL (RETIRED) (1917–2002).** Tikka Khan was born in Jhelum district of **Punjab**, once a preferred area for recruitment by the British Indian Army. He joined the army in 1937 and saw action in World War II. He steadily rose in the ranks of the Pakistani army and held a number of senior command positions before being sent by President **Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan** to East Pakistan (today's **Bangladesh**) as the commander of the army garrison stationed in the province. The Bengalis called him the “butcher of Bengal” because he adopted a hard-line approach toward the secessionist elements in East Pakistan. This approach contributed to increasing Bengal's alienation with West Pakistan and eventually led to civil war in East Pakistan.

In 1972, **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto** appointed Tikka Khan chief of army staff (COAS), replacing General Gul Hassan. Upon Tikka Khan's retirement in March 1976, General **Zia ul-Haq** was appointed to lead the army. It was Tikka Khan who brought Zia ul-Haq to Bhutto's attention. Zia proved to be less loyal to Bhutto than his predecessor, however. General Zia forced Bhutto out of office on 5 July 1977, an act by a former and trusted colleague that brought Tikka into politics.



He joined Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's **Pakistan People's Party (PPP)** and soon became the organization's general-secretary.

Tikka remained active in the PPP during the time General Zia ul-Haq was in power (1977–1988). He was given the PPP ticket to contest in the national **elections of October 1988** from a seat in **Rawalpindi**. He lost the election to an **Islami Jamhuri Ittehad** candidate but was rewarded for his long and loyal service to the PPP. In December 1988, Prime Minister **Benazir Bhutto** appointed him governor of Punjab, a position he held until August 1990. He retired from politics after the dismissal of Bhutto's government in August 1990 and died on 28 March 2002.

**THE TIWANAS.** The Tiwana family of Shahpur district in northwest **Punjab** were one of the score or so landed families who benefited enormously from the British rule of their province. The vast irrigation system built by the British included "private canals" that drew water from the main rivers of the province during the rainy season. A number of these inundation canals were located in the riverine tract of the Jhelum River, and from 1860 onward they were entrusted to the area's large landlords for management. These were not the only concessions granted by the British to the landed families of Punjab. Land was also awarded under a number of other schemes, including land for maintaining stud farms to provide horses and mules needed by the British armed forces in India. Under the patronage of the British, the Tiwanas were able to vastly expand their holdings.

This was a good investment by the British rulers; the Tiwanas and other landed aristocrats provided the rulers with much needed loyalty in an area in which opposition to British rule could have been both embarrassing and expensive. The British recruited a large number of soldiers from Shahpur to put down the disturbances associated with the **Great Indian Mutiny of 1857**. They also turned to Shahpur and neighboring districts to recruit soldiers for the British Indian Army during World Wars I and II. And finally, when much of India became openly hostile to British rule—a development that shook the Indian subcontinent in the 1930s and 1940s—Punjab remained steadfastly loyal to its rulers. Under **Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana**, the prime minister of Punjab, the landed interests of the province opposed **Muhammad Ali Jinnah** and his demand for establishing Pakistan,

an independent homeland for the Muslims of British India. Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana became so closely associated with the anti-Pakistan movement in Punjab that the Tiwanas paid a heavy political price once Pakistan came into being. Whereas other landed families were able to find their way back into the mainstream of Punjabi politics in Pakistan, the Tiwanas did not fully recover their prominence. Khizar was never invited back into the corridors of power in **Lahore**.

**TRADE.** In 2004–2005 exports by Pakistan were valued at US\$14 billion, imports at US\$19 billion, leaving a trade deficit of US\$5 billion. There was a high level of commodity concentration in exports, as only five products (cotton and cotton products, leather, rice, synthetic textiles, and sports goods) accounted for over 79 percent of the total. There was also a concentration in markets; seven countries accounted for 48.2 percent of total exports in 2004–2005. The **United States** was the largest single importer for Pakistani products, accounting for 25.6 percent of total exports in 2004–2005.

Pakistan followed import substitution economic and trade policies for more than four decades. This inward focus meant that the trade-to-GDP ratio was much smaller than would be expected for a country of its size and the state of economic development. Since the 1990s, Pakistan has opened its economy by reducing the level of tariffs, removing most tradeables from negative lists, doing away with licensing requirements for importers and exporters, reducing the extent of government procurement for agricultural commodities, and reducing the scope of non-tariff barriers. Consequently, the volume of trade in recent years has increased by a multiple of the increase in GDP. The share of total trade in GDP increased by four percentage points in five years (2000–2005), from 26 percent to 30 percent.

In 1947, the year **India** and Pakistan gained independence, India was Pakistan's main trading partner, accounting for more than one-half of the country's total exports and imports. Initially, because of a trade war between the two countries in 1949 provoked by Pakistan's decision not to follow India in devaluing its currency with respect to the U.S. dollar, the volume of Indo-Pakistan trade declined precipitously. Although India-Pakistan trade has expanded in recent years, trade with India through official channels amounted to only 2.5 percent of the total. For India, trade with Pakistan was even a smaller proportion of total trade.

There was a significant change in both the commodity composition and the destination and origin of Pakistan's exports and imports. At the time of independence, Pakistan's exports were overwhelmingly agricultural—raw cotton, rice, and wheat accounted for more than 90 percent of exports. India was the largest market. Sixty years later, manufactures—mostly textiles and leather products—accounted for three-fourths of the total exports. By policy, both India and Pakistan continued to restrict inter-country trade. India continued to levy specific duties on textiles from Pakistan and had numerous non-tariff barriers in place. It had, nonetheless, granted most-favored-nation (MFN) status to Pakistan, a step Islamabad did not reciprocate. Pakistan's imports from India were governed by a positive list, which was expanded in 2005, with imports allowed for some agricultural commodities and farm products that were in short supply in the country.

Pakistan was an important trading partner for landlocked **Afghanistan**. For several decades it granted its northern neighbor transit rights through its territory. More than 90 percent of Afghanistan's imports before 1979 came through Pakistan. **Karachi** was the main port for Afghanistan's trade. However, some of the country's imports were smuggled back into Pakistan. The Afghan external trade was seriously disrupted after the **Soviet Union**'s invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and remained more or less suspended even after the Soviet troops vacated the country. It was only after the fall of the Taliban regime in December 2001 that economic life, along with external trade, began to return to the country. Since that time, Pakistan has reemerged as the most important trading partner for Afghanistan.

While Pakistan's trade policy encourages trade with Afghanistan, the country continues to prohibit Indian exporters from using the Pakistani land corridor. India began to develop the more expensive sea-land route using a newly built port in Iran. However, Pakistan allowed the use of its territory for Afghan exports to India. Yet, cumbersome procedures had to be observed even for these exports at Wagah, the border post between Pakistan and India. The decision to admit Afghanistan into the **South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation**, taken at the Dacca (Dhaka) summit meeting in November 2005, would allow easier access to Afghanistan by India if

transit rights were to be incorporated as a trade facilitation measure within the scope of the **South Asian Free Trade Area**.

Pakistan announces a new trade policy every year, timed with the announcement of the budget. The most recent policy for 2005–2006, announced in June 2005, aimed to enhance export proceeds by improving the world market share of Pakistan's core exports. For this, the focus was placed on sustainable value addition through capacity building and capability enhancement of exporters. It also strove to achieve product and geographic diversification, besides reducing the cost of doing business. The policy facilitated regional as well as bilateral trade agreements for enlarging market access and endeavored to build international confidence on protection of intellectual property rights.

**TRADE UNIONS.** Pakistan is a signatory of the 1948 International Labour Organization Convention on the right of workers to organize, as well as of the 1949 Convention on Collective Bargaining. That notwithstanding, union membership claims only a small proportion of the local work force. With 3.5 percent of the labor force of 52 million enlisted in about 9,000 unions, Pakistan is one of the least-unionized countries in Asia. Only **Bangladesh** (with about 3 percent) and Thailand (with about 1.1 percent) have smaller proportions of workers in organized unions. Union activity is almost entirely confined to the urban sector; trade unions claim almost 1.5 million members out of an estimated industrial work force of about 2.5 million. The political and economic power of the unions has suffered over the years; they were powerful in the 1950s and 1960s, but successive **martial-law** regimes have tended to view them with suspicion. The 1969 Industrial Relations Act regulates union activity, including the right to appoint collective bargaining agents.

The Labor Act of 1972, passed by the government of **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto**, provided some further rights to labor, including the right to social security payments, health care, and pensions. While General **Zia ul-Haq's** martial law (1977–1985) did not change basic labor laws, certain overriding regulations were issued. Under one of these, unions were banned outright at the country's flag carrier, **Pakistan International Airlines**, and at Pakistan Television Corporation and Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation. After the lifting of martial law (30 December 1985), unions began to assert themselves once again.

Most of the unions were established on the basis of individual enterprises, which makes it difficult for them to work together to promote the welfare of workers. National labor federations have developed in recent years, however, and some of them have acquired strong links with political parties. Eight of these unions claim two-thirds of the total union membership. These include the right-wing All-Pakistan Federation of Trade Unions and the Pakistan National Federation of Trade Unions—both affiliated with the Islamic National Labour Federation, which serves as the labor wing of the **Jamaat-e-Islami**, and the Pakistan Federation of Trade Unions. **Women** workers have a very low representation in unions. Some of their leaders—most notably Kaneez Fatima—have played important political roles.

The unions became actively involved in the process of **privatization** that was begun by the first administration of **Benazir Bhutto** (December 1988–August 1990), continued by Prime Minister **Mian Nawaz Sharif** (1990–1993), by the second Bhutto administration (October 1993–November 1996), and accelerated by the government headed by President **Pervez Musharraf**. They sought adequate compensation for their members. The most successful effort in this context was launched by the labor union representing the workers of the **Water and Power Development Authority**, who made the government change in a very significant way the terms under which the **Kot Addu** power plant was privatized.

**TRANSPORT.** A well developed system of transport made up of roads, railways, and a deep water port was one of the several legacies left by the British for Pakistan, one of the two states that replaced the *raj* in South Asia. And, as with several other legacies of the *raj*, Pakistan did little to build upon the transport system it inherited. Very little investment was made to develop the system of railways. While the private sector was encouraged to provide long-haul road transport, the sharp increase in the number of vehicles on the roads was not matched by an increase in or improvement of the road system.

There was a reason for the British administration's interest in developing the transport sector. There were repeated famines in north-east **India** in the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century. These were investigated by a series of Royal Famine Commissions

that proposed that virgin lands in the sparsely populated provinces of **Punjab** and **Sindh** be brought under cultivation to produce grain surpluses that could be transported to the food deficit parts of the sub-continent. These proposals were accepted by the administration in Delhi, which invested heavily in tapping the waters in the **Indus River** system for irrigation. A number of canal colonies were built, and farmers were brought from east Punjab to cultivate the lands that now had access to year round irrigation.

A network of roads was built to bring surplus grain from the farms to collection points in new market towns. These towns were connected by railways that transported grain over long distances to Bengal, Bihar, and eastern United Provinces that had experienced famines. A separate rail administration, the Northwestern Railway (NWR), was established to run the elaborate system. The port of **Karachi** was developed to handle food grain for shipment to Calcutta (Kolkata).

For nearly half a century, successive governments in Pakistan neglected the transport system. Consequently, the railway system shrank in size. In 1990–1991, the system covered 8,775 kilometers, carried almost 85 million passengers and 7.7 million tons of freight. Thirteen years later, in 2003–2004, the system was reduced to 7,791 km and transported 76 million passengers and 6 million tons of freight. There was a significant increase in the total length of roads in the same period, from 170,823 kilometers to 256,070 kilometers. However, this increase of almost 50 percent did not match the growth in the number of vehicles on the roads. In 1990, there were 872,000 registered vehicles in the country (683,000 cars, 84,000 buses, and 105,000 trucks). By 2004, their number had nearly doubled to 1.644 million (1.3 million cars, 163,000 buses, and 181,000 trucks). The system had become extremely crowded.

In 1992, the government headed by Prime Minister **Mian Nawaz Sharif** initiated a program to improve the road system. The National Highway Authority was established to construct a modern system of motorways that would eventually connect **Peshawar** with Karachi, a distance of almost 2,000 kilometers. The first link in the chain, the **Lahore-Islamabad Motorway (M-2)**, was constructed over a period of six years by **Daewoo**, a South Korean firm. Other sections of the system are scheduled for completion by 2010.

Ports were the only part of the transport sector that received consistent government attention. The amount of cargo handled by Karachi Port increased by 49 percent between 1991 and 2004, from 18 million tons to 27.8 million tons. The capacity of Karachi port to receive ocean-going ships was expanded a number of times while a new port—Port Qasim—was built to handle bulk cargo. A third port was built specifically to bring iron ore and coal for **Karachi Steel Mills**. In 2004, the government of President **Pervez Musharraf** formulated an ambitious plan to construct a modern port at **Gwadar** on the **Balochistan** coast.

The government played an important role in developing—at times also managing—the transport sector. Several public sector enterprises were engaged in this endeavor. These included **Pakistan International Airlines**, the National Shipping Corporation (for ocean-going vessels), and the National Logistics Cell (for trucking).

**TROIKA.** The term *troika* came into currency in the early months of 1989. It was used to describe the informal grouping made up of the president, the prime minister, and the chief of the army staff (COAS) who governed Pakistan after the death of General **Zia ul-Haq**. The “troika” was an informal governing arrangement, evolved over time as a response to the twists and turns in the country’s political history. From 1989 to 1996, Pakistan saw six “troikas,” each with its own peculiar dynamics and each with a different distribution of power among its three members.

The first troika came into being gradually, as Pakistan adjusted to the situation caused by the death of President Zia ul-Haq in a plane crash on 17 August 1988, leaving behind an immense political vacuum that had somehow to be filled. Of the two formal positions held by him, that of COAS went to General **Aslam Beg**, who was Zia’s deputy at the time of his death. **Ghulam Ishaq Khan**, chairman of the Senate, took over as acting president, but in appointing a caretaker administration to function until an elected government could be put into place he did not nominate a prime minister. Ishaq invited Aslam Beg to participate in the deliberations of the caretaker administration, thus laying the ground for the formation of the “troika.” The third member of the arrangement, however, was still to emerge.

There was no clear winner in the **elections of November 1988**. Benazir Bhutto's **Pakistan People's Party** won the largest number of seats but was well short of a majority. This inconclusive result gave the president and the COAS a powerful bargaining hand, which they used to great effect. The tacit agreement reached with Ms. Bhutto created the troika; it also reduced her degree of freedom. Bhutto agreed to be guided by Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Aslam Beg in the areas they considered critical for Pakistan's security. These included nuclear policy, in particular decisions with respect to the development of a nuclear bomb and the capability to deliver it; the country's stance toward **Afghanistan** and **Kashmir**; and relations with India. Bhutto also agreed to let the army look after its own affairs. The troika had thus evolved as an institution for overseeing decision-making in the country.

From 1988 until December 1997, Pakistan saw many changes in the membership of the "troika," but the informal institution retained its importance. With the resignation of President **Farooq Leghari** and the election of **Muhammad Rafiq Tarar** as president, Prime Minister **Mian Nawaz Sharif** had concentrated so much power in his hands that the troika arrangement became redundant.

**TUFAIL MUHAMMAD, MIAN (1914– )**. Mian Tufail Muhammad was elected the *amir* (president) of the **Jamaat-i-Islami** on 2 November 1972, following the resignation of the ailing **Maulana Maududi**, the party's first leader. He was the second person in Jamaat's history to hold that position. Tufail belonged to the first generation of leaders of the Jamaat. Like Maulana Maududi, he had migrated from East Punjab to the Pakistani part of **Punjab** after the partition of British India. Being a refugee, he did not have a strong geographical base of his own. His base of power, therefore, was in the party's secretariat rather than in the field offices. Before becoming president, he served as the party's secretary-general (*qayyim*) for several years with competence and dedication. His election as *amir* was more the result of the influence he exercised over the party machine than on its general membership.

Tufail served as *amir* for 15 years. It was under his stewardship of the party that the Jamaat forged a close relationship with President **Zia ul-Haq**. Tufail and Zia had developed a good understanding, in



part because both of them were from Jullundhur, a city in the part of Punjab that went to India. Tufail's willingness to work with Zia did not improve his standing in the party. He gradually lost the confidence of the younger members of the organization. On 15 October 1987 the Jamaat elected **Qazi Husain Ahmed** as its amir. Ahmed was 24 years younger than Tufail and was also the first Jamaat amir not to have come to Pakistan as a *muhajir* (refugee) from India.

**TURKMENISTAN–AFGHANISTAN–PAKISTAN GAS PIPELINE.** The decision to revive the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan Gas Pipeline project was taken during the visit of Afghanistan's President **Hamid Karzai** to **Islamabad** on 22–23 May 2005. The idea of the pipeline was first proposed in the 1990s but was put on the back burner because of the unsettled conditions in Afghanistan during most of the decade. Karzai's visit was followed within a month by the visit of a technical group from Afghanistan. A protocol to build the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan Gas Pipeline was signed in Islamabad by ministers from the three countries who met on 13 April 2005. The US\$3.5 billion, 1,680-kilometer pipeline has the support of the **Asian Development Bank**, which has termed the project viable and feasible. The Daulatabad gas fields in Turkmenistan were estimated to have enough gas reserves to meet Pakistan's requirement of 300 million cubic meters of gas per day for 30 years. The three countries participating in the venture would support extending the pipeline to India to provide that country with another source of energy for its rapidly growing economy. Since both India and Pakistan have entered a rapid economic growth trajectory, their demand for energy is expected to increase significantly over the years. Connecting the two countries with a grid of gas pipelines was one way of meeting the growing demand. If the various pipeline projects that were on the planning board materialized, Pakistan could become an important hub for the distribution of natural gas from countries such as **Iran**, Qatar, **Saudi Arabia**, and Turkmenistan that have large proven reserves available for exploitation and export. *See also* IRAN–PAKISTAN–INDIA GAS PIPELINE.

**TWENTY-TWO FAMILIES SPEECH.** On 24 April 1968, **Mahbubul Haq**, the chief economist of the Planning Commission, delivered

what came to be called the “twenty-two families speech.” He chose an influential audience in **Karachi** to speak about the extent of asset concentration that had taken place during the 1960s, the years in which Pakistan put into operation **Muhammad Ayub Khan**’s highly acclaimed model of economic development. The data Haq presented dealt with the accumulation of assets by the families that owned, managed, or controlled the firms listed on the Karachi Stock Exchange. Haq’s conclusions were dramatic but not strictly accurate. He implied that just 22 families owned 66 percent of the industrial wealth in the country and controlled 87 percent of the assets of the **banking** and insurance industries. This may have been the case for the assets of the firms listed on the Karachi Stock Exchange but certainly did not include the non-incorporated medium and small-scale firms that had been extremely dynamic during the Ayub Khan period and had added significantly to the country’s industrial wealth.

The speech had a profound political and economic impact. Its precise statistics and methodology were soon forgotten, but a general impression was created that in the 1960s, the poor in Pakistan had become poorer, whereas the rich had become fabulously rich. From the government’s perspective, Haq could not have chosen a worse time for making his pronouncements. From the perspective of the growing political opposition to Ayub Khan, the timing of the speech could not have been better.

The speech was given while the government’s program for celebrating Ayub Khan’s “Decade of Development” was still at an early stage. Moreover, it served to reinforce the widespread feeling that had been created by a number of scandals concerning influence peddling that surfaced during President Muhammad Ayub Khan’s waning years. Some of these scandals involved the sons of the president, in particular Gouhar Ayub, who working with Lieutenant General (retired) Habibullah Khan, his father-in-law, had obtained the license to establish an automobile assembly plant in Karachi. Gandhara Industries, founded by Habibullah Khan, became the symbol of corrupt activities during the Ayub Khan period. These activities left a strong impression that notwithstanding government propaganda, the Ayub regime was not concerned with advancing the general welfare of the people. It appeared that it had instead promoted the economic interests of persons closely connected with it. As a result of the speech,

the expression “twenty-two families” became synonymous with government-promoted income and wealth concentration, and economic exploitation in Pakistan.

Haq’s findings were used to great political effect by **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto** in his campaign to discredit the economic policies of Ayub Khan. Once Bhutto was in control in **Islamabad**, his government lost little time in launching a concerted campaign to reduce the economic power of the large industrial, banking, and insurance houses identified by Haq as the members of the exclusive “twenty-two families” club. Within days of becoming president, Bhutto began the process of profoundly restructuring the Pakistani economy. His government nationalized 31 large industries, including Gandhara Industries, in January 1972, and later took control of all private banks and insurance companies.

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## UMBRELLA ORGANIZATIONS OF RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS.

Schools that based their teaching on religion proliferated in Pakistan following the country’s birth in 1947. A number of religious organizations, feeling the need for some discipline and control of the schools that were run under their auspices, set up regulatory bodies. The most important task of these regulatory organizations was to prescribe the curricula that could be taught in the schools that sought to affiliate with them. Most of these bodies functioned on the lines followed by the well-known *Nadwatal-Ulama* (the council of Islamic scholars) that had been established in Lucknow, India, in 1893. The Deobandis in Pakistan set up the *Wafaq al Madaris al-Arabia* in Multan in 1959. In the same year, the Bareilvis founded the *Tanzim al-Madaris al-Arabiya* in Dera Ghazi Khan. Also in the same year, the Shia community established the *Majlis-e-Nazarat-e Shia Arabiya* in **Lahore**. The Ahle Hadith already had a functioning organization by then, having established the *Markaz-e Jamiat Ahl-I Hadith* in **Faisalabad** in 1955. The **Jamaat-e-Islami** followed much later, with *Rabita al-Madaris* established in Lahore, in 1982.

**UNIONIST PARTY.** The Nationalist Unionist Party, most commonly known as the Unionist Party, was founded in 1923 by a group that included **Mian Fazli Husain**, a prominent urban professional, who invited both Muslims and non-Muslims to cooperate politically to prepare for the transfer of power from the British to the Indians. The process had begun in 1911 with the **Minto-Morley reforms** and in Fazli Husain's estimate was likely to increase its pace quickly. The party's principal purpose was to protect the political and economic interests of all the communities of **Punjab**: the Hindu merchant class, the Hindu and Muslim urban professionals, the Muslim landed aristocracy, and the Hindu *bania* (shopkeepers) in the countryside.

Sir Fazli Husain died in 1936, and the mantle of leadership moved onto the shoulders of Sir **Sikander Hayat Khan**, the scion of a landholding family from northern Punjab. This change in leadership brought the Muslim landed community more deeply into politics. It was under Sir Sikander's leadership that the Unionists fought the first provincial elections, held in 1937 under the Government of **India Act of 1935**. The Unionists triumphed, winning 95 seats in a legislature of 175. What was even more impressive about the Unionists' success was that they secured 74 seats of the 88 allocated to the Muslims. The **All-India Muslim League** was left in disarray, winning only one seat. Sikander Hayat Khan was invited to form a government, and became Punjab's first prime minister.

As Punjab's prime minister, Sikander Hayat Khan started a dialogue with **Muhammad Ali Jinnah** and joined the Muslim League while still retaining the leadership of the Unionist Party and maintaining its separate identity. Sikander Hayat Khan's death in 1942 changed the fortunes of the Unionist Party, however. **Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana**, the new leader, was much less accommodating in his political orientation: He did not see any great need to forge alliances that extended beyond the boundaries of Punjab. He responded to Jinnah's increasing pressure to obtain a larger role for the Muslim League in provincial politics by removing the Unionists from the Muslim League shortly before the elections of 1946. Compared to their 1936 performance, the Unionists fared poorly, this time obtaining only 21 seats in all, in a legislature of 175 persons. The Unionists formed an alliance with the All-India Congress and the Akali Dal, parties dominated by the Hindu and Sikh communities, respectively.

Although this arrangement kept Khizar in office for a few more months, it was an act of extreme political desperation. It ensured Khizar's political death as well as the death of the Unionist Party.

The All-India Muslim League won favor with Punjab's Muslim population as the campaign for Pakistan gained momentum in 1946. The League launched a highly effective movement of civil disobedience against the Unionist government headed by Khizar. At one point during the campaign, so many Muslim League followers had courted arrest that the government ran out of jail space to accommodate all of them. The Punjab prime minister had to resign to restore peace and order in the province. Pakistan was born in August 1947, and the Unionist Party was dissolved soon after.

The Unionists were a much more broad-based **political party** than the Muslim League in Punjab. Unlike the League, its program had a wider reach. The League was a one-issue organization—the establishment of Pakistan—whereas the Unionists sought to represent and articulate a broad coalition of interests. But for Khizar's poor tactics, the Unionists might well have survived long after the Muslim League, in its original incarnation, had ceased to exist in Punjab.

**UNITED BANK LIMITED (UBL).** The United Bank Limited occupies a special place in Pakistan's economic and financial development. It was the first large commercial **bank** to be established by an industrial group, the Saigols. It was perceived, however, that the close links among the owners of industrial financial assets, illustrated by the rapid growth of UBL, had contributed to the massive consolidation of wealth in only a few hands. This impression factored into the campaign against the government during the closing years of the **Muhammad Ayub Khan** administration. It also resulted in the nationalization of large-scale industry and private financial institutions by the government of **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto**. UBL also occupies an important place in Pakistan's economic history because it launched the impressive career of **Agha Hasan Abedi**, who was later to be associated with the **Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI)**.

UBL, along with other public-sector banks, was used during the two administrations of **Benazir Bhutto** (1988–1990 and 1993–1996) to lend money to friends and supporters. This resulted in the massive

accumulation of non-performing loans. An effort was made in 1996 to **privatize** the bank, but the offers received were well below the value anticipated by the government of Benazir Bhutto. That notwithstanding, the Bhutto administration decided to sell the bank to a Middle Eastern group. The deal was not consummated by the caretaker administration that succeeded the Bhutto administration in November 1996. In 1997, the government of Prime Minister **Mian Nawaz Sharif** appointed a new set of managers and gave them the mandate to improve the asset base of the institution. In October 2002, the government of President **Pervez Musharraf** sold 51 percent (264.18 million) shares to private investors. A foreign consortium made up of Abu Dhabi Group and Britain's Bestway Group acquired 25.5 percent of the bank's shares for a total investment of Rs 12.3 billion (about US\$200 million). The consortium won the right to manage the bank. In May 2005, the government sold another 15 percent of the bank's shares in the market at a price of Rs 45 per share.

**UNITED FRONT.** The United Front was organized in East Bengal—later East Pakistan, and still later **Bangladesh**—in 1954 to challenge the **Muslim League** in the provincial **elections of 1954**. The Front was made up of the **Awami League**, the Krishak Sramik Party, the Nizam-i-Islam, Ganotanrik Dal, and a number of small political organizations. The Front's 21-point election manifesto called for the recognition of Bengali as one of Pakistan's national languages, greater administrative autonomy for the province of East Bengal, and rejection of the **Basic Principles Committee Report** as the basis for a constitutional structure for Pakistan.

The Front was inspired by the leadership of two veteran Bengali leaders—**Fazlul Haq** and **Maulana Bhashani**. It campaigned vigorously and won a decisive victory, capturing 237 seats in the Provincial Assembly of 309 members. The Muslim League secured only 10 seats. The United Front was invited to form a government, which it did in April 1954. The administration lasted for less than two months. It was dismissed in May 1954 by the central government led by Governor-General **Ghulam Muhammad**.

**UNITED STATES–PAKISTAN RELATIONS.** The administration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt in the United States supported the

Indian aspiration for independence but not the movement to divide British India into two states—one Hindu and one Muslim. The United States wanted India to remain united. Pakistan's emergence therefore was not greeted with enthusiasm by Washington. The visit by **Liaqat Ali Khan**, Pakistan's first prime minister, in 1950 notwithstanding, American indifference toward Pakistan persisted throughout the presidency of Harry S Truman. It was only after the Eisenhower administration took office in 1953 that the U.S. government began to become concerned about the spread of communism to South Asia, and the foreign policy establishment in Washington began to take an interest in Pakistan. It suddenly began to appreciate Pakistan's geopolitical situation. This recognition culminated in the **Mutual Defense Agreement** signed in 1954 between Pakistan and the United States. General **Muhammad Ayub Khan**, commander in chief of the Pakistan army and minister of defense in the cabinet of Prime Minister **Muhammad Ali Bogra**, was the principal architect of the agreement on the Pakistani side.

There was a further strengthening of the relationship with the United States as Pakistan entered the **South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO)** in 1955, and the Baghdad Pact—renamed the **Central Treaty Organization (CENTO)** after Iraq left the pact—in 1956. With the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), CENTO, and SEATO, the United States had forged a chain of buffer states around the Soviet Union and China in order to contain the spread of communism. Pakistan linked the SEATO and CENTO parts of the chain. The United States rewarded Pakistan with generous amounts of economic and military assistance. Military bases were constructed at Kharian and Multan with the aid of the United States, and a secret air force base was built at Badabir near **Peshawar**. It was from this base that Gary Powers took off on his U-2 spy plane reconnaissance flight over the Soviet Union and was shot down and captured by the Soviets. An embarrassed President Ayub Khan had to acknowledge the existence of the secret base.

The United States military program was terminated after the **Indo-Pakistan War of 1965**. Military assistance was revived 16 years later when President Ronald Reagan took office. The United States used Pakistan as a conduit for supplying assistance to the Afghan **mu-jahideen** who were fighting the Soviet troops in **Afghanistan**. The

two countries signed a US\$3.2 billion program of economic and military assistance to cover a period of six years, 1981–1987. The program was kept in place despite the United States' anxiety over the intensive work begun by Pakistan to develop the capability to produce nuclear weapons, a route taken following the explosion of a nuclear device by India in 1974. These misgivings intensified in the program's concluding months, and for some time it seemed that Washington would not be able to pledge to assist Pakistan economically and militarily. To do so would have required the U.S. president to indicate that for strategic reasons the application of the **Pressler amendment**, which required sanctions against Pakistan because of its nuclear program, had to be waived. The president issued the waiver, and in December 1987 the U.S. Congress renewed the program of support for another six years (1987–1993). An amount of US\$4.02 billion was pledged for this period. Presidential waivers were granted for two more years.

The dramatic change in Pakistan's geopolitical situation following the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 reduced Pakistan's importance in the eyes of Washington. President George H. W. Bush decided to apply the Pressler amendment to Pakistan in 1990. Its most serious consequence was that even the military purchases made and paid for by Pakistan, including 36 **F-16** fighter-bombers, were not shipped.

For a few days following the testing of five nuclear devices by India, on 11 and 13 May 1998, it seemed that Pakistan was back in favor in Washington. There was intense diplomatic traffic between the capitals of the two countries, including four telephone conversations between Prime Minister **Mian Nawaz Sharif** and President Bill Clinton. The United States failed to dissuade Pakistan from testing its nuclear bombs, however. **Islamabad** announced that it had carried out two series of tests on 28 and 30 May. On 30 May, the United States imposed fresh sanctions on Pakistan. Following the visit to Islamabad in July by Strobe Talbot, deputy secretary of the U.S. State Department, Washington announced some easing of the sanctions in order to save Pakistan from bankruptcy. Relations between Washington and Islamabad deteriorated further after the assumption of power by the military on 12 October 1999 under General **Pervez Musharraf**.



Pakistan was back in favor in September 2001 following the decision by President Musharraf to provide full support for the United States in its war against international **terrorism**. In a telephone conversation between U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell and President Musharraf on 13 September, Islamabad agreed to all of the American demands including the cessation of all support to the **Taliban** regime in Afghanistan, the use of its air space for American aircraft on bombing missions to Afghanistan, and the use of some bases in Pakistan in support of the U.S. military's operation against Afghanistan. Pakistan was rewarded richly by the administration of President George W. Bush. Washington cancelled US\$1 billion of Pakistan's **debt** to the United States, agreed to provide US\$3 billion of military and economic assistance over a six-year period (2004–2010), and in April 2005 agreed once again to provide F-16 fighter planes to Islamabad.

Even the revelation that Dr. **Abdul Qadeer Khan**, the father of the Pakistani nuclear bomb, had been engaged in proliferation activities and had aided **Iran**, Libya, and **North Korea** in their nuclear programs, did not cause Washington to reassess its relations with Islamabad.

**URBANIZATION.** Pakistan has had one of the most rapid rates of urbanization in the Third World. When Pakistan became an independent state, approximately 3 million people lived in urban areas—only 10 percent of the total **population**. By 1998, the urban population was 42 million; according to the **census of 1998**, urban areas accounted for 32.5 percent of the population. Two cities—**Karachi** and **Lahore**—together had more than 15 million people. In 2005, Karachi's population was estimated at 13 million and that of Lahore at 7 million.

There were several reasons for the rapid growth of the urban population in Pakistan, some of which are unique to the country. These include a rapid and reasonably steady growth in the **economy**. For more than 40 years, Pakistan's gross domestic product (GDP) increased at a rate of nearly 6 percent a year, twice the increase in population. This level of GDP growth inevitably meant a high level of rural-to-urban migration, and Pakistan was no exception. A fairly significant restructuring of the economy so that the nonagricultural sector accounted for a greater proportion of the GDP than is common for the countries of Pakistan's level of development also contributed to a high level of urbanization.

Immigration of millions of people, first from **India** soon after independence and later from Afghanistan in the early 1980s, added to the size of the Pakistani cities. Karachi was the most seriously affected city as a result of the arrival of millions of people in search of jobs. The development of an urban-based “underground” economy, fed by remittances sent by the Pakistanis working in the Middle East, trade in drugs, and the leakage from the supply of arms from the **United States** to the **mujahideen** fighting in **Afghanistan** also added to the rate of growth of the urban population. Although most of the urban growth was the consequence of the rapid increase in the population of such large cities as Karachi, Lahore, **Faisalabad**, **Hyderabad**, and Multan, scores of small towns have also contributed to the rapid urbanization. The growth in the size of small towns occurred because of the increase in agricultural output during the two “**green revolutions**.” *See also* REFUGEES FROM AFGHANISTAN; REFUGEES FROM INDIA.

**USHR.** *Ushr* is a tax on **agricultural** income. Levied at the rate of 5 percent a year, it is enjoined by **Islam**, together with *zakat*. *Zakat*, a tax on accumulated wealth, does not count agricultural property among the taxpayers’ assets. The *Zakat* and *Ushr* Ordinance was promulgated by President **Zia ul-Haq** on 20 June 1980. Although *zakat* was levied from the day of the promulgation of the ordinance, collection of *ushr* only began several years later. The delay in introducing the tax was the result, in part, of the government’s failure to abolish the existing land revenue, a tax on gross agricultural income originally imposed by the **Mughuls** and incorporated by the British into the fiscal system during their rule of **India**. The powerful landed aristocracy argued successfully that the imposition of *ushr* along with the levy of land revenue would be tantamount to double taxation. The landlords were finally persuaded that *ushr* was a lighter burden to carry than an income tax on agricultural incomes from which they had been exempt since the days of the Mughuls and the British.

**USMANI, MAULANA SHABBIR AHMAD (1885–1963).** Shabbir Ahmad Usmani was born in 1885 and educated at Darul Ulum, Deoband. He taught at the institution after graduating with distinction. After 18 years (1910–1928) at Darul Ulum, Deoband, he took up a teaching assignment at Jamila Islamia, Deoband (1928–1932), and

went on to become the institution's principal (1932–1935). He was an early recruit to Muslim politics; in 1919, he took an active interest in the Khilafat movement. In 1945, having been influenced by the political thinking of **Muhammad Ali Jinnah**, he parted company with the majority of the Deobandi *ulema* (Islamic scholars) and established the **Jamiatul-Ulemai-Islam** (JUI). The JUI turned away from the Jamiatul-Ulemai-Hind of the Deobandi ulema because the latter did not see any reason to campaign explicitly for the political rights of the Muslim community. According to the Deobandis of the traditional schools, the Muslim was no different from a non-Muslim; what made him different was only the pursuit of Islam. What mattered was personal piety, which, in turn, depended on a profound understanding of the basic tenets of Islam.

Usmani did not support this line of thinking, and his decision to establish the JUI provided the **Muslim League** with political backing at a critical time when the latter needed to reach the Muslim masses. With Usmani's efforts, the JUI established a strong presence in the **Northwest Frontier Province** (NWFP) and campaigned successfully for Pakistan in the referendum conducted in 1947 in the NWFP. Jinnah rewarded Usmani for his efforts by inviting him to hoist the Pakistani flag on 14 August 1947 at the ceremony held in **Karachi** to launch the new Muslim state. Usmani joined the **First Constituent Assembly** in 1947 and remained an active member until his death in Karachi.

– V –

**VALUE ADDED TAX (VAT).** Pakistan's inability to improve its resource situation is in part the result of the tax instruments used by the government, which cannot tap the more dynamic sectors of the economy. The possibility of adding the "value-added tax" to the armory of instruments was examined on several occasions by the government, but no action was taken. The VAT is an indirect tax that is imposed on each sale starting at the production-and-distribution cycle and culminating with the sale to the consumer.

The VAT became a major source of revenue for a number of countries in the final decades of the 20th century. The introduction of a comprehensive consumption tax such as the VAT was recommended

to Pakistan by the **International Monetary Fund (IMF)** and the **World Bank** as a way of increasing the government's tax receipts and reducing the large fiscal deficit the country had lived with for many years. But the introduction of the tax was resisted by the powerful business community on the grounds that it would place an enormous administrative burden on them. In 1993, the government adopted an expanded **General Sales Tax (GST)** as the first step toward the introduction of the VAT. The scope of the GST was expanded by the government of President **Pervez Musharraf** as a part of the program it negotiated with the IMF in 2000.

– W –

**WAHABISM.** Wahabism is based on the teachings of Muhammad ibn abd al-Wahab, a Muslim scholar who lived in the 18th century in Najd Central Arabia. Wahab emphasized *tawhid*, the absolute oneness of God, and decried such acts as overt affection for saints or visits to their shrines for prayers and other acts of devotion including the recitation of the names of God as done by the mystics belonging to various **Sufistic** orders. Wahab's followers consider such practices as polytheism. They advocate returning to the original teachings of **Islam**, as contained in the Koran and Hadith, the recorded sayings of Prophet Muhammad. Wahabi theology and jurisprudence incorporated the teachings of Ibn Taymiya and the legal school associated with Ahmad Ibn Hanbal. They believe in the literal interpretation of the Koran and the establishment of a Muslim state encompassing the entire world of Islam and based only on Islamic law.

The Wahabi movement has gone through several ups and downs over the last two and a half centuries. By the end of the 18th century, Wahabis brought central Arabia under their control and attacked Karbala, the holy city of the Shiite branch of Islam. However, the Ottomans put an end to the first Wahabi empire in 1818. The political fortunes of the Wahabis revived in the 19th century, only to be destroyed at the end of the century by the Rashidya rulers of northern Arabia. The Wahabis were back in power in 1932 when Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud founded the state of **Saudi Arabia** and declared Wahabism to be the official religion of his kingdom.

Wahabi influence in Pakistan arrived via the scholars trained at **Deoband**, a seminary in what is now the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh. These scholars set up *madrassas* first in the **Northwest Frontier Province** and later, after the birth of Pakistan in 1947, in **Karachi**, the first capital of the new country. Karachi attracted nearly a million Muslim refugees from India, including many who had been deeply influenced by the teachings of seminaries such as the one at Deoband.

Wahabism expanded its influence in Pakistan during the 11-year rule of President **Zia ul-Haq** (1977–1988), Pakistan’s third military leader and an orthodox Muslim. Zia encouraged the establishment of *madrassas* in the country, which provided instruction in the Wahabi interpretation of Islam. Some of these *madrassas* were used as training camps for the mujahideen who were sent to fight the **Soviet Union**’s occupation of **Afghanistan** (1979–1989). This was done with the active assistance of the **United States** who provided training to and military equipment for the mujahideen, and by Saudi Arabia who made large financial contributions in support of the effort. The mujahideen success in Afghanistan encouraged the Wahabi groups to expand the *madrassas* and form their own militias for supporting various Islamic causes around the world, including the wars in Bosnia, Chechnya, **Kashmir**, Kosovo, and southern Philippines.

The political success in the **elections of 2002** of the **Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal**, a coalition of six Islamic groups that espoused Wahabism, further helped the movement to increase its presence in Pakistan until it came into direct conflict with the government headed by President **Pervez Musharraf**, Pakistan’s fourth military leader. In the summer of 2005, following the **terrorist** attacks of July on the London transportation system, when it became known that at least two of the suicide bombers in this incident had been to Pakistan and may have attended some of the Wahabi schools in the country, the Musharraf government launched a program to reform the *madrassas* to ensure that they were not being used to prepare jihadis, but were engaged in genuine educational activities.

**WAHEED KAKAR, GENERAL (RETIRED) ABDUL (1938– )**. On 13 January 1993 General Abdul Waheed Kakar became the eleventh person to command the Pakistani army. For the army and for the

country—and most certainly for Waheed himself—this was an unexpected appointment. The three-year term of General **Asif Nawaz**, his predecessor, was to end in August 1994, a year after Lieutenant General Waheed was scheduled for retirement. The army’s General Headquarters had already announced the names of half a dozen lieutenant generals who were to retire in the summer of 1993. The list included Waheed Kakar, who at that time commanded an army infantry corps stationed in **Quetta**. However, General Asif Nawaz died of a massive heart attack on 6 January 1993, and a week later President **Ghulam Ishaq Khan** selected Lieutenant General Waheed as the chief of the army staff.

On 17 July 1993, Waheed Kakar, taking a strictly neutral position in the conflict between President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Prime Minister **Mian Nawaz Sharif**, forced both to resign from office. A caretaker administration was appointed under **Moeen Qureshi**; its assigned task was to hold another general election in the country. Elections were held in early **October 1993**, and later that month, **Benazir Bhutto** was back in power as prime minister for the second time. Soon after Bhutto took office, she was able to get **Farooq Leghari**, her trusted lieutenant, elected president.

The Bhutto-Leghari-Waheed “**troika**” settled into an easy relationship. Waheed was quite content to be the junior partner in this combination as long as the prime minister and the president followed a course that protected the interests of the armed forces. On 18 December 1995, President Farooq Leghari announced the appointment of General **Jehangir Karamat** as the new chief of the army staff. Waheed relinquished his position on 12 January 1996 and went into retirement. *See also* THE MILITARY.

**WALI KHAN, KHAN ABDUL (1921–2006)**. Khan Abdul Wali Khan built his political career on two traditional foundations of **Pathan** politics: the anti-establishment approach adopted with great effectiveness by the **Khudai Khidmatgars** and the intense Pathan nationalism of his father, **Abdul Ghaffar Khan**. He entered politics in 1942 at the height of the Quit India Movement launched by Mahatma Gandhi’s **Indian National Congress**. After Pakistan was born, the Khan brothers—Ghaffar Khan and Dr. **Khan Sahib**—and Abdul Wali Khan suffered long periods of incarceration. After several spells of confinement, Wali Khan finally emerged from jail in 1953 and

three years later, in 1956, he joined the **National Awami Party** (NAP) formed by **Maulana Bhashani**. Following the military takeover of 1958, Wali Khan found himself back in prison.

The NAP split into two factions in 1965, and Wali Khan became the president of the pro-Moscow wing of the party. He and his faction took an active part in the anti-**Ayub Khan** movement of 1968–1969. In Pakistan's first general election, called by General **Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan**, Ayub Khan's successor, Wali Khan's NAP gained six seats in the National Assembly, three each from **Balochistan** and the **Northwest Frontier Province**. With the restoration of civilian rule in 1972, the NAP formed coalition governments in Balochistan and the Northwest Frontier Province, joining with the **Jamiatul-Ulemai-Islam** (JUI). The NAP-JUI governments were dismissed a few months after they had taken office, however. **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto** accused the two provincial administrations of working against the integrity of the state of Pakistan, a charge that was upheld by the Supreme Court. Wali Khan was once again back in prison, and the NAP was banned as a political organization. He had to wait for Bhutto's departure from the political scene before he could return to active politics. He was released from prison in 1978. Not impressed with the state of socialist politics in Pakistan, in 1986 he persuaded four small organizations to join him under the umbrella of a new organization, the **Awami National Party** (ANP). The ANP elected him president.

In the political realignment that took place after President **Zia ul-Haq**'s death in 1988, Wali Khan decided to work with the **Pakistan Muslim League** (PML), the party he had opposed throughout his political life. He joined with **Mian Nawaz Sharif**, the president of the League, to fight against the **Pakistan People's Party** (PPP) of **Benazir Bhutto**. He stayed with Nawaz Sharif through four elections—in 1988, 1990, 1993, and 1997. The ANP was in the coalition that governed the Northwest Frontier Province from 1990 to 1993 when Nawaz Sharif's PML was in power in **Islamabad**. It stayed in office for a brief period after the elections of 1993 but was outmaneuvered by Benazir Bhutto. In 1995, Wali Khan stepped down as the president of the ANP, leaving the management of the organization to his wife, **Nasim Wali Khan**, and **Ajmal Khattak**.

**WANA.** Wana, the capital of South Waziristan, a Political Agency on Pakistan's border with **Afghanistan**, became an important battleground in

the **United States**–led war on international **terrorism**. In the spring of 2003, upon receiving intelligence reports that several hundred foreign Islamic fighters had taken refuge in the Agency, Pakistan’s military authorities launched a major campaign against the militants. The intelligence agencies had reported that the group hiding in and operating out of Wana was being led by, among others, Abdullah Mehsud, an Afghan who had recently been released by the United States from the Guantanamo Bay Prison in Cuba.

There was heavy loss of life on both sides, as the militants in Wana and the surrounding mountainous areas offered stiff resistance to the Pakistani army. In the two year period between the springs of 2003 and 2005, 500 people were reportedly killed. The situation in the Agency improved after Pakistan’s military authorities changed their tactics. An offer of amnesty and payment of a significant amount of money to the tribal leaders of the area brought relative calm. In a face-to-face meeting held at Srarogha on 7 February 2005, the government of Pakistan agreed to make cash payments amounting to about US\$1 million to the area’s tribal leaders. The leaders had demanded a total of US\$2.8 million to settle their debt with **al Qaeda**, which had loaned money to the tribal chiefs in order for them to host foreign fighters and allow the latter to use the Wana area as a launch pad for attacks on Afghanistan.

According to the agreement with the tribal leaders, the members of the tribe would neither give shelter to nor assist any foreign militants in South Waziristan. It was agreed that those members of the tribe who did not abide by this agreement would be handed over to the government and tried under Riwaj (the tribal custom). The agreement also granted amnesty to a number of the tribal members, but it was not clear whether the understanding included Abdullah Mehsud.

The United States was not impressed by the Pakistani attempts to bring the South Waziristan Agency under control by a combination of means that included the use of amnesty and financial rewards. On a visit to Pakistan, Lieutenant General David Barno, the commanding officer of the American troops in Afghanistan, told reporters in **Islamabad** on 19 April 2005 that Pakistan was planning to launch a major military operation to expel militants who had taken up residence in the country’s northern areas, including South Waziristan. The general’s comment drew a sharp riposte from Lieutenant General



Safdar Hussain, Pakistani corps commander in the area. “I am not a spectator to sit on the fringes and watch. I have a mission to end terrorism, and I will act if there is any actionable intelligence. But I want to achieve this without firing a single bullet,” said the general. He said that his country had done more on its side of the border than the Afghans had accomplished on their side. Pakistan, he said, had set up 669 military posts along the 660-kilometer long border and had deployed about 70,000 troops. Afghanistan had established only 69 posts on its side. The grant of amnesty and award of financial compensation did not entirely bring peace to the area. The government was not able to establish its full control, and skirmishes between the military and the tribes continued throughout most of 2005, albeit at a much reduced level.

**WAQFS.** The Islamic tradition encourages—and the Muslim *fiqh* (law) allows—the setting up of charitable trusts called *waqfs*, the profits from which can be used by the trustee, his family, or his community for any purpose designated by him. Such a broad interpretation of the legitimate use of waqf profit was bound to result in a great deal of misuse, and it did. Corruption traditionally associated with the management of religious properties was one of the many social problems that the government of General **Muhammad Ayub Khan** faced when it assumed office in October 1958.

A large number of waqfs were set up in British India to administer mosques, shrines, and other religious properties. Donations to the waqfs came mostly from devotees, and the waqfs were administered by individuals who, either by tradition or by inheritance, had the right to oversee religious properties. A great deal of corruption had crept into the way the waqfs were managed. This was investigated by a commission set up by the Ayub government, which recommended the establishment of the West Pakistan Auqaf (plural for waqf) Department to administer the properties hitherto run by trustees. This step, in fact, resulted in the nationalization of religious properties and became a source of abiding resentment against Ayub Khan on the part of the religious leaders who had lost an important source of income. Successor administrations continued government control of waqfs but did not expand the reach of the provincial auqaf departments to the properties that were not nationalized by the Ayub administration.

**WATER.** Although the **Indus River** system, one of the world's largest river systems, flows through Pakistan, the country is now experiencing a serious shortage of water. Water supply per capita is about 1,250 cubic meters per year—1,000 cubic meters per year is internationally regarded as an acute shortage. By about 2020, millions of hectares of land could turn into desert if expensive water-saving and water-tapping schemes are not implemented. According to a Pakistani water expert, "the Himalayas are one of the biggest reservoirs of water in the world. We only have to learn how to manage it." And, according to the **World Bank**, "the whole system, from the mountain top to the roots, needs development, and it has been neglected for decades." Chronic underinvestment in water has left the huge system that irrigates about 18 million hectares of land leaking about 40 percent of the water that flows through it. Water that leaks raises the water table and brings salt toward the surface, rendering the land useless for cultivation.

Emphasis on saving the large irrigation infrastructure, built mostly by the British in the 19th and 20th centuries, and developing additional storage capacity in the Indus River basin were adopted as the twin objectives by the government headed by **Pervez Musharraf** in 2005. Its program was the culmination of several months of work. At the **Pakistan Development Forum** held in April 2005, the government presented to the donor community a program for infrastructural development, heavily biased in favor of the water sector. The government indicated that it was planning to spend US\$33 billion for the sector in the 20-year period between 2005 and 2025. Of this, US\$12 billion were earmarked for the first five years of the program. It planned to build two water storage projects that would cost US\$6 billion over the next five years. Another US\$4.5 billion is needed for the improvement and maintenance of the large irrigation network. This amount would be spent on augmenting existing storage capacity and on modernization and repair of several barrages; rehabilitation, remodeling, and lining of canals and water courses. *See also* INDUS; INDUS WATER TREATY; MANGLA DAM; TARBELA DAM; TECHNICAL COMMITTEE ON WATER RESOURCES; WATER AND POWER DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY.

#### **WATER AND POWER DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (WAPDA).**

The Water and Power Development Authority was established in 1958

to develop and maintain Pakistan's extensive irrigation system in order to reclaim the land being lost to salinity and waterlogging, and to generate, transmit, and distribute electric power. Until the creation of WAPDA, these tasks were carried out by several ministries and departments in the federal and provincial governments. These overlapping responsibilities among ministries and departments had created a great deal of red tape and had slowed the country's progress in these vital sectors of the **economy**. WAPDA was given the mandate to develop a strategy for the development of Pakistan's abundant **water** resources for irrigation as well as power generation.

WAPDA was initially presided over by a number of exceptional men, including Ghulam Faruque (1959–1962), **Ghulam Ishaq Khan** (1962–1965), and A. G. N. Kazi (1965–1969). However, the advent of martial law in 1977 turned WAPDA into a preserve of the army corps of engineers. **Zia ul-Haq** appointed Lieutenant Generals Fazle Raziq, Safdar Butt, and Zahid Ali Akbar, all from the Army Corps of Engineers, as chairmen. During **Benazir Bhutto**'s second tenure in office, starting in 1993, the WAPDA Act was amended to make the authority and its chairman subject to greater control by the government.

Since its inception, WAPDA has implemented a large number of irrigation and power-development schemes. These include the massive works built under the Indus Waters Replacement Program, including the construction of two large **dams**—the **Mangla Dam** and the **Tarbela Dam**—the Guddu Barrage, and a system of “link canals” that transferred water from the **Indus River** to the Jhelum, from the Jhelum to the Chenab, and from the Chenab to the Ravi. These achievements notwithstanding, by the late 1980s WAPDA had begun to exhibit all the symptoms typical of large public corporations in the developing world. It had become a bloated organization, employing a much larger work force than needed. Employment had increased because of political pressures; like other corporations in the public sector, WAPDA was the employer of last resort to which the politicians turned to obtain jobs for their constituents. WAPDA was also incurring large losses in its power transmission and distribution system. It also failed to keep its power development program proceeding in pace with the enormous growth in electricity consumption. The result was “load shedding”—or power rationing—particularly during the periods when the flow of water in the Indus River system was low.

The answer to all these woes was to downsize WAPDA by starting a process of gradual **privatization** of some of its assets. In the early 1990s, the authorities in Pakistan decided to privatize two power plants owned by WAPDA—the plants at **Jamshoro** and **Kot Addu**—and one system of power distribution in the city of **Faisalabad**. At the same time, it was decided to end the monopoly of the public sector over new power generation. In 1993, the government of Pakistan announced an energy policy that encouraged the participation of the private sector in power generation.

By the time Benazir Bhutto left office in November 1996, WAPDA was effectively bankrupt. It owed large amounts of money to the government, to a number of public-sector corporations that supplied it with fuel, to the railways that transported fuel to its power stations, and to thousands of private business people who provided it all kinds of services. The caretaker administration of Prime Minister **Meraj Khalid**, which took office after Bhutto's departure, made an effort to restore the financial health of WAPDA. Increasing power tariffs and improving operational efficiency were two important parts of this strategy. The government of **Mian Nawaz Sharif** that came to power in early 1997 was initially reluctant to further increase tariffs, but was persuaded to reverse its decision in March 1998 on the insistence of the **World Bank**, which had financed several programs of development undertaken over the years by WAPDA.

**WATTOO, MANZOOR AHMAD (1934–)**. Until the **elections of 1993**, Wattoo was a little-known small-town politician from central **Punjab**. Shortly before the elections he decided to abandon **Mian Nawaz Sharif** and the **Pakistan Muslim League (PML)** in favor of a splinter group that was organized by Nasir Chatta, Sharif's rival. Chatta gave his splinter group the name of **Pakistan Muslim League (Junejo)** (PML(J)) in memory of **Muhammad Khan Junejo**, who had served as **Zia ul-Haq's** prime minister after the lifting of martial law in December 1985. Wattoo became a prominent member of the PML(J).

In the 1993 elections, neither **Benazir Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (PPP)** nor Mian Nawaz Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League returned to the National Assembly and the Provincial Assembly of Punjab with a clear majority. Both were dependent on the support of minor parties, splinter groups, and independents. The Pakistan Muslim

League (Junejo) was one such splinter group that chose to support the PPP. In return, the PML(J) was awarded the chief ministership of Punjab, a position that went to Manzoor Wattoo. Wattoo had maneuvered himself into the right place at the right time. Once in office, Wattoo proved difficult for the PPP to manage. Under his stewardship, the Punjab government also earned a reputation for corruption and incompetence, and after a number of skirmishes with Benazir Bhutto, it was dismissed by President **Farooq Leghari** on 5 September 1995. The president suspended the Provincial Assembly for two months and imposed direct rule through the governor.

**WATTOO, MUHAMMAD YASIN KHAN (1930–1996).** Yasin Khan Wattoo began his professional career as a lawyer in the Sahiwal district court. He joined the **Convention Muslim League** of General **Muhammad Ayub Khan** in 1963, was elected to the West Pakistan Provincial Assembly in 1965, and was appointed minister of **basic democracies** and local government in the same year. **Muhammad Khan Junejo** was also a minister in the same cabinet, and the two formed a good working relationship, which helped Wattoo when **Zia ul-Haq** chose Junejo to become prime minister. In the 1970s, Wattoo switched parties and joined **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party**; he was elected to the National Assembly in the controversial **elections of 1977**. He briefly held a cabinet appointment at the center but lost the position with the promulgation of martial law on 5 July 1977. In the party-less **elections of February 1985**, Wattoo won a seat in the National Assembly from Sahiwal district. With Junejo appointed prime minister, Wattoo was called in to take charge of education. In 1986, he replaced **Mahbubul Haq** as minister of finance. Wattoo lost his job when Prime Minister Junejo was dismissed by President Zia ul-Haq in May 1988. Wattoo was defeated in the **elections of 1988** but won a seat in the National Assembly in the **elections of 1990**.

**WHEAT.** Wheat is Pakistan's main staple and by far its most important crop. Of the country's total cultivated area of 22.93 million hectares, more than a third (36.6 percent 1997–1998) is used to grow wheat. In 1997–1998, the latest year for which crop data are available, wheat was cultivated on 8.4 million hectares. Both the output of wheat and the area devoted to it have increased several-fold (the area by almost

twice as much and production by four-and-a-half times) since Pakistan gained independence. Additionally, the yield per hectare has increased considerably since independence: Average output per hectare in 1950–1955 was only 780 kilograms; 50 years later, it had increased to nearly 2.2 metric tons. The most spectacular growth came in the 10-year period between 1965 and 1975—the period of the first “**green revolution**”—when the yield of wheat per hectare increased from 995 kilograms to 1.2 metric tons, or, considered another way, increased at an annual rate of nearly 2 percent.

The changes in wheat-yield per hectare of land were the consequence of both government policy and private initiative. Even after the green revolution was over—that is, after all the areas that could profitably use the new high-yielding wheat varieties were already doing so—wheat output and the productivity of land devoted to wheat continued to increase. This was largely because of the progressive commercialization of **agriculture**. Although the second green revolution had its most dramatic impact on the **cotton** crop, it changed the environment in which all farmers—not just those growing cotton—were making production decisions. Agriculture was no longer directed at subsistence farming; its aim was now to produce for the market. And the signals that began to be received from the market in the late 1980s and 1990s did not indicate that continued emphasis on wheat was to Pakistan’s overall comparative advantage.

**WINGS OF PAKISTAN.** Pakistan has existed as a nation-state for more than 50 years but not in the shape and form in which it was created. It was born as a country with two “wings”: the one in the west was made up of the provinces of **Balochistan**, the **Northwest Frontier**, **Punjab**, and **Sindh**; the other, in the east, included the Muslim part of Bengal and the district of Sylhet in Assam. The term *wings* to describe the two parts of the country, separated by 1,700 kilometers of Indian territory, became popular soon after the establishment of Pakistan in August 1947. The use of the term lost its relevance once the eastern wing of Pakistan gained independence as the state of **Bangladesh** in December 1971.

**WOMEN.** Statistics such as the female rate of literacy, female enrollment rates in schools and colleges, the rate of female infant mortal-

ity, maternal mortality, fertility rate, and so on, all point vividly to the very low social status of Pakistani women. This applies particularly to the poorer segments of the society where women suffer from all manner of deprivation. The social status of women in Pakistan is even lower than in other countries with comparable levels of development. At 55 years in 1996, Pakistan's female life-expectancy at birth was five years less than the average for all poor countries. The first time that female life expectancy in Pakistan was reported to be equal to male life expectancy was in 1988; in developed and most developing countries, women tend to outlive men by about five years. In 1997, at 35 percent, Pakistan's female primary-school enrollment ratio was among the lowest in the world. There were only eight countries with lower ratios, and apart from Bhutan, all the others were in Africa. The women of Pakistan carry a very heavy reproductive burden. The average age of marriage is 17; although it is increasing somewhat, it is still very low. With the incidence of marriage at 98 percent, exposure to possible pregnancy on average is for a period of 33 years. Since only 11 percent of women of childbearing age use contraception, this long period of exposure results in a very high total fertility rate (TFR). In Pakistan, the TFR for 1996 was estimated at 5.6, one of the highest in the world. Pakistan has one of the lowest gender ratios in the world, and it has declined over time. In 1985, in Pakistan's population there were only 91 women for every 100 men. This low and declining ratio is caused by two factors: high mortality rates for women and improving mortality rates for men.

For a variety of reasons, economic as well as social, women belonging to the upper strata of the society are acquiring **education** and skills that are comparable—in some cases, even better—than those possessed by men. This has happened because of the rapid modernization and **urbanization** of the society since the mid-1970s, which pulled men prematurely into the work force. This had a significant impact on the enrollment rates for women in colleges and universities. Because society was still not prepared to accept women into most workplaces, they stayed on in colleges and universities. On graduation, a large number of women moved into professions where their presence will have a profound impact on the country's social and political development. For example, journalism, particularly in the English language, and politics have attracted a number of talented

women. The fact that **Benazir Bhutto** became Pakistan's prime minister not once but twice, and two women (Abida Hussain and Maleeha Lodhi) have served as ambassadors to the United States, are good indications of the emancipation of women belonging to the upper strata of society.

The Islamization of society ordered by **Zia ul-Haq** deeply affected Pakistani women, producing a reaction that contributed to their politicization. Women's reactions to the policies adopted by Zia resulted in the establishment of an abundance of women's groups that embraced a wide variety of objectives: economic, social, and political. The most important of these organizations was an umbrella group, Khawateen Mahaz-e-Amal (**Women's Action Forum**, WAF), founded in **Karachi** in 1981. The WAF opened branches all over the country and within two years of its establishment, boasted a membership of 15,000 women.

Although keeping in some check the conservative elements of the society, the work done by women's organizations has not improved their situation since the death of Zia and the introduction of democracy. Much greater effort is needed to bring about a significant improvement in the status of women. The state must get directly involved. *See also* MUKHTARAN BIBI.

**WOMEN'S ACTION FORUM (WAF).** The Women's Action Forum was formed in 1981 as **Zia ul-Haq's** program for the **Islamization** of the legal system gathered pace. **Women** were especially concerned with the **Hadud Ordinances of 1979**, the 1984 Law of Evidence, and the law of Qisas and Diyas. Women—in particular, professional women working in large cities—were concerned that the changes in the legal system that had been introduced, or were being contemplated by the government of Zia ul-Haq, would reduce their status in the society to the point at which they would have to abandon their careers. Although most of the WAF's members identified themselves as Muslims, they viewed religion as a private matter and did not believe that it should shape public policies.

The WAF was successful in slowing the pace of change, although it failed to remove the Hadud Ordinances from the statute books. In February 1983, the WAF sponsored a series of protests against the changes proposed by the Zia administration in the Law of Evidence.



These changes proposed that in all cases other than those covered by the Hadud Ordinances, two male witnesses, and in the absence of two male witnesses, one male and two female witnesses, would be required to prove a crime against a woman. The WAF was of the view that these changes had nothing to do with Islam, but reflected the obscurantism of the regime. On 12 February a clash between women activists and the police in **Lahore** led to a number of injuries and arrests. This incident was a defining moment for women's movements in Pakistan. It not only slowed down the government's efforts at Islamization but also sent a message to all politicians in the country that women's issues had to be taken seriously.

**WORLD BANK GROUP AND PAKISTAN.** The World Bank was created in 1944. In its initial form—the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)—it focused on rebuilding the war-torn countries of Europe. It also provided large amounts of assistance to Japan. It was only after this task had been accomplished that the Bank turned its attention to development. Two more affiliates were added to the original IBRD: the International Finance Corporation (IFC) was established in the 1950s to provide help to the private sector in the developing world. In 1960, the International Development Association (IDA) was created to provide “soft” funding to the poor countries. Whereas the IBRD and IFC raised most of their resources in the international financial markets, the IDA was funded by grants from the rich industrial countries. In the late 1980s a third affiliate was added to the Bank; called the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), it provides insurance to the companies against political risks in the developing world. The IBRD, IFC, IDA, and MIGA together have come to be known as the World Bank Group. All four affiliates of the World Bank Group have been active in Pakistan.

The World Bank's association with Pakistan began in 1952. For the first eight years, the Bank financed projects on close to market terms, but with the creation of the IDA, poor countries such as Pakistan gained access to soft credits. In the period since 1952, Pakistan has received 68 loans and credits amounting to a total of over US\$7 billion. Nearly 39 percent of the assistance provided by the World Bank has gone into **agriculture**, 28 percent into energy, and 17 percent into

**industry.** The Bank has played a major role in getting Pakistan and India to agree to the division of the waters of the **Indus River** system. The resources required for the execution of the Indus Replacement Works were mobilized with the help of the World Bank. The Bank also assisted Pakistan in setting up a number of development finance corporations, including the Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Investment Corporation, the Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan, and the National Development Finance Corporation. *See also* INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND.

**WULLAR BARRAGE.** The **Indus Waters Treaty** of 1960 succeeded in removing ambiguity over the riparian rights of Pakistan and India with respect to the **Indus River** system. The treaty's success notwithstanding, disputes occasionally arose over its precise interpretation on the use of the waters in the upper reaches of the Indus River. Pakistan's problem with the Indian plan to construct a barrage in the Wullar Lake area is an example of the type of disputes that arose in spite of the treaty. In the mid-1980s India undertook the construction of the Tulbal Navigation Project to improve navigation in the Wullar Lake. A barrage on an important inlet into the Indus River was planned, to which Pakistan objected. The issue was not resolved.

– Y –

**YAHYA KHAN, GENERAL AGHA MUHAMMAD (1917–1980).**

Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan was born in the **Northwest Frontier Province** (NWFP) and joined the British Indian Army. He opted for service in Pakistan following the partition of India. With his career under the active sponsorship of General **Muhammad Ayub Khan**, Yahya Khan rose rapidly in the officer ranks of the Pakistan army. He received the ultimate reward for his loyal service to Ayub Khan when in September 1966 he was promoted to the rank of full general and appointed to succeed General **Muhammad Musa** as commander in chief of the Pakistan army. Two-and-a-half years later, at the height of the anti-Ayub Khan movement, Yahya Khan decided to act against his mentor. He forced Muhammad Ayub Khan out of office and nominated himself president and chief martial-law administrator.

The Yahya Khan administration took two important steps: it dissolved the **One Unit of West Pakistan** and promulgated the result of this reengineering as the **Legal Framework Order (LFO)** of 1970. The LFO turned back Pakistan's constitutional clock by more than two decades. It discarded the principle of representational **parity** between East and West Pakistan. With this important change, it was now possible for an East Pakistani political party to gain a comfortable majority in the National Assembly and thus form a government without assistance from the representatives of West Pakistan. Yahya Khan and his advisors, banking on the perpetuation of the fractious politics of East Pakistan, did not think that such an outcome would ever be possible.

The **elections of 1970**, held under the LFO, proved all these calculations wrong. **Mujibur Rahman's Awami League**, by winning 160 seats in a house of 300, was now in a position to dictate its terms to West Pakistan. Yahya Khan panicked, and in this he was encouraged by **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto**. On the night between 25 and 26 March 1971, Yahya Khan ordered the military to restore law and order in East Pakistan. Mujibur Rahman was arrested and sent to a prison in West Pakistan, and the Awami League was banned. What followed was an exceptionally bloody civil war in which hundreds of thousands of people were killed. Millions of Bengalis fled from East Pakistan and took refuge in neighboring **India**. India used the arrival of the refugees in its territory as the pretext for intervening in the civil war. Aided by the Indian troops, the Bengali resistance force entered Dacca (Dhaka) on 16 December 1971. The Pakistan army surrendered to the commander of the Indian army on the same day. Four days later, following a turbulent session with senior- and middle-level officers of the Pakistan army held in the General Headquarters Lecture Hall at **Rawalpindi**, President Yahya Khan agreed to resign and hand over power to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Yahya Khan's role in the East Pakistan crisis was investigated by a commission set up by the government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto under the chairmanship of Chief Justice Hamoodur Rahman. The commission's report was not released to the public. *See also* HAMOODUR RAHMAN COMMISSION.

**YAQUB, MUHAMMAD (1939– )**. Muhammad Yaqub was born in **Faisalabad** and educated at **Lahore** and at Yale University in the

United States. He joined the **International Monetary Fund** in 1969, took early retirement, and returned to Pakistan in 1990. He was appointed special secretary in the Ministry of Finance, and a year later he became governor of the State Bank of Pakistan. His term at the central bank was renewed in January 1997 by the caretaker administration of Prime Minister **Meraj Khalid**. In the spring of 1998, however, he developed major differences with the administration of Prime Minister **Mian Nawaz Sharif** and tendered his resignation.

**YAQUB KHAN, LIEUTENANT GENERAL (RETIRED) SAHIBZADA (1920– )**. Born in the United Provinces of British India (today's state of Uttar Pradesh in **India**), Yaqub joined the British Indian Army before the British decided to leave the subcontinent. After the creation of Pakistan, he opted to work for the new Muslim state. To do so, he and his family had to leave their ancestral home and migrate to Pakistan. He rose quickly in the ranks of the Pakistani army. He came to the attention of the public at large during Pakistan's second general martial law imposed by General **Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan**. In 1970 he was dispatched to Dacca (Dhaka) to take over the command of the Pakistani armed forces stationed in the eastern wing of the country. As governor, Yaqub took the position that some of his predecessors had also taken. Like General **Azam Khan**, who was the governor of East Pakistan during the first few years of Ayub Khan's martial-law administration, Yaqub Khan came to the conclusion that the use of force was not a viable solution to the problem of Bengal. When it became clear to him that Yahya Khan was determined to force the Bengalis to submit to the will of West Pakistan, Yaqub Khan asked for retirement from the army. He returned to **Karachi**, having been replaced by Lieutenant General A. K. Niazi.

General **Zia ul-Haq** appointed Yaqub Khan to be Pakistan's ambassador to the United States. Zia was obviously happy with the job Yaqub Khan performed in Washington. When the military president decided to bring civilian professionals into his cabinet, he asked Yaqub Khan to take the portfolio of foreign affairs. He served many years in this position and was back in the Foreign Office as minister even after the induction of **Benazir Bhutto** as prime minister in December 1988. This appointment came as a total surprise, since Bhutto

was not kindly disposed to any associate of Zia. It was obvious that Yaqub's appointment was one part of the deal that Benazir Bhutto had struck with President **Ghulam Ishaq Khan** and the army to gain power. Yaqub remained with Bhutto until her dismissal in August 1990, after which he left active political life. He carried out a few assignments for the United Nations and was considered for a senior UN position at one point. He retired in **Islamabad** but returned as foreign minister in the caretaker cabinet that took office after the dismissal of the second administration of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto.

**YOUSSEF, RAMZI (c. 1963– )**. Ramzi Youssef is a shadowy figure with unknown nationality and a set of confused objectives. He is the nephew of Khalid Sheikh Muhammad, generally regarded as the master planner of the **terrorist** attacks of 11 September 2001 on the **United States**. Youssef was arrested by the Pakistani authorities in 1995, obviously on the basis of information provided by the U.S. intelligence agencies, and was promptly deported to the United States to stand trial on two counts: conspiracy to blow up a U.S. civilian aircraft over the Pacific and for participating in the 1993 bombing of New York's World Trade Center. Youssef was accused of working with a number of different groups. His activities in the Philippines involved a number of Pakistanis who had participated in the war in **Afghanistan** against the Soviet Union. In the United States, he was accused of working with a group of Arab activists, whose principal aim was to punish the United States for providing support to Israel. Tried in New York in the World Trade Center bombing case in 1997, he was convicted and sentenced to life in prison without parole. Following the missile attack on Afghanistan, in August 1998, the U.S. authorities revealed that Youssef might have worked for **Osama bin Laden**, a Saudi businessman-turned-terrorist.

**YUNIS KHALID, MAULVI (c. 1935– )**. Maulvi Yunis Khalid headed Hizb-e-Islami, one of the seven groups of Afghan **mujahideen**. These groups were formed after the Soviet Union invaded **Afghanistan** in December 1979. They operated out of **Peshawar**, the capital of Pakistan's **Northwest Frontier Province**. In the summer of 1984, the Hizb-e-Islami joined with the other six groups to coordinate efforts against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan. Khalid did not

play a prominent role in Afghan politics after the signing of the Geneva peace agreement and the departure of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

– Z –

**ZAKAT.** *Zakat* is an Islamic tax on wealth; it is levied at the rate of 2.5 percent on accumulated wealth and assets in excess of Rs 2,000 (not including principal residence and agricultural land), and in Pakistan it is deducted on the first day of the month of Ramadan. President **Zia ul-Haq** promulgated the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance on 20 June 1980. The provisions of the ordinance concerning zakat came into operation from the date of its promulgation, while the provisions relating to *ushr* (land tax) became operative at a later date. The ordinance prescribed the system to be followed for the collection of zakat and its disbursement to *mustahequeen* (the deserving) under the Islamic Sharia (law).

Its Islamic origins notwithstanding, the introduction of zakat did not go unchallenged. The Shia community objected strongly to the promulgation of the Zakat Ordinance on religious grounds. According to the Fiqh-i-Jafariyah—the legal code accepted by the Shias—zakat should not be levied on capital and trade. The Shias also believe that the payment of zakat and the purpose for which it is to be used are the responsibility of the individual, to be exercised without any state interference. After considerable agitation by the Shia community, the government amended the Ordinance and exempted the Shia community from the levy of zakat.

The distribution of zakat is entrusted to an elaborate network of committees called Zakat Committees, elected by local communities throughout the country. The principal function of the committees is to identify the *mustahequeen* eligible for receiving zakat funds. Some 32,000 Zakat Committees now operate under a national body called the Zakat Council. As with most other functions performed by government agencies in recent years, the process for the collection and distribution of zakat was not without controversy. There was a growing feeling among the people that the *mustahequeen* identified by the

Zakat Committees were not always the most deserving, and that the local functionaries of both political parties, the **Pakistan People's Party** and the **Pakistan Muslim League**, were using some of the zakat funds to win votes for themselves and their organizations. The use of zakat resources for funding religious institutions created a momentum of its own, the full extent of which was not appreciated when the decision was taken to use these funds for this purpose.

**ZARDARI, ASIF ALI (1950– )**. Asif Ali Zardari entered the center stage of Pakistani politics in the summer of 1987 after his engagement to **Benazir Bhutto** was announced in London. Belonging to a family of Sindhi landlords, he was born and brought up in **Karachi**. After Zardari and Bhutto were married in Karachi on 18 December 1987, he promised not to become active in politics. He did not, however, keep his word and thus cast a long shadow on Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's first administration. Although he was not assigned a formal position in the administration, a number of his close associates joined the prime minister's secretariat. Stories began to circulate about the extent to which Zardari was influencing government decisions. There was a suspicion that he was involved in a number of deals in which government procurement of expensive items and the award of building contracts by the government had led to his receiving large commissions.

Ultimately, based on the extent of talk of Zardari's activities, the recently liberated press in Pakistan chose Zardari as a subject for investigative reporting. The press coverage received by Zardari contributed no doubt to the dismissal of his wife's administration by President **Ghulam Ishaq Khan** in August 1990. The president mentioned "rampant corruption" as one of the reasons for his drastic move against Bhutto. In September 1990, Zardari was arrested on charges of corruption and extortion. One of the cases in which he was implicated—the Unnar Case—revolved around a London-based Pakistani businessman who was allegedly forced to write a check for a large sum of money. The caretaker government of **Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi**, which took office after the dismissal of Benazir Bhutto, charged Zardari with having been involved in this case of extortion.

Zardari took part in the **elections of 1990** as a candidate representing the **Pakistan People's Party** (PPP). Having been denied bail by

the judge presiding over his case and thus unable to leave jail, Zardari could not actively campaign for his own election. That notwithstanding, he won a seat in the National Assembly from the Lyari district of Karachi. The elections brought **Mian Nawaz Sharif** and his **Pakistan Muslim League** to power in **Islamabad**. The new government was not inclined to give any space to Zardari; it was convinced that if he was allowed out of jail, he would flee the country. Thus, Zardari languished in jail for two years but was eventually freed on bail, when Prime Minister Sharif's relations with President **Ishaq Khan** began to sour in the winter of 1993.

By October 1993, another general election had been held, and **Benazir Bhutto** was back in power as prime minister. Zardari initially adopted a low profile, since apparently the prime minister and her husband had learned a valuable lesson from the way they had conducted themselves the first time she was prime minister. He once again won a seat in the National Assembly and for a few months was quite content to serve as a PPP backbencher. But this new attitude did not persist for very long. Once Prime Minister Bhutto felt she was settled in her job, Zardari reemerged even more prominently than he had in 1988–1990. He also began to amass a vast amount of official power. His wife initially gave him the job of chairman of the Environment Commission. In a surprising move in July 1996, Bhutto brought Zardari into her cabinet as the minister in charge of investment. This move was not appreciated by President **Farooq Leghari**, who in 5 November 1996 dismissed the prime minister and her cabinet and dissolved the National Assembly.

Once again, as had happened after Bhutto's first dismissal, Zardari found himself behind bars, accused of using his position in the government to amass vast amounts of wealth. Among the accusations that received the most attention was the purchase of a large mansion in Surrey, outside London. The cases against Zardari were investigated by the **Ehetasab** cell operating out of the office of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. In January 1998, the *New York Times* published a long story carefully documenting the misdeeds allegedly committed by Zardari while his wife was prime minister. *See also* "SURREYGATE."

**ZARDARI, HAKIM ALI.** Hakim Ali Zardari was a little-known **Karachi** businessman before his son, **Asif Ali Zardari**, married **Be-**



**nazir Bhutto.** The son's marriage to Ms. Bhutto also brought the father into the political spotlight. He took part, as a **Pakistan People's Party** candidate, in the general **elections of 1988** and won a seat from **Sindh**. On being elected prime minister, Benazir Bhutto appointed her father-in-law as chairman of the Public Accounts Committee of the National Assembly. Zardari used this position to good political effect, focusing a great deal of the committee's time and effort on highlighting the alleged misdeeds of the administration of **Zia ul-Haq** and Prime Minister **Muhammad Khan Junejo**.

However, his own business dealings after his daughter-in-law's assumption of office came under scrutiny as a result of the investigative efforts of the press. Two Karachi-based news magazines, *Herald* and *Newsline*, took a great deal of interest in Hakim Ali Zardari's business practices. In its August 1990 issue, *Newsline* devoted its cover story to the way public-sector financial institutions—commercial and investment banks—had been used to lend large sums of money to those with close links to Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, including Hakim Ali Zardari. These allegations were used by President **Ghulam Ishaq Khan** in dismissing Bhutto from office in August 1990. When she returned to power in October 1993 as prime minister, Hakim Ali Zardari did not play any significant political role.

**ZIA UL-HAQ, GENERAL MUHAMMAD (1924–1988).** Zia ul-Haq was born and educated at Jullundur and at St. Stephen's College in Delhi. He joined the British Indian Army in 1943, and was trained in the Officer Training School. After the establishment of Pakistan in 1947, he opted for service in the Pakistani army. He received training in the **United States**, served as an advisor to the government of Jordan in 1974–1975, and was promoted to the rank of lieutenant general in 1975. He was commanding the army corps stationed in Multan when Prime Minister **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto** appointed him chief of the army staff (COAS). In selecting Zia to succeed General **Tikka Khan** as the COAS, Bhutto was influenced by a number of factors: Zia had the reputation of being a professional soldier with little interest in politics. He belonged to Jullundur, and not to one of the northern districts of Pakistan, which had been the favorite recruiting areas for the British Indian and Pakistani armies. As such, he did not have a strong rank-and-file following in the army. He was from the

*Arain* (agricultural) caste, which had little representation in the army. From Bhutto's perspective, this was a safe appointment. Zia would not come in with a political agenda of his own; unlike General **Muhammad Ayub Khan**, he was not known to have strong political views. He did not have strong community ties with the members of the army's officer corps. Ayub Khan and **Yahya Khan** were **Pathans**, and the Pathans had a strong presence in the armed forces. There were few *Arains* in the army. There were some other things about Zia's background that were known to Bhutto, however, but to which he seems not to have attached much importance. Among them was Zia's belief that **Islam** presented Pakistan with a model of statecraft that it would do well to follow. He was also known to be tenacious.

Following a long and bitter confrontation between Bhutto and the **Pakistan National Alliance** (PNA), a coalition formed to challenge the **Pakistan People's Party** (PPP), the army, under the leadership of General Zia, decided to intervene. It assumed control on 5 July 1977 but did not abrogate the constitution as Generals Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan had done in 1958 and 1969, respectively. The **Constitution of 1973** was merely suspended. The army's main objective for intervening was to create an environment in which fair general elections could be organized. The army set a limit of ninety days for completion of this intervention, known as **Operation Fairplay**.

Zia and his fellow army commanders might have stuck to this schedule had Bhutto not responded with such belligerence toward the leadership of the armed forces. Once allowed to address public meetings, he promised his followers that those who had engineered the **military** takeover in July would have to face the full legal consequences of their actions. The Constitution of 1973 had been explicit in defining a coup d'état against the government as a capital offense, punishable by death. Bhutto made it absolutely clear that it was his intention to implement this provision once he was back in power. Tried for the murder of a political opponent, he was convicted and sentenced to death by the Lahore High Court in the summer of 1978. The sentence was appealed but was upheld by the Supreme Court in early 1979. Bhutto refused to appeal to Zia for clemency and was hanged in **Rawalpindi** on 4 April 1979.

Once the decision had been made to send Bhutto to the gallows, it was obvious that the army could not let his party, the Pakistan Peo-

ple's Party, regain power. The six-year period from 1979 to 1985 was devoted to restructuring the political system in such a way that the PPP and its new leader, **Benazir Bhutto**, would not be able to return to power. In pursuit of this objective, Zia was prepared to take many risks, including the cancellation of elections promised for November 1979, the organization of a national referendum in December 1984 to award him five more years as president, and the development of close ties with the political forces that totally opposed the PPP and Bhutto. This strategy paid off. The PPP decided to boycott the **elections of 1985**, which gave Zia the opportunity to put in place a civilian government that he could trust. Thus began the Zia-Junejo political era on 23 March 1985, which lasted for more than three years. Zia and **Muhammad Khan Junejo** were confident enough about their situation to lift martial law (**Martial Law, Third**) on 30 December 1985. But Zia decided to stay on as the COAS, thus ensuring a role for the military in the further evolution of the political experiment he had launched with the referendum of December 1984.

The Zia-Junejo political experiment ended suddenly on 29 May 1988 when the president dismissed the prime minister and dissolved the National Assembly. Extreme incompetence, growing corruption, and the failure to further the process of Islamization were offered by Zia as the reasons for his decision. In actual fact, however, Zia had been long resentful of the efforts Junejo was making to distance himself from the president and many of his policies. Zia's death on 17 August 1988, in a plane crash near the city of Bahawalpur, destroyed the political model he had constructed with such care and diligence. Among Zia's abiding legacies were the formal introduction of Islam into the country's economic and social structures, and the assistance provided to the Afghan **mujahideen** in their struggle against the Soviet Union.



## Appendix

# Important Personalities

### GOVERNORS-GENERAL

Muhammad Ali Jinnah	August 1947–September 1948
Khawaja Nazimuddin	September 1948–October 1951
Ghulam Muhammad	October 1951–October 1955
Iskander Mirza	October 1955–March 1956

### PRESIDENTS

Iskander Mirza	March 1956–October 1958
Muhammad Ayub Khan	October 1958–March 1969
Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan	March 1969–December 1971
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto	December 1971–August 1973
Fazal Elahi Chaudhry	August 1973–September 1978
Zia ul-Haq	September 1978–August 1988
Ghulam Ishaq Khan	August 1988–July 1993
Waseem Sajjad	July 1993–December 1993
Sardar Farooq Ahmad Khan Leghari	December 1993–December 1997
Abdul Rafiq Tarar	December 1997–June 2001
Pervez Musharraf	June 2001–

### PRIME MINISTERS

Liaquat Ali Khan	August 1947–October 1951
Khawaja Nazimuddin	October 1951–April 1953
Muhammad Ali Bogra	April 1953–August 1955

## Chaudhri

Muhammad Ali	August 1955–September 1956
H.S. Suhrawardhy	September 1956–October 1957
I.I. Chundrigar	October 1957–December 1957
Feroze Khan Noon	December 1957–October 1958

*Presidential form of government was in place from October 1958 to August 1973.*

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto	August 1973–July 1977
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*Presidential form of government returned in July 1977 and was in place until March 1985.*

Muhammad Khan Junejo	March 1985–May 1988
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*There was no prime minister from May 1988 to December 1988.*

Benazir Bhutto	December 1988–August 1990
Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi	August 1990–November 1990
Mian Nawaz Sharif	November 1990–April 1993
Balkh Sher Mazari	April 1993–June 1993
Mian Nawaz Sharif	June 1993–July 1993
Moeen Qureshi	July 1993–October 1993
Benazir Bhutto	October 1993–November 1996
Meraj Khalid	November 1996–February 1997
Mian Nawaz Sharif	February 1997–October 1999

*There was no prime minister from October 1999 to January 2003.*

Zafarullah Khan Jamali	January 2003–July 2004
Shujaat Hussain	August 2004
Shaukat Aziz	August 2004–

### CHIEFS OF THE ARMY STAFF (COAS)

Frank Messervy	August 1947–January 1949
Douglas Gracey	January 1949–January 1951
Muhammad Ayub Khan	January 1951–October 1958
Muhammad Musa	October 1958–September 1966

Agha Muhammad	
Yahya Khan	September 1966–December 1971
Gul Hassan	December 1971–March 1972
Tikka Khan	March 1972–March 1976
Zia ul-Haq	March 1976–August 1988
Aslam Beg	August 1988–August 1991
Asif Nawaz	August 1991–January 1993
Abdul Waheed Kakar	January 1993–January 1996
Jehangir Karamat	January 1996–October 1998
Pervez Musharraf	October 1998–





## Bibliography

Since its independence in 1947, Pakistan has not been the subject of a great deal of scholarship. Even when the country celebrated its 50th birthday on 14 August 1997, the event was relatively unnoticed. On the other hand, a great deal was written and said about India when it turned 50, a day after Pakistan did. A number of books on Indian history appeared, and several journals and magazines published special issues or surveys.

Interest in Pakistan per se has been confined to a few periods in its turbulent history. Events that would be considered ancient history and those more recent ones leading up to the emergence of the new state were part of the history of India before partition. The Pakistan Movement, which concerned the campaign to create an independent homeland for the Muslim community of British India, is the period that has attracted the most interest. The subject has often been dealt with in the context of the Indian independence movement. Among the notable works belonging to this genre are two recent books: Patrick French's *Liberty or Death: India's Journey to Independence and Division*, and Anthony Read and David Fisher's *The Proudest Day: India's Long Road to Independence*. This recent attention to the subject was not entirely the result of the 50th anniversary celebration, however. A number of works have appeared on this subject over the last 50 years. These include Chaudri Muhammad Ali's *The Emergence of Pakistan*. Ali was a close associate of Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Pakistan's founder, and Liaqat Ali Khan, the country's first prime minister. Khalid bin Sayeed's *Pakistan: The Formative Phase* provides a detailed account of the way Jinnah guided the Pakistan movement. Ayesha Jalal's *The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan* provides an entirely different interpretation of Jinnah's role in creating Pakistan. She argues that Jinnah wanted Pakistan to get a better deal for the Muslim community of British India from the Indian National Congress led by Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru. Had such a deal been made, Jinnah might not have pressed on with the idea of Pakistan to the point at which India had to be partitioned.

Muhammad Ali Jinnah attracted few biographers. Among the more competent works are Stanley Wolpert's *Jinnah of Pakistan* and Sharif Al Mujahid's *Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah: Studies in Interpretation*. This latter book has a detailed chronology of Jinnah's political life. The National Archives of Pakistan is publishing the *Jinnah Papers* under the direction of Z. H. Zaidi, a Pakistani historian. Akbar S. Ahmad, a Pakistani anthropologist, is directing a project out of Cambridge University, England, that includes the production of a documentary on the life of Jinnah as well as a feature film.

The advent of military rule in Pakistan in October 1958 and President Muhammad Ayub Khan's political experiment, as well as his success with accelerating the rate of economic

growth, excited considerable academic interest. This was helped by the presence of Harvard University's development experts in the Planning Commission, several of whom wrote important books. Among these are Gustav Papanek's *Pakistan's Development: Social Goals and Private Incentives* and Stephen R. Lewis's *Economic Policy and Industrial Growth in Pakistan*. This period was also covered by some Pakistani economists. Mahbubul Haq's *The Strategy of Economic Planning: A Case Study of Pakistan* provided useful insights into the model of planning pursued by the Planning Commission in formulating and implementing the highly successful Second Five Year Plan.

The conflict with East Pakistan that led to a civil war in 1971 and the breakup of Pakistan was also the subject of several useful works. Rounaq Jahan's *Pakistan: Failure in National Integration* examined the circumstances that led to the conflict between the two wings of the country. A more recent book, Hassan Zaheer's *The Separation of East Pakistan: The Rise of Bengali Muslim Nationalism* presents a highly competent analysis of the entire episode. Zaheer was a senior civil service official at the time of the civil war and was a prisoner of war in India.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's charisma and style of governance interested a number of scholars. Bhutto attracted more biographers than any other Pakistani leader. Among the books dealing with this extraordinary figure in Pakistan's history are Stanley Wolpert's *Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan: His Life and Times*, Salman Taseer's *Bhutto: A Political Biography*, and Shahid Javed Burki's *Pakistan Under Bhutto, 1971–77*. The book by Benazir Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's daughter, *Daughter of the East: An Autobiography*, dealt with her father's rise and fall from power. Zulfikar Bhutto wrote a defense of himself while he was in prison waiting to be tried for the murder of an opponent. The manuscript of *If I Am Assassinated. . . ?* was smuggled out of the prison in Rawalpindi and published in India.

Zia ul-Haq, Pakistan's third military president, has been largely ignored by Western scholars. The war in Afghanistan against the invasion of that country by the Soviet Union in which Zia ul-Haq took a personal interest was to become the subject of some inquiry. Among the better books written on this subject are Riaz M. Khan's *Untying the Afghan Knot: Negotiating Soviet Withdrawal* and Diego Cordovez and Selig S. Harrison's *Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal*. Both books deal with the long negotiation, much of it personally directed by President Zia, between the Soviet Union, the United States, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, which finally led to the Soviet Union's withdrawal after 10 years of bitter struggle. One of the better books on the Zia period is General K. M. Arif's *Working with Zia*. Arif was a close associate of the president and, as such, was a participant in most of the important decisions made by the military government.

Pakistan's 50th birthday provided an occasion for one publisher, Oxford University Press, Karachi, to publish extensive material on the country's history. Among the books included in the series are Omar Noman's *Economic and Social Progress in Asia: Why Pakistan Did Not Become a Tiger*; *Just Development: Beyond Adjustment with a Human Face*, a book edited by Tariq J. Banuri, Shahrukh Rafi Khan, and Moazam Mahmood; Lawrence Ziring's *Pakistan in the Twentieth Century: A Political History*; Dicky Rutnagar's *Khan Unlimited: A History of Squash in Pakistan*; Sydney Friskin's *Going for Gold: Pakistan at Hockey*; and Mushtak Gazdar's *Pakistan Cinema, 1947–1997*.

The best continuous source for the analysis of various aspects of the Pakistani economy is *Pakistan Development Review*, published by the Pakistan Institute of Develop-

ment Economics (PIDE). PIDE also holds an annual conference in Islamabad and publishes its proceedings. The government of Pakistan's *Pakistan Economic Survey*, published annually, provides information on the year under review and carries time series on several economic indices including growth in gross domestic product, national income accounts, external trade, money supply, internal and external debt, population, and employment. Economic data are also available in the World Bank's annual *World Development Report*, the International Monetary Fund's monthly *International Financial Statistics*, and the United Nations Development Program's annual *Human Development Report*. Mahbulul Haq established the Human Development Center at Islamabad in 1995. Its annual report has become an important source of information and data on social development.

Pakistan does not publish a serious journal devoted to politics and history. Most of the academics, both Pakistanis and foreigners, publish their work in foreign journals. Among these are *Asian Survey*, *The Middle East Journal*, *Modern Asian Studies*, *Orbis*, and *Pacific Affairs*. Three Pakistani newsmagazines, *Herald*, *Newsline*, and *The Friday Times*, carry useful articles and features on current affairs.

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## V. NEWSPAPERS AND MAGAZINES

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*The Business Post* (Islamabad)  
*The Business Recorder* (Karachi)  
*Dawn* (Karachi and Lahore)  
*The Frontier Post* (Peshawar)  
*The Leader* (Karachi)  
*The Muslim* (Islamabad)  
*The Nation* (Lahore and Islamabad)  
*The News* (Lahore and Islamabad)

### B. Newspapers: Urdu-Language Dailies

*Jang* (Karachi, Lahore, Islamabad, and Multan)  
*Khabrain* (Lahore and Islamabad)  
*Nawa-i-Waqt* (Karachi, Lahore, Islamabad, and Multan)

### C. Newsmagazines

*Economic and Political Weekly* (Karachi)  
*The Economist* (London)  
*Far Eastern Economic Review*. Weekly (Hong Kong)  
*The Friday Times*. Weekly (Lahore)  
*Herald*. Monthly (Karachi)  
*India Today* (Delhi)  
*Newsline*. Monthly (Karachi)  
*Urdu Digest*. Monthly (Lahore)  
*Zindigi*. Urdu monthly (Lahore)

## VI. WEBSITES

### A. Government in Pakistan

[www.pakistan.gov.pk](http://www.pakistan.gov.pk) (Government of Pakistan)  
[www.gksoft.com/govt/en/pk](http://www.gksoft.com/govt/en/pk). (List of government institutions and political parties in Pakistan)



[www.infopak.govpk/President](http://www.infopak.govpk/President)  
[www.presidentofpakistan.gov.pk](http://www.presidentofpakistan.gov.pk)  
[www.pakistangov.pk/ministries](http://www.pakistangov.pk/ministries)  
[www.cbr.gov.pk](http://www.cbr.gov.pk) (Central Board of Revenue)

## **B. Nongovernmental Organizations in Pakistan**

[www.apsena.com](http://www.apsena.com) (Association of Pakistani Scientists and Engineers of North America)  
[www.aapna.com](http://www.aapna.com) (Association of Pakistani Physicians of North America)  
[www.bankproblemspk.com](http://www.bankproblemspk.com) (Bank Problems Pakistan)  
[www.pmjamaat.org](http://www.pmjamaat.org) (Pakistan Memom Jamaat)  
[www.pwww.org.pk](http://www.pwww.org.pk) (Peace Worldwide)  
[www.prcs.org.pk](http://www.prcs.org.pk) (Pakistan Red Crescent Society)  
[www.dgkhanpihro.cjb.net](http://www.dgkhanpihro.cjb.net) (Human Rights)  
[www.pasme.org.pk](http://www.pasme.org.pk) (Pakistan Association for Small and Medium Enterprises)  
[www.fdn.00it.com](http://www.fdn.00it.com) (FATA Development Network)  
[www.akdn.org/](http://www.akdn.org/) (Agha Khan Foundation)  
[www.edhifoundation.com/index.html](http://www.edhifoundation.com/index.html) (Edhi Foundation)  
[www.shaukatkhanum.org.pk](http://www.shaukatkhanum.org.pk) (Shaukat Khanum Memorial)

## **C. Newspapers in Pakistan**

[www.dawn.com](http://www.dawn.com)  
[www.jang.com.pk](http://www.jang.com.pk)  
[www.jang.com.pk/thenews](http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews)  
[www.jang-group.com](http://www.jang-group.com)  
[www.internews.net.pk](http://www.internews.net.pk) (Pakistan media)



## About the Author

**Shahid Javed Burki** has graduate degrees in physics and economics from Punjab, Oxford, and Harvard Universities. He went to Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar and to Harvard as a Mason Fellow.

Burki joined the Civil Service of Pakistan in 1960. His assignments in Pakistan included chief economist of West Pakistan and economic advisor, Ministry of Commerce, Government of Pakistan. He also worked as a senior research fellow at Harvard's Center for International Affairs and the Harvard Institute for International Development.

Burki joined the World Bank in 1974. Among the positions he has held at the World Bank are director of the China Department and vice president of Latin America and the Caribbean. In 1996–1997 he was finance minister in Pakistan.

Burki has written several books on China, Pakistan, and human development.